STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. AL-SHARIF SCRIVEN, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Supreme Court of New Jersey
July 20, 2016
140 A.3d 535
Argued April 26, 2016
Distriсt Docket Nos. IIB-2014-009F and VC-2013-0591F), and his payment of the sanctions in the amount of $500 to the Disciplinary Oversight Committee, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further
ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent‘s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he comply with Rule 1:20-20.
Alison S. Perronе, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney).
Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney).
Justice ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we must determine whether a purported violation of the high-beam statute,
Here, a police officer stopped а car traveling on a street with its high beams on, even though that car was not approaching an oncoming vehicle. At the time, the officer was on foot and his car was parked on a perpendicular street, where he was investigating an abandoned car. After stopping the vehicle, the officer questioned defendant Al-Sharif Scriven, who was sitting in the front passenger seat. The questioning led to the discovery of a handgun possessed by defendant, who claims that the unconstitutional motor-vehicle stop requires suppression of the handgun.
The trial court found that because thе subject car, whose high beams were activated, was traveling on a street with no oncoming vehicles, the driver was in compliance with
We hold that the trial court and Appellate Division properly concluded that the motor-vehicle stop violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The language of the high-beam statute,
I.
A.
Defendant Al-Sharif Scriven was charged in an Essex County indictment with (1) second-degree unlawful possession of a .40 caliber handgun,
B.
On November 3, 2013, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Officer Cohen and his partner, Officer Eric Overheely, observed an unoccupied vehicle “with a fictitious temp tag” located on the left side of Adams Street (a one-way street), which runs parallel to Independence Park in the City of Newark. At that location, Adams Street forms a “T” intersection with New York Avenue. Traffic flowing on New York Avenue toward the park must turn left onto Adams Street.
Officer Cohen double-parked his patrol car immediately behind the unoccupied vehicle to investigate. He kept his headlights on but did not activate his overhead lights. After determining that the vehicle was unregistered, he called for a tow truck. While waiting for the tow truck, Officer Cohen observed a vehicle on New York Avenue approaching him from about a quarter-mile away. The vehicle was traveling with its high beams on at a normal speed in this well-lit residential area. The vehicle obeyed the stop sign at the intersection of New York Avenue and Adams Street. No other vehicles were operating on either street at the time.
Officer Cohen stated that the high beams were blinding both him and his partner. Using the strobe light attachment on his flashlight, Officer Cohen signaled to the driver to pull over, and the driver did so, turning left onto Adams Street. Officer Cohen testified that he intended to educate the driver on the proper use of high beams—that is, to tell her “you can‘t drive with your high beams on.” He indicated that the use of high beams “always sends up a red flag.” In his experience, stolen cars have been driven with high beams, and the blinding light takes away his tactical advantage to see inside a car and to know whether guns are pointed at him.
As Officer Cohen approached the driver‘s side of the vehicle, he did not give the driver a simple warning to turn her high beams off, but instead instructed her to produce her license, registration, and insurance cards. At this point, with the driver‘s window down, he could smell burnt marijuana. He then walked around the vehicle, asked defendant, the front passenger, to roll down the window, and detected a stronger odor of burnt marijuana. Officer Cohen asked defendant and the rear passenger whether they had any “CDS” on them, and both replied, “No.” While engaged in this exchange, Officer Cohen noticed inside the vehicle a hollowed-out cigar, which, from his experience and training, he knew was used as a receptacle for marijuana.
Based on this observation, Officer Cohen told defendant to step out of the car. In response, defendant indicаted that he had a gun under his jacket. The officer then ordered defendant to keep his hands up while he retrieved the weapon. Defendant was placed under arrest, and the driver was later issued a ticket for a violation of the high-beam statute.
C.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress because the automobile stop violated the Fourth Amendment and Article
D.
The Appellate Division granted the State‘s motion for leave to appeal and, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court‘s suppression order. The appellate panel concluded that there was no valid basis to stop the vehicle for violating the high-beam statute,
Like the trial court, the appellate panel found that Officer Cohen did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the operator of the subject car violated the high-beam statute because there were no oncoming vehicles approaching it. In light of the clear and unambiguous language of
Additionally, the panel asserted that the community-caretaking doctrine did not apply because “the record contains no proof that operation of the vehicle otherwise presented a traffic safety hazard or endangered the safety and welfare of defendant, the officer, or others on the road at the time.”
