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State v. Novembrino
519 A.2d 820
N.J.
1987
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*1 JERSEY, STATE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, NEW v. OTTAVIO NOVEMBRINO, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. Argued February January 198 6 Decided 1987. *3 Prosecutor, argued the Flynn, E. Assistant James First (Harold Ruvoldt, Jr., County Hudson appellant J. cause Prosecutor, attorney). argued respondent {Ashleyand

Joseph Charles the cause for Charles, attorneys). General, Nodes, Attorney argued the cause Deputy

Allan J. Jersey Attorney Cary of New for amicus curiae General {W. Edwards, Jr., General, Attorney attorney). *4 Defender, Harkov, Deputy D. Assistant Public

Anderson of the Public argued the cause for amicus curiae Office Jr., Smith, Acting Jersey Public Defender of New S. {Thomas Defender, attorney). Director, a brief on

Jeffrey Fogel, Executive submitted E. of New curiae American CivilLiberties Unión behalf amicus Jersey. Jr., a brief on of amicus

Joseph Hayden, submitted behalf A. Jersey Lawyers of New Defense Association Criminal curiae Jr., attorney; and {Joseph Hayden, Harvey A. Ju- Weissbard Katz, brief). on Margulies dith opinion of the was delivered The Court STEIN, J. 1961, Supreme decided

Since when United States Court 1684, 1081, Ohio, 643, New Mapp 6 L.Ed.2d U.S. compelled by the federal Jersey and her sister states have been evidence to exclude from the State’s case-in-ehief constitution The in fourth amendment. so-called obtained violation “exclusionary applied rule” in criminal cases has been federal rights adopted protect since when the rule first States, by the fourth United secured amendment.1 Weeks v. 341, 58 writing Day, for a L.Ed. 652. Justice 34S.Ct. U.S. “the Court, exclusionary that without unanimous observed * * * * * * value, might and as well 4th of no Amendment t stricken from the Constitution.” Id. 34 S.Ct.a at 656. L.Ed. decision,

For the time the Court first since the Weeks government’s application modified rule’s Leon, 897, 104 case-in-chief. United States held seized 82 L.Ed. 2d the Court that evidence need not warrant cause pursuant to a issued without warrant, police if who executed the be excluded officer judged objective reasonably of a well-trained by the standard officer, good on the warrant relied faith defective case, by the asked gathering evidence. In this we are Attorney County and to decide the Hudson Prosecutor General Constitution, I, Jersey which paragraph if 7 of the New article proffered concerning the been of several that have 1For a discussion theories Stewart, Mapp purpose and v. Ohio rule see “The Road Development Exclusionary Beyond: Origins, Rule Future of the (1983), Cases,” Kami 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1380-85 Search-and-Seizure sar, (Should) ‘Principled (Did) Exclusionary Rest Basis’ Rule "Does Creighton ‘Empirical Proposition’?,” L.Rev. 565 Rather than an *5 100 against

incorporates protection almost verbatim the unreason amendment, able searches and seizures in the fourth set forth exclusionary of recog will tolerate modification rule that exception good-faith nizes the established United States Leon. Supreme Court posed

We of approach controversy issue here mindful engulfed has exclusionary inception.2 its since As Janis, acknowledged in United States v. Justice Blackmun U.S. 3021, 3028, 1046,1056 (1976), “The debate within the Court the exclusionary on rule has always been warm one.” sharp

Characteristic of the criticism the rule has provoked Burger, are observations of Chief Justice dissent ing Agents Bivens Unknown Six Named Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 388, 419-20, 1999, 2016-17, L.Ed. 2d (1971): right graded I submit that has least much society expect rationally judges from of the universal responses punishment” we inflict place “capital all on evidence when error is shown in its Yet for over 55 acquisition. * * * increasing legal our years, and has scope intensity system treated dissimilar as if cases were the same. Our to the vastly adherence they change, our rule, resistance and our refusal even to acknowl- edge bring the need for effective enforcement mechanisms to mind Holmes’ well-known statement: revolting “It have better for than it no reason a rule of law that so was grounds revolting laid down in the time of IV. It is still if more Henry long it was down upon since, which laid have vanished and the rule simply blind from imitation persists The Path of the past.” Holmes, Law, (1897). L Harv Rev characterizing doctrine as an anomalous and ineffective suppression regulate

mechanism with which to law enforcement, I intend no reflection motivation those members who it this Court would be means hoped enforcing Judges being the Fourth Amendment. cannot faulted for Rights offended arrests, searches, seizures violate the Bill of regulate statutes intended to officials. But we can and faulted public should be clinging unworkable and irrational of law. concept & Wasserstrom, 2 SeeMertens "The Faith Good Exclusionary Exception Deregulating Derailing Rule: Law," Police and 365-66 70 Geo.L.J. & nn. 4-6 *6 rule sharp perception In contrast is the of the Ohio, supra: in by Mapp Justice Clark v. articulated (then Judge) Cardozo, those as did Justice that under our There are who say, go to free doctrine criminal is because the constitutional exclusionary “[t]he People Defore, v. at has 242 NY NE [13], constable blundered.” [585], this will be the result. as was But, some cases undoubtedly [1926]. Elkins, judicial in is another consideration —the of said “there imperative integrity.” U.S. 364 US at 222 at 1447, [Elkins ] [206], [80 goes (1960)]. but it is free, must, The criminal if he the law that L.Ed.2d government Nothing free. more than its failure sets him can destroy quickly disregard charter its or its of the of its own laws, worse, to observe own dissenting, said Olmstead v United in Brandeis, As Mr. Justice existence. States, (1928): ALR 376 277 US 72 LEd 48 SCt “Our 438, 485, good For it ill, is the the teacher. for Government potent, omnipresent its If the Government teaches the whole becomes example.... people by to it for it invites man become a law lawbreaker, law; every breeds contempt it himself; unto invites anarchy.” [*******] ignoble left State tends the The shortcut to conviction open destroy of of restraints the liberties the

entire constitutional on which people system Having right recognized in once embodied Fourth rest. that privacy right against is and that the to be secure Amendment enforceable States, against therefore, rude of state constitutional in is, invasions officers privacy by longer origin, right an can to remain we no empty promise. permit it in the same manner and to like effect other basic Because is enforceable longer rights no it to secured Due Process we can Clause, permit the name of at the of officer law enforce who, revocable whim any police enjoyment. decision, its Our founded reason itself, ment chooses to suspend gives individual no more than that which Constitution truth, and guarantees to which law him, to the officer no less than that honest judicial integrity so to the courts, necessary entitled, and, enforcement 81 S. justice. Ct. 1963-64, true administration of [367 (footnote omitted).] at 1092-93 con- question appreciation requires us before flicting and the exclusion- purpose effectiveness views “good-faith” necessity ary and the wisdom Moreover, recognized we exception Court Leon. system in context of federalist which address this issue courts, laws in federal and state “enforcement criminal encourages application episodes, identical involving sometimes seizure,” Hunt, governing search and State of uniform rules (1982), yet because a state mindful 91 N.J. may protection afford enhanced individual liber- constitution for ties, uncritically we adopt “should not federal constitutional interpretations Jersey merely for the New Constitution (Pashman, consistency,” J., concurring). sake id. at 355 I Defendant, Novembrino, possession Ottavio was indicted for dangerous contrary of controlled substances 24:21- N.J.S.A. 20(a)(1),(4), possession dangerous of controlled substances 24:21-19(a)(1). with intent to distribute in violation of N.J.S.A. suppress pursuant A motion to evidence was filed to Rule 3:5-7. *7 hearing suppression sharply

The conflicting resulted in ac- surrounding counts of the circumstances defendant’s arrest and subsequent search of his service station. to According Higgins, Detective whose affidavit led to the issuance of the warrant, disputed stopped by search defendant was two offi- Bayonne Department cers from the at p.m. Police about 6:15 stop shortly June 1983. The occurred after Novembrino proceeding closed his station and service was home automo- search, One pat-down bile. officer conducted a while the other officer inspection conducted a limited interior defend- ant’s agreed go automobile. Defendant to with the officers to police headquarters. ear, He to drove the station in his own accompanied by one of the Higgins officers. Detective testified placed that Novembrino was not under and was to arrest free leave, although right neither officer him of advised his to do so. being rights,

After advised of his Miranda Novembrino refused to consent to a search of his station. At about 6:30 p.m., message Higgins requesting Detective left a that municipal Bayonne judge telephone began court him. He then support type affidavit in of a search warrant. Detective Higgins conceded that this such he was first affidavit had prepared and preparation ever approxi- estimated that its took mately ten municipal judge or fifteen minutes. When the court shop- him telephoned, Higgins to meet a arranged Detective p.m. They approximately judge 6:50 The ping center. met signed Hig- the affidavit and the warrant. Detective reviewed radio, Kelly proceeded to the gins spoke with Detective and Kelly. Detective After gas where he met defendant and station warrant, he unlocked shown the the door Novembrino was contra- pointed station and out the location the service band. testimony substantially was different. He

Novembrino’s pulled approximately 6:45 that him over stated the officers while one officer him the other p.m. Immediately, searched police headquarters was then his He taken searched car. Kelly Higgins was strip-searched. he Detectives where gas Novembrino testified him to his station. then drove back left and therefore could Higgins police headquarters never that returning municipal judge met court before not have Novembrino, Kelly According to Officer took service station. The officers searched and unlocked the door. key defendant’s Defendant testified the contraband. the station discovered they warrant, although he he asked the if had until eleven o’clock approximately warrant not shown search night. hearing, affida- suppression argued At the defendant the warrant was and that did not establish cause vit court had seized. trial issued after evidence been *8 warrant issued was initially declined to consider whether the search, evidence on suppressed the or after the before support in of the warrant that submitted ground the affidavit appeal, Appellate probable cause. On failed to establish hearing when matter for a to determine Division remanded testimony, hearing the trial After issued. the warrant was search had obtained the determined that officers court Appel- of station. The prior to search the service warrant it was finding on the basis that that Division affirmed late credible supported sufficient evidence. Division, Appellate argued Higgins the State that the sufficient to probable

affidavit was establish cause. The crit- portion alleged: ical affidavit I from received information has informant who reliable in several proven (with investigations supplied), he information that ‘Otto’ above description, marijuana. engaged illegal sales of and cocaine informant stated My gas drugs that Otto his station at He usually above location. keeps (informant) drugs gas dealing also that stated he witnessed ‘Otto’ from his along subject station. I, with Det. conducted a Scianni, surveillance of Ralph on Thurs., and his station between the hours of PM and 7:00 6/2/83, PM, 3:00 meeting leaving and observed Otto with several after his and station persons, making drug During we what believed be transactions. surveillance, we making observed one a on person transaction with Otto and checked his vehicle drugs. and called the squad narcotics his inquire relationship They us said told that has been arrested for person cocaine other violations and drug felt that Otto and the other are involved in they From person activity. information received our informant and our do from from we feel observations, gas illegal a that search Otto’s station should be conducted for contraband. belongs We checked on of the station and it to Otto who have ownership we investigation. rights on this Otto was headquarters advised his presently a and refused search of his station but be nervous. appeared very The Appellate Division concluded that the affidavit failed to probable establish cause: The affidavit here involved revealed a that informant concluded simply drug for unknown reasons that defendant was a a dealer, that person previous gas arrested ly cocaine was seen at defendant’s station possession engaged in some activities which caused edu detective, whose unspecified training and cation, are to conclude that activi unknown, criminal experiences taking gas

ties the form of violations of Title 24 were at the station. place The of the circumstances out failed in the affidavit to contain a totality spelled single objective tending engender grounded fact “well suspicion” * * * being crime was committed. We cause conclude, therefore, probable Novembrino, N.J.Super. (1985) was established. [State (citation omitted).] argued State also if cause was not estab- lished, the evidence should nevertheless admissible on the good-faith recognized basis of the exception by the United Supreme Appellate States Court in Leon. The Division ac- knowledged that if Jersey, Leon followed in were New it would thereby apply retroactively admissibility determine the the evidence majority obtained defendant’s A station. Appellate Division also satisfied that Higgins Detective *9 warrant, upon relied the which objectively reasonably and had judge. Accordingly, by a detached and neutral had been issued majority adequate- found that the record Appellate the Division good-faith exception should be ly the issue the raised whether our Constitution. applied under State panel Division determined that majority Appellate A of the exception good-faith be- Jersey recognize should not New requirement of it the constitutional cause would undermine concurring opin- In a N.J.Super. at 244. probable cause. 200 ion, Judge Simpson agreed probable cause had not been However, appli- he that the Id. at 245. concluded established. by inappropriately considered cability of Leon doctrine was by been made court no record had the trial majority, since good faith on the search whether officer had relied as to granted the State’s motion for at 245-46. We warrant. Id. (1985). appeal, N.J. leave

II sufficiency of concerns the The first issue we confront The prompted issuance of the warrant. affidavit cause, is the affidavit by which we measure standard fourth amendment and article imposed by both the the standard I, Jersey New Unlike 7 of the Constitution. paragraph rule, judge-made and not derided critics as constitution,3 probable cause is constitu mandated determining and whether a search tionally-imposed standard position it of indis- Accordingly, occupies seizure lawful.4 Evidence?,” 3 See, Why Suppress e.g., Wilkey, Exclusionary Valid Rule: "The 62 Judicature 215 provides: States Constitution amendment to United 4 Thefourth houses, persons, papers, people and right be secure their violated; seizures, effects, against not be and shall unreasonable searches cause, supported by upon probable Oath issue and no Warrants shall searched, affirmation, describing place particularly to be or persons things seized. *10 putable significance Supreme in search and seizure the law. As Henry v. United States: Court noted in requirement probable deep history. The of cause has roots that our are warrant, general person The the which name of the to be arrested was left blank, assistance, against inveighed, and the writs of which James Otis both perpetuated practice allowing police oppressive the the of to arrest and search suspicion. place judicial control, showing on Police control took the of no since “probable magistrate required. Virginia of cause” before The Declara- Eights, adopted 12, 1776, against practice. tion of June rebelled philosophy That later was reflected in the Fourth And Amendment. as the early immediately show, adoption American decisions both before and after its suspicion, report, "strong suspect” commonrumor or or even reason was not adequate support principle a warrant for arrest. And that has survived to day. this

[********] required guilt hand, necessary. Evidence to establish not is On the other good part arresting enough. faith is officers Probable cause prudent exists if facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a believing important, man in that the offense has been committed. It is we think, enforced, requirement strictly this be for the standard set protects 98, 100-02, Constitution both officer and the citizen. U.S. [361 168, 170-71, (1959) (footnotes omitted, 4 L.Ed.2d 137-38 citations omitted).] Any search person property nonconsensual of a or his is a significant invasion privacy rights. of fundamental Neverthe- less, enforcement of the requires criminal laws employ proof searches to obtain probable-cause of crime. The requirement constitutionally-prescribed standard for dis- tinguishing unreasonable searches from those that can be toler- society: ated in a free long-prevailing safeguard These standards seek citizens from rash and privacy charges unreasonable interferences with and from unfounded of crime.

They leeway give enforcing community’s also seek to fair law the I, paragraph Jersey provides: Article 7 of the New Constitution right houses, people persons, papers, to be The secure in their and effects, against seizures, violated; unreasonable searches and shall not cause, except upon and no probable supported warrant shall issue oath affirmation, particularly place describing or to be searched and the papers things to be seized. confront the course of Because which officers situations many protection. ambiguous, executing must be allowed for their duties are or less room more on their the mistakes must be those reasonable some mistakes But part. acting leading to their conclusions of on facts men, sensibly probability. affording the best cause is a nontechnical rule of probable conception practical, accommodating opposing these often that has been found for compromise Requiring To allow more law enforcement. interests. would unduly hamper law-abiding whim the officers’ be to leave citizens at mercy less would States, [Brinegar v. United 1302, 1311, 160, 176, caprice. (1949).] L.Ed. 1890-91 signifi recognized has the historical steadfastly This Court indispensable criterion for cance cause as *11 Macri, In determining validity the of a search. State N.J. our (1963), unequivocally confirmed insis Justice Jacobs be probable would not warrants without cause tence that issued Jersey: in New tolerated great is not a mere but is formality for search [a]

The warrant requirement and in free men substantially constitutional embraced by expressed principle language It has its in state roots identical both our federal and constitutions. highly infringements English The of in and colonial abusive history. deep general and writs the of warrants of and which were incidents freedom privacy allowing were too searches on alone suspicion only arrests and assistance inclusion, on the the insisted wisely well-known to American settlers. They right Rights, the Amendment that in the Fourth the Bill provision against shall not be secure and seizures the to be unreasonable searches people cause, but issue, upon supported violated and that “no Warrants shall probable describing be searched, the or and affirmation, place Oath by particularly * * * things or be seized.” and the persons to the essentials a firm with respect Amendment sets standard The [Fourth] issue is not to Under terms the search warrant except of a warrant. its search determina- or affirmation. The crucial oath cause, supported by upon probable judge. issuing not officer but a neutral made the by tion is by he judge issuance, is in a to make his determination Before position underlying which facts or circumstances be made aware of the must properly being believing violated. that law was would warrant man prudent ******** * * * recognize, Governing as Warrants Rules Search expressly Our recent showing of cause a verified probable the constitutional need for must,

they acknowledge issuing magistrate; the basic and they implicitly before show- asserted, have which federal cases repeatedly requirement, underlying ing or circumstanc- facts of belief or be not merely suspicion, being believing man in the law es which would warrant a prudent whatever to no inclination so, we have Even if we are at do liberty violated. great safeguard- restrict undermine the force or uniform of that applicability (citation ing omitted).] 260-61 [Id. requirement. Before sufficiency we examine the of the affidavit relied on by judge case, this we shall review both federal state case order to law determine standard to be used in evaluating probable whether cause was Detec- established Higgins’ tive affidavit.

