State v. BellState v. Bell
Christopher Pagan, Middletown, Ohio, for appellant1.
Aaron E. Haslam, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio, for appellee.
ABELE, J.
{1} This is an appeal from an Adams County Common Pleas Court judgment of conviction and sentence. Cherith Bell, aka Gapi, defendant below and appellant herein, entered a guilty plea to pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor.
{2} Appellant assigns three errors for review:
“BELL‘S CONVICTION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE SHE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (IAC) AT THE PLEA PROCEEDING.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“BELL‘S CONVICTION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER DUE PROCESS BECAUSE HER PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, OR VOLUNTARY.”
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“BELL‘S PRISON SANCTION WAS CONTRARY TO LAW.”
{3} Appellant and her late husband, Mizael Gapi, engaged in and recorded sexual activity with a 14-year-old victim and published the video to the victim. After her husband entered a guilty plea to pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor in violation of
{4} An Adams County Grand Jury also returned an indictment that charged appellant with (1) one count of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor in violation of
{6} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court also acknowledged that it reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report, the victim impact statements, and a summary of the pre-sentence investigation report. The victim‘s mother spoke about the severe impact on her daughter and family‘s lives, along with appellant and her father. The court observed that appellant “had oral, vaginal * * * sex * * * with the victim and the victim performed * * * oral vaginal sex on * * * appellant,” and appellant and her late husband “took video recordings of the encounters.”
{7} The trial court stated that, although appellant had shown “some genuine remorse” and stated that she “had no intention of
{8} The trial court then sentenced appellant to (1) serve an indefinite stated term of 7 to 10 1/2 years in prison, (2) serve a mandatory post-release control term of up to five years, (3) register as a tier two sex offender for 25 years, and (4) pay $300 restitution and costs. This appeal followed.
I.
{9} In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. In
{10} “Due process requires that a defendant‘s plea be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; otherwise, the defendant‘s plea is invalid.” State v. Medina, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109693, 2021-Ohio-1727, ¶ 6, citing State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 10, citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25. See State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996), citing Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927) (“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United State Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.“); State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110467, 2022-Ohio-1311, ¶ 20.
{11} The standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is de novo. State v. Weaver, 171 Ohio St.3d 429, 2022-Ohio-4371, 218 N.E.3d 806 ¶ 25, citing State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77. However, a guilty plea generally waives a defendant‘s right to claim that counsel‘s ineffectiveness prejudiced the defendant, except to the extent that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the defendant‘s plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100459, 2014-Ohio-3415, ¶ 11-12, citing State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272, 595 N.E.2d 351 (1992), citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973).
{12} To establish trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness, a defendant must show that counsel‘s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. Bunch, 171 Ohio St.3d 775, 2022-Ohio-4723, 220 N.E.3d 773, ¶ 26, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel failed to function as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. Thus, the question is whether counsel was deficient in her representation of appellant.
{13} In the context of a defendant who entered a guilty plea, the defendant can prevail under this standard only by demonstrating (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling
{14} As a general matter, defense counsel‘s tactical decisions and trial strategies even “debatable” ones do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., State v. Black, 2019-Ohio-4977, 149 N.E.3d 1132, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.); see also State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 101, 111. Therefore, reviewing courts “will ordinarily refrain from second-guessing strategic decisions counsel make at trial,” even where trial counsel‘s strategy was “questionable” and even where appellate counsel argues that they would have defended against the charges differently. State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 2002-Ohio-6658, 780 N.E.2d 186, ¶ 152; State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 169, 694 N.E.2d 932 (1998); State v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 42.
(A) No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or performance involved, shall do any of the following:
(1) Create, record, photograph, film, develop, reproduce, or publish any material that shows a minor or impaired person participating or engaging in sexual activity, masturbation, or bestiality;
Thus,
[a] person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high
probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
Therefore, “to have knowledge, a person need only believe that certain circumstances probably exist, not that they exist with 100% certainty.” State v. Duhamel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102346, 2015-Ohio-3145, ¶ 36. See also State v. Sotelo, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1240, 2020-Ohio-5368, (defendant acknowledged seeing a thumbnail of a video of a child and forensic examination revealed defendant deleted child pornography videos she sent to her boyfriend, permitting jury to draw reasonable inference defendant knew of the illicit nature of videos.); State v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St.2d 354, 364, 384 N.E.2d 255 (1978) (precise knowledge of contents of obscene material not prerequisite to satisfy requirement of scienter to sustain obscenity conviction and knowledge of character or nature of obscene material is a constitutionally adequate indicium of scienter to sustain a conviction.); State v. Jenkins, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040111, B-0105517-A, 2004-Ohio-7131, (sufficient evidence of pandering obscenity when defendant knew of character of the material in a videotape; state need not prove defendant knew beforehand that materials would be judicially determined obscene).
{16} In State v. Kraft, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060238, 2007-Ohio-2247, the First District concluded that to establish an
{17} In the case sub judice,
{18} Thus, it appears that appellant acknowledged (1) the victim was a minor (under the age of 18) (
{19} Accordingly, based on the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error.
II.
