State v. ButlerState v. Butler
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Syllabus
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, challenging the trial court’s decision to grant the state’s motion to open the judgment dismissing certain criminal charges, including risk of injury to a child, that had been filed against the defendant. The charges stemmed from an incident in which the defendant allegedly had inappropriate contact with a twelve year old child. After the charges were filed, the defendant applied for and was granted admission to a statutory (
- The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had lost jurisdiction when it dismissed the defendant’s criminal charges and was therefore without jurisdiction to rule on the state’s motion to open the judgment of dismissal: This court determined, after reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, and after considering oral argument, that the Appellate Court‘s reasoning and analysis were sound, and agreed with the Appellate Court‘s conclusion that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction when it rendered a final and unconditional judgment of dismissal. This court clarified that the statutory (
§ 52-212a ) “four month rule,” which permits a trial court to retain jurisdiction over a civil judgment for a period of four months after the notice of judgment has been sent and to open that judgment during that four month period, is inapplicable in criminal cases. This clarification was based on this court‘s consideration of legislation passed in 1977, which served to modify a trial court‘s common-law authority to revise its judgments, the fact that§ 52-212a pertains to “civil” judgments and the fact that the legislature had not enacted any similar provision authorizing a trial court to retain jurisdiction over a criminal judgment for a designated period of time following its rendering, and on this court‘s recognition that, in State v. McCoy (331 Conn. 561), it had determined that the common-law rule that a trial court‘s jurisdiction is lost upon the execution of a defendant‘s sentence remained viable law. Moreover, this court concluded that State v. Wilson (199 Conn. 417), in which the court held that the four month rule of§ 52-212a applied to criminal judgments, was wrongly decided, and that particular holding in Wilson was overruled. In concluding that the trial court‘s judgment dismissing the defendant‘s criminal charges served to divest that court of jurisdiction to decide the state‘s motion to open, this court reasoned that a trial court‘s authority over a criminal case derives from the presentment of an information, that§ 54-56l (i) ensures that a defendant‘s pending criminal charges will be dismissed upon his or her successful completion of the diversionary program authorized by§ 54-56l , and that, when an information, which contains the charges and establishes the trial court‘s jurisdiction, is dismissed, the court‘s jurisdiction is extinguished because there exists no valid charging document to confer jurisdiction. Furthermore, this court observed that other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction and authority upon the dismissal of all criminal charges. - This court did not need to decide whether the civil rule permitting a trial court to open a judgment obtained by fraud applies in the criminal context insofar as the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the record in the present case did not support a finding of fraud or intentional misrepresentation.
(One justice concurring separately)
Argued February 23—officially released September 19, 2023
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with the crimes of risk of injury to a child and breach of the peace in the second degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, geographical area number five, where the court, Brown, J., granted the defendant’s application to participate in a statutorily authorized diversionary program; thereafter, the court, McShane, J., rendered judgment dismissing the information; subsequently, the court, McShane, J., granted the state’s motion to open the judgment of dismissal, and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Prescott and Alexander, Js., with Bishop, J., dissenting, which reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to dismiss the state’s motion to open, and the state, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Emily H. Wagner, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
McDONALD, J. This certified appeal requires us to decide, as a matter of first impression, whether a criminal court has inherent common-law jurisdiction to open a judgment of dismissal following the defendant‘s completion of a supervised diversionary program within four months of the date it was rendered. We are also asked to decide whether the trial court has the authority to open the same judgment of dismissal if that judgment was the result of purported misrepresentations to the court. We conclude that criminal courts do not have jurisdiction to open a judgment following a dismissal. We also decline to reach the second certified question because the trial court made no findings of misrepresentations in the present case.
The defendant, Carlton Butler, was arrested in 2017 on charges of risk of injury to a child and breach of the peace in the second degree. The charges arose from an incident at a McDonald‘s restaurant in Derby involving inappropriate conduct between the defendant and a twelve year old child. In August, 2017, the defendant filed an application to participate in a supervised diversionary program for individuals with psychiatric disabilities. The trial court canvassed the defendant on the conditions imposed on him while participating in the diversionary program, which included that he have no contact with minors, including in a volunteer or work capacity, and that he not go to any areas frequented by minors. The defendant indicated that he was willing to abide by all of the conditions. The court subsequently granted the application.