A. Probable Cause —Federal Case Law The evolution of applying probable-cause federal case law to specific standard search has distinguished warrants not been Amsterdam, clarity consistency. See “Perspectives Amendment,” 35 Minn.L.Rev. Fourth of its significant probable-cause one most recent and decisions, Supreme Court observed that teaching bearing the central of our on the perhaps decisions probable-cause dealing it standard is a nontechnical “In “practical, conception.” ... name we

probable cause, deal with These very implies, probabilities. not are are technical; the factual and they considerations practical everyday legal life on which reasonable and act.” [Illinois prudent men, technicians, Gates, U.S. (1983) 213, 231, 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 69 160, 175-76, (1949)).] 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. practical, Court’s characterization cause as a *12 concept nontechnical frequently repeated, has been even cases in which the Court was sharply divided as to whether probable See, e.g., cause had been established. Massachusetts Upton, v. 727, 730-33, 466 U.S. 2085, 2087-88, S.Ct. 104 80 721, Harris, (1984); L.Ed.2d United v. 726-27 States U.S. 403 573, 577, 2075, 2079, 91 S.Ct. 723, (1971); 29 L.Ed.2d 730 Spinelli States, United 410, 419, 584, U.S. S.Ct. 393 89 Ventresca, 590-91, 637, 21 (1969); United 645 States 102, 108, U.S. 741, 85 S.Ct. 684, 13 L.Ed.2d States, (1965); Draper v. United 307, 313, U.S. S.Ct. 333, 329, 327, 3 L.Ed. 2d (1959). Justice Potter Stewart attempted explain why judiciary’s application probable practical cause though and it nontechnical standard — divergent to its generated markedly such views as may be—has mandate: judge of no The a occupation requires

The fourth amendment is “technicality.” sweeping language presenting the infinite of of to cases variety its application judge, being of there is that in real life. art a if situations arise The factual announcing of varied art, clear rules in the context these infinitely such is government and conscientious rules can understood observed cases, that be regarded If cases has come to be the outcome of fourth amendment officials. turning it is in because of the inevitable human on “technicalities,” part articulating shortcomings judges fourth faced the task of amendment range doing justice in in a broad situations while principles applicable enough. good judges do but that is not best, always case. Most their particular Mapp Origins, and v. Ohio and The Beyond: Road to Development [“The 83 Colum.L. Cases,” Rule in Search-and-Seizure Future of Exclusionary (1983).] Rev. probable is a Apart theme cause from the central that probable-cause deci concept, Supreme Court’s nontechnical such sustaining principles. few generated sions have One by a principle probable is not established concluso cause is provide magistrate ry with sufficient affidavit that does to whether the independent determination as facts to make an leading proposition this warrant issue. case should 41, 54 States, L.Ed. United Nathanson v. There, challenged that a feder warrant recited al officer cause and does believe

has stated under his oath that he has to suspect foreign origin a more to wit: Certain merchandise, liquors particular certain given, not been which the duties have paid, of which cannot upon description brought to law, into the contrary or has otherwise been United States which is now contained within the that said merchandise premises deposited dwelling being as a 2 frame J.J. said described story Nathanson premises 54 S.Ct. at 78 L.Ed. at at [Id. at 117 No. Bartram Ave. 160.] located had issued without held that the warrant been The Court cause, observing ** * dwelling rest nothing may that a warrant to search private indicates supporting or belief without disclosure mere affirmance of suspicion upon 54 78 L.Ed. [Id. 161.] facts or circumstances. Court, by the consistently followed Nathanson has been by the officer conclusory allegations asserted whether the are incorporated in the are by an informant whose observations *13 110 Whiteley Wyoming affidavit. See v. Warden State

officer's Penitentiary, 560, 564, U.S. S.Ct. 1031, 401 91 28 (1971); Spinelli States, supra, 306, v. United L.Ed.2d 311 393 U.S. 410, S.Ct. v. 584, United States 637; 89 21 L.Ed.2d Ventresca, supra, 102, 741, U.S. S.Ct. 684; 380 85 13 L.Ed.2d Ohio, Beck v. 89, 379 U.S. 223, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1964); 85 142 13 Aguilar Texas, v. U.S. S.Ct. 108, 1509, 378 84 12 L.Ed.2d 723 States, Rugendorf v. (1964); United S. 528, U.S. 84 Ct. 825, 376 States, L.Ed. Jones v. United (1964); 257, U.S. 11 2d 887 362 80 725, S.Ct. (1960), 4 grounds, L.Ed.2d on 697 overruled other Salvucci, United v. States 83, U.S. 100 S. Ct. 65 L.Ed. 2547, 448 States, v. (1980); Giordenello United U.S. 2d 619 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, L.Ed.2d 1503

The allege Court’s insistence that an officer’s specif- affidavit ic facts and principle not conclusions is on the based the inferences from the facts which lead drawn complaint ‘‘[must] by magistrate being neutral judged engaged and detached instead of the officer ferreting in the often out crime.” The competitive enterprise purpose magistrate, is to then, enable the complaint, appropriate Commissioner, here to determine whether cause” a warrant “probable required support judge exists. The Commissioner must for himself persuasiveness complaining facts relied officer to show cause. He should not probable without mere accept question conclusion that complainant’s person sought

whose arrest is has committed a crime. States, United [Giordenello 357 U.S. (quoting at 486, supra, S.Ct. Johnson 1250, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1509 United (1948)).] States, U.S. 68 S.Ct. L.Ed. 10, 14, 369, 436, 367,

Another principle only entrenched is that not amay magistrate hearsay determining cause, consider probable hearsay provide alone can a sufficient basis for warrant. Although the impliedly accepted Court had hearsay as a basis States, Draper see v. United prior cases, cause supra, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d 327 and Brinegar 329, States, supra, v. United 338 U.S. 93 L.Ed. States, held in Jones v. United expressly it that an officer’s affidavit could rely on provided by information an informant: here whether question an affidavit which sets out observations personal relating to the existence cause to is to be search deemed insufficient by

Ill of it sets out the affiant’s but those of the fact that not observations virtue score, long so as is not to be deemed insufficient on another. An affidavit 269, crediting hearsay presented. substantia] 80 the at S.Ct. a basis for [Id. 735, 4 at at L.Ed. 707.] attempt not to set standards for Jones In the Court did crediting determining “a basis for what constitutes substantial in by the hearsay.” the That task was undertaken Court 1509, 12 Texas, L.Ed. Aguilar supra, 378 84 S. Ct. 108, U.S. 410, States, supra, 393 Spinelli v. United U.S. 2d and in decisions, superseded 21 These S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 637. two Gates, supra, Illinois U.S. 462 103 1983 at past the have for the two decades been 76 L.Ed.2d concerning sufficiency the of an infor center of the debate establishing probable cause.5 mant’s observations for the defend- Aguilar, warrant In to search narcotics alleged: the basis of an affidavit that ant’s home was issued on person do and have reliable information from credible Affiants received heroin, marijuana, narcotic barbiturates other narcotics and and believe that premises purpose being kept for paraphernalia the are at the described above provisions 84 at contrary at S. and to the of the law. Ct. [378 sale use 1511, 12 725.] admissibility of evidence sustaining challenge warrant, the Court established seized execution of infor- sufficiency of an to determine “two-pronged test” appris- First, tip must include information that tip. mant’s allegations informant’s magistrate of the basis for the es the second, (the “basis-of-knowledge” and, affiant must prong); Faith,’ Cause,’ Kamisar, “Gates, Beyond,” 69 Iowa ‘Good and ‘Probable 5 See Disturbing Mascolo, (1984); Some "Probable Cause Revisited: 551 L.Rev. Gates,” Eng.L.Rev. Emanating New Implications from Illinois v. W. Cause, LaFave, (of Imper (1983); Vagaries Improbable Amendment "Fourth Askew),” View, Balancing Privacy, 74 J. Crim.L. ceptible Notorious Plain Problem," Livermore, (1983); Draper-Spinelli Criminology “The & Rebell, (1979); "The Informant and the Fourth Undisclosed Ariz.L.Rev. (1971); Standards," Meaningful Yale L.J. 703 for Amendment: A Search Informer,” Note, Colo. L.Rev. 357 First-Time 43 U. Cause and the "Probable Arrest,” Mather, (1972); Tip Cause for Search Informer’s as Probable "The Comment, (1969); the Basis “Informer’s Word 54 Cornell L.Rev. 958 Courts,” Federal Cause Probable Calif.L.Rev. magistrate inform the basis for his on reliance credibility (the “veracity” prong). informant’s See Illinois v. Gates, 267, 103 supra, 462 U.S. at 76 L.Ed.2d (White, J., concurring). Concluding that the affidavit did conditions, not meet these the Court determined that the war rant not should have issued: Although an affidavit be based information need may hearsay magistrate reflect the direct affiant, observations must personal *15 underlying informed of some of the circumstances from the which informant concluded that the narcotics were he were, where claimed and some of the they underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose need not be was identity disclosed, “credible” his “reli information able.” inferences the to Otherwise, “the from facts which lead complaint” magistrate,” will drawn a neutral and detached as the Constitution “by “engaged instead, in officer the often requires, by competitive ferreting enterprise crime,” or, out as in this an case, unidentified [Aguilar Texas, 378 U.S. 84 S.Ct. at informant. at supra, 1514, 12 (quoting

L.Ed.2d at 729 Giordenello v. United 357 States, U.S. S.Ct at 78 486, United at States, Johnson 333 U.S. 1250, L.Ed.2d at at S.Ct. 1509; 14, 440) (footnote 92 L.Ed. at at omitted).] 369, omitted, citations later, years States, Five in Spinelli v. United 410, 637, 584, sought the Court clarify Aguilar by delineating the manner in which the “two- pronged applied test” should be allega- when the informant’s tions, although alone, inadequate standing partially are verified by police investigation. The Spinelli affidavit in stated that a reliable had operat- informant the FBI that “Spinelli advised is ing a wagers accepting handbook and and disseminating wager- ing telephones information means of the have which been assigned the numbers 4-0029 WYdown and WYdown 4-0136.” Id. at at L.Ed.2d at 642. To corroborate tip, informant’s Spinelli affidavit recited that was ob- period served for days, of five during four he which Missouri, traveled from Illinois parking adjacent in a lot an apartment entering apartment house and occupant whose possessed telephones assigned phone the same numbers as provided those by the Although concluding informant. that the cause, FBI affidavit insufficient to was establish suggested that deficiencies a search warrant affidavit Court incorporating from an informant could be remedied information “veracity”: respect “basis-of-knowledge” both with Aguilar, allegations tip inadequate which If the is found under other hearsay report then be contained should corroborate information however, stage well, Aguilar this enunciated in considered. At as the standards fairly magistrate’s He must ask: Can it be said that must inform the decision. by independent tip, parts of it have corroborated even when certain been sources, trustworthy tip pass Aguilar’s which tests without is as would independent L.Ed.2d at S.Ct. at [Id. 643.] corroboration? Spinelli if an majority in observed that affidavit of the informant’s in its recitation as to basis deficient tip knowledge, self-verifying of the informant’s can details deficiency: this overcome detailing the manner which the information In the absence of a statement tip gathered, especially important that the describe the accused’s it is magistrate may activity he is know that criminal sufficient detail circulating in relying something rumor more substantial than a casual general reputation. merely on an individual’s an accusation based

underworld or 21 L.Ed.2d at 89 S.Ct. [Id. 644.] veracity, if informant’s acknowledged also that the The Court affidavit, inadequately in the officer’s could be documented *16 by investigation, but concluded a corroborative bolstered sufficiently been Spinelli veracity had of the informant established: Aguilar report’s patent as to the raises Nor we believe that doubts do detailing by allegations adequately reliability are resolved a consideration most, allegations investigative independent indi- At these

the FBI’s efforts. telephones by Spinelli specified the informant could used the cated that have by support purpose. the inference that cannot be said to both some This itself charge trustworthy generally he had made his and that the informer was way. Once against Spinelli a reliable of information obtained on basis police Independent Draper comparison. again, provides work a relevant provided by had small detail that been much more than one case corroborated There, upon meeting on the police, inbound Denver train informant. Hereford, morning specified saw man whose dress informer second apparent description. was then corresponded precisely to It Hereford’s detailed cloth; fabricating report since out whole his informant had not been that the report experience may recognized was of the sort which in common as having way, probable perfectly been obtained in a reliable it was clear that 418, 590, cause been at had established. [Id. S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d at 644.]6 Gates, supra, v. Illinois the Court its abandoned exclusive reliance on the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test for evaluat- ing provided by informant, information adopting place in its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis traditionally “the has 238, informed cause determinations.” However, at 548. the Court took pains point out that question independent police investigation 6 The remedy whether can also deficiency knowledge" subject in the informant's "basis of has been sharp Maryland Appellate Judge Moylan, academic debate. Charles an ac

knowledged authority, investigation fourth-amendment concludes that is knowledge: irrelevant to the basis of informant's knowledge" prong "veracity," The "basis of assumes an informant’s ("What proceeds probe then and test his conclusion: are the raw facts upon which the informant based his conclusion?” "How did the informant precisely obtain those facts?” "What did he or see hear or smell touch else, firsthand?” "If he heard the facts from someone what makes that person person third ‘credible’ and did how that third come the knowl- edge?”). judge must ascertain the source for the raw data —the product weigh of someone's senses —and then that data for He is himself.. part testimony concerned provides not with that of an affidavit or which story information about but with the recitation of informant coming the informant. from ******** “independent technique repair [T]he verification” cannot defect knowledge” prong. Verifying story part "basis of the truth of aof does nothing story’s either to ascertain the source or check the informant’s perhaps State, 507, —, [Stanley Md.App. invalid conclusions. 313 A. (1974).] 2d 861-62 LaFave, Amendment, See 1 W. Search and A Treatise on the Fourth Seizure: 3.3(f) (1978); Gates, § at 562 Illinois U.S. at S.Ct. at J., (Brennan, dissenting). 76 L.Ed.2d at 576-77 But id. 270 n. cf. J., (White, (if concurring) 103 S.Ct. at 2349-50 n. 76 L.Ed.2d at 569 n. 22 police corroborate "information from which it can be inferred that the information, tip grounded informant’s inside this corroboration satisfy knowledge veracity prong" sufficient to the basis of as the well Kamisar, prong); (“I supra note at 558 share Justice White’s view that *17 independent deficiency a corroboration can ’cure’ in either or both prongs.”). highly knowledge” are all and “basis of an informant’s "veracity,” “reliability,” agree, determining his We that do however, relevant in value report. elements should be understood as entirely separate independent these * * * * * rigidly in case *. Rather, to be exacted they every requirements issues that be understood intertwined closely may usefully should simply is eommonsense, “probable illuminate the whether there practical question in or evidence located a cause” believe that contraband particular place. 76 L.Ed.2d at 103 at 543.] [Id. in of an affidavit offered sufficiency involved Gates authorizing the of the a warrant search support of search application car for the warrant defendants’ and house. handwritten letter sent to the triggered anonymous, an Department alleged: Bloomingdale, Illinois Police a in town who “This letter is inform have you your strictly you couple living selling drugs. on are Sue and Lance live Gates, they make their They Bloomingdale Most are in the of their off Rd. condominiums. Greenway, buys Florida, in his wife drives their car to where she leaves it to done Florida. Sue drugs, drives Sue then Lance down and it back. flys be loaded up flys driving 3 she is down there after she the car off in Florida. drops May back flying again it At time in a few to drive back. and Lance will be down days $100,000.00 the car he has the trunk loaded with over Lance drives back drugs drugs. their basement. $100,000.00 have over worth of Presently they brag and make their entire work, about the fact have never “They they living on pushers. big guarantee make catch. They “I if watch them will a you you carefully big drug who visit their house often. dealers, are friends with some “Lance & Susan Gates

“Greenway 2325, 76 L.Ed.2d at 540.] 103 S.Ct. “in Condominiums” [Id. in- Bloomingdale Department Police Detective Mader of the anonymous tip Illinois driv- vestigated the and learned an Bloomingdale. had issued to Lance Gates er’s license been a “L. had an individual named Gates” also learned that He Florida, Beach, departing flight to West Palm reservation on agent May request, Mader’s Chicago on 5th. At from Administration conducted surveillance Drug Enforcement Beach. West Palm flight destined for Gates board observed agents Florida had observed reported that federal He also he had and confirmed that arrival West Palm Beach Gates’ nearby motel. The airport by to a from the taxi traveled a room in the motel Gates had entered agents reported that *18 116

registered The morning Susan Gates. next Gates an and unidentified woman left in Mercury the motel with automobile plates. They Illinois license drove northbound an interstate generally highway by used Chicago. travelers for The bound plate license Mercury number on the by was identified the agents registered wagon federal one a station by owned Gates.

Detective Mader prepared incorporated affidavit that during details learned the investigation. He submitted the affidavit, along copy anonymous letter, with a to a county judge. judge court issued that search warrant authorized searches of the Gates’ residence and automobile. 7,May On when Lance and wife Gates his returned to their home in Bloomingdale, the Bloomingdale searched the Mercury trunk of the approximately and discovered pounds marijuana. During search the Gates’ home the officers marijuana, weapons, found and other contraband.

The Illinois suppressed Circuit Court evidence on ground support affidavit submitted in of the search warrant did establish cause. That decision was Court, affirmed Appellate Illinois 82 Ill.App.3d (1980), Ill.Dec. 2d Supreme N.E. Court Illinois, Ill.2d 53 Ill.Dec. N.E.2d

Relying on the two-pronged analysis derived from Aguilar Spinelli, Supreme the Illinois Court concluded that anonymous letter, supplemented by affidavit, Detective Mader’s satisfy did not either “veracity” or the “basis-of-knowl edge” prong by Aguilar. established The court concluded there no basis determining anonymous was that the letter credible, writer was by police and that the corroboration innocent details in the contained letter could not satisfy the requirement. “veracity” 222-24, Id. Ill.Dec. at addition, N.E.2d 891-93. In the court observed that anonymous letter did not reveal the source of its author’s knowledge and concluded that the set detail forth in the letter an inference that the contents of justify not sufficient Id. from a source. the letter had been obtained reliable majority, agreed Gates writing for the Rehnquist, Justice letter, anonymous Supreme Illinois Court standing alone *19 might nothing that its author is which one conclude from

provides virtually gives no the letter likewise, or his information reliable; absolutely either honest regarding the Gateses’ basis the writer’s predictions indication of the magistrate Something more was before then, criminal required, activities. cause contraband would there was to believe that conclude that probable could U.S. at 103 S.Ct. at be found in the Gateses’ home and car. 2326, 76 [462 L.Ed.2d at 541.] Aguilar on and Supreme Illinois Court’s reliance Rejecting the independent investiga- Spinelli, determined that the the Court Bloomingdale police by agents ade- tion the federal and the tip. The reliability of the informant’s quately the verified two-pronged analysis the Aguilar-Spinelli Court observed that guide of to determinations overly technical and ill-suited probable cause: largely “two-pronged chan- into two independent test” directs analysis [T]he knowledge.” of his “basis or and “reliability” nels —the informant’s "veracity” arguments according against two elements such these

There are persuasive status. independent [********] rigorous prongs of and into the the complex superstructure Spinelli inquiry our have in Spinelli that some seen implicit and rules analytical evidentiary warrants the fact decision, many quite cannot be reconciled with are— judgments of common-sense nontechnical, the basis of properly —issued demanding applying used more formal than those a standard less laymen given in which legal proceedings. informal, hurried context Likewise, the often “two-pronged of test” are subtleties,” it must the “built-in be applied, determining magistrates in [Id. cause. to assist probable particularly unlikely (citations omitted).] at 103 L.Ed.2d at 233, 235-36, 2329, 2331, at totality-of-

Nevertheless, formulating the elements of the continued analysis, recognized the Court the-circumstances knowledge: of veracity and basis relevance of an informant’s issuing magistrate common-sense make practical, The task of the simply given set all the circumstances decision whether, before affidavit forth persons supplying him, knowledge" “veracity" including the “basis and of of hearsay information, or evidence of that contraband there is a fair probability * * * found are a crime will be in a We convinced that this particular place. flexible, standard will better achieve the of applied accommodation easily public and interests the Fourth Amendment private than does the requires Aguilar that has from at Spinelli. [Id. approach developed 233, 238-39, 103 (emphasis omitted).] at at 2329, 2332, L.Ed.2d added, citations The Gates majority also totality-of-the-cir- observed provided magistrates cumstances test with wider discretion to grant or refuse warrants permitted than had been under Aguilar-Spinelli rules: Nothing magistrate in our of lessens the opinion any way authority draw such inferences as he from reasonable will the material to him supplied by indeed, regime he is than under for a warrant; applicants freer of

Aguilar Spinelli inferences, such to draw them draw he refuse if so is minded. (emphasis [Id. S.Ct. added).] Finally, explicitly scope the Court limited permissible appellate review cause determination made warrant-issuing judge, holding that the fourth amendment de novo require did not validity review as to warrant: have said that [W]e repeatedly after-the-fact courts of the sufficien- scrutiny magistrate’s an affidavit should not take the cy form de novo review. A *20 great reviewing “determination of cause should be deference paid by grudging negative reviewing “A courts.” attitude courts towards war- by strong rants,” is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s for preference searches conducted should pursuant warrant; “courts invalidate interpreting in a rather than a warrants] by affidavits] com- hypertechnical, monsense, manner.”

