STATE OF OHIO v. ALEX CINTRON
No. 110600
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District, County of Cuyahoga
February 3, 2022
2022-Ohio-305
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-21-657187-A
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED IN PART, VACATED, AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 3, 2022
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael W. Timms, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
R. Tadd Pinkston, for appellant.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Alex Cintron (“Cintron“), appeals from his sentence following plea of guilty to a single misdemeanor offense. He raises the following assignments of error for review:
The trial court did not have jurisdiction to make orders pertaining to child support, thus the ordered community control condition is void ab initio. - The trial court abused its discretion under
R.C. 2929.25 when it ordered that Mr. Cintron pay child support. - Trial counsel‘s failure to object to the terms of community control deprived Mr. Cintron of the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution .
{¶ 2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we reverse Cintron‘s sentence in part, and vacate the condition of his community-control sanctions requiring him to “pay court ordered child support within 60 days.”
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 3} On February 24, 2021, Cintron was named in a one-count indictment, charging him with breaking and entering in violation of
{¶ 4} On June 1, 2021, Cintron appeared before the court and expressed his desire to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty pursuant to the terms of a negotiated plea agreement with the state. Following a
{¶ 6} On June 8, 2021, Cintron filed a motion to stay execution of the child-support condition pending an appeal. Cintron argued that the condition “is unrelated to his offense and violates his right to privacy in that he and the mother of the child have the right to reach a private agreement without the interference of the court or government agency.” On June 21, 2021, the trial court granted Cintron‘s motion to stay, and this appeal followed.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Cintron argues the criminal division of the court of common pleas lacked jurisdiction to issue a sentencing order pertaining
{¶ 8} “The term ‘jurisdiction’ refers to the court‘s statutory or constitutional authority to hear a case.” State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10. “The concept encompasses jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case as well as jurisdiction over the person.” Id.
{¶ 9} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a case. State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23; Smith v. May, 159 Ohio St.3d 106, 2020-Ohio-61, 148 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 37. It is the court‘s power to hear a case and render a sentence. See State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). Relevant to this appeal, the General Assembly has given the common pleas courts original jurisdiction over “all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.”
{¶ 10} In turn, personal jurisdiction refers to the court‘s power to render a valid judgment against a particular individual. In a criminal matter, the court
{¶ 11} Jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review under a de novo standard of review. See State v. Stewart, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-21-05, 2021-Ohio-2294, ¶ 6. “De novo review is independent, without deference to the lower court‘s decision.” State v. Hudson, 2013-Ohio-647, 986 N.E.2d 1128, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147, 593 N.E.2d 286 (1992).
{¶ 12} After careful consideration, we find no merit to Cintron‘s position that the alleged defect in the court‘s imposition of community-control sanctions rendered his sentence void ab initio. The Ohio Supreme Court has restored the traditional understanding of what constitutes a void sentence, stating:
A judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If the court has jurisdiction over the case and the person, any sentence based on an error in the court‘s exercise of that jurisdiction is voidable.
State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-8784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 43. “If the court pronouncing the sentence had jurisdiction to do so, a sentence imposed in excess of that permitted by law was ‘erroneous and voidable, but not absolutely void.‘” Id. at ¶ 16, citing Ex parte Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 426, 432 (1874).
{¶ 14} Cintron‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} In his second assignment of error, Cintron argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay child support as a condition of his community-control sanctions. We agree.
{¶ 16} Under
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} We review the trial court‘s imposition of community-control sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Cleveland v. Pentagon Realty, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-3775, 133 N.E.3d 580 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cooper, 2016-Ohio-8048, 75 N.E.3d 805, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion connotes a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). Although a trial court is granted broad discretion in imposing community-control sanctions, the trial court‘s discretion “is not limitless.” State v. White, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-1027, 2015-Ohio-3844, ¶ 5, citing Talty at ¶ 11.
{¶ 19} In this case, the trial court imposed a suspended sentence and placed Cintron under a community-control sanction or combination of community-control sanctions authorized under
{¶ 20} On appeal, Cintron contends that his current obligation to “pay court ordered child support” as a condition of his community-control sanctions is unrelated to his crime and constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on his right to privacy. Cintron notes that at the time of sentencing there was no existing child-support order because he and the mother of his child had made the personal decision to not pursue a formal order of support.
{¶ 21} The starting place for our review is the test announced by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990), “which looks to whether a community-control condition reasonably relates to the offense at issue, furthers the twin goals of rehabilitation and justice, and does not cause a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to achieve those penological goals.” State v. Chapman, 163 Ohio St.3d 290, 2020-Ohio-6730, 170 N.E.3d 6, ¶ 17, citing Jones at 53. Specifically, the Jones Court held that in determining whether a condition of probation is reasonable, a trial court must consider “whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation.” Jones at 53. All three conditions must be satisfied for the reviewing court to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Solon v. Broderick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107043, 2018-Ohio-4900, ¶ 8, citing White at
{¶ 22} After careful consideration, we agree with Cintron that the condition of establishing a child-support order does not share a relationship with his misdemeanor offense. Significantly, this case does not involve a criminal nonsupport conviction in violation of
{¶ 23} We are also unable to conclude that the condition is reasonably related to rehabilitating Cintron. Here, there is no basis to conclude that the condition serves to prevent future theft offenses, ensure good behavior, or otherwise further the goals of community-control sanctions. Requiring Cintron to establish a child-support order would have little effect on preventing the criminal conduct
{¶ 24} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Cintron to establish a child-support order within 60 days of sentencing as
{¶ 25} Cintron‘s second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 26} Judgment is reversed in part and remanded to the lower court to vacate the community-control condition requiring Cintron to “pay court ordered child support within 60 days.” Our resolution of the second assignment of error renders the third assignment of error moot.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and CORNELIUS J. O‘SULLIVAN, JR., J., CONCUR