We granted the State‘s motion for leave to appeal. State v. Scriven, 223 N.J. 551, 127 A.3d 698 (2015). We also granted the request of the Attorney General of New Jersey to participate as amicus curiae.
II.
A.
The State рresents two primary arguments. The first is that Officer Cohen had “a reasonable, articulable, and objective basis to believe” that the driver of the subject car was violating the high-beam statute. The State posits that it was reasonable for Officer Cohen to believe that his patrol vehicle, which was parked on a street perpendicular to the advancing car, was an “oncoming” vehicle for purposes of the high-beam statute, even while he and his partner were standing in the street. The State cites to Heien for the proposition
The State‘s second argument is that, by stopping the subject car, Officer Cohen was performing a “community-caretaking role by informing the driver that her high beams were on” and to dim them because they were creating a traffic-safety hazard. From that perspective, the State submits that the officer acted in a constitutionally reasonable manner to address a dangerous situation.
B.
Amicus curiae, the Attorney General, elaborates on the arguments advаnced by the State. According to the Attorney General, Officer Cohen had reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver was engaged not only in a motor-vehicle violation, but also in criminal wrongdoing, and therefore had a constitutional basis to make the stop. To support this premise, the Attorney General refers to Officer Cohen‘s testimony that operators of stolen cars drive with high beams on and that, due to the blinding light of the high beams, he could not tell if the car‘s occupants had guns pointed at him and his partner. The Attorney General also asks this Court to rest its decision оn Heien, maintaining that, even if Officer Cohen was mistaken in his interpretation of the high-beam statute and in his suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, the motor-vehicle “stop was still lawful because it was based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law.”
Last, the Attorney General asserts that Officer Cohen was justified in making the stop based on the community-caretaking doctrine because “something could have been wrong with the driver,” the blinding high-beam lights presented a safety hazard to the officers and other potential drivers, and the driver may have been attempting to obscure the viеw of the license plate of a stolen car.
C.
Defendant urges the Court to give effect to the plain language of the high-beam statute and conclude that a parked car on a perpendicular street is not an “oncoming” vehicle. According to defendant, the State‘s characterization of the police vehicle as “operational” or “actively engaged in a motor vehicle investigation” does not convert a parked, unoccupied vehicle into an “oncoming” one for purposes of the statute. Defendant asserts that Officer Cohen‘s clearly erroneous understanding of an unambiguous statute cannot be viewed as an objectively reasonable mistake of law. For that reason, defendant explains that Heien is not applicable. Defendant, however, argues that Heien‘s holding that a reasonable mistake of law does not render a motor-vehicle stop unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes is inconsistent with the greater protection of rights accorded by the New Jersey Constitution. To that end, defendant relies on Puzio, supra, 379 N.J. Super. at 381-83, 878 A.2d 857, in which the Appellate Division concluded that “an entirely erroneous reading of [a] statute” cannot provide probable cause to justify a motor-vehicle stop. Defendant submits, moreover, that despite Officer Cohen‘s speculation about the nefarious reasons why a driver might use high beams, the most obvious reason for doing so at 3:30 a.m. is to illuminate the roadway, even in an area with streetlights.
In addition, defendant stresses that the community-caretaking doctrine is inapplicable because the use of high beams by a driver operating a car at a normal rate of speed and in an ordinary way at 3:30 a.m.
III.
A.
Our standard of review requires that we accord deference to the factual findings of the trial court, which had the opportunity to hear and see the sole witness at the suppression hearing and to evaluate the credibility of his testimony. See State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007). Accordingly, we must respect factual findings that are “supported by sufficient credible evidence” at the suppression hearing, even if we would have made contrary findings had we sat as the motion court. Id. at 243-44, 927 A.2d 1250 (quoting State v. Elders, 386 N.J. Super. 208, 228, 899 A.2d 1037 (App.Div.2006), aff‘d in part and rev‘d in part, 192 N.J. 224 (2007)). Thus, “[a] triаl court‘s findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.‘” Id. at 244, 927 A.2d 1250 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162, 199 A.2d 809 (1964)). In contrast, our interpretation of a statute is de novo, and we need not defer to a trial or appellate court‘s interpretative analysis, unless the analysis persuades us. See Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584, 46 A.3d 1262 (2012); cf. Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 302-03, 137 A.3d 1168 (2016).