[********] Reflecting this for the warrant the traditional standard for preference process, issuing magistrate’s of an review determination has probable-cause been so long magistrate concluding]” had a “substantial basis for ... that a wrongdoing, search would uncover of evidence the Fourth Amendment requires Spinelli 236, 103 S. Ct. no more. at at (quoting 76 at 546-47 [Id. 2331, L.Ed.2d dissenting, Stevens, 7 Justice believed that was defective even warrant under the Id. totality-of-the-circumstances 291-94, at newly-adopted test. 103 S.Ct. at 76 2360-62, L.Ed.2d 582-85. Justices and Brennan Marshall dissent Aguilar-Spinelli ed on the basis that of rules repudiation was and unwise 462 U.S. 286-91, 103 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d at 579-82. 76 unnecessary. 2357-60, concurring, White, Justice believed that was valid warrant under Aguilar-Spinelli thought standard, which he should be clarified but not aban Id. at 267-73, S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d at 567-71. doned. 103 at 2347-51,

119 584, 637; States, 410, 419, 393 89 21 L.Ed.2d v. U.S. S.Ct. United Ventresca, 102, 108-09, 741, 745-46, 85 13 v. 380 U.S. S.Ct. United States 257, 725, 736, 684; States, 271, v. 362 U.S. L.Ed.2d Jones United S.Ct. 697).] of Gates up, the fourth amendment impact To sum First, by adopting probable-cause determinations two-fold. analysis, reempha totality-of-the-circumstances signals it conception” probable cause “practical, sis nontechnical of of the States, supra, 160, Brinegar 338 U.S. United in endorsed 93 L.Ed. repudiating the S.Ct. does so without “veracity” “basis-of-knowledge” inquiries with relevance Second, respect allegations by informants. it limits scope appellate by the fourth of federal review mandated war probable-cause by determinations amendment as to rant-issuing magistrate. Jersey Law

B. Probable Cause—New Case concerning probable decisions in cases cause This Court’s expected, As relatively have uncontroversial. would be been Upton, by aspect the Court Massachusetts of Gates reaffirmed 8 This (1984). of review standard L.Ed.2d 721 U.S. appears Upton to contradict the Court’s established in Gates endorsed California, 10 L.Ed.2d in Ker v. formulation Ker, Clark, writing majority approved de novo review Justice constitutionally-mandated necessary standards: to vindicate when it is the first a substantive is in instance reasonableness search [T]he circum- by from facts and made trial court to be determination down light criteria” laid case and in of the "fundamental stances applying opinions Court this the Fourth Amendment and course, reasonableness, only respected Findings are Amendment. guarantees. we have As consistent with federal constitutional insofar as rights, involving and in federal constitutional above other cases stated against findings examination no means insulated of state courts are appraise prius contra- sit as in nisi While this Court does not here. *21 will, necessary dictory questions, determination factual it where facts, the rights, independent examination of the make an constitutional in the findings, whether can determine for itself and the record so that it i.e., constitutional —crite- as to decision reasonableness fundamental — 33-34, respected. 83 S.Ct. by [Id. at this been ria Court have established omitted).] (citations 10 L.Ed.2d 738 120

many opinions our emphasize principles the same that have recognized by been decisions the federal courts. We have consistently probable characterized common-sense, cause as a practical standard for determining validity of a search Kasabucki, In State v. 110, warrant. 52 N.J. (1968), 116 we said: Probable cause is a nontechnical flexible, It includes a conscious concept.

balancing governmental against need for enforcement of criminal law right the citizens’ regarded It must be constitutionally protected privacy. representing competing an effort to accommodate those often interests so as to serve hampering them both in a fashion without practical the one or unduly impairing significant unreasonably content of the other. cert, Davis, See State v. denied, N.J. 16, (1967), 50 24 389 U.S. 1054, 805, S.Ct. 88 Laws, (1968); 19 State v. L.Ed.2d 852 50 cert, N.J. 159, (1967), denied, 971, 173 393 U.S. 408, 89 21 (1968); Mark, L.Ed.2d 384 State v. 262, 46 N.J. (1966); 271 Contursi, State v. 422, 44 N.J. (1965); 428-29 Boyd, State v. N.J. 390, (1965).

This Court has unwavering also been in its insistence that affidavits submitted support application of a allege warrant specific facts so that issuing judge can indepen- determine dently probable whether or not cause has been established: The crucial determination is to be not made officer but issuing judge. judge neutral Before the is in a to make his determina position tion for he underlying issuance, must be made aware of the properly facts or circumstances which believing would warrant a inman law prudent being Legal guilt violated. sufficient proof is, establish of course, not good required; faith on the officer’s suspicion without will part, more, not suffice. As the Nathanson Court it in v. United Supreme succinctly put States, issuing magistrate search warrant not issue unless may can find from cause the facts or probable circumstances to him under presented oath or enough.” affirmation —“Mere affirmance of belief or v. [State suspicion

Macri, supra, States, (quoting at N.J. Nathanson v. United (1933)).] 78 L.Ed. 11, 13, Fariello, See State v. 71 N.J. (1976); State v. 564-65 Ebron, Mark, N.J. (1972); State 46 N.J. 273; State v. Moriarty, 39 N.J. (1963); State Burrachio, 39 N.J. 275-76 courts,

Like the permitted federal we have reliance on hear- say for purpose establishing cause, but have *22 warrant-issuing provide the the officer’s affidavit insisted that hearsay. crediting the State a basis for judge with substantial 212; Perry, 59 N.J. Ebron, at v. supra, N.J. State v. 275; v. Burrachio, at State (1971); supra, 39 N.J. v. State 262; Southard, 144 Macri, N.J.Su supra, 39 N.J. State (App.Div.1976). per. validity required to consider the infrequently been

We have Aguilar- of the hearsay in the context warrants based on supra, 59 N.J. Perry, In two-pronged test. State Spinelli on information “from reliable was based the affidavit informant, past given reliable information in the who ha[d] “monies, arrests,” consisting of property that stolen leading to [sic], and narcotics bag, narcotics barbituates doctor’s jewelry, paraphernalia” apartment. could be found in the defendant’s Id. veracity adequately held that the informant’s 387. We was As past reliability. his reference to officer’s established prong, noted that “basis-of-knowledge” we to the nature in the informant’s is of such detailed contained tip the information magistrate had the informant lead a to infer that probably it could reasonably gained had his stolen, he knew to be items himself which observed the * * * in this We think the detailed description in a reliable way. information * * * regarded as sufficient which case is of the Court type Spinelli in a reliable way. [Id. 392.] was obtained establish that the information allegation Ebron, officer’s N.J. State v. home mother’s selling narcotics from his was that defendant who “informant part information from an ha[d] based in on past”9 part on a surveillance in the prove[n] reliable concluded three-day period. We by police over the residence reliability past as to the informant’s officer’s assertions that the that the prong Aguilar-Spinelli, veracity satisfied at 212. Id. prong had not been satisfied. “basis-of-knowledge” ground that Nevertheless, the warrant was sustained satisfy the “basis-of-knowl- tip although informant’s did of the “totality supplemented by the edge” it could be prong, in the Appellate is set forth verbatim opinion 9 The detective’s affidavit Division, 113 154-55 N.J.Super. proofs issuing id., magistrate,” including submitted during facts established the officers their surveillance defendant’s residence.10 We held that the informant’s “[w]hen *23 test,’ ‘two-pronged statement fails to meet this the affidavit may if in application nevertheless be sufficient elsewhere enough ‘permit suspicions engendered there report ripen judgment informant’s into a that a crime was probably being We committed.’ think the affidavit before us 212 (quoting Spinelli meets this test.” 61 at N.J. v. United 410, States, 418, 584, 590, 637). U.S. 89 393 21 L.Ed.2d Validity

C. the Warrant of matter, preliminary As a guidance and for to trial and officials, appellate courts and law enforcement we acknowledge totality-of-the-circumstances our apply intention to test analo gous Gates, that set forth in supra, Illinois v. 462 238, 2332, 548, 103 76 L.Ed.2d at validity test the of probable-cause search warrants under the standard set in forth I, paragraph Jersey article 7 of New Constitution.11 We note that those commentators who have on the focused decision differ in its significance. Compare their assessment of Kami- Attorney analysis similarity 10 The General cites the Ebron its Gates, totality-of-the-circumstances adopted supra. test in Illinois v. To the acknowledges tip extent that Ebron an informant’s neither discloses knowledge self-verifying the basis of the informant’s nor contains detail can be supplemented by warrant, holding collateral facts to sustain a in Ebron analysis Supreme majority indeed resembles relied on Court’s in acknowledged propriety supplementing Gates. We also in Ebron that the tip prongs Aguilar corroborating informant’s that fails both one or with specifically recognized by details in an officer's affidavit was the Court’s States, 418, opinion Spinelli supra, in v. United 393 U.S. at 89 S.Ct. at 21 L.Ed.2d at 645. “totality-of-the-circumstances” apply 11 The test that we and endorse in this principle case is a of state constitutional law used to test determinations of I, pursuant Jersey paragraph cause to article New Constitu application substantially tion. We assume that the will this standard Gates, supra, consistent with the criteria set forth Illinois v. atU.S. 103 S.Ct. at 76 L.Ed.2d at 548. sar, “Gates, Cause,’ Faith,’ Beyond,” ‘Good and ‘Probable (1984) Iowa L.Rev. (interpreting Gates as dismantling test), LaFave, two-pronged “Fourth Amendment Va Cause, View, garies Imperceptible Improbable Plain Noto Askew),” Balancing Privacy, rious 74 Crim.L. & Criminol (1983), It ogy Moylan, “Illinois v. Gates: What (1984) Do,” Did and What It Did Not 20 Crim.L.Bull. (both applica interpreting Gates as consistent with continued Aguilar-Spinelli evaluating tion of the factors in informants’ view, totality-of-the-circumstanees tips). our Gates analysis approach is consistent with the this Court has tradi tionally employed resolving probable-cause See issues. State Ebron, 207; Kasabucki, supra, supra, v. N.J. State 110; Laws, majority As the N.J. State N.J. 173. conceded, applications rely part Gates search-warrant thorough scrutiny tip require on an will continue to informant’s knowledge in the veracity of the informant’s and basis *24 in the officer’s totality context of of the facts contained Gates, showing cause. v. 462 U.S. Illinois 238-39, also 103 at 76 at 548. We would case, note, that as illustrated the affidavit in this by it analysis though may be assess Aguilar-Spinelli —useful weight tip ing the to be accorded to informant’s —does sufficiency necessarily inquiry end as to an affidavit’s . establishing probable cause part Higgins’ this case Detective affidavit relies

In The affi from an informant. information obtained unidentified appears comply with both davit’s reference to the informant veracity informant’s prongs Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Higgins’ Detective unvarnished statement supported is (with investigations proven in several he “has reliable accepted past in the supplied).” information he We have satisfying informant as similarly undetailed endorsement of an supra, 59 requirement. Perry, N.J. veracity State State, Md.App. Stanley v. 390; compare veraci- Aguilar’s (1974)(where informant satisfied 847, 851 A.2d colors.”). ty “flying Similarly, the informant’s “ba- prong with knowledge” clearly sis of is established the assertion that “he dealing drugs gas ‘Otto’ from witnessed his station.” Although the affidavit’s reference to the informant satisfies test, the Aguilar-Spinelli the substantive information obtained meager from the informant is indeed. One deficiency critical the affidavit furnishes no information whatsoever as to when the informant allegedly drug “witnessed” the sales. Con- sequently, allegations, alone, standing informant’s were inadequate provide judicial a neutral officer with a reason- present suspicion able basis for that a search of Novembrino’s premises yield would In Rosen- activity. evidence of criminal States, cranz v. (1st Cir.1966), United F.2d 310 the court rejected affidavit, a similar which contained no time reference other than the fact phrased present affidavit was in the holding invalid, tense. the warrant the court cautioned: present suspended air; point tense is in the it has no of reference. It speaks, all, anonymous conveyed after of the time when an informant informa- officer, week, day, tion to the which could have been a or months before the inference, date of the affidavit. To make a double that the undated information speaks as of a date close to that of the affidavit and that therefore the undated strength speak observation made on the of such information must as of an even open unsupervised more recent date would be to the door to the issuance of aging search warrants on the basis of information. Officers with information questionable recency escape by simply omitting could embarrassment aver- time, long they reported they ments as to so that whatever information Magistrates received was stated to be current at that time. would have less opportunity perform Indeed, their “neutral and detached” function. if the valid, adjudged any affidavit in this case be it is difficult to see how function stamp but that of a rubber remains for them. [Id. 316-17.] Boyd, Accord United (6th States F.2d Cir.1970); Elliott, F.Supp. United States v. (S.D.Ohio 1984); R.B.C., N.J.Super. State Interest (J.D.R.C.1981); *25 LaFave, see W. A Search Seizure: Treatise on the Amendment, 3.7(b) Fourth (1978) (hereinafter LaFave, at 693 § ).12 Search and Seizure substantially specific 12 Theaffidavit at issue in this case is less as to time Blaurock, N.J.Super. (App.Div.

than the affidavit construed in State v. addition, In conclusory allega- unidentified informant’s usually keeps drugs gas tions that “Otto in the station” and dealing drugs” that he “witnessed unsupported by any Otto are specific facts judge from which a neutral independently could suspicion a yield derive reasonable that a search would evidence of criminal activity. may The fact that a officer be willing to tip particularly believe the one who informant — helpful prior has been on judge’s occasions—does not lessen the duty tip to scrutinize the of the weigh substance order to its sufficiency against practical of probable standard cause. Macri, As Justice Jacobs observed in State v. “Before judge position is in a to make his determination for is- suance, properly he must be made of the underlying aware prudent facts circumstances which would warrant inman believing being the law was violated.” 39 N.J. 257. Here, tip conclusion, allegedly informant’s is a bald based personal observation, on unsupported by any but reference to events, dates, or circumstances. alone, allegations,

Because the standing informant’s are cause, insufficient probable to establish we focus on the inde pendent observations Higgins made Detectives and Scianni they adequately supplement to determine if the informant’s 1976). Appellate suppress In that case the Division refused evidence where challenged grounds. Relying the affidavit was on United ‘‘staleness” States Harris, (3d Cir.1973), Johnson, F.2d and United States v. 461 F. (10th Cir.1972), question 2d the court concluded that the probable depends merely staleness of cause on the recitation in the times, particular upon affidavit of dates and assessment of careful conclusion, allegedly activity. reaching nature of the unlawful its the court days passed reported considered the fact that 18 had between the last surveil inconsequential lance and the date of the be affidavit to because the affidavit description drug-related included a detailed of the defendant’s activities. Cf. States, 206, 210-11, Sgro v. United 287 U.S. 53 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed. (1932) ("[I]t proof probable [of is manifest must be of facts so cause] closely justify finding related to the time of the issue the warrant as to proof cause at that time. test Whether meets this must case.”). determined the circumstances of each *26 126

allegations.13 first is silent with We observe that affidavit appre regard experience investigating officers’ in hending Although acknowledge police drug dealers. we that specific activity criminal is experience officer’s with forms of assessing probable whether cause entitled to consideration 742-43, established, Brown, 730, 460 has see Texas v. U.S. been 1535, 1543-44, 502, (1983); 103 75 L.Ed.2d 514 United S.Ct. 421-22, 411, 690, 697, Cortez, 101 v. 449 U.S. 66 States S.Ct. Kasabucki, 621, (1981); 2d 631 v. 52 N.J. at L.Ed. State 17, Sainz, 22 117; N.J.Super. (App.Div.), 210 certif. v. State (1986), suggests nothing this affidavit granted, 104 N.J. 453 familiarity investigating particular officers had a any drug transactions. The crux of the officers’ direct observations is summarized by one sentence the affidavit: I, along Scianni, Ralph subject with Det. conducted a surveillance of and his Thurs., 6/2/83, PM, station on between the PM and 7:00 hours 3:00 meeting persons, leaving observed Otto with several after station and his

making drug what we believed to be transactions. phrase “making The critical is officers Otto observed drug what we to be believed transactions.” If the officers had suspicion they witnessing drug reasonable were fact transactions, they would have been authorized to arrest defend- spot. Williams, ant on the Adams v. 407 92 U.S. 1921, 1924-25, (1972); Ohio, Beck v. explanation supplementing 13 Alucid of the role of observations in State, allegations probable Stanley informant’s to establish cause is found in supra, Md.App. at A.2d at 860: function, purposes. They primary Such observations serve two have a course, bearing directly probable on the establishment of cause. When probable such are observations sufficient in themselves to demonstrate cause, problem thereby the final is solved and all information both from redundancy; probable and about the informant becomes a cause is estab- necessary hearsay. Similarly, lished without resort to the direct observa- tions, cause, may probable insufficient unto themselves to establish never- trustworthy hearsay, Aguilar's theless be added which meets standards itself, incriminatory also insufficient unto so that the combination of may quite elements establish the cause which neither alone demonstrates. 89, 91, 223, 225, (1964); 13 L.Ed.2d Macuk, State N.J. (1970); Doyle, State v. 42 N.J. *27 The officers in requested this case defendant to accompany police headquarters but, them to pointedly, did not place him under arrest.