In the early stages of the two year supervised diversionary program, the defendant struggled with the program‘s mental health and counseling requirements, which became the subject of several court
On September 25, 2019, the Judicial Branch Court Support Services Division issued a final progress report, which indicated that the defendant had not satisfactorily completed the assigned diversionary program. Attached to the report was a letter from the defendant‘s probation officer. The attached letter stated that the probation officer received information from an anonymous source that, in August, 2019, the defendant volunteered for a YMCA trip involving minors. The letter indicated that the Office of Adult Probation was unable to verify the accuracy of the information provided by the anonymous source. The letter further indicated that the probation officer found that the defendant was not allowed to enter the Waterbury and Torrington YMCAs due to “separate, undisclosed incidents” and that the Plainville YMCA director informed the officer that the defendant “unsuccessfully applied for three separate employment positions as a ‘camp counselor’ on [March 15, 2019].” Lastly, the letter noted that the defendant failed to report to his probation officer on September 18, 2019. There was nothing appended to the letter to substantiate these allegations.
From September 25, 2019, until the defendant‘s October 2, 2019 hearing, the Office of Adult Probation did not provide any further support or details regarding the information in the letter. On October 2, 2019, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether it would dismiss the charges against the defendant. The prosecutor argued that the court should not grant a dismissal because of the statements and allegations contained in the September 25 letter attached to the final progress report. In response, defense counsel argued that the allegations contained in the letter regarding volunteering at a local YMCA and submitting YMCA job applications had not been substantiated.
Defense counsel also argued that “[the defendant] does not [have] a driver‘s license. He does not own a car. His father drives him everywhere. His father is present here in the courtroom and is willing to come up and talk to Your Honor. Your Honor, I talked to [the defendant‘s] father, who stated that [the defendant] has never gone on a YMCA trip as a volunteer. He‘s also indicated to me that he‘s never—they live in Waterbury. He‘s also indicated to me that he‘s never driven [the defendant] to the Plainville YMCA to apply for a job.
“Secondly, Your Honor, the reason why [the defendant] is not allowed at the YMCAs is because, prior to this case—prior to the supervised diversionary program being granted, he was going to the YMCA. While the case was pending, he was going to the YMCA. At that point, someone notified the YMCA of his arrest. They told him he was no longer allowed back. So, I found it concerning . . . that some of this information [in the September 25, 2019 letter] is very dated. Okay? And, secondly, based on his father‘s own representation to me, false.
“I think, up to [this] point, Your Honor, [the defendant] has fulfilled everything on the supervised diversionary program. He paid for the Sterling Center out of pocket. He‘s on disability. It was a financial hardship for him and his father. The allegations of [his] going to the YMCA during the pendency of [his] being [in] the supervised diversionary program is unfounded . . . and refuted by the only person he can get a ride from. For those reasons, Your Honor, I think [the defendant] should have a successful dismissal on this program.”
After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court proceeded to articulate its ruling dismissing the charges against the defendant: “[W]hat the court has before it is an individual who missed his last appointment, and the fact that this case has been pending since [June, 2017], with no arrests certainly speaks in the defendant‘s behalf. I certainly understand the state‘s concern with [regard] to the defendant working as a camp counselor, but I am concerned [with] the fact that this was an anonymous tip that was not looked into by the Office of Adult Probation, other than just to receive it without making phone calls. It doesn‘t appear as though any of it is, in fact, true. The defendant had numerous appointments during the way, he had his bumps along the way and ended up making those. You know, it‘s something that he applied for back on [October 2, 2017], with the understanding that, if he did what he was supposed to do, [the case] would be dismissed. He did what he was supposed to do. The case is therefore dismissed.”