{20} In her second assignment of error, appellant asserts that she did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. Here, appellant claims that authorities led her to believe that “it was irrelevant that [her late husband] and [the victim] conspired to lie about [the victim‘s] age and did so.”
{21} In general, when deciding whether to accept a plea a court must determine whether a defendant enters the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. McDaniel, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 09CA677, 2010-Ohio-5215, ¶ 18. “‘In considering whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a de novo review of the record to ensure that the trial court complied with constitutional and procedural safeguards.‘” (Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting State v. Eckler, 4th Dist. Adams No. 09CA878, 2009-Ohio-7064, ¶ 48; State v. Hearn, 4th Dist. Washington No. 20CA7, 2021-Ohio-594, ¶ 18; State v. Willoughby, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 20CA5, 2021-Ohio-2611, ¶ 32.
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
* * *
{23} Substantial compliance with
When the trial judge does not substantially comply with
Crim.R. 11 in regard to a nonconstitutional right, reviewing courts must determine whether the trial court partially complied or failed to comply with the rule. Ifthe trial judge partially complied, e.g., by mentioning mandatory postrelease control without explaining it, the plea may be vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect. The test for prejudice is “whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” If the trial judge completely failed to comply with the rule, e.g., by not informing the defendant of a mandatory period of postrelease control, the plea must be vacated. “A complete failure to comply with the rule does not implicate an analysis of prejudice.” (Emphasis sic.) (Citations omitted.)
{24} ”
{25} In the case sub judice, appellant claims that her late husband and the victim “conspired to lie about [the victim‘s] age and did so.” Thus, appellant contends that authorities led her to believe that this alleged conspiracy was irrelevant. As the state points out, however, the record is clear that appellant knew the victim was under age 18 when she engaged in sexual activity, when
{26} At the change of plea hearing in the case at bar, the state agreed to dismiss count two of the indictment. The trial court addressed appellant, discussed the charges and maximum sentence, and explained the various rights appellant would waive with her guilty plea. The court inquired whether appellant had consulted with her attorney, whether she was satisfied with her representation, and whether she had any questions regarding the consequences of her plea. Appellant indicated multiple times that she understood her plea‘s implications. Further, appellant acknowledged that she understood the allegations, the elements, and the recommended sentence. See State v. Jackson, 2023-Ohio-3895, 226 N.E.3d. 518 (4th Dist.), ¶ 37.
{27} Therefore, after our review, we believe that the trial court complied with the applicable rules. Further, appellant acknowledged that she understood the implications of her plea and the various rights she would waive through a guilty plea. Appellant, represented by counsel at the plea hearing, did not assert her innocence, and nothing suggests any confusion or lack of
{28} Accordingly, because appellant failed to establish prejudice, we conclude that appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered her guilty pleas and we overrule appellant‘s second assignment of error.
III.
{29} In her final assignment of error, appellant asserts that at sentencing the trial court neglected to fully consider the seriousness factors and improperly considered various extraneous factors.
{30} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts apply the standard of review set forth in
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{31} The Supreme Court of Ohio has summarized the applicability of
In Ohio, two statutory sections serve as a general guide for every sentencing. First,
R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the overriding purposes of felony sentencing “are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.” To achieve these purposes, the trial court “shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution.”Id. The sentence must be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”R.C. 2929.11(B) . * * *Second,
R.C. 2929.12 specifically provides that in exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider certain factors that make the offense more or less serious and that indicate whether the offender is more or less likely to commit future offenses. * * *
[A]n offender‘s conduct is considered less serious when there are “substantial grounds to mitigate the offender‘s conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.”
R.C. 2929.12(C)(4) .R.C. 2929.12(C) and(E) also permit a trial court to consider “any other relevant factors” to determine that an offense is less serious or that an offender is less likely to recidivate.
State v. Day, 2019-Ohio-4816, 149 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, ¶ 17-18. This court has held that, generally, a sentence is not contrary to law if a trial court considered the
{32} In the case sub judice, at the sentencing hearing the trial court referred to the
{33} Appellant also asserts that the trial court relied on extraneous factors and notes the court‘s statement, “There is a presumption of * * * a prison term and, * * * the court finds your actions * * * to be literally beyond the pale of comprehension of this court * * *.” The court further stated, “I cannot restore the victim. I cannot restore [the victim‘s mother] to * * * a sense of * * * comfort or closure.” Finally, the court stated, “I cannot assist * * * the desires of your father who * * * is a good man and loves his daughter. But there must be punishment and * * * in this court‘s opinion it must be harsh for the act some people when they do things beyond the pale of comprehension.”
{34} Appellant cites State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22 for the proposition that the court based its sentence on a subjective factor, i.e., “beyond the
{35} Appellant does not explain how this statement constitutes an improper reliance on extraneous factors. Appellant‘s actions severely damaged a young girl and her family. Thus, we believe the court‘s statement reflects to the seriousness of the offense pursuant to
{36} Finally, appellant contends that the age of consent in Ohio is 16 years old,
{37} After our review, we believe that the trial court complied with all pertinent sentencing requirements, reviewed and considered the presentence investigation report, parties’
{38} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant‘s third assignment of error and affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY: Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.