Additionally, utterly the affidavit is devoid of specific facts witnessed the officers from which judge could have independently suspicions concluded that their were reasonable. The affidavit does not state with particularity what the officers observed or why the officers drugs believed that being were sold. It judge does not inform the respect in what the transac- tions observed the officers differed from routine service station only specific transactions. The allegation offered is that an identification check was with respect made to one vehicle that entered the day service station that its —after occupant completed “a transaction” with defendant —and check revealed that the vehicle’s owner had been arrested on charges drugs. related to That factual insertion is insufficient to overcome the deficiencies detail and substance which we have averted. Spinelli States,

In his v. United concurrence in supra, U.S. 89 21 L.Ed.2d Justice empha- White sized that an affidavit specific must include support facts suspicions: officer’s gambling If an officer swears that there is aat certain equipment address, (1) (2) the possibilities are that he has seen the that he has observed equipment; facts from which the perceived presence equipment may reasonably (3) (1) inferred; and that he has obtained the information from someone else. If good. (2), is is true, affidavit But the affidavit is insufficient unless given, magistrate, facts are it is the not the perceived officer, who is to

judge (3), the existence of cause. With probable where officer’s respect good is crediting information no warrant should issue hearsay, absent cause for at 423-24, hearsay. [393 at 648 (citations omitted).] complete We are in agreement with the trial court and the Appellate affidavit, Division that tolerantly this read and non- technically, simply pass does not constitutional muster. Our dissenting colleague, Garibaldi, agrees Justice that the affidavit allegations probable conclusory

does not establish cause. The persuasive of the officers are even less certain and less than conclusory vague allegations the informant. Our common-sense review of these circumstances leads to the con- officers, investigation, clusion an after abbreviated they drug seen were uncertain whether had sales and their vague informant was about what he had seen and silent as to together, allegations he had seen it. Read when provide issuing judge informant and of the officers did not independent sufficient facts on which to determi- with base the existence of cause. nation emphasize our inadequacy We conclusion as to the affidavit, notwithstanding compliance its literal both prongs thoroughly Aguilar-Spinelli, consistent with our law, application, totality- as a matter of state-constitutional of a *28 Rehnquist of-the-circumstances test. As Justice observed Gates, issuing judge under that standard the “is freer than regime Aguilar Spinelli under the and to draw such inferenc- es, to if he is refuse to draw them so minded.” 462 U.S. view, 76 L.Ed.2d at 549. In our judge in presented this case was not sufficient to facts and, permit probable of the inference existence of cause therefore, improperly the warrant was issued. might sparseness allega

One assume from the of the have, judge may tions submitted to the these officers simply observed additional facts that were omitted from the body police of the It affidavit. is not sufficient that officers adequate support they are aware of facts if warrant fail facts, issuing judge. Any communicate these facts to the such testimony judge contempora if offered as recorded neously, judge supplementing could be considered Fariello, contents of the affidavit. State v. 71 N.J. at Nothing suggests 558-63. in the us record before Detec Higgins supplemented testimony tive his he affidavit with when appeared judge before the to obtain the warrant.

Independent of our conclusion as to the affidavit’s insufficiency cause, probable to establish we note that prepared hastily preparation affidavit was time for its —the estimated be ten or fifteen minutes—and it that was the experience preparing officer’s first support affidavit in Although a search warrant. the affidavit antedates the Attor Statement,14 ney Policy General’s requires which the re search Attorney view of warrant affidavits either the Gener al’s county prosecutor’s staff, or the the record in this case by any reflects that the affidavit was not reviewed superiors in Bayonne officer’s Police Department. Our observations as to experience, spent the officer’s the time affidavit, preparing any and the absence of review reflect our support conviction that an affidavit in aof search warrant carefully prepared must be and reviewed to assure that it faithfully police investigation reflects the results of the provides judge with sufficient perform detail to him to enable constitutionally-mandated stated, his review. As we have preparation adequate standards for of an affidavit are more technical, practical than necessary readily and the skills can acquired by perceive well-trained officer. We no incom patibility objectives between skills and of law-enforcement requirement officials and the constitutional that warrants issue only upon probable cause.

III view our conclusion that the search warrant was issued cause, without now we consider State’s contention *29 by construing that hold the to we evidence be admissible article I, paragraph Jersey permit recog- 7 the New Constitution “good-faith” nition the modification of the rule 14 "Policy Attorney Jersey County Statement of the General of New and the Jersey Regarding Prosecutors Association New Prosecutorial Review of Manual, Applications," Jersey Search Warrant New Prosecutors at 46-1 to 46-4 1985). (February at 150-151. See discussion infra 897, Leon, supra, 468 U.S. v. United States in

set forth 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.15 concurring opinion in the the Preliminarily, note that we excep good-faith cautions that review of Division Appellate N.J.Super. at 245. may inappropriate. in tion this case Leon application opinion retroactive That observed Leon, that, trial court in this case unlike “doubtful” reasonably good in faith relied finding that the officer made no Id. searching defendant’s service station. on the warrant hearing suppres Although the search and 246. both Leon, we assume without in this case antedate sion motion Leon was intended to question that the decision deciding the United Eighth noted in retroactively. As the Circuit apply cert, denied, 1261, (1984), Sager, 743 F.2d States 1264-65 1196, (1985), day 84 1217, on the 105 U.S. certiorari Leon was decided the Supreme granted Court cases, re judgments fourth-amendment vacated the several light of Leon.16 manding them for further consideration 981, case, Sheppard, 104 S.Ct. companion 468 U.S. 15 In Massachusetts v. 3424, (1984), good-faith exception applied 82 L.Ed.2d 737 the Court pursuant suppression of evidence obtained overturn issuing magis "technically” defective because a search warrant was failing adequately error in to alter form had made clerical trate Stevens, concurring judgment, that the in the maintained warrant. Justice necessary good-faith exception the case it was clear decide because during objects seized the warrant issued on cause and that affidavit limitations contained in the the search were consistent support 104 S.Ct. at 82 L.Ed.2d of the warrant. Id. at submitted in 963-66, Leon, supra, (citing 104 S.Ct. at 468 U.S. at United States v. 725-27). posed by Sheppard Although is not issue 82 L.Ed.2d case, "technically specifically with Rules deal involved in this our Court faith, 3:5-7(g): no “In absence of bad warrants. See R. defective” search unlawful shall be deemed made with a search warrant search or seizure irregularities or in the in the warrant of technical insufficiencies or because it, proceedings papers its execution.” to obtain or in Cassity, L.Ed.2d 879 104 S.Ct. United States Tate, (1984); 104 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d United States v. 468 U.S.

131 Moreover, that have addressed federal circuit courts those appli has retroactive uniformly that Leon have concluded issue 963, Merchant, 760 F. 2d 968-69 v. cation. See United States — cert, U.S.-, 3293, 92 (9th Cir.1985), S.Ct. granted, (1986); supra, 743 F. 2d at Sager, L.Ed. 2d 708 United States 653, (9th Hendricks, 1264-65; 743 F. 2d United States cert, 1006, 1362, Cir.1984), denied, 84 L.Ed. 105 S.Ct. U.S. (1985). 2d 382 objective good-faith reliance of the officers’

As to the issue warrant, apply opinion Leon would the Court’s acting objective officer exception whenever “an good-faith judge a search from good faith has obtained warrant 920, scope.” at within its 468 U.S. magistrate and acted Accordingly, assuming that at 697.17 at 82 L.Ed.2d role, and neutral magistrate did his detached not abandon “only if the officers were permit suppression would Leon their affidavit or could not preparing dishonest or reckless in the existence objectively an reasonable belief harbored have 926,104 82 L.Ed.2d at cause.” Id. hearing in case testimony suppression this No at the 701. Despite our conclusions was false. suggested that the affidavit so as to are not blatant insufficiency, its defects as to its validity of on the objectively reasonable reliance preclude an the warrant.18 Crozier,

(1984); L.Ed.2d 873 104 S.Ct. United States v. exception good-faith ‘‘[m]any objections assume that 17 Recognizing to a officers,” good-faith subjective of individual exception will turn on adopted in Leon was emphasized of reasonableness Court standard n. 82 L.Ed.2d objective S.Ct. at 3420 468 U.S. at 919 n. one. moreover, added, adopt, requires objective we standard 20. Court "The n. The prohibits.” Id. knowledge of law what a reasonable officers have 958-59, But see United States v. Leon 468 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. at J., ("Given (Brennan, dissenting) such a relaxed 82 L.Ed.2d at 721-22 court, standard, reviewing virtually that a when faced with it is inconceivable suppress, first find that a warrant was invalid defendant’s motion to could Appellate majority *31 Division was satisfied from its exami- nation of the record that Higgins’ Detective reliance on the warrant objectively reasonable. 200 N.J.Super. at 237. dissenting however, colleague, Our cautions that without fur- police investigation ther competent and of review the warrant application, she would not in police future cases consider re- liance on warrant issued under these circumstances to be objectively reasonable. Post at 186-88. For purpose our good-faith discussion of exception to the exclusionary rule, disposition and view our issue, of the adopt, we conceding correctness, without its the conclusion Appel- late majority Division on the issue of objectively the officer’s reasonable reliance on the warrant.

A. The Exclusionary Development Rule: and Prior to United States Leon Modifications Our consideration of the “good-faith” recognized modification in Leon can be only undertaken in the history context of the and application of the exclusionary rule prior to the Leon Although decision.19 origin of the exclusionary can be traced Boyd States, United 116 U.S. 6 S. Ct. standard, then, time, police under the new Gates but at the same find that offi "objectively cer’s reliance on such an invalid warrant was nevertheless reason overlap completely, able” under the test. Because the two [Leon] standards so it unlikely yet that a warrant could found invalid under Gates and reasonable; otherwise, upon objectively reliance it could be seen as we would mind-boggling concept objectively have to entertain the reasonable reliance Kamisar, upon objectively (citing supra unreasonable warrant." note 588-89; Wasserstrom, Amendment," Shrinking "The Incredible Fourth 21 Am. LaFave, (1984); Imperfect Crim.L.Rev. 257 "The Fourth Amendment in an Faith,”’ Drawing ‘Bright World: On Lines’ and Good 43 U.Pitt.L.Rev. (1982)). 333-59 history 19 Foran excellent development discussion of the and of the exclu sionary Stewart, supra rule see note and Mertens and Wasser strom, supra note at 373-89. the rule was case in which (1886),20 L.Ed. first criminal States, 383, 34 232 was Weeks v. United applied 20 Boyd proceeding government, concerned civil forfeiture in which the subpoena, sought production goods prove of invoices for in order to their quantity complied subpoena and appealed value. The defendants with the judgment ground compelled production on the that the violated their rights. impassioned opinion, fourth and fifth-amendment In an Justice Brad ley emphasized opposition primary to unreasonable searches was a cause independence England: effort to achieve from proceedings In order to ascertain the nature of the intended Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the terms "unreasonable seizures," only necessary contemporary searches it is to recall the history subject, country then recent of the controversies on the both in this Colonies, England. practice issuing had obtained in the officers, them, empowering writs of assistance revenue in their discretion, suspected places smuggled goods, to search which James *32 pronounced arbitrary power, Otis "the worst instrument of the most English law, liberty principles destructive of and the fundamental of that book;" English they placed liberty ever was found in an law since "the of every every petty February, man in the hands of officer.” This was in 1761, Boston, and perhaps the famous debate in which it occurred was prominent inaugurated the most event which the resistance of the colonies there,” oppressions country. of the mother "Then and said John Adams, opposition "then and there was the first scene of the first act of arbitrary Indepen- the claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child 624-25, 528-29, dence [116 was born.” U.S. at 6 S.Ct. at 29 L.Ed. at 749 (footnote omitted).] Bradley opinion Justice referred to Lord Camden's famous in Entick v. XIX, Trials, Carrington, (1765), principles State as the source of embodied in the fourth amendment: principles opinion very The laid down in this affect the of essence liberty security. They constitutional and reach farther than the concrete court, circumstances; form of the case then before the its adventitious invasions, they apply part employ- to all on the of the Government and its ees, sanctity privacies of the of a man’s and home of life. It is not the breaking rummaging of his doors and the of his drawers that constitutes offense; right the essence of the but it is the invasions of his indefeasible personal security, personal liberty private right property, of and where offense; public has never been forfeited his of conviction some it is the right invasion of this sacred which underlies and constitutes the essence of judgment. Breaking opening Lord Camden’s into house and boxes and aggravation; any compulso- drawers are of circumstances forcible and ry testimony private papers extortion of a man’s own or of his to be used goods as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his is within the judgment. regard condemnation of that In this and Fifth the Fourth S. Ct. 58 L.Ed. 652. The defendant Weeks was tried for illegal and of gambling. convicted Before trial had he moved incriminating the return of letters had records and by government during been seized officials a warrantless conviction, of home. The holding search his Court reversed illegally-seized that the fourth amendment barred the use evidence: and held and used can be seized documents thus letters and If private of the 4th against offense, of an the protection a citizen accused evidence against sei and declaring right such searches his to be secure

Amendment, might as concerned, are so far as those thus placed is of and zures, value, no * * * proceedings such To sanction from the Constitution. be stricken well neglect, judicial if not an open manifest affirm decision would for the Constitution, protection intended of the defiance, prohibitions at 344-45, 34 Ct. against action. S. [Id. unauthorized such the people 58 L.Ed. 656.] scope expanded early 1920’s when the Court decided Silverthorne Lumber v. United States, U.S. 64 L.Ed. (1920), States, Gouled v. United 255 L.Ed. Silverthorne, federal illegally officers raided office of company. After copying the books .lumber seized, papers agents returned them to the company. A subpoena compel then production issued to of the doc- company uments. The refused to comply subpoena with the guilty and was found contempt. The Court reversed the conviction, rejecting government’s contention only Weeks compelled illegally-seized decision the return *33 evidence, did preclude government but not using the from in information obtained the course of the search: although could not be proposition more It presented is that nakedly. outrage government course its regrets, seizure anwas which the now it may it study before returns papers them, and then use the copy them, may knowledge gained it regular has to call the owners in more to upon form that the them; Constitution covers the produce protection physical posses- advantages government object gain but not sion, that the can over any of its run

Amendments almost into each at [116 630, 535, other. U.S. S.Ct. at 29 L.Ed. at 751.] * * * It not the law. such is In our doing opinion act. the forbidden by pursuit for- of a The essence provision words. a form of 4th Amendment reduces evidence so is that merely in a certain way bidding of evidence the acquisition used at all. not be that it shall court, before the be used shall not acquired omitted).] (citations at 321 64 L.Ed. 182-83, at 40 S.Ct. 391-92, atU.S. [251 Gouled, 298, 261, 255 U.S. 647, S.Ct. 65 L.Ed. Court held that the exclusionary rule applied would be even though the defendant did not seek the return of the seized trial, evidence before effectively overruling the Court’s earlier in York, 585, decision Adams v. 372, New U.S. (1904).21 L.Ed. 575 1949, It was not Colorado, until 25, 338 U.S. Wolf 1359, 93 L.Ed. that the Court was upon called

decide whether due-process clause of the fourteenth amend required ment state courts apply and enforce the exclusion ary Although rule. concluding that protect the critical interest ed the fourth amendment —“the security privacy of one’s against arbitrary police,” intrusion id. at 69 S. Ct. at 1361, 93 L.Ed. at 1785—was against enforceable the states through process clause, the due impose Court refused to states, observing on that the states were rely free effective,” other methods that equally “would be id. at 69 S.Ct. at opinion 93 L.Ed. at 1787.22 The noted that courts in seventeen states had determined to Wolf holding follow the in thirty Weeks courts states had dissent, declined to it.23 In Murphy follow rejected Justice distinguished case Weeks, 21 In the Court the Adams on the its opinion ground of his before trial. 232 that Weeks had for the return papers applied 345-46, at 58 L.Ed. at 657. at 34 S.Ct. advanced the rationale of first that the Court marked the occasion Wolf at 338 U.S. at 69 S.Ct. rule. deterrence as basis for L.Ed. at 1787. 1362-63, 93 among the New Jersey the Court included opinion, 23 In appendix 1364-67, 69 S.Ct. 338 U.S. to follow Weeks. states that had declined (Cty.Ct.1926)). (citing Black, 5 N.J.Misc. State L.Ed. 1788-91 *34 136

majority’s suggestion that remedies other than exclusion could equally be effective: Imagination give zeal invent a dozen methods content may commands of Amendment. But this the Fourth Court is limited to the remedies legislate It available. cannot the ideal If we

currently would system. attempt the enforcement of the search and seizure clause in the case we ordinary today, judicial illegally are limited to three devices: exclusion obtained evidence; against criminal and civil action prosecution violators; violators the action of trespass. Alternatives are Their statement that deceptive. very conveys impression one is effective as the next. In case this their statement is possibility blinding. For there one alternative to the rule of is no exclusion. That Ct. 93 L.Ed. at at at sanction all. 69 S. at [Id. 41, 1369, 1793.] impact of relatively was to short-lived. Wolf 165, v. California, 205, Rochin 342 U.S. 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), applied the Court a state prosecution by criminal to exclude evidence police obtained misconduct “so brutal so dignity” to human offensive 174, 172, 210, it “shocks the conscience.”24 Id. 72 S.Ct. 209, 191, Then, in California, 96 L.Ed. at 190. Irvine v. 347 128, 381, Court, (1954), U.S. 561 S.Ct. L.Ed. a 5-4 decision, upheld a bookmaking in part conviction based testimony reciting incriminating the defendant’s statements that were microphone overheard means of had been planted by illegally police in closet in defendant’s residence. Frankfurter, dissented, Wolf, Justice the author of and Justice Clark, disagreeing decision, although concurred Wolf judgment on the basis of which he followed with the. Wolf “great reluctance.” Id. at 74 S. Ct. at 98 L.Ed. at 572. A further erosion of occurred in Elkins United Wolf States, (1960), when rejected doctrine, platter” the Court the so-called “silver there by precluding police unlawfully evidence seized from state being prosecutions. used in federal Id. at 2d at Ultimately, Ohio, supra, L.Ed. 1672. Mapp Rochin, 24 In used a officers stomach recover two capsules pump had defendant swallowed. morphine *35 1081, 643, 1684, 81 6 L.Ed.2d the Court overruled U.S. S.Ct. futility relegating of the Recognizing obvious “[t]he Wolf. remedies,” protection the to the of other Fourth Amendment rule, exclusionary part “an essential of held that the Court Amendments,” enforce Fourteenth the Fourth and both at through process clause. Id. against states the due able the 1691-93, 655-57, 6 at 1090-91.25 81 at L.Ed.2d however, exclusionary has scope the of rule Mapp, Since States, 394 steadily v. U.S. eroded. Alderman United been (1969), 961, the Court held that 165, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 89 S.Ct. violat rights had not been whose fourth-amendment defendants in standing to evidence object not to obtained ed did have first time of others. The Court rights of violation application rule that advanced view not con depend analysis: a cost-benefit are should on “[W]e extending the exclusion that the benefits of vinced additional further justify would encroach ary rule to other defendants in those accused of upon public prosecuting interest ment all on having acquitted or convicted the basis crime and them 174-75, at exposes the truth.” Id. 89 S.Ct. evidence which 967, 22 L.Ed.2d at 187. at significant incursion occurred United States

Another (1974), Calandra, 338, 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 414 94 S.Ct. U.S. grand-jury witness could a divided held where Court based on evidence questions rule refuse to answer invoke the Holding that warrant. pursuant to a defective search seized reasoning Mapp expressly rejected 25 Although the Court in Wolf rely "equally methods other than were effective" states free to amendment, Court members of the rule the fourth to enforce possibility means to vindicate periodically endorse the alternative C.J., Burger, dissenting guarantee. v. Six Un Bivens See constitutional 421-24, 29 Agents, supra, S.Ct. at 2017-19. at 91 Narcotics U.S. known 1092, Malley Briggs, U.S. 106 S.Ct. term in at 641-43. This L.Ed.2d civil-damage judgment (1986), upheld §a the Court 89 L.Ed.2d against plain police arrest warrants against who had obtained a state officer Stewart, supra issue see of this cause. For discussion tiffs without 1385-89, 1, at note the purpose not to injury “is redress the privacy of the search victim to deter future unlaw- rather] [but police conduct,” ful id. at apply the Court declined in a the rule context speculative undoubtedly

“would achieve a minimal advance expense the deterrence of misconduct at the sub- stantially impeding grand jury,” the role of the id.

