State v. Bennett

Aug 18, 2026

AC47780

Syllabus

The defendant, who had previously been convicted of murder, appealed from the trial court‘s judgment denying his motion to open and/or vacate his conviction on the ground that it was procured by fraud. He claimed that the court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his motion. Held:

The trial court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant‘s motion to open and/or vacate, as the defendant had already begun serving his sentence, which terminates a criminal court‘s jurisdiction in the absence of unambiguous legislative or constitutional exceptions to that general rule; accordingly, although the trial court properly rejected the defendant‘s motion, the form of the judgment was improper, as the court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion, and the case was remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment dismissing the motion.

This court declined to consider the defendant‘s contention that the trial court nonetheless possessed jurisdiction over his motion on the ground that common-law authority that permits the opening of a civil judgment obtained by fraud should apply equally in the criminal context, as the defendant had existing, legislatively provided expansive rights available to him to challenge the judgment with respect to his claims of fraud, such as the right to file a petition for a new trial or a habeas action, and, even if this court were inclined to consider the defendant‘s contention, he did not raise any previously undiscoverable evidence that might support a colorable claim of fraud but, instead, largely repackaged challenges to his conviction that have been extensively litigated under different legal theories in numerous prior proceedings.

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven and tried to the jury before B. Fischer, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment; thereafter, the court, Harmon, J., denied the motion to open and/or vacate the judgment, and the defendant appealed to this court. Improper form of judgment; judgment directed.

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Erick Bennett, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open and/or vacate his conviction of murder on the basis of fraud. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his motion.¹ We agree with the court‘s jurisdictional determination but conclude that the appropriate disposition is dismissal rather than denial of the motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment only as to its form and remand the case with direction to dismiss the motion.

Our Supreme Court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history underlying the defendant‘s criminal conviction in affirming the judgment of conviction. See State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744, 155 A.3d 188 (2017). We summarize them only as necessary for resolution of the present appeal. During an altercation outside of a bar in Meriden, the defendant fatally stabbed a person several times in the chest. Id., 748–49. Shortly after the crime occurred, the police obtained evidence inculpating the defendant; id., 749; and the state subsequently charged the defendant with murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) §53a-54a.² After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and, on August 26, 2011, was sentenced to fifty years of incarceration.

On January 18, 2024, more than twelve years after the defendant‘s conviction and execution of his sentence, the defendant, acting as a self-represented party, filed, in the underlying criminal docket, a motion to open and/or vacate the judgment of conviction on the basis of what he characterized as fraud.³ On January 30, 2024, the court, Harmon, J., denied the defendant‘s motion, noting on the motion itself that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the defendant had been sentenced in this matter.

On July 5, 2024, the defendant, represented by counsel,⁴ filed the present appeal along with a notice pursuant to Practice Book §64-1 (b)⁵ indicating that the trial court had not issued a memorandum of decision setting forth the factual and legal basis for denying the defendant‘s motion to open. On September 24, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it explained that, because the defendant was a sentenced prisoner and had begun serving his sentence, the court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the defendant‘s motion. The court rejected the defendant‘s request to extend the civil rule permitting the opening of judgments obtained by fraud to the criminal context. The court further concluded, as an alternative basis for denying the motion, that the defendant‘s claims “had been ruled upon in prior proceedings, and the doctrine of collateral estoppel, therefore, precluded their relitigation.”

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court had improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider, on the basis of fraud, his motion to open and/or vacate the criminal judgment rendered against him. Although the defendant acknowledges in his brief the “general rule that the [criminal] court‘s jurisdiction ends when the defendant begins serving his sentence,” he argues that “[a] motion to open based on fraud . . . would serve as a common-law exception to this common-law rule, just as [such a motion] serves as [an] exception to [the limitations on opening judgments in] General Statutes §52-212a in the civil context.”⁶ For the reasons that follow, we decline the defendant‘s invitation to recognize such an exception.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and relevant legal principles regarding the existing jurisdictional limits of our criminal courts. Although ordinarily we would review a court‘s ruling on a motion to open a judgment for abuse of discretion; see Pennymac Corp. v. Tarzia, 215 Conn. App. 190, 200 n.8, 281 A.3d 469 (2022); the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the defendant‘s motion to open and/or vacate. Questions of subject matter jurisdiction present issues of law over which we exercise plenary review. See id.; see also State v. McCoy, 331 Conn. 561, 576, 206 A.3d 725 (2019).