The next day, the state filed a motion to open the judgment of dismissal, claiming that information had come to the state‘s attention following the judgment of dismissal that demonstrated that the defendant did not successfully complete the supervised diversionary program. It argued that the trial court relied on representations made by defense counsel that had proven to be false. The state also asserted that there was footage of the defendant working at a summer camp in Massachusetts that was taken during the summer of 2019. The state indicated that the Office of Adult Probation would provide a more detailed report as to the noncompliance. As to the trial court‘s authority to open the case, the state argued that the court had
The defendant objected to the motion, arguing that the cases relied on by the state were not pertinent to the trial court‘s consideration of whether it could open the dismissal of the criminal charges. He also argued that granting the motion to open would be against public policy and would set a dangerous precedent that is particularly troublesome under these circumstances because a defendant who is enrolled in a diversionary program must agree to the tolling of the statute of limitations with respect to his underlying crimes in order to participate. Therefore, the defendant argued, granting the motion to open would endanger all current and past defendants who used a diversionary program and whose crimes are within the statute of limitations.
The trial court held a hearing on the state‘s motion to open on October 15, 2019, at which the court entered as court exhibits (1) an “addendum” to the September 25, 2019 letter,2 and (2) a five page report from the defendant‘s probation officer dated October 4, 2019, which detailed the officer‘s supervision of the defendant during the diversionary program and noted the officer‘s concern that the defendant “continues to seek contact with minors and actively engages in deceptive behavior to conceal such contact.” The letter further stated that, “[u]nfortunately, this officer was unable to communicate this information to the [c]ourt prior to the dismissal of the [s]upervised [d]iversionary [p]rogram due to the [time frame] of the information being confirmed.”
At the hearing, the trial court noted that it “based its decision to dismiss this [case] on information that was incorrect, was totally contradictory . . . and I would assert . . . that I did it under false pretenses. I dismissed this under false pretenses that the defendant was in compliance when . . . not only was he not in compliance, he couldn‘t have been any further away from compliance.” It also indicated to defense counsel that it was “a little angered” by the representations made to the court but that it did not fault counsel because counsel “went with the information [he] had . . . at the time” and that the information later proved to be inaccurate.
Both parties then presented argument on the issue of opening the judgment. The
The trial court proceeded to grant the state‘s motion to open the judgment of dismissal, noting that the dismissal was “erroneous” and stating on the record: “I don‘t know a lot about subject matter jurisdiction. I know I looked at the cases that the state has provided [the court] with, and none of them seem[s] to be quite on point. But I also know what the right thing to do is. And the right thing to do in this particular case is to [open] this case and have the defendant . . . face the charges. I say that because this dismissal was granted [on] erroneous grounds. The dismissal was false, with false information. And, counsel, nobody has put any [aspersions on] you . . . and I‘m not going to ask for—elicit a response, but it is wrong. It is wrong [that] the defendant received a dismissal. Just as if it was a clerical error, I will say this was an error, in that I had none of this information before me.” The court did not make any express finding that the state had established, by clear and convincing evidence, intentional misrepresentations by defense counsel to the court.
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court‘s decision to open the judgment, claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to open and set aside the unconditional dismissal of his charges following his completion of the supervised diversionary program and that, in doing so, it deprived him of liberty and finality of judgment interests. See State v. Butler, 209 Conn. App. 63, 79 (2021). The state argued in response that the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction to open a case following a dismissal. Id. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant and concluded that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the matter when it rendered the judgment of dismissal. Id., 79–80. Therefore, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court improperly granted the state‘s motion to open. Id., 80.
The Appellate Court began its analysis by reviewing the original common-law rules regarding jurisdiction, under which “a trial court possesses the inherent power to modify its own judgments during the term at which they were rendered“; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 81; and that “a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the sentence has been executed.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 83. Additionally, it noted that “[n]o statutory provisions exist . . . that expand the existing common-law jurisdiction of our criminal courts or expressly permit a court to reinstate criminal charges after it has dismissed them.” Id.