S.Ct. at 38 L.Ed.2d at 573. Subsequent to the Court has Calandra invoked the same used balancing permit illegally-seized test evidence during impeach cross-examination to testimony, the defendant’s Havens, 620, 627-28, United States v. S. Ct. *36 559, (1980), 64 L.Ed. 2d 566 admit into evidence proceeding in a wagering federal civil tax records that had been warrant, by police pursuant seized state to a search defective Janis, 433, 454, 3032, 3021, United States v. 428 U.S. 96 Ct.S. 1046, (1976). 49 Peltier, L.Ed.2d In United States v. 531, 2313, (1975), U.S. 95 S.Ct. the Court found exclusionary the rule to be in unavailable defendant prosecution by declining narcotics to give retroactive effect to holding earlier decision warrantless searches automobile patrol the border to be violative of the fourth amendment: “If purpose the exclusionary the rule deter unlawful conduct, then sup evidence obtained from search should be only pressed if it can be said that law enforcement officer ** * knowledge had search was unconstitutional 542, 2320, under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at S.Ct. L.Ed. 2d Invoking at 384. analysis, the same cost-benefit Court declined to afford corpus federal habeas relief to a state prisoner opportunity” who had a “full and fair to litigate his fourth-amendment proceeding. claim a state criminal Stone Powell, 465, 493-94, 3037, 3051-52, 428 U.S. L.Ed. 2d 1087-88

Despite gradual compression scope Court’s of the of the exclusionary rule, prior no decision to United States v. Leon expressly contradicted the principle established that evidence government’s in the case-in- was inadmissible illegally obtained respect, In this Leon constitutes prosecutions. in criminal chief its rule since significant limitation of the most genesis in Weeks. United,

B. v. Leon States “good faith as the Although holding Leon is described rule, that characterization sub- exception” decision. Two the breadth of the Court’s stantially understates majority opinion are illustrative White’s passages from Justice scope: potential of its * * * to a warrant of evidence obtained conclude that suppression pursuant We in those unusual basis and only on a be ordered case-by-case should only rule. will the exclusionary exclusion purposes cases which further ‡******* and the the exclusionary have now re-examined purposes We on a have relied subsequent- in cases where officers of its propriety application the rule’s will is that purposes search warrant. Our conclusion invalidated ly applying it in such circumstances. [468 be served by only rarely added).] (emphasis 104 82 L.Ed.2d at formulation, suppression cases According to Justice White’s exclusionary rule will application involving warrants “exception” recognition good-faith exception, prevailing standard. be the will persons, resi- Leon, were made of defendants’ searches on a who relied

dences, by police officers and automobiles superior issued a California facially search warrant valid *37 during drugs were discovered judge. Large quantities of court by a were indicted Defendants course of the searches. the charged conspiracy possess grand jury and were federal offenses. as other substantive as well and distribute cocaine the war- pursuant to evidence seized suppress Motions argued that the extensive government filed. The rant were experi- by police a officer prepared application, search-warrant depu- by investigations reviewed several in narcotics enced cause. probable established attorneys, adequately ty district of informant tip from an part on a stale application relied The gleaned by facts reliability, supplemented was unproven but premises from substantial of surveillance to be searched. The federal district court concluded that the warrant probable had been issued without cause. The court acknowl- edged conducting that the officer good the search had relied in government’s faith on the warrant suggestion but declined the recognize exception that it exclusionary to the Id. at rule. 904, 3411, at L.Ed.2d 686. affirmed,

A panel concluding of Ninth divided Circuit stale, reliability informant’s information was that his unverified, independent investigation and that the officer’s “nei ther cured nor the staleness corroborated the details 904, informant’s declarations.” Id. at 104 S.Ct. at L.Ed. 2d at The of Appeals 686. Court also declined to establish good-faith exception exclusionary rule. petition

The Government’s did not certiorari seek review lower court’s probable decision that cause for the war- had rant not been Supreme grant established. The Court’s certiorari was limited to the issue advanced the Govern- “ ‘[wjhether ment: the Fourth Amendment should be modified so as not to the admission bar of evidence reasonable, good seized faith reliance on a search warrant ” subsequently that is held to be defective.’ Id. at 686-87.26 major premise holding of the Court’s in Leon is that the required rule is not fourth amendment “ operates rather judicially remedy ‘a designed created safeguard Fourth rights generally through Amendment its effect, deterrent than personal right rather constitutional Leon, 26 In his dissent noted Justice Stevens that Illinois v. Gates was decided after the Ninth held Circuit that the Leon warrant lacked certain, "probable, though admittedly cause and that was it that the Court Appeals would now conclude the warrant in satisfied Fourth Leon given opportunity light Amendment were if it reconsider issue in the of Gates." U.S. at 104 S.Ct. at 82 L.Ed.2d at 724. See Wasser Mertens, Scaffold; Exclusionary & strom "The But Rule on Was it Fair Trial?," 22 Amer.Crim.L.Rev. *38 ” aggrieved.’ 468 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. at person Calandra, 414 (quoting States L.Ed. 2d United (1974)). 613, 620, opinion 338, 348, The L.Ed.2d as a deterrent of of the rule’s function view observes misconduct, particular cases “must be application its police preventing by weighing the costs and benefits resolved trustworthy inherently prosecution’s use in the case-in-chief on a search warrant tangible evidence obtained reliance ultimately magistrate that is by a detached and neutral issued 3412-13, defective.” Id. at found to be 688. prior citing examples of the Court’s majority, after rule, analysis to the application of the cost-benefit is the exclusion there little likelihood that concluded that pursuant subsequently to invalidated obtained evidence law-enforcement deterrent effect on warrant will have a search officers: argue applying rule in cases where police One the exclusionary could deters cause in warrant future to demonstrate application

failed probable “magistrate shopping” the ends and thus or promotes presentations inadequate Suppressing to a evidence obtained pursuant of the Fourth Amendment. might encour- cause also warrant defective supported by probable technically age out of the warrant and point to scrutinize more the form closely officers arguments judicial errors. We find such speculative. suspected [********] assuming deters some misconduct

But police even effectively a whole to conduct for the law enforcement profession incentives provides should it cannot be the Fourth Amendment, expected, itself in accord with objectively enforcement activity. deter reasonable law be applied, ******** acting objective an officer true, believe, we when This is particularly judge magistrate good and acted from a or faith has obtained search warrant illegality and thus is no cases, In most such there within its scope. magistrate’s whether the to determine nothing It is the to deter. responsibility allegations if to issue a warrant and, so, cause establish officer’s In the Amendment. comporting of the Fourth in form with the requirements magistrate’s officer cannot be case, an expected question ordinary judgment warrant is form the his that the determination probable-cause nothing “[Ojnce there issues, literally the warrant sufficient. technically Penalizing seeking law.” with the can do in comply more the policeman *39 magistrate’s officer logically for the rather error, than his cannot own, contrib ute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. [Id. at 918-21, S.Ct. at (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 82 L.Ed.2d at 695-97 1067).] 498, 3037, application Because the the unlikely police of rule is to deter misconduct when has in good an officer relied on faith an warrant, invalid the Court concluded that are there no “bene suppression fits” to justify the substantial “costs” of excluding Accordingly, the evidence. the Court held that “[i]n allegation magistrate absence an that the abandoned his role, detached and suppression neutral if appropriate only the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could objectively not have harbored an reasonable belief in 926, the existence of 3423, cause.” Id. at 104 S. Ct. at 82 L.Ed.2d at 700-01. Blackmun, emphasizing

Justice what he described as the “unavoidably provisional nature of decision],” id. at [the] at 104 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d at concurred with the majority experience good-faith cautioned that with the ex ception might require the Court to holding: reconsider its on we [T]he assumptions which in cannot be cast stone. To the proceed today now will be they tested in the real contrary, world of state and federal law emerge enforcement, this Court will attend to the results. If it should from good that, to our experience contrary expectations, faith exception change results a material police with compliance Fourth shall Amendment, we have to what reconsider we have here. undertaken logic aof decision that rests on untested about conduct predictions police demands no less. [Id. at L.Ed.2d at 702.] Brennan,

Justice dissenting, sharply majority’s attacked view that the fourth amendment’s mandate is limited to the prohibition of illegal require searches and does not view, courts exclude the evidence obtained. In his there exists an relationship inextricable illegally between the admission obtained therefore, evidence and an unlawful “by search and admitting evidence, unlawfully judiciary seized becomes a part of single governmental what is fact a prohibited action by the terms of 933,104 the Amendment.” Id. at S. Ct. at disagreement L.Ed. Summarizing his basic 2d 705. he majority observed that drawing an artificial line between the Court evades this principle by [t]he engaged rights that are actions constitutional and responsibilities engaged before the courts. and those are when defendant appears police According Amendment the substantive Fourth Court, protections an are exhausted at the moment when invade individu- unlawfully wholly al’s and thus no force remains to those protections substantive privacy government time to use evidence obtained the police. of trial when the seeks reading such Amendment casts aside I submit that a crabbed Fourth teaching who rule, of those Justices first the exclusionary formulated understanding judicial rests responsibility ultimately impoverished right of the to be our constitutional For secure my scheme. *40 part, “[t]he people against searches and effects, in their and unreasonable houses, persons, papers right means to exclude all evidence secured by seizures” comprises personal right free the of and The to be from initial unreasonable searches seizures. right of the invasion of and the of exclusion are coordinate components privacy embracing right searches and seizures. central to be free from unreasonable at at at 3433, [Id. 706.] majority this fundamental difference with the Because of amendment, rejected Brennan scope the of the fourth Justice to “deter- purpose rule’s is concept that the sole depends on an application particular that in cases rence” and its analysis compare the “cost” and empirical attempts that to excluding illegally-seized evidence: “benefits” of remaining basing the rule redoubt solely within its of empiricism by By legitimacy. A has the rule of on the Court robbed rationale, deterrence for which is as if it an but empirical doctrine that were explained proposition an unstable and easy limited is both inherently there is only support empirical of to Fourth Amendment mark critics. The extent this Court’s fidelity for I statistical uncertainties. should not turn such however, requirements, Faretta v the Court in Justice Stewart view, share the expressed averages.” are not based on law that liberties California, “[p]ersonal seeking give the Fourth the liberties secured by Rather than effect through guesswork restore to the Court should about deterrence, Amendment ago individual in that an its framed 70 Weeks place years proper principle Fourth Amendment has whose has been invaded in violation privacy government right subse- grounded from in that Amendment to prevent making at at use evidence so obtained. [Id. of any quently (citations omitted).] 82 L.Ed.2d at dissent, emphasized that a separate In Justice Stevens according preferred majority’s “good exception, faith” warrant, invalid status to evidence seized reliance on directly contradicted the intentions of the framers of the fourth He adoption “good amendment.27 characterized the exception product faith” as the of “constitutional amnesia.” Id. 104 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d at 731. precise problem The that the Amendment was intended address was the observed, unreasonable issuance warrants. As we have often the Amend- actually practice issuing general ment was motivated warrants —war- satisfy particularity probable requirements. did rants which cause resentments which led to Amendment were directed at the issuance of unjustified by particularized wrongdoing. warrants evidence of Those who sought Rights repeatedly to amend the Constitution to include a ofBill voiced the view that the evil which had to be addressed was the issuance of warrants Taylor on insufficient evidence. As Professor has written: searches, “Our were constitutional fathers not concerned about warrantless overreaching perhaps they say but about is warrants. It too much to search, plain enough feared the warrant more than the it is that the prime object looking warrant was the of their concern. Par from at the protection searches, against they warrant aas unreasonable saw it as an searches____” authority oppressive for unreasonable and short, deeply suspicious Framers of the Fourth Amendment were warrants; paradigm in their minds the of an abusive search was the execution aof warrant not based on cause. The fact colonial officers had magisterial they engaged general authorization for their conduct when surely searches did not make their conduct “reasonable.” The Court’s view adopt it presumptive- is consistent with our Constitution to a rule that it is ly rely product on a reasonable defective warrant of constitutional (quoting amnesia. 104 S.Ct. at 730-31 [Id. L.Ed.2d at T. Taylor, Interpretation (1969)).] Two Studies Constitutional

IV 1947, Jersey The New Constitution of I, Article Paragraph 7 It is an principle established our system of federalist may that state constitutions of a source “individual liberties expansive more than those conferred Federal Constitu- general genesis 27 Fora discussion of the of the fourth amendment see J. Landynski, Court, (1966), Supreme Search and and the Seizure 19-48 N. Lasson, History Development “The of Fourth Amendment to the United Constitution," Hopkins University States 55 Johns Studies Historical and 2, (1937). Political Science No. 13-78

145 74, Robins, 447 Pruneyard tion.” Center v. Shopping 741, (1980); 2040, 81,100 Oregon 64 L.Ed.2d 752 see 714, 718, 43 L.Ed.2d Haas, 95 S.Ct. 420 U.S. v. (1986); Gilmore, (1975); N.J. 522 v. 103 575 State Law,” 63 Emergence of “Symposium: The State Constitutional (1985); Pollock, Separate “State Constitutions as Tex.L.Rev. 959 Rights,” (1983); 707 Rutgers 35 Sources of Fundamental L.Rev. of Interpretation State Consti “Developments in Law—The (1982); Brennan, “State 1324 Rights,” 95 Harv.L.Rev. tutional Rights,” 90 of Individual and the Protection Constitutions Note, Supreme (1977); Jersey “The 489 New Harv.L.Rev. Application of the Constitu Interpretation and State Court’s tion,” 491 Rutgers 15 L.J. our own State frequently has resorted to

This Court protection afford our citizens broader Constitution order to analogous or rights afforded than that personal of certain v. provisions the federal State Constitution. identical Williams, Byrne, 91 N.J. (1983); Right Choose v. 93 39 N.J. Alston, 338; v. (1982); Hunt, supra, 91 State N.J. 287 v. State (1980), Schmid, appeal (1981); N.J. 535 v. State N.J. Schmid, v. 455 U.S. Univ. nom. Princeton dismissed sub Johnson, (1982); v. 68 N.J. State L.Ed.2d 855 102 S.Ct. I, paragraph (1975). Although language article Jersey identical virtually New Constitution that it amendment, in other contexts we have held the fourth against unreasonable protection greater our citizens affords See amendment. than does the fourth searches and seizures (individual Hunt, protectible has N.J. State I, para billing article records under telephone toll interest Constitution); Alston, State v. graph Jersey 7 of New sufficient (possessory property interest in supra, 88 N.J. search); automobile standing challenge validity of confer (validity consent Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. State consent). right to refuse depends knowledge of the search *42 case, urges In this defendant that we construe our state-con- protection against stitutional unreasonable searches and sei- good-faith to preclude recognition zures exception to the Attorney rule established Leon. The General County argue the Hudson Prosecutor that we follow should Supreme Court’s modification rule and I, paragraph 7 construe article of our Constitution in manner good-faith exception. consistent with the as Our conclusion to which of to strongly these courses follow is influenced what perceive impact we to likely be the of our decision on the privacy rights of our citizens and the enforcement of our laws, criminal “particular matters of state interest” that afford an appropriate for resolving independent basis this issue on grounds. Hunt, supra, state State v. See N.J. at 366 J., (Handler, concurring) (“A may state constitution also employed particular interest.”) to address matters of state

The State interest in the resolution of the us issue before is clarified to extent by some perspective. Although historical our Constitution of 1776 did not provisions equivalent include to Rights,28 the Bill of this was remedied in our Constitution incorporated protection which against unreasonable virtually searches and seizures identical to the fourth amend I, paragraph ment and to article of the 1947 Constitution. convening 28 One reasons the Constitutional Convention in 1844 comprehensive rights was the lack aof bill in the 1776 Constitution. The rights Jersey’s absence of a bill of been has attributed the fact that New was one of the earliest State Constitutions and was written in some haste: Jersey colony adopt New was third a constitution. The document necessarily practically drawn in haste and without the benefit of earlier state constitutions serve as It models. is assumed that this brief man; largely although dispute constitution was the work of one there event, drafting any which member of the ten committee of he was. In "colony" by provincial constitution became law of vote of the congress only eight days appointment after the of the committee. This may partly Sandy haste have been due arrival of British fleet off [Proceedings Jersey Hook. of the New State Constitutional Convention of (footnote pp. omitted).] x and xiii

147 Const, VI, 6; Macri, para. supra, v. 39 art. State N.J. 1844 of cert, 506, 511, 256; Richman, 26 Eleuteri v. N.J. N.J. 843, 52, denied, 3 77 358 79 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. Ohio, Supreme Mapp decision in v. Court’s

Prior the 1081, 1684, Jersey 6 81 New supra, 367 U.S. rule, exclusionary adhering policy instead to apply the did prose “competent proof available for the shall be decision that illegality in the seizure.” notwithstanding the offense cution of Richman, 509-10; v. supra, 26 N.J. at see State v. Eleuteri cert, denied, Alexander, (1951), 72 343 7 594 N.J. Guida, (1952); 118 96 1326 State v. N.J.L. L.Ed. 1938); aff’d, (E. v. 119 & A. State (Sup.Ct.1937), 297 N.J.L. 464 Cortese, Merra, (E. 1927); v. 104 & A. State 361 N.J.L. (E. 1927), (Sup.Ct.1926); aff’g, A. Misc. N.J.L. & N.J. (E. 1923). & A. Lyons, 99 v. N.J.L. State during Conven- noteworthy the Constitutional It also I, paragraph was to article tion of 1947 an amendment exclusionary rule incorporated the have proposed that would thereof “Nothing violation into Constitution: obtained Although was the amendment received into evidence.” shall be of defeated, of the merits included discussion both the debate rule incorporating of into propriety federal rule and the opinion Eleuteri v. guarantee. In his the constitutional Weintraub, outspoken oppo- Richman, supra, Chief Justice rule, summarized Con- accurately nent of the proceedings: vention of the federal rule. to the merits was reference debated,