“The Superior Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction. . . . In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 576–77. Under the common law, “in the criminal context, a trial court was . . . divested of jurisdiction upon any action in execution of a defendant‘s sentence. . . . This is so because the court loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the [C]ommissioner of [C]orrection and begins serving the sentence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Butler, 348 Conn. 51, 68, 300 A.3d 1145 (2023).

In State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 586, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the “long and consistent” principle that criminal trial courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction to act after a defendant is sentenced. Once there is a “complete and final resolution of all pending charges,” the trial court loses jurisdiction to consider matters unless authorized by unambiguous legislative or constitutional exceptions. State v. Butler, supra, 348 Conn. 71; State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 586–87. Unlike in civil proceedings, concerning which the legislature has enacted §52-212a to govern motions to open judgments, no comparable statute authorizes the opening of criminal judgments after the execution of a sentence or other final disposition. See State v. Butler, supra, 69. “[I]t is not appropriately within [the court‘s] purview to infer jurisdiction when no statutory provision exists to grant it.” Id., 71.

Despite the foregoing limitations, the defendant argues that the criminal trial court nonetheless possessed jurisdiction over his motion because he alleges fraud on the court. The defendant does not direct our attention to any legislative or constitutional provision that he contends overrides our common-law understanding that a trial court loses jurisdiction following the execution of a criminal sentence. Although a common-law exception exists to allow for the opening of a civil judgment for fraud at any time, “no case [exists] in which the fraud on the court exception has been applied in the criminal context.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Butler, 209 Conn. App. 63, 95 n.17, 267 A.3d 256 (2021), aff‘d, 348 Conn. 51, 300 A.3d 1145 (2023). Rather, the defendant effectively seeks recognition and application of a new common-law fraud exception. The defendant argues that common-law authority permitting a court to open at any time a civil judgment obtained by fraud should apply equally in the criminal context. The defendant further notes that our Supreme Court in Butler did not reach the issue of whether motions to open based on fraud are permitted in criminal cases. To support his arguments, the defendant cites to out-of-state cases that this court is neither bound by nor persuaded to follow. Rather, we conclude that the defendant‘s arguments falter for the following reasons.

First, our recognition of a civil fraud exception to the four month limitation period set forth in §52-212a does not run afoul of or contradict any common-law limitation on the jurisdictional power of the Superior Court in civil matters. Unlike in the criminal context, the Superior Court does not lose jurisdiction over a civil matter following the execution of a final judgment, although the legislature has limited the authority of the court to exercise any continuing jurisdiction to open and vacate a judgment. In Kim v. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 733 A.2d 809 (1999), our Supreme Court made clear that ”§52-212a operates as a constraint, not on the trial court‘s jurisdictional authority, but on its substantive authority to adjudicate the merits of the case before it.” Id., 104. In other words, any court action on a civil judgment after the statutory time limitation “is not void for want of jurisdiction of the court to render it . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. By contrast, as we have discussed, there are common-law restraints in place regarding the jurisdiction of the court to act in a criminal matter after sentencing. Accordingly, whereas recognition of a fraud exception to §52-212a is not inconsistent with the common law and does not implicate jurisdiction, recognizing a similar exception in the criminal context would be in direct conflict with well settled common-law jurisprudence.

Second, we know of no compelling policy rationale for recognizing such an exception in the criminal context. Unlike the relatively short four month limitation period the legislature has placed on the authority of our civil courts to open and potentially correct a civil judgment, the legislature has provided more expansive rights to criminal defendants to seek relief, including with respect to allegations of fraud. For example, a criminal defendant has three years in which to file a petition for a new trial under General Statutes §52-582 (a),⁷ which must be construed together with General Statutes §52-270. See Turner v. State, 172 Conn. App. 352, 365, 160 A.3d 398 (2017); id., 366–67 (“[a] petition for new trial pursuant to §52-270 is in clear derogation of the common law because it grants the trial court continuing jurisdiction over criminal matters following sentencing“). Perhaps more fundamentally, a criminal defendant can raise claims of fraud that violate his due process rights in a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g., Carter v. Commissioner of Correction, 203 Conn. App. 794, 808, 249 A.3d 749 (fraud on court raised in habeas as freestanding due process claim), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 952, 251 A.3d 992 (2021). It is well understood, after all, that “[t]he principal purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to serve as a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fine v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn. App. 136, 142, 81 A.3d 1209 (2013). Accordingly, although we embrace the importance of recognizing and maintaining the Superior Court‘s inherent common-law powers to correct errors of substance in order to do justice, due consideration must also be given to the importance of the finality of judgments. See, e.g., State v. Mollo, 63 Conn. App. 487, 492, 776 A.2d 1176 (recognizing society‘s strong interest in finality of criminal judgments), cert. denied, 257 Conn. 904, 777 A.2d 194 (2001). We are convinced that criminal defendants currently have sufficient avenues available by which to challenge a judgment of conviction on the basis of fraud. Moreover, such avenues do not impose unreasonable demands on defendants or trial attorneys to discover, disclose, and seek to correct any problems they perceive with a judgment within reasonable time limits and consistent with existing common-law jurisdictional parameters.