The Appellate Court surveyed a line of cases from this court dealing with the “four month rule” set forth in
The Appellate Court also considered whether a criminal court has inherent jurisdiction to modify a judgment obtained by fraud. The court acknowledged the existing civil rule that a trial court has intrinsic power to open a judgment obtained by fraud. Id., 94; see also, e.g., Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 218 (1991). It concluded, however, that “it [was] unnecessary to decide at this juncture . . . whether this particular civil rule applies equally in the criminal context because, even [if it assumed], without deciding, that it does, [it was] unconvinced that the record in the present case would support a finding that a fraud, as opposed to a negligent misrepresentation, was perpetrated on the [trial] court.”4 (Footnote omitted.) State v. Butler, supra, 209 Conn. App. 94–95. The Appellate Court noted that, although the trial court likened its decision to dismiss the case to a “clerical error,” it cannot be properly classified as one. Id., 104. “The [trial] court made a reasoned determination on the facts presented that, contrary to the opinion of the Court Support Services Division and the state, the defendant had completed satisfactorily the diversionary program. It did so on the basis of the evidence before it and the arguments presented by the parties, including the representations made by defense counsel that went unchallenged despite later proving to be, at least in part, untrue. . . . The fact that the state later came into possession of better or more convincing evidence that, if presented to the [trial] court at the October 2, 2019 hearing, likely would have changed the
Lastly, the Appellate Court noted the policy considerations served by its conclusion, including the “significant liberty and finality of judgment interests” that attach by virtue of the trial court‘s granting of an unconditional judgment of dismissal and the fact that the defendant, in agreeing to participate in the supervised diversionary program, “gave up his right to defend against the allegation leveled by the state and agreed to be subject to numerous conditions in excess of those imposed by the [trial] court as conditions of his release.” Id., 102. The Appellate Court acknowledged the state‘s “valid and weighty interest in convicting the guilty“; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 103; but also emphasized that “the unique situation that the [trial] court found itself in . . . was largely the result of the state‘s handling of the initial October 2, 2019 hearing. . . . [T]he state, in opposing the dismissal of the defendant‘s charges, chose to rely solely on the negative final report and the letter appended thereto, which contained only unsubstantiated allegations of potential contacts with minors and one admitted failure to report as the sole basis to support the contention that the defendant unsatisfactorily completed the diversionary program. The state did not provide affidavits from the various YMCA employees who had provided information to the probation officer. It did not obtain or submit copies of the employment applications allegedly executed by the defendant or other corroborating evidence. It did not request the opportunity to question under oath the witness . . . on [whom] defense counsel [relied] in his argument and who was present in the courtroom during the October 2, 2019 hearing. Moreover, the state has not lost its ability to prosecute the defendant with respect to any actions that he took while participating in the program that may constitute violations of his terms of release or new crimes.” Id.
The dissenting Appellate Court judge disagreed with the majority‘s characterization of the state of the law following McCoy and concluded that Wilson was, at least in part, still applicable law. See id., 110–11 (Bishop, J., dissenting). In concluding that, when “no sentence has been imposed, a criminal court‘s jurisdiction to modify its judgment ends after a period of four months following judgment,” the dissent implied that the trial court retained jurisdiction to modify its judgment notwithstanding the dismissal. Id., 110 (Bishop, J., dissenting). Furthermore, although it agreed with the majority‘s conclusion that the trial court made no explicit findings of fraud, it characterized the court‘s comments as a reflection of the court‘s belief that it was “grossly misled“; id., 114 (Bishop, J., dissenting); and “induced into an erroneous decision . . . .” Id., 115 (Bishop, J., dissenting).
The state filed a petition for certification to appeal to this court, which we granted, limited to the following issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court lacked inherent common-law authority to modify its judgment of dismissal within four months of the date on which it was rendered?” And (2) “[d]id the Appellate Court properly reverse the trial court’s decision to open its judgment despite the fact that the judgment of dismissal was predicated on a material misrepresentation made to the trial court?” State v. Butler, 343 Conn. 904 (2022).