The issue specific delegate event he questioned advisability incorpo- One added in any rating organic was defeated law. The amendment by an answer either inway Proceedings infer do not Record, 608. We 1 Convention to 25. vote of 46 delegates it is our case law, intended to embed equally thereby wake of the constitution- is not the unmistakable clear that the rule exclusion N.J. al [26 511.] provision. exclusionary rule apply This first had occasion Court (1961). There, the defendant’s Valentin, N.J. State alleging that he prosecution in a suppress motion evidence without permit had denied shotgun been possessed a without proof any prosecutor offer legality as to the us, appeal pending search and seizure.29 While the before Supreme Ohio, Mapp Court holding decided applicable through states due process clause of the Accordingly, fourteenth amendment. we remanded permit the matter to the trial court to reconsideration suppression proof motion in the context “all relevant on the generated new issue Mapp.” N.J. at 44. *44 Valentin, supra, Since State v. the exclusionary rule has During become imbedded in our jurisprudence. past twen ty-five years consistently it has applied been to exclude from illegally through the State’s case-in-chief evidence obtained or in warrantless searches reliance on defective warrants. E.g. Valencia, (evidence (1983) State v. N.J. obtained as telephone-authorized a result of suppressed search would where prove requirements State failed to procedural minimal to reliability); Fariello, supra, assure (requir State v. 71 N.J. 552 ing suppression of possession evidence of narcotics where affi probable davit was insufficient to issuing show cause judge made no transcription summary or of testimony); officer’s Macri, State (mandating suppres 265-66 N.J. illegally sion of seized bookmaking evidence of activities and rejecting argument support State’s good exception: of a faith good “The faith of the officer would not be sufficient proceeding federal it here.”); nor should be viewed as sufficient (evidence Moriarity, State v. (1963) 39 N.J. 502 that defendant bookmaking conducted lottery suppressed was where affi did davit not show testimony cause and officer’s issuing judge given oath).30 not under opinion prosecutor's 29 The in Valentin notes that failure to offer evidence long circumstances of the search was in reliance "on established Jersey" irrespective legality rule in New that evidence was admissible of the search. 36 N.J. at 43. cases, dissenting opinion post-Mapp 30 JusticeGaribaldi's cites number of post proposition Jersey for the that "New has no historical legislature incorporated our in 1968 We also take note that Jersey New exclusionary rule into its enactment Act, Surveillance Control N.J.S.A. Wiretapping and Electronic suppres- provides for expressly -26. That statute 2A:156A-1 to intercepted wire or oral any from sion evidence derived interception unauthorized or incon- if the was communication statute, if was the order authorization sistent with the Significantly, an officer’s 2A:156A-21. insufficient. N.J.S.A. authorizing interception order good-faith reliance on a court civil, or administrative any a defense to criminal constitutes 2A:156A-25, officer, against instituted N.J.S.A. proceeding derived from an suppression does avoid the of evidence improper interception. 2A:156A-21. N.J.S.A. essence, have, long exclusionary "we rule" and that attachment recognized good-faith exception to the rule.” Post at 186. collateral on the basis of factors Each these cases decided Gerardo, (1969), the evidence issue rule. In State v. 53 N.J. 261 pursuant duly warrants issued search was obtained federal authorities prosecutions basis the fifth-amend were dismissed on the

but the federal prosecution against precluded under the privilege self-incrimination ment *45 register engaging wagering in the business statute to before federal for failure prose sought suppression in a state gambling. of the evidence Defendants of violating lottery the dismissal of the laws. The issue was whether cution for issued, indictment, anticipation had warrant in of which the search the federal prosecution. affirmed the state The Court of the evidence in the barred use Zito, (1969), suppression N.J. concerned of State v. denial motion. pursuant validity reliance on a to an arrest in of a warrantless search challenged to be valid held the statute as unconstitutional. The Court statute grounds independent statute for of the also that the had and concluded exclusionary arresting applicability not of the the defendant. The Bisaccia, (1971), pursuant involved search issue. State v. 58 N.J. 586 incorrectly the address of and stated both the warrant affidavit warrant where However, the place 10th Street. searched as 371 rather than 375 to be sign description support a detailed of the warrant contained affidavit in recognition of the building. concern our The issue did not on the front of his propriety reliance on of the officer’s rule but rather the cert, (1983), Bruzzese, executing State 94 N.J. the warrant. affidavit in (1984), denied, concerned the 79 L.Ed.2d 695 104 S.Ct. objective and not involve New warrantless search did reasonableness of a Jersey’s recognition of the rule. Jersey’s agencies New steps law-enforcement have taken quality application process enhance the search-warrant compliance constitutionally-mandated order to assure with the probable-cause particu- standard. Two recent initiatives are significance. July special lar grand 1984 a county jury presentment concerning procedure issued a deficiencies in the by police department followed a local in applying for and executing a resulting search in the warrant search and seizure of property presentment without cause. The noted that “the execution aof search warrant is the most intrusive of privacy permitted by government invasion agents,” and set grand forth jury's finding group “that citizens * * * by affected the execution of the warrants did receive protection law afforded the Constitution.” Present- ment, County Special Jury, Union Grand Panel No. March Stated Session 1984 Term.

Prompted part by the findings grand jury present- of the ment, Attorney County General and the Prosecutors Associ- adopted February ation joint policy 1985 a statement intend- ed to achieve the systematic “institutionalization of a search procedure Jersey.”31 warrant review policy New state- ment, applies State, all County, municipal officers, which requires that applications search for warrants shall be “[a]ll Attorney reviewed designees, or his General or the appropriate Prosecutor, County designees, or his prior to their submission to the Courts authorization.” The Court has informed, been in response to inquiry, its direct this policy implemented statement has been exception without in every county in the cognizant significant State.32 We are also recurring training programs regu- search warrant offered larly municipal judges throughout court the state. We

31Supra note 14. *46 Belsole, July Attorney 32 Letterdated from Donald R. First Assistant General, Townsend, Stephen Clerk, Jersey Supreme W. New Court. policy requir- likely effect of such a statewide assume that applications, legal review of search warrant ing competent municipal judges, training programs with the combined compliance proba- extent of with the be to enhance the would of suppression of and minimize the incidents ble-cause standard defectively-issued warrants.33 evidence because connection, survey performed by the Administrative In this respect suppression motions in ten Office of Courts cal studies on a national rule are minimal: 33 Inhis prosecutions and that the of the rule's critics ple, Accounting prosecution criminals,” States, illegal studies have demonstrated tion drop the costs weighs police Look Exclusionary study [I]ndeed, due to the exclusion Fourth smaller. circumstances that the balance ed with reasonably [United States because of a 1979 29 L Ed 2d Am. Bar Found.Res.J. cases at What We Know dissenting opinion shows that have made search Impact Amendment. “costs” only attributable to the exclusion as the Court 716-17 because of Bivens v Six If the GAOdata Office aggregated study prepared problems. Report Rule: The NIJ those that led to exclusion Court, mistakenly potential federal Leon, only tips lost objectively reported (Brennan, cases basis also of evidence in the narrower Exclusionary When such convictions —are in favor of however, potential 0.2% costs acknowledges, prosecutors exclusion Unknown Federal (and S Ct in which evidence is excluded believe that Leon, that federal and state are restated as a of all reasonable mistakes of exclusion J., dissenting).] at the Still Study suggest only search and of the 635. Of ignores Justice Brennan faulty felony leads to “the release Need to restricting Rule [2014] against rule —calculated request 0.4% of and Other Studies were declined that the "costs" quite of evidence recent Comptroller their conduct on Federal Criminal Prosecutions scales are arrests this distinction course, (Burger, Narcotics Learn) problems. seizure all low. all percentage studies have demonstrated potential benefits associat cases Congress by are declined for cases, irrespective of the must these emphasized category of cases where application About the “Costs" of 104 S.Ct. prosecutors used, Contrary C.J., in all problems. General primarily Officers, in terms of actually does not violate See of the necessarily be even of countless data describe of “Lost" dissenting), it is little wonder of all cases; Davies, because of the United to the claims exclusionary the General declined for that statisti 3441-42, very rarely arrests, because mistakenly For exam prosecu dropped US Arrests, A Hard guilty these costs rule. only *47 1, 1985, during period counties the six-month of December to 31, 1986, filed, May that of reveals the motions these, motions have granted been resolved. Of 38 were and all granted motions involved warrantless searches. addition, study granted the suppression examined all the of motions three of the ten for an counties additional six-month period and in two additional during counties a twelve-month period. granted motions, only Out suppression of one order a probable involved search warrant for lack defective of cause. Courts, Report Administrative of Suppression Office Motions, July survey 1986.34 This not statewide and sample examined a suppression limited of motions. Neverthe- less, currently Jersey suggest grant its results in New of suppress pursuant motions to evidence obtained to defective relatively poses search warrants is apparently uncommon and significant no obstacle law-enforcement efforts. note recurring

We that one the most frequently themes in the criticism that has been at the decision35 directed Leon is that it will tend to undermine the motivation of law-enforce- to comply requirement ment officers with the constitutional argument cause. Professor makes the LaFave co- gently: pre-Leort Under version of the rule, had come to police finally enough gotten learn that it was not had called a they paper piece subject challenge warrant. Because that warrant was later motion to it was the warrant suppress, important be issued or police properly might that the warrant turned down at time when it be request possible investiga- compromising necessary additional information without acquire

tion. had there localities Consequently, many sound developed very going through warrant-issuing greatest practice with the process care, having magistrate. often the affidavit reviewed individuals other than * * * under Leon there go through But no reason such cautious proce- dures to. reason take the risk that every Why some conscientious will prosecutor is insufficient if when, supervisor say application copy report 34 Counselhave been furnished of this and were afforded opportunity findings. its to comment on Leon," 95 YaleL.J. “Living 906 n.5 35 SeeDripps, it, magistrate can be issue a warrant some induced to on the basis of virtually challenge? is thereafter immune from There is thus no affidavit it, that, escaping put “long-run the fact as the Leon dissenters effect” of “unquestionably integrity that case will be to undermine of the warrant 1.2, Seizure, (1986 Part), LaFave, supra process.” Pocket § Search and [1 20.] *48 “good-faith” exception find this criticism of the to be We persuasive. consequence of the of the application One obvious encouragement in of exclusionary Jersey rule New has been the comply constitutionally- officials to the law-enforcement sup- in probable-cause standard order to avoid the mandated pression suppression evidence. The rule avoids Leon violated, requir- if standard even the is evidence constitutional executing the have ing only that the officer defective warrant relying for on Whatever else objectively reasonable basis it. rule, good-faith against said for or the Leon the may be inevitably inexorably quality of exception will diminish the applications. By in eliminat- presented evidence search-warrant require- ing any noncompliance cost for with the constitutional cause, us good-faith exception assures ment of the standard will be diluted. that the constitutional White, opinion, of the note that Justice author Leon We in very in I.N.S. expressed concerns similar these his dissent 1032, 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d Lopez-Mendoza, U.S. Leon, in (1984), day which decided the same case in civil exclusionary applied rule need not held that the be Court obser- proceedings. Responding majority’s deportation immigration officers in fourth- training vation that exclusionary rule application of the principles made amendment unnecessary, White noted: Justice law, [I]mmigration in Amendment officers are and examined Fourth instructed exclusionary why suggested that this is another reason and it is education unnecessary. contrary existence of A be discerned from the is lesson could

rule however, during they programs, that instituted when it is recalled were these uniformly legal regime which the and commentators sanctioned in cases “a & expressed similar concerns. See Wasserstrom have 36 Othercommentators 114-15; Kamisar, 109-10, Mertens, supra supra at 662-63. note note Thus, deportation proceedings.” support invocation rule rather than ing unnecessary, that the rule conclusion is existence of programs suggests these that instead rule has created incen agency tives for that ensure its officers follow the dictates of the Constitution. Since the function of deterrent the rule is furthered if it alters policies either “the behavior of law individual enforcement officers departments,” likely their it that seems it was the deterrent effect rule’s that programs points led to the to which the now for its assertion that the rule Court no would have deterrent effect. S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d [Id. Leon, (quoting supra, 677).] at 796 good-faith exception ultimately Our view will reduce respect compliance probable-cause for and with the standard steadfastly persuades that we have enforced us there is a strong state interest adopting that would disserved We acknowledge consistency Leon rule. virtue of between state federal and courts in the administration the criminal laws, although Weeks, we note from supra, the decision Mapp Ohio, 1914 until the exclusionary applied in the federal constitutionally courts was not compelled Although in the irony states. there in the reversal roles, ample precedent of these there is view that *49 uniformity between federal and state is not courts essential regard exclusionary to Colorado, with the rule. See v. Wolf 28-33, 1361-64, 338 U.S. at 69 S.Ct. at 93 L.Ed. at connection, this generat- 1786-88. we observe that Leon has significant jurisdictions.38 ed debate in other application 37 It should noted that White Justice assumes that the exclusionary deportation proceedings accompa rule in would nevertheless be by good-faith exception. nied State, 533, —, 233, 38 Compare (1985) McFarland v. Ark. 284 S .W.2d 684 243 exclusionary Leon); (adopting McCary modification rule as set in forth v. Commonwealth, 219, 231-33, 637, (1984) (“embracing” 228 Va. 321 S.E.2d 644 Ariz, Bolt, 260, good-faith exception Leon); 269, in announced State v. 142 519, (1984) (holding "exclusionary applied 689 P.2d 528 to be rule as a Welch, rule”); law v. matter of state is no broader than federal State 316 578, 588-89, 789, (1986) apply (declining exclusionary N.C. 342 S.E.2d "to good-faith rule to violation of the fourth amendment" where search warrant required police reasonably authorizing but officer relied on court order 463, Stewart, sample); People seizure of blood v. 104 Ill.2d 85 Ill.Dec. Ultimately, focus on we the inevitable tension between proposed good-faith guarantee exception and the contained our State Constitution that search warrants “shall not issue upon except probable twenty-five years during cause.” In the applied exclusionary which we have Jersey, rule New we perceived standard; probable-cause have no dilution of our rather, comply efforts to with the constitutional mandate have perceive application enhanced. Nor do we been exclusionary any significant way impaired rule ability has law-enforcement officials enforce the criminal laws. The contrary. statistical evidence is to 422, 428, 1227, (warrants valid, (1984) (dictum) 473 N.E. 2d found affidavits, concluding assuming agents that even defect in FBI court reason good-faith able and belief that a search was authorized would "insulate” the cert, denied, 1120, 105 2368, motion), suppression searches from a 471 U.S. — (1985); State, Ind.-,-, 439, 86 L.Ed.2d 267 Blalock v. 483 N.E.2d (1985) (dictum) (court finding probable concluding cause exists but that even if deficient, good-faith exception affidavit found would articulated in Leon admissible); 420, Sweeney, render v. evidence and State 701 S. W.2d invalid, (Mo.1985) (dictum) (assuming arguendo that search warrant was exclusionary rule would not bar the introduction of evidence seized officers reasonably judge), who relied on issued detached and neutral warrant 277, 290-91, (Mich.Ct. People Sundling, Mich.App. v. 395 N.W.2d Michigan (refusing incorporate good-faith exception App.1986) into the probable-cause requirement ground it render the constitution on the that would 451, 458, nullity”); People Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 488 N.E.2d 497 N.Y.S.2d "a v. (1985) (declining adopt good-faith exception on state constitutional evidence, grounds People permitted because “if the are to use the seized frustrated, placed premium purpose completely rule’s is illegal positive engage provided action and a incentive is to others to future”); Upton, 394 Mass. acts in the Commonwealth similar lawless n.5, (1985) (discussing Leon but N.E.2d and n.5 553-54 368-71 concluding any judicial admitting that state statutes bar consideration of pursuant evidence to search warrant issued in the absence of seized 428, 430-33, Grawien, cause); Wis.2d 367 N.W.2d 817-18 and State good-faith exception (Ct.App.1985) (adopting would *50 Stringer jurisprudence); be of state constitutional see also violative — State, Miss.-,-, (1986) (where Justice Robert 491 So.2d 841-51 son, maintaining grounds, concurring, rejects that Leon on state constitutional analysis, probable under the Illinois v. Gates fails to establish cause where State recognize may pose

We that the rule greater jurisdictions obstacle to law enforcement in other non- where lawyer magistrates are authorized to issue search and warrants police officers’ affidavits are not subjected review trained Gates, prosecutors. Illinois v. U.S. 546; City 76 L.Ed.2d at Shadwick v. Tampa, (1972); 32 L.Ed.2d 783 see Mertens, supra Wasserstrom & note 106-11. The inci- dence of jurisdictions may defective search in other warrants partially Supreme adoption explain the Court’s of a restric- less testing admissibility tive standard evidence federal Plainly, thus apply obtained. same considerations do not Jersey. New Jersey’s

In the face evidence justice that New criminal system impaired by guarantee is not the constitutional probable cause, dissenting colleague urges our nevertheless us adopt good-faith exception promulgated in Leon because perceives public she good-faith exception “that will view rule as a sensible accommodation between protecting rights punishing an individual’s constitutional and guilty.” at 187. Post We have little doubt that assessment, particularly dissent is accurate this at a time widespread drug when drug-related use and law enforcement are issues that dominate the public national consciousness. The is likely to any have little short-term tolerance for minimally prosecution drug-related encumbers even crime. concern, however,

Our is with the Constitution and with guarantees basic and fundamental document citizens, particularly intended to afford to all our in times of public view, right our ferment. from citizen’s be free unreasonable searches seizures conducted without just preserved cause is principle, such fundamental the search warrant objects conferred by seized virtue authority evidence). not be received into may *51 separate system our protected vigilance. tripartite with preser- primary responsibility for its governmental powers, the judiciary. of the vation is that rule, application of its consistent exclusionary by virtue integral an element past twenty-five years, has become

over the search guarantee that warrants will of our state-constitutional merely probable cause. Its function is not not issue without indispens- rule also serves as the deter misconduct. The vindicating right to be mechanism for the constitutional able that searches.39 Because we believe free from unreasonable exclusionary adopted in good-faith exception to the rule Handler, colleague, argues “metamorphose that we should not 39 Our Justice *** * exclusionary from a common-law doctrine into a constitutional possibility ap right” “effectively of alternative since to do so forecloses right.” might proaches basic constitutional Post that serve to enforce the exclusionary application rule in 170. We would first observe that the Rather, Jersey doctrine. it New has never been based on common-law 657, 643, Ohio, supra, 81 S.Ct. Mapp by v. decision mandated exclusionary 1081, 1091, holding rule is "the 1684, that part and thus enforce of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments” essential today through process against Until the fourth the due clause. able the states decision, amendment, by Mapp has been the source applied states exclusionary Jersey’s rule. New recognizing good-faith Leon has diluted the rule Because the Court in application exception, Jersey’s rule unmodi New continued independent good-faith exception requires of the fourth a source fied "integral holding element of our state-con that the rule is an amendment. Our probable guarantee issue without search warrants will not that stitutional 157, cause," nothing acknowledgment supra more than a candid beginning jurisprudence years hundred of fourth-amendment lessons of one 524, 616, L.Ed. 746. States, 6 S.Ct. 116 U.S. Boyd United suggestion adopt rule as common- that we Justice Handler’s approaches” possibility principle of alternative not to “foreclose the law so as 25, Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. the Court in issue that divided raises the Wolf rely There, on other states free to the Court left the 1782. 93 L.Ed. effective," equally id. amendment that "would methods to enforce the fourth ignoring Murphy's admonition Justice S.Ct. at 93 L.Ed. at sanction That is no to the rule of exclusion. that “there is but one alternative Court, Mapp, the L.Ed. at 1793. In Id. at 69 S.Ct. at at all." issue, recognized experience reconsidering of California ”[t]he by the is buttressed worthless and futile such other remedies have been Leon would constitutionally-guaranteed tend to undermine the cause, process disrupt standard of and in the highly procedures employed by justice effective our criminal system guarantee accommodate constitutional without *52 enforcement, recognize good-faith impairing law we decline to a exception exclusionary rule. result, reaching hardly ignore this we can the ebb and flow during century.