Third, we find unpersuasive the defendant‘s contention that our Supreme Court‘s decision in Butler is distinguishable because it left the door open for a motion to open based on fraud. Butler does not recognize a fraud exception to the jurisdictional limitations governing criminal motions to open but, rather, reaffirms the jurisdictional limitations of the criminal court under our common law. See State v. Butler, supra, 348 Conn. 68–72. In Butler, our Supreme Court reaffirmed that once a criminal judgment has become final and the sentence has been executed, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction unless authorized by statute or a recognized common-law exception. Although the court declined to decide at that time whether the civil doctrine permitting a judgment obtained by fraud might apply in criminal proceedings, nothing in Butler suggests that a criminal defendant may overcome clearly established jurisdictional limits merely by characterizing his claims as fraud on the court. Butler reaffirmed the principle that, in the absence of recognized exceptions, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion to open a criminal judgment after execution of the sentence.

Finally, even if we were inclined to consider recognition of a new common-law exception to the well settled limitations on the continuing jurisdiction of our criminal courts, the present case is not an apt vehicle in which to do so. Rather than raising any previously undiscoverable evidence that arguably might support a colorable claim of fraud—one that might have evaded the defendant‘s ability to seek relief via other legal avenues available to him—the allegations set forth in the defendant‘s motion to open and/or vacate only rehash matters that have been the subject of extensive litigation over the course of numerous prior proceedings challenging his conviction. See, e.g., Bennett v. Commissioner of Correction, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-14-4005763 (June 15, 2021) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, that petitioner “received ineffective assistance of counsel; the state did not disclose impeachment and exculpatory evidence; the state allowed witnesses to perjure themselves; the trial court erred and was biased against him; the court did not have jurisdiction over him and he is actually innocent“), aff‘d, 217 Conn. App. 901, 287 A.3d 1157, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1019, 292 A.3d 1255 (2023). Stated differently, the substance of the allegations in the defendant‘s motion to open and/or vacate concern matters that were raised or could have been raised during the defendant‘s direct appeal, habeas proceedings, motion to open prior habeas judgments, and related collateral litigation. The defendant‘s motion to open and/or vacate largely repackages challenges to his conviction that have been asserted previously under different legal theories. Accordingly, even if a well-founded claim of fraud on the court could provide a basis for relief notwithstanding the jurisdictional limitations discussed in Butler, this case is not the proper vehicle to determine whether Connecticut should recognize such a common-law fraud exception permitting the opening of criminal judgments.

We agree with the trial court‘s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant‘s motion to open and/or vacate his judgment of conviction. Once a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, however, it is without authority to adjudicate the merits of the claim, and the proper disposition is dismissal, rather than denial of the motion. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 179 Conn. App. 337, 345, 179 A.3d 807 (concluding that, because trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over petition for writ of error coram nobis, court should have dismissed rather than denied petition), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 914, 180 A.3d 594 (2018).

The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment denying the defendant‘s motion to open and/or vacate is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the defendant‘s motion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Notes

The defendant also claims that, having determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court improperly determined in the alternative that the claims raised in his motion were barred by collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. Because we conclude that the court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant‘s motion, we do not reach the merits of the court‘s alternative basis for denying the defendant‘s motion. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to caution that, because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold matter implicating the court‘s power to act on the merits of a motion or action, once a court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, its analysis ordinarily should end there. See .

“[Two witnesses] gave statements identifying the defendant as the person who had stabbed [the victim]. Another witness . . . described the [clothing worn by the] person who stabbed [the victim] . . . which was consistent with the clothing worn by the defendant that night. Although the police did not recover the entire knife, they found two thumb studs—the part of a folding knife used to open the blade—in the defendant‘s vehicle with blood on them that was consistent with [the victim‘s] DNA profile.
“The defendant testified at trial. He denied stabbing [the victim] and claimed not to know who had done so because he had been walking to his vehicle when the stabbing occurred. The defendant suggested through the testimony of the mother of several of his children that the police had planted the knife thumb studs in his vehicle.
“The defendant attempted unsuccessfully to obtain and introduce certain evidence in support of a theory that [a third party] had stabbed [the victim], as well as evidence of police bias against him. Following the jury‘s verdict of guilty on the murder charge, the defendant also unsuccessfully sought permission to file a late motion for a new trial on the basis of a newly published report finding certain defective procedures in the state forensic laboratory. Those rulings, as well as challenges to the propriety of certain statements made by the prosecutor during cross-examination and closing arguments [were] the subject of the [defendant‘s direct criminal] appeal.” . Our Supreme Court concluded that none of the defendant‘s claims warranted reversal of the judgment of conviction. See .