We begin by addressing the “four month rule” and its purported applicability to criminal cases. As the Appellate Court extensively discussed, our trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction. See State v. Butler, supra, 209 Conn. App. 81; see also, e.g., State v. Ramos, 306 Conn. 125, 133 (2012). “In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of [their] jurisdiction are delineated by the common law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, supra, 133–34. At common law, the Superior Court sat in sessions; see
The legislature modified the structure of our court system in 1977 when it revised
Since the revision to
We recognize that, notwithstanding the legislature‘s action in the civil context, this court, in State v. Wilson, supra, 199 Conn. 417, concluded that the four month rule in
Following Wilson, this court, in State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 561, clarified that Wilson cannot be read as expanding the jurisdiction of the
Although McCoy did not address the general applicability of the four month rule in criminal cases prior to the execution of a sentence, we take the opportunity to do so now. Our review of the common law and subsequent statutory provisions leads us to conclude that Wilson was wrongly decided, and we overrule it to the extent that it concluded that the four month rule applies in the criminal context. The court in Wilson failed to consider the differences between the civil and criminal contexts. Moreover, its conclusion that there was “no reason” not to apply the civil rule to the criminal context is analytically backward. State v. Wilson, supra, 199 Conn. 437. The proper inquiry is whether there was specific statutory authority to apply the civil rule in the criminal context, not whether there was a prohibition to extending it beyond what was legislatively authorized. The conclusion in Wilson usurped the proper role of the legislature and ignored the limitations that it inserted in
As the Appellate Court stated, “the four month time period is not itself a creature of the common law; indeed, no such rule existed. Rather, it is the result of legislation and court rule, both of which expressly limit its application to a ‘civil judgment or decree . . . .‘” Id., 93–94. Neither of those enactments contemplates application in the criminal context. It is well established that “[w]e are not permitted to supply statutory language that the legislature may have chosen to omit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations, 296 Conn. 594, 605 (2010). Therefore, it is not appropriately within our purview to infer jurisdiction when no statutory provision exists to grant it.
Having concluded that the four month rule does not apply in the criminal context and that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a criminal matter once a sentence has been executed, the question that remains is whether the dismissal of criminal charges also divests the trial court of jurisdiction. We agree with the Appellate Court‘s conclusion that the dismissal in the present case was a complete and final resolution of all pending charges, and, therefore, the trial court lost jurisdiction following that action. See State v. Butler, supra, 209 Conn. App. 80–81, 103–104. We find it useful, however, to expand on the Appellate Court‘s rationale.
There is no case law or statutory authority directly addressing the effect of a complete dismissal of criminal charges on a trial court‘s jurisdiction. Existing authority in the criminal context generally, however, is instructive on this question. It is well established that the authority of the Superior Court over criminal cases derives from the presentment of an information, which is “essential to initiate a criminal proceeding.” Reed v. Reincke, 155 Conn. 591, 598 (1967). Here, to resolve the charges against him, the defendant applied for and was accepted into a pretrial supervised diversionary program for persons with psychiatric disabilities. Upon the successful completion of the program and applica-tion for dismissal,
One example illustrating this principle is the trial court‘s loss of jurisdiction upon entry of a nolle prosequi. “The effect of a nolle is to terminate the particular prosecution of the defendant without an acquittal and without placing him in jeopardy. . . . Therefore, the nolle places the criminal matter in the same position it held prior to the filing of the information. Indeed, no criminal matter exists until, and if, the prosecution issues a new information against the defendant. As our rules explain, [t]he entry of a nolle prosequi terminates the prosecution and the defendant shall be released from custody. If subsequently the prosecuting authority decides to proceed against the defendant, a new prosecution must be initiated. . . . The defendant is accused of no crime, is released from custody unconditionally and is no longer under the authority of the [trial] court. It follows that, generally, a court does not have jurisdiction over the case after the entry of a nolle. . . . Although this court has recognized a narrow exception to this general rule, that exception is not applicable in [this] case.”10 (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Richardson, 291 Conn. 426, 430 (2009). The dismissal following completion of a diversionary program similarly places the case in a state in which “no criminal matter exists . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Therefore, without pending charges, the trial court does not possess jurisdiction over the case.
Other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction and authority upon the dismissal of all criminal charges. For example, the Appellate Court highlighted Smith v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 3d 285 (1981), in which the California Court of Appeal concluded that, “at least [when] no actual fraud has been perpetrated [on] the court, a criminal court
The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it dismissed the defendant‘s pending charges and, therefore, was without jurisdiction to entertain the state‘s motion to open the judgment and reinstate the charges. We also agree with the Appellate Court‘s conclusion that we need not decide whether the civil rule permitting a trial court to open a judgment obtained by fraud applies in the criminal context because the record before us does not support a finding of fraud or intentional misrepresentation.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion ROBINSON, C. J., and MULLINS and MOLL, Js., concurred.