of federal search-and-seizure law this States,” experience exclusionary of other and concluded that the rule is the only satisfactory remedy to vindicate fourth-amendment interests. 367 U.S. at 1690-91, persuasively 81 S.Ct. at 6 L.Ed.2d at 1088-90. This view was endorsed Justice Potter Stewart: together, currently exclusionary Taken the available alternatives to the some, all, satisfactorily necessary rule achieve but not of the functions of a They punish perhaps grossest remedial measure. deter the of viola tions, governmental legitimate policies as well as these that violations. They compensate egregious some of the of the most victims violations. little, they anything, majority But do if to reduce the likelihood of the vast infringements frequent of fourth amendment violations —the motivated zeal, violations, commendable not commendable malice. For those remedy required inspires is the officer to channel his enthusi apprehend comply asm to to criminal toward the need with the dictates remedy only the is one fourth amendment. There such exclusion —the [Stewart, illegally obtained evidence. Colum.L.Rev. at 1388- 89.] exclusionary integral Accordingly, rule is an conclusion that the we view our reflecting the unreasonable searches the citizen’s freedom from element of attempt- weight experience overwhelming of federal and state courts of the rights guaranteed by ing the fourth amendment. Neverthe- to enforce the less, principle need not be immutable. application constitutional of a the “paradoxical," post concurring colleague perceives at 170 Although it as our carefully judiciary n.3, obligation acknowledge to evaluate the we any legislative the effect of or to executive initiative intended afford source of supplementary exclusionary rule. enforcement distinct from to Cf. 467, 1624, 694, Arizona, Miranda 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d (1966) ("Our way straitjacket decision in no constitutional which will creates a reform, handicap sound efforts at nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States their laudable search for continue * * *."). increasingly ways protecting rights effective of the individual yet developed, The fact that no effective has been either at the alternative level, today impels exclusionary federal or state our what conclusion Ohio, Mapp reversal of decision in impact Wolf test, on the Aguilar-Spinelli Gates and the erosion of the during past two decades counsel us against assumption that the decision Leon is be a permanent Blackmun, judicial star in the firmament. Justice concurring Leon, provi- cautioned “unavoidably us as to the decision, sional nature” of the S.Ct. at good if and warned that “the faith exception change rule results in a material police compliance Amendment, with the Fourth we have shall here,” to reconsider what we have undertaken id. at 3424, 82 suspect S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d at 702. We that Justice forebodings may view, prophetic Blackmun’s indeed. In our probable-cause guarantee corollary erosion of will be a good-faith exception. quite possible We think it damage guarantee may to the constitutional level reach such a experiment as to cause the Court to its reconsider *53 fourth amendment. Jersey experiment

We see no need in New with the rights protected by fundamental the fourth-amendment coun- terpart subject of our State Constitution. We will not the rights procedures guaranteed that vindicate the fundamental I, paragraph procedures article 7 of our State Constitution — justice that have not diluted the our effectiveness of criminal system inevitably the uncertain effects that we believe will —to accompany good-faith exclusionary exception to the federal rule. judgment Appellate Division is affirmed.

HANDLER, J., concurring.

Defendant, Novembrino, possession indicted for Ottavio dangerous possession of controlled substances and of controlled guarantee against searches unreasonable required enforce our seizures secured State Constitution. dangerous substances with intent to distribute. He filed a and, suppress motion evidence as majority noted in the opinion, suppression hearing resulted sharply conflicting surrounding accounts of the circumstances defendant’s arrest subsequent and the search of his service station. The trial court, however, evidence, credited the Appel- State’s did Division, and, now, late spite this Court. of the fact that every judge who reviewed issuance of the search warrant and examined the surrounding evidence the search and seizure version, accepted this case the State’s each reached the same conclusion—that the probable State failed to demonstrate cause justify issuance the search warrant.

I concur the unanimous determination that there was no probable Further, cause in join this case. I majority in its conclusion that pursuant evidence seized to a search warrant issued without cause must be excluded notwithstand- ing executing subjective good relying officer’s faith in upon warrant; this, in a case such as judicially-devised exclusionary applied rule must be to vindicate the underlying However, constitutional interest. I break rank with the Court expresses when it result, reaching additional reason for this namely, that the rule itself is a right constitutional directly protected under the State Constitution.

I. explaining Before my disagreeing reasons for major- with the ity conceptual as to the applying rule, basis for concerning some observations antecedent issues case this pertinent. are These relate to both the ques- non-controverted tion of probable cause highly-controverted and the issue of the *54 executing relevance of the subjective good officer’s faith. probable cause, As to in unanimity view of the opinion, I necessity see no for the exposition Court’s extensive of this I issue. would be in simply adopt content this case to the sound position of Appellate Division that the affidavit and circum- of the surrounding stances issuance search warrant failed adequate probable to demonstrate cause: The affidavit here involved revealed that a informant concluded simply drug unknown was a dealer, for reasons defendant that a person previous- gas arrested for of cocaine was seen at station defendant’s ly possession engaged in some activities which caused a edu- detective, whose unspecified training and are to conclude that criminal activi- cation, unknown, experiences taking gas in ties the form of violations of Title were at the station. place of the circumstances out the affidavit failed to contain a spelled totality objective engender single tending grounded fact a “well suspicion” * * * being crime was committed. We cause conclude, therefore, probable Novembrino, N.J.Super. (1985) [State not established. (citations omitted).] particularly light ruling This is of the that a so Court’s analogous totality-of-the-circumstances formula to that set 213, 103 Gates, forth in 76 L.Ed. Illinois (1983), validity 2d of search is now be used assess in Article probable warrants under the cause standard set forth I, paragraph at 122. Jersey 7 of the New Ante Constitution. respect executing police

With to the relevance of the officer’s faith, subjective good rejects proposition that if the Court lacking, probable cause the issuance of search warrant evidence should admissible on the basis seized nevertheless be good-faith exception recognized Supreme of the Court Leon, 897, 104 82 L.Ed.2d United States v. 468 U.S. I concur in this determination. effectively agree majority good-faith I that the test indispensable founda- dilutes cause—the constitutional by eliminating the tion for a reasonable search seizure— demonstrating grounds make a necessity for reasonable search obtained therefrom will be admissible before evidence operation of evidence. This conclusion is based on the fact that only intentional offi- rule serves to deter cial misconduct also mistaken official misdeeds. simply addition, proffered Leon is not the test under Rather, objective-sub-

subjective good as such. the test is faith actual, good faith jective good “subjective” faith: whether “objec- executing police can considered officer itself *55 162

tively” undertaking a reasonable as basis validat- —and ing upon generally search in reliance the warrant. We have —a significance eschewed the relevance or of the actual state of executing mind of the officer. recent cases we have been emphatic proposition and consistent our adherence to the that probable objective cause must be demonstrated reference to informed, reasonably expe- circumstances —what an trained and police rienced officer all of the under circumstances would have in terms understood of whether there is cause. See Bruzzese, (1983)(police 94 State N.J. 210 officer’s search and only seizure would be considered reasonable if it conformed to standards); objectively police reasonable see also State Gu- erra, (1983)(“if validity N.J. of a search can be independently sustained on objective grounds demonstrating reasonableness, the existence of other defects that do not derogate objective from the overall reasonableness impugn integrity judicial search or process should search.”) upon (emphasis added); not be relied to invalidate the Ercolano, (1979) (dissenting opinion). State v. N.J. problem objective-subjective good that faith test of requirement objective probable Leon is inconsistent with the put by dissenting cause. As Justice Brennan United States v. Leon: reviewing it is inconceivable when faced with a defend virtually court, ant’s motion to could first find that a warrant was under the suppress, invalid, Gates new [Illinois at the same v.] standard, then, time, find police “objectively officer’s reliance on such an invalid warrant was nevertheless reasonable” under [Leon] test. Because two so standards overlap it is Gates that warrant could be found invalid under completely, unlikely objectively reliance it could be seen other yet upon reasonable; mind-boggling objectively we have wise, would to entertain the concept objectively (citing reasonable reliance an unreasonable warrant.” Kami upon Shrinking sar, note 588-89; “The Fourth Wasserstrom, Incredible (1984); Am.Crim.L.Rev.

Amendment,” LaFave, "The Fourth Amend ” Drawing ‘Bright ment World: On Imperfect Faith,’ Lines’ ‘Good U.Pitt.L.Rev. 333-59 [468 3445-46, L.Ed. 2d at 721-22.] subjective good-faith Justice that the test Brennan concluded virtually requirement would eviscerate the constitutional more, I agree point and on this am I could not probable cause. concurs, particularly majority of this Court confident paramountcy proba- emphasis upon the its extended *56 view of for a reasonable search quintessential as the basis ble cause good objective-subjective rejection its of the and seizure and Ante 157. test of Leon. faith

II. its has not to do with major difference from Court My excep- good-faith of the rejection cause or its test of case, Therefore, agree this I circumstances of under the tion. The exclusionary rule. application of the Court’s the exclusion case is to sanction judgment our this effect of upon seizure a search and based derived from of evidence objec- cause—on supported by probable warrant was subjective good faith grounds notwithstanding tive — relying upon the search warrant. executing officer in by its character- Court is My departure from the occasioned in this case. exclusionary applied rule as it is ization of exclusion exclusionary rule—the that the majority has decided search objectively unreasonable from an of evidence derived right. I do not believe is a constitutional and seizure—itself Rather, a remedial it is right as such. it constitutional is a central constitutional incidental to the ancillary or rule that is searches unreasonable free from right of the citizen be ancillary rule exclusionary rule is a remedial That seizures. singular denigrates the way right in no constitutional legal potency. See from its rule or detracts importance of the I (concurring opinion). (1986) Hartley, N.J. v. State necessary to vitally exclusionary rule is that the am satisfied part of individ- right on underlying constitutional protect and seizures searches unreasonable free from uals our as a matter of remedy a court-created continued as should be has no disagreement conceptual this law. While state common rami- case, enormous may it have in this consequences practical in other situations. fications

I my am constrained to state difference from the Court I analysis reasoning because cannot subscribe to its concern- ing exclusionary the constitutional basis of the rule. The by Court’s determination is borne out neither the decisional law explicate that has served our legal traditions relative to the exclusionary rule, history nor state constitutional relevant rule, nor public considerations of sound policy generally that we consider in expounding and —factors interpreting Gilmore, our state constitution. v. State 103 N.J. (1986); Williams, (1983); Hunt, State 39N.J. State v. (1982) (concurring opinion). N.J.

A. A that, review of our decisional law shows after even Weeks States, United 34 S.Ct. L.Ed. (1914), in which applied first under *57 amendment, the fourth Jersey apply New did not the exclusion ary Rather, rule. this state adhered to “compe the rule that proof tent shall for prosecution be available of the offense notwithstanding illegality in the seizure.” Eleuteri v. Rich man, 506, (1958); Alexander, 26 N.J. 509-10 see v. State 7 N.J. cert, 585, (1951), denied, 908, 594 636, 343 U.S. 96 (1952); Guida, L.Ed. 1326 (E. v. State & N.J.L. A.1938); (E. Merra, A.1927); State v. 103 N.J.L. 361 & v. State Cortese, (E. A.1927), & aff’g N.J.L. 4 N.J.Misc. 683 (Sup.Ct.1926); (E. A.1923); Lyons, State v. 99 N.J.L. 301 & MacQueen, 522, (1903). State v. 69 N.J.L. 1958, opportunity we had an to re-examine the constitu- significance

tional Richman, this settled rule. In Eleuteri v. supra, 26 N.J. search warrants were invalidated because issuing magistrate power was without to authorize a search beyond the territorial limits of his 508. court. Id. at The issue was whether the fruit of that unlawful search was nevertheless admissible evidence. The Court observed that: govern- The rule rests two The first is that upon propositions. ment should not of a business” criminal order catch stoop “dirty offending against civil and criminal remedies The is that him. second the rule of exclusion is and hence ineffective, matter officer are as practical led to the from the excesses which society remedy protect available only Id. at 512. right. constitutional And further: device to the role of a deterrent —a compel respect rule has the exclusionary It disregard removing it. guarantee incentive to for the [constitutional] prevent; repair. not to enforcement

is calculated The is an postulate added). (emphasis Id. rights. 141 A.2d 46 to basic official indifferent 1684, 6 Ohio, 367 U.S. Mapp v. Even after adoption of the (1961), the federal by which 2d 1081 L.Ed. vindicate the fourth device to exclusionary rule as a remedial searches became against unreasonable guaranty amendment amendment, we con under the fourteenth to states applicable pri served the exclusionary rule recognized that the sistently Moreover, initially we held deterrence. mary purpose of culpable police redress applied only to rule should be (1969) Gerardo, 53 N.J. State v. See misconduct. by the is not mandated of evidence (holding that exclusion society, in our amendment, it is “important since as [it] fourth enforc judicial where sanctions imposition does not call regard punctilious such the law with ing officers have followed (1969) Zito, here”); 54 N.J. have State they suppressed not be should product of a search (holding that “the strength of a upon the good faith made in a search is when Bisaccia, 58 unconstitutional); State later declared statute suppression (“It that the puzzling 589-91 N.J. The evil for its creation. to the reason not anchored rule was office.”) was insolence sought to ended the decision at least since asserts that majority here *58 exclusionary has (1961), rule Valentin, “the 36 N.J. v. State at 148. It Ante jurisprudence.” our imbedded become applied consistently has been exclusionary rule states that illegally ob- evidence case-in-chief from the State’s to exclude upon defec- or in reliance through warrantless searches tained concern judicial a cites all reflect The cases it tive warrants. of to, seized violation that was with, evidence and reaction designed and to assure the of standards rules reasonableness 126, 141 Valencia, 93 E.g. and seizure. State v. search N.J. (1983) (evidence telephone-authorized a of obtained as result suppressed prove to mini search where failed would State requirements reliability); procedural mal to assure State v. Fariello, (1976) (requiring suppression of evidence N.J. possession of narcotics where affidavit was insufficient to show probable issuing judge transcription cause and made no or testimony); of summary Moriarity, officer’s State v. 39 N.J. (evidence (1963) bookmaking that defendant conducted and lottery suppressed where affidavit did not show and, testimony issuing judge given not cause officer’s under Macri, oath); (1963)(mandating sup v. 265-66 State N.J. bookmaking pression illegally seized of activities and of evidence argument good exception). of rejecting support faith State’s It may not be amiss to characterize these decisions as “em- beddpng]” exclusionary jurisprudence. in our Their significance, however, is not so much a upon consistent reliance exclusionary judicial rule but expansion scope of the effect, rule. these decisions pur- extend the deterrent pose exclusionary of the encompass rule to cases of unreason- able official misconduct simply misguided mistaken, that was or as well as intentional malicious. It overempha- cannot be sized, however, Court, that this in extending applying exclusionary rule, has consistently unfailingly stressed its purpose deterrent origins and its remedy court-created designed discourage improper police E.g., conduct.1 v. State that, amendment, noteworthy 1 it is Mapp terms fourth since scope See, steadily e.g., rule has shrunk. Alderman States, 165, 174-75, 961, 967, (1969) United 394 U.S. 22 L.Ed.2d (defendants rights whose fourth-amendment had not did been violated standing object others; rights have to evidence obtained in violation application depend analysis); rule should on a cost-benefit Calandra, 338, 351, United States 414 U.S. 38 L.Ed.2d (1984) (grand-jury witness could not invoke rule to refuse answer *59 (“The Gerardo, suppression is at 267 doctrine 53 N.J. adopted upon the there no judge-made, a device belief that remedy a fourth effective violation [the amendment]. done, ordered, rectify wrong already Suppression is not to violations.”). given has similar to deter future Court not designed make weight the that rule is to the to notion the constitutionally by negat- frequently-guilty defendant “whole” Thus, search. while ing the use of the fruit an unreasonable part “jurisprudence,” it is the Court’s un- the rule is of our that accounts swerving purpose endorsement of its deterrent rule, say the exaggeration is that for this. It therefore broadened, acquired though markedly has constitutional stat- ure. that argued (though by majority)

It not the might be directly it is exclusionary rule related is constitutional because We, however, not “judicial integrity.” have subscribed “judicial purpose integrity” that is the served the view rule, although “judicial integri- exclusionary particular cases police ty” may threatened certain kinds misconduct See, e.g., justify of the rule. application and itself would Delaware, Franks v. (1979) (1978); (holding that N.J. Howery, State v. requires allowed an defendant be

the fourth amendment supporting challenge veracity of an affidavit opportunity to position warrant). last term we reiterated a search Just rule deterrence. function of (1985), Com’n., Jersey Racing N.J. Delguidice New police conduct is unlawful we held that of future “[d]eterrence rule, sole ‘prime purpose’ of the ‘if ” omitted). rejected argument (citations one.’ at 85 We Id. courts exclude all “judicial integrity” mandates that the warrant; to defective search based on evidence seized pursuant questions injury of the search not to privacy "is redress purpose conduct.”). [but victim to deter future unlawful rather] unlawfully that has been evidence seized. The held that Court *60 suppression in most cases wrong the evidence is and accurate the is the time unquestionably complete by the evidence reaches the court. the is to Therefore, narrowed the analysis admitting encourage of whether the evidence would future question improper actions____ law enforcement is the same as the [T]his inquiry substantially of whether exclusion would serve a deterrent at 89 [Id. question purpose.