In his motion, which is not a model of clarity, the defendant makes numerous factual allegations in support of what he claims are multiple instances of fraud. The allegations raise a variety of pretrial, trial, postjudgment, and habeas issues. According to the defendant, “the judgment of [the] criminal court . . . was infected by the state‘s fruit of a poisonous tree of fraud.”
In his reply brief to this court, the defendant restates the alleged instances of fraud, asserting that (1) his house and car were illegally searched, and the fruits of those illegal searches improperly were admitted into evidence; (2) the search warrant never was returned to the court with a written inventory of the property seized; (3) a police detective did not collect evidence from the defendant‘s car and perjured himself regarding the return of the search warrant; (4) the state made false representations to the court about the return of the search warrant and the perjured testimony; (5) the state induced the defendant to waive the time limit for the probable cause hearing under false pretenses; (6) the state improperly arrested, charged and held the defendant, and delayed the probable cause hearing while the police created false evidence in support of the case against him; (7) the information failed to sufficiently inform the defendant of the charges against him; (8) the state failed to disclose prior to the probable cause hearing certain exculpatory evidence and failed to correct false testimony; (9) the state presented false evidence at the probable cause hearing that DNA of the victim was found in the defendant‘s car; (10) the state presented false testimony regarding state crime laboratory protocols, which were out of compliance with governing and/or validated standards, methods, and procedures; (11) the state presented evidence from a medical examiner whom it knew but failed to reveal was under investigation for giving perjured testimony; (12) the state and the court failed to disclose police officers’ internal affairs files that he could have used for impeachment and to support a theory of personal bias against him; (13) the state fraudulently denied the existence of certain evidence that would have supported his third-party culpability and alibi defenses; (14) the state and the police worked to conceal and prevent an exculpatory witness from testifying; (15) the state falsely represented that none of its witnesses had criminal records, despite two having extensive criminal records; (16) the state and the Department of Correction failed to disclose recorded conversations in which the defendant discussed trial strategy and his defense; (17) the defendant‘s pretrial attorney failed to disclose a conflict of interest that precluded him from properly presenting the defendant‘s case; (18) his pretrial attorney failed to move to dismiss the charges on the basis of an unlawful arrest, failed to have the defendant arraigned and put to plea, failed to correct the search warrant and its return, failed to suppress evidence from the defendant‘s vehicle, failed to object to the probable cause hearing, failed to object to the late disclosure of evidence, and failed to inform the defendant of his right to cross-examine; (19) criminal trial counsel failed to disclose their conflicts of interest to the defendant; (20) a conflict of interest existed between the judge in his habeas action and his habeas counsel; and (21) the judge who denied a motion to open and vacate the judgment denying his third amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus failed to disclose his conflict of interest.
Many of these allegations concern matters that were previously addressed in the defendant‘s prior postjudgment proceedings challenging his conviction. Our resolution of the present appeal on subject matter jurisdictional grounds does not require us to consider the merits of the defendant‘s various fraud allegations or whether, as the trial court determined, the defendant‘s claims would be barred on res judicata grounds.

The legal services unit of the Office of the Chief Public Defender filed this appeal on behalf of the defendant. The defendant‘s current counsel filed an in lieu of appearance shortly thereafter.

Practice Book §64-1 provides in relevant part: “(a) The trial court shall state its decision either orally or in writing . . . in making any . . . rulings that constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal . . . . The court‘s decision shall encompass its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties and the factual basis therefor. . . .
“(b) If the trial judge fails to file a memorandum of decision or sign a transcript of the oral decision in any case covered by subsection (a), any party may file with the appellate clerk a notice that the decision has not been filed in compliance with subsection (a). The notice shall specify the trial judge involved and the date of the ruling for which no memorandum of decision was filed. The appellate clerk shall promptly notify the trial judge of the filing of the appeal and the notice. The trial court shall thereafter comply with subsection (a).”

General Statutes §52-212a provides in relevant part: “Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment or decree was sent. . . .”

General Statutes §52-582 (a) provides in relevant part: “No petition for a new trial in any civil or criminal proceeding shall be brought but within three years next after the rendition of the judgment or decree complained of . . . .”