B.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provide that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense to justify a stop. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470, 724 A.2d 234 (1999). The heart of our constitutional analysis is whether the motor-vehicle stop in this case was unreasonable, recognizing that raw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop. See State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 357, 788 A.2d 746 (2002).
The State‘s primary argument is that the driver of the car in which defendant was traveling was violating the high-beam statute, thus justifying the motor-vehicle
Every person driving a motor vehicle equipped with multiple-beam road lighting equipment, during the times when lighted lamps are required, shall use a distribution of light, or composite beam, directed high enough and of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles at a safe distance in advance of the vehicle, subject to the following requirements and limitations: whenever the driver of a vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle within five hundred feet, such driver shall use a distribution of light or composite beam so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver, and in no case shall the high-intensity portion which is projected to the left of the prolongation of the extreme left side of the vehicle be aimed higher than the center of the lamp from which it comes at a distance of twenty-five feet ahead, and in no case higher than a level of forty-two inches above the level upon which the vehicle stands at a distance of seventy-five feet ahead.
[(Emphasis added).]
Because the parties contest the meaning of an “oncoming vehicle” and “oncoming driver,” we must engage in an interpretative analysis of
With those principles in mind, we can say that the high-beam statute is a clearly written, straightforward statute. It requires a driver to dim a vehicle‘s high beams whenever he or she “approaches an oncoming vehicle within five hundred feet” so that “the glaring rays [of the high beams] are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver.”
The word “oncoming” is consistently defined as “coming nearer,” “nearing,” “approaching,” and “moving forward upon one.” See, e.g., American Heritage College Dictionary 971 (4th ed.2002) (defining “oncoming” as “[c]oming nearer” or “approaching“); New Oxford American Dictionary 1188 (2d ed.2005) (defining “oncoming” as “approaching,” or “moving toward“); Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1575 (1981) (defining “oncoming” as “coming nearer in space or time,” “moving forward upon one,” or “approaching“).
Those dictionary definitions explain the word “oncoming” in a way that an ordinary, everyday driver—and police officer—can comprehend. Understood in that light, an “oncoming vehicle” and “oncoming driver” cannot mean an unoccupied vehicle, parked on a perpendicular roadway, whose driver and passenger are standing in the street. That is so even if the unoccupied vehicle‘s motor is running and its headlights are on. Officer Cohen, who was on foot waiting for a tow truck to remove an unregistered vehicle on Adams Street, was not an “oncoming vehicle” or “oncoming driver” to the car approaching him from New York Avenue.
Officer Cohen testified that at 3:30 a.m., no vehicles were traveling on either New York Avenue or Adams Street, other than the car in which defendant was traveling. No vehicle was “nearing,” “approaching,” or “moving forward upon” the car carrying defendant, and therefore the “glaring rays” of the high beams from that car were “not projected into the eyes of [an] oncoming driver.” See
Accordingly, the driver of the subject car was not in violation of the high-beam statute based on Officer Cohen‘s testimony. We conclude, moreover, that the high-bеam statute is unambiguous in its language and meaning to both the public and police. We reject the State‘s argument that an unoccupied police vehicle parked on a perpendicular street and a police officer on foot, collectively or individually, count as an “oncoming” vehicle under the statute. We also do not find the State‘s argument to be an objectively reasonable interpretation of the statute. Therefore, Officer Cohen did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the subject car was operating in violation of the statute. See Puzio, supra, 379 N.J. Super. at 380, 878 A.2d 857 (concluding that vehicle “stop was unwarranted because the officer, who misunderstood the meaning of a statute, did not have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that defendant had committed a motor vehicle offense“).
Because we determine that Officer Cohen‘s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable, we need not address the issue dealt with in Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed. 2d 475 (2014).
In Heien, the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, the requisite suspicion necessary for the police to make a stop for a motor-vehicle violatiоn may be based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law. Id. at —, 135 S.Ct. at 540, 190 L.Ed. 2d at 486-87. In that case, a police officer stopped a vehicle and issued a ticket because one of its rear brake lights was not functioning. Id. at —, 135 S.Ct. at 534, 190 L.Ed. 2d at 480. The applicable North Carolina statute, however, allowed a driver to operate a vehicle with only one working stop lamp, and thus the stop was based on the officer‘s mistaken understanding of the law. See ibid. Unlike the present case, the North Carolina statute lacked clarity and was susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. See id. at —, 135 S.Ct. at 540, 190 L.Ed. 2d at 486-87. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the officer‘s belief that a “faulty right brake light was a violation of North Carolina law” was objectively reasonable. Id. at —, 135 S.Ct. at 540, 190 L.Ed. 2d at 487.
Because the facts before us do not present a motor-vehicle stop based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law, we do not determine here whether such a
Additionally, Officer Cohen did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the subject car because he has encountered stolen cars using high beams. That generalization, standing alone, would justify the stop of any car using high beams at nighttime in an urban setting. The suspicion necessary to justify a stop must not only be reasonable, but also particularized. See Stovall, supra, 170 N.J. at 356-57, 788 A.2d 746 (“A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable and particular-ized suspicion to believe that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968))). The car that Officer Cohen observed traveling on New York Avenue was “driving [at] normal speed” and there was “nothing out of the ordinary” about it, other than the use of its high beams. Officer Cohen, moreover, had not received a dispatch that a stolen vehicle was being operated in the area.
Accordingly, Officer Cohen did not have a reasonable, articulable, and рarticularized suspicion for making the stop under the Federal or State Constitution.
IV.
The State alternatively argues that Officer Cohen had a justifiable basis for stopping the subject car under the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution.
The community-caretaking doctrine represents a narrow exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 324, 63 A.3d 175 (2013). The State bears the burden of showing that the “seizure” of the car and its occupants falls within the community-caretaking exception. Id. at 314, 63 A.3d 175. “The community-caretaking doctrine recognizes that police officers provide ‘a wide range of social services’ outside of their traditional law enforcement and criminal investigatory roles.” State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 141, 47 A.3d 737 (2012) (quoting State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73, 975 A.2d 377 (2009)); see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed. 2d 706, 714-15 (1973) (describing community-caretaking functions as police activities “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute“). In their community-caretaker role, police officers, who act in an objectively reasonable manner, may check on the welfare or safety of a citizen who aрpears in need of help on the roadway without securing a warrant or offending the Constitu-tion. See State v. Diloreto, 180 N.J. 264, 276, 850 A.2d 1226 (2004).
Police officers who have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that a driver may be impaired or suffering a medical emergency may stop the vehicle for the purpose of making a welfare check and rendering aid, if necessary. In State v. Goetaski, 209 N.J. Super. 362, 364-65, 507 A.2d 751 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 458, 517 A.2d 443 (1986), the community-caretaking doctrine justified a state trooper stopping a car that was driving on
Unlike Goetaski, Martinez, and Washington, the evidence here—according to the trial court—did not suggest that the driver of the car was “impaired” or that the vehicle had a “problem.” The trial court determined that the reason for the stop was the alleged violation of the high-beam statute.
We do not question that a police officer сonducting an investigation on the street can ask and even instruct a driver to dim high beams if the brightness of the lights is obstructing or impairing the officer‘s ability to perform certain tasks. Certainly, a police officer could order motorists to dim their high beams while passing through an area where construction workers are fixing a roadway. Police officers acting in their community-caretaking roles can take such reasonable steps to ensure public safety in conformity with our Federal and State Constitutions.
Here, however, Officer Cohen did not signal to the driver to dim her high beams because they were interfering with his mission, which was waiting for a tow truck to take away an unregistered vehicle. Rather, he effectuated a motor-vehicle stop under the objectively unreasonable belief that the driver was in violation of the high-beam statute.
Finding that the motor-vehicle stop was not justified and that the subsequent seizure of the handgun (and the hollow-nose bullets and large-capacity magazine) were the fruits of a violation of the Fourth Amendment and its state constitutional counterpart, the trial court suppressed the evidence. We conclude that those factual findings are supрorted by sufficient credible evidence in the record. See Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 243, 927 A.2d 1250.
V.
For the reasons expressed, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division, which upheld the trial court‘s suppression order.
Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in Justice ALBIN‘S opinion. Judge CUFF (temporarily assigned) did not participate.
Notes
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
[