(citations omitted).] sum, In exclusionary developed applied the rule as and in this jurisdiction focusing essentially evolved from one has on cal- lous, police or willful insolent misbehavior to one that encom- passes reflecting ignorance, official misconduct no more than mistake, situations, inexperience. or of these either the result to the objectively victim is the same—an unreasonable And, therefore, and application search seizure. the of the rule is the same—to exclude ill-found evidence in to order discour- age Thus, offending the judicial officials. it is the under- standing is “improper” what misconduct that has changed years, over the purpose not the of the rule. The genetic thread that connects is design our decisions the central exclusionary of the to improper rule deter official conduct. To reiterate, purpose solely primarily punish is not or offending compensate police officer defendant or even judicial integrity. Consequently, assure this deci- stream of sional law erodes supports upon rather than the foundation exclusionary which the Court now raises the rule to a constitu- right. tional

B. The clearly strong legal decisional law not reflect does tradi- suggest exclusionary tions itself of constitution- Hence, al stature. our do provide decisions from basis which to reason that the rule has now evolved into Moreover, constitutional express doctrine. the relevant and history against constitutional in this area militates the conclu- acquired sion rule itself has status agree analysis point I right. On this constitutional at 168. dissenting opinion. Post of the jurisdiction allowed noted, early prevailing rule our As illegal Supra and seizure. of an search the fruits into evidence firmly place when admissibility at 164. This rule of assembled Jersey’s Convention delegates to New Constitutional guarantee- provision The constitutional of 1947. in the summer and of unreasonable searches right to be free ing the citizens’ counterpart, pro- seizures, fourth amendment like its federal vides: and right houses, in their papers to be secure persons, people against violated; shall not be seizures, searches and unreasonable

effects, oath or cause, supported issue upon probable no warrant shall except describing searched and papers to be affirmation, place and particularly (1947) art. things I, para. 7.] be seized. Const. [N.J. *61 added have the Convention would proposed at An amendment I, “Nothing 7: paragraph Article following to sentence into received evidence.” hereof shall be in obtained violation rule made an exclusionary be effect, proposed that it was pro- delegates defeated right. The express constitutional 25. See Conven- of 46 to by a final vote posed amendment 19, 1947). (August 598-608 Proceedings Record tion included of the amendment leading the defeat to The debate exclusionary rule federal of the the merits of both discussion constitu- into the such a rule incorporating propriety and the Rickman, supra, in Eleuteri v. The Court guarantee. tional proceedings: the Convention summarized federal rule. to the merits reference debated, specific The issue delegate advisability incorpo- he event questioned added that any One organic aby was defeated law. The amendment rating an answer either way infer Proceedings We do not 608. Record, 598, 25. 1 vote of 46 to Convention it is case delegates law, equally to embed our intended thereby that of the constitution- wake is not the unmistakable rule of exclusion clear the the N.J. at 511] al [26 provision. and Constitution United States to the fourth amendment 2 The text of the identical. are paragraph nearly Constitution 7 of the New I, Jersey Article rule. the exclusionary reference to contains any Neither be, may It as the acknowledged, Court Eleuteri that exclusionary-rule defeat of the amendment at Constitutional left the judicial Convention rule amenable to treatment and development, perhaps point someday recognizing even it as a standard of It equally constitutional dimension. seems clear, however, brought has our case-law to this us remains, point. been, The rule always judicial as it has remedy. Though the rule has achieved scope broadened application, designed protect it is the central constitutional right of citizens to free be from unreasonable searches and by deterring seizures unlawful official conduct that otherwise right. undermines this It is constitutional thus fair to conclude (1) expressly part not a of the New Jersey (2) Constitution and the decisional law does not holdings express implication clear furnish basis deter- mining that the rule has integral part become an of the State Constitution.3

C. judicially-fashioned The Court offers why no reason ex- clusionary rule satisfactorily regarded cannot as a common- principle fully vindicating law remain efficacious in underlying right. Indeed, rights constitutional and interests are vital been firmly individual have anchored our E.g. common Hartley, law. State N.J. (privilege against self-incrimination). It therefore seems me unnecessary metamorphose unwise—because this Court —for *62 ancillary rule such the exclusionary from a common- rule a right. law doctrine into constitutional so To do forever blocks appropriately exclusionary part 3 Wecan the a consider rule to have become law,” what one of commentator labels the "constitutional common “a substruc substantive, procedural drawing ture of inspiration and rules remedial their from, authority required by, [, provisions and but not various constitutional amendment, subject rules that are] ... to modification or even [the reversal Monaghan, Law,” legislature].” "Forward: Constitutional Common 89 Harv.L. Rev. 2-3 effectively development of the rule and forecloses any future might serve approaches of alternative that to possibility the right.4 enforce basic constitutional the Moreover, incorporated permitting exclusionary rule to be the effectively prevents of into the other branches our Constitution protect exercising responsibility their to government from own right free from unreasonable searches and a citizen’s to be have, generation today, For a we until seizures. at least of expressed the role the branches confidence in other right respect to the citizen’s constitutional to government with Compare against and seizures. unlawful searches secure (“The Rickman, judiciary, 514-16 Eleuteri N.J. course, guardian is the sole of the Constitution. The it.”) Delguid- equally uphold branch sworn to executive is Com’n, (“There supra, 100 N.J. Jersey Racing ice v. New courts, duty to which with their point comes a consistent law, to to continue create barriers law administer cannot the properly that supervisory a role is pursuit enforcement in the find our- legislative branches. We duty of executive and if case.”) be remiss we point We would selves at that this government branches of comprehend to that other failed enforce- respect to the effective responsibilities with have direct willingness majority carefully” to "evaluate 4 Paradoxically, professes right. legislative remedies to constitutional preserve any attempt develop Legislature and suitable This if the ultimately develops may imply then Court has the rule, this exclusionary power effective alternative to is Ante at that it now claims "constitutional.” or even abandon rule modify it does not undermines, contradict, if directly This 39. proposition n. of a constitutional has attained the view that the permanence right. recognizes exclusion majority, intrinsic nature effect, designed conduct, to deter official rule as a improper court-crafted ary remedy light acknowledges can contract expand remedy impliedly changing to which it should be applied. of conduct kind perceptions suggest, I considerations, These support proposition right, right, is not a constitutional rule, it a constitutional itself while serves change subject doctrine, which amenable always common-law legislative and attention. executive *63 against ment guarantee of the constitutional unreasonable searches and seizures. majority itself the stresses constructive measures taken Attorney the General and other law enforcement authorities procedures

to adopt the of assure reasonableness searches quite at 150-151. It and seizures. Ante also aptly acknowl edges Legislature, specifically incorporated the which the exclu sionary rule its the Jersey into enactment of New Wiretapping Act, and Electronic Surveillance Control N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to exclusion, providing statutory -26.5 In for a rule of N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21, Legislature specifically recognized the the avail ability and, supplementary significantly, forms relief provided good that an officer’s faith reliance on a court order authorizing civil, interception any constitutes defense to criminal, proceeding against administrative instituted officer, 2A:156A-25, does suppres N.J.S.A. avoid the sion improper interception. of evidence derived from an N.J. Molinaro, N.J.Super. S.A. 2A:156A-21. State (Essex Cty.Ct.1971), grounds, 122 N.J.Super. rev’d other 181 (App.Div.1973),the court noted “In adoption that: Jersey Wiretapping New and Electronic Surveillance Con Act, Legislature attempted trol Jersey scrupu New protections lous about which it fashioned for individual privacy.” Id. at 287. The court then held:

Where evidence has been seized of that evidence unlawfully, suppression trial follows. This doctrine is a court-authored reme- ordinarily suppression Where, however, evidence stems from unlawful dy. wiretap, suppression Legislature. such evidence selected 294. Id. at remedy specifically by (citations omitted). The court also stated:

Arguably, judiciary setting in a different abandon or could modify originated doctrine since It this courts. has been 5 That statute derived from of evidence expressly provides suppression wire or oral if was any communication unautho intercepted interception rized or statute, inconsistent with the or if the order of authorization insufficient. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21. *64 power legislative body however, suggested, a to that it is also within negate suppression. respect adopt to from a rule of With evidence derived surveillance, Legislature by Jersey electronic the New N.J.S.A. an unlawful (citations 295, a 284 A. 2d has such rule. Id. 385. 2A:156A-21 instituted omitted).6 a Wiretapping Act instructs us that when threatened The sufficiently Legisla- important, the privacy interest is deemed remedies, including the to effective ture not hesitate devise will rule, exclusionary protect interest. this despair majority to be its line” for the seems The “bottom any alternative to the exclusion can ever be effective that there therefore, permanency. it and, might give we well ary existing certainly fair to observe that alternatives It is Pape, inadequate. Monroe v. exclusionary largely Eg. rule are (An (1961) individual 81 5 L.Ed.2d 492 365 U.S. by a state have been violated rights fourth amendment whose cause of action under U.S. C. law enforcement official has a 1983); Agents, Fed. Narcotics Bivens v. Six Unknown § (A (1971) of action cause L.Ed.2d U.S. itself when its under fourth amendment damages for arises Nevertheless, officials). by this federal provisions are violated not, not, for itself end search need and should Court alternatives to possible The over effective solutions. debate time, long and has exclusionary on for a gone rule has Court’s decision vigor Supreme taken increased since on an Leon, 104 Ct. supra, 468 S. in v. United States Burger suggested compre has Justice 677. Chief Bivens, supra, remedy in 403 U.S. in his dissent hensive proposal is 2017-18, 642. This 29 L.Ed. at 91 S. Ct. at by time from time to suggested have to those that been similar See, Gangi, Exclusionary Rule: legal e.g., commentators. Catania, substantially N.J. 418 position State affirmed 6 This (1981), Legislature has enacted strict that the which the Court stressed scope of part minimize the remedy officers to failure on the case of the earlier wiretap further overruled rule. Catania —the legislative (1972), that the Dye, had determined which State v. N.J. 518 interpretation. given broad rather than a narrow rule should Study Usurpation, A Case Judicial 34 Drake L.Rev. 33 (1984-85);7 Berner, Fourth-Amendment Models: Enforcement (1981); Analysis Proposal, 16 Wilkey, Val.U.L.Rev. Enforcing the Fourth Amendment Alternatives Rule, (1982). Exclusionary 95 F.R.D. 211 I would leave to the Legislature judgment sound and the Executive whether developed preserve there can be ways other the constitution- right against al of citizens to be secure unreasonable searches course, and seizures. Of this power pass Court reserves the upon the constitutionality any action undertaken the other government. branches of See Tp. Hills Dev. Co. Bernards Cty., meantime, Somerset 103 N.J. 1 I *65 strongly significance continue to believe in the of the exclusion- ary serving rule in right the constitutional of citizens to free from unreasonable searches and seizures and would not hes- recognize apply exclusionary itate to and rule this to end as a matter of state common law.

IY. stated, For the I judgment reasons concur in the of the Court. GARIBALDI, J., part concurring dissenting in part. I concur with the majority’s adoption Gates, of the Illinois v. 213, 2317, 527, 462 denied, U.S. 103 S.Ct. reh’g 1237, 33, (1983), U.S. totality-of-the- 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 circumstances validity test determine of a search warrant I, under Article paragraph Jersey 7 of the New I Constitution. dissent from the majority’s recognize, failure a matter of law, “good state exception exclusionary faith” to the rule supporting common 7 The thread is these task of proposals "[t]he overseeing remedying Rights legislative Bill violations is a ultimately legal legislative one, and no obstacle exists the rule’s today to prevent repeal Gangi, modification.” The A Rule: Case in Judicial Exclusionary Study Usurpa tion, 34 Drake L.Rev. at 35. 897, Leon, 3405, U.S. 104S.Ct. set forth United States (1984). 2d 82 L.Ed. 677 justification exclusionary rule dominant

I consider the I, that violates Article conduct to be the deterrence Jersey majority, paragraph 7 of New Constitution. however, remedy into judicially-created a state transforms this good adoption of faith right. It fears that constitutional rule the constitu exception will undermine position This tionally-guaranteed standard of cause. goal protect improper between valid strikes an balance pub rights and the ing under the state constitution individual brought transgress law to have those who right lic’s go the constable has “The criminal is free because justice. (1958), Rickman, N.J. blundered.” Eleuteri 150 N.E. People v. 242 N.Y. quoting Defore, cert, den., 70 L.Ed. 784 (Ct.App.), exception good properly faith more accommo A limited public in an effective legitimate interests dates the rights system sacrificing the individual justice criminal without good excep faith Adopting the protected our Constitution. not a concern reflects lesser tion to the rights deeper but a safeguarding constitutional individual’s probative, reliable high when appreciation of the costs incurred investigative error. barred evidence is because may Moreover, provide undisputed that a state while it *66 found in the rights than is greater protection to individual consti- Constitution, departure from the federal a States United policy rea- historical or supported sound tution should be 338, (1982). state Hunt, 345 Consistent 91 N.J. sons. State v. development of rulings to the rational are crucial and federal officials. guidance law of our law-enforcement criminal and in this justify divergence Only purpose would strong a state Jersey of the New Consti- An examination very sensitive area. in fact tution, statutes, purpose, and cases reveals no such Sheppard adoption of the Leon leads to conclusion Jersey law. exception with New good is consistent limited faith 176

I Ohio, 643, Mapp v. 1684, U.S. S.Ct Since 367 81 6 L.Ed.2d (1961), Court, Supreme 1081 recognizing high cost justice system criminal of indiscriminately suppressing pro all evidence, applied balancing approach bative has that has gradually scope exclusionary Stone eroded of the See rule. Powell, 465, 3037, v. 428 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976); 96 49 Peltier, v. 531, United States U.S. 2313, 422 95 S.Ct. 45 L.Ed. Calandra, (1975); 338, United States 2d 374 414 U.S. 94 (1974); States, S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d 561 613, Alderman v. United denied, 165, 394 U.S. 961, 176, reh’g S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 89 22 394 939, 1177, 22 L.Ed.2d 475 U.S. S.Ct. cases, In those the Court held that the exclusionary judicial rule is a remedy that must be to the imposi sensitive costs and its benefits of Leon, United States 897, tion. U.S. S. Ct. 3405, 677, case, 82 L.Ed.2d Massachusetts v. companion and its Sheppard, 104 (1984), U.S. L.Ed.2d adopted specifically good exception the Court faith exclusionary rule. Leon, supra,

In United States v. at U.S. 104S.Ct. L.Ed.2d “marginal Court concluded that the produced or nonexistent by suppressing benefits evidence ob tained in objectively subsequently reasonable reliance invalidated warrant justify search cannot the substantial costs justice system] criminal of exclusion.” To understand [to fully impact rule in search and seizure recognize cases one must unlike other rules involving the fifth and sixth impli amendments —which often cate reliability concerns about the inherent and truthworthiness of the excluded evidence —this rule excludes evidence that typically probative reliable and often most information bearing guilt on the or innocence of the As defendant. Justice States, emphasized Black v. United dissent in his Kaufman 217, 237, 1068, 1079, 394 89 (1969): *67 crucially illegal Fourth Amendment is and seizure under the

A claim of search rights; ordinarily many seized other constitutional evidence different from untrustworthy by way the means of seizure its can no have been rendered beyond virtually any shadow alone establishes indeed often this evidence guilty. a doubt that defendant Leon, acknowledged of the some substantial the Court impedes applying the rule: social costs of truth-finding some jury judges; functions of the allows sentences due guilty go free or receive reduced defendants and, through application, its indiscriminate plea bargains; justice.1 generate disrespect the administration of may 906-09, 3412-14, L.Ed.2d at 688-89. at at The Court stated: objective good

Particularly faith have acted in when law enforcement officers minor, magnitude transgressions of the benefit conferred their have been system, concepts justice guilty criminal basic on such defendants offends [Id.] rectify disparity this between good exception The seeks to faith and the windfall officer the error committed guilty afforded a defendant. disposition 1 Empirical rule on the on the effects of data Leon, supra,

felony U.S. at are See United States warrants inconclusive. 949-52, 6; 6,n. n. 468 U.S. at 82 L.Ed.2d 907-08 n. 104 S.Ct. J., (Brennan, survey dissenting). A 716-17 82 L.Ed.2d at 104 S.Ct. respect suppres Office of the Courts the Administrative conducted period during Jersey six-month in ten New counties sion motions 1, 1985, during period, May 80% of the this 1986 discloses December dangerous and 10% involved substances motions filed involved controlled filed, roughly disposed inof weapons. 540 or half were Of all the motions (usually plea following that mooted the withdrawn after manner: 49% were dismissed; denied; issue); and 7% were 4% were suppression 40% were warrant). (all The evi granted without a searches made of which involved dangerous in 75% of substances included controlled dence seized in these cases 17.1%, study cases, remaining The weapons 7.3%. and alcohol in annually, 4,500 Jersey suggests filed in New motions that of the estimated granted. approximately 300 are granted for an study analyzed in five of the ten counties motions also period an additional of the counties for and in two additional six-month granted suppression Only that were one-year period. motions one of the pursuant during period to a warrant. involved search made this *68 Recognizing importance the extreme of protecting an individ- right seizures, ual’s to be free from unreasonable the Court in abolish, modified, merely Leon did not exelusionary rule provide to magistrate judge remains an ... if the [suppression in appropriate remedy issuing a warrant was misled information in an affidavit affiant knew was false or would have known was false for his reckless except disregard of the truth---- The ... will also not in exception cases where apply issuing magistrate judicial his wholly abandoned role in ...; such circum- no stances, well-trained officer on reasonably should the warrant. Nor rely objective good relying would an officer manifest faith in on a warrant based on lacking in affidavit “so indicia of as to cause render official probable belief depending its existence unreasonable.” ... entirely the circum- Finally, stances of the case, a warrant so particular be may i.e., facially deficient — failing things to be particularize searched or the be place seized —that executing valid, officers cannot it to be reasonably presume [citations U.S. at omitted.] [468 923-24, 698-99.]

The Court concluded that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be only case-by-case ordered on a instance, basis. In each weigh the court must the costs and of applying short, benefits probative rule. evidence should not suppressed where its exclusion will serve no useful, recognized purpose.

The foundation of the majority’s decision is assumption its good exception Leon’s limited faith will tend to undermine the motivation of comply law-enforcement officers to with the requirement constitutional majority cause. The to recognize fails application that indiscriminate of the exclu- sionary may actually hinder the educative and deterrent suppression remedy. functions of the Kaplan, “The See Limits Rule,” Exclusionary (1974) 26 Stan.L.Rev. (“Instead of disciplining employees, police their departments generally adopted have the attitude that the courts cannot be satisfied, that the hopelessly rules are complicated and subject to change, suppression and that the of evidence is the courts’ problem and not the departments’.”). good-faith exception fashioned in Leon does not reduce a respect Constitution, officer’s incentive because it objectively is rea- only an officer’s conduct triggered when

sonable. law should have If when a enforcement officer evidence is only suppressed violating Fourth Amendment, may known that he police departments when is invoked. officer’s misconduct suppression look more seriously good-faith gathered providing on a that evidence reliance Moreover, by good-faith creates an incentive excluded, rule will not be exception

reasonable governing in the to formulate rules activities of officers police departments including area. commentators, search-and-seizure Many proponents recognize that the formulation of such rules by police sanction, guidelines training these and the necessary implement departments, *69 protecting means of Amend are the most effective Fourth practice, perhaps (1969); rights. “Rule-Mak See McGowan, K. Justice Davis, Discretionary ment (1972); ing Mich.L.Rev. 70 659 Police,” Amsterdam, “Perspectives and the Minn.L.Rev. 50 416-431 Amendment,” the Fourth Gates, supra, n. U.S. S.Ct. at 260-61 n. at 2344-45 76 v. 15,103 [Illinois (White, concurring).] J., at 563 n. acting objectively in reasonable manner police If a officer an good in believes judge from faith he a warrant and secures more can requirements, what complied has with constitutional constantly must officers expect we of him? Law-enforcement make probable is cause to whether there judgments make about arrest. ground and that believe that a crime has been committed Is reasonable to there facts are it? Sometimes the historical has committed particular suspect the facts be clear otherwise in doubt. In other situations may or are disputed In still cause remains. so known, yet question probable far as are they information about the of secondhand reliability there are worries special others coming which occur situations, In these as that from informants. any such to arrest he cause convinced that has officer is probable when repeatedly, Powell, supra, 428 at the arrest. [Stone he will make very likely (White, dissenting).] J., 49 L.Ed.2d at S.Ct. at 538-39, decisions, police officer determines of these most This is arrest. make an probable cause to there is sufficient and reviewed is issued particularly when a warrant the case Jersey, by a in and required New superiors, as now an officer’s many Nevertheless, only the difficul- consider one need judge. defining in had standards courts themselves have ties the scope of the exclu- “probable cause” and constitutes what be occasions when sionary realize that there will rule to wrong. guess officer, judge will superiors, his police and appellate disagree be those will occasions where the trial or court [T]here will cause, police probable on the issue no [with officer] matter how grounds appeared though reasonable for arrest to the officer reason- easily question. happens men able could differ on the It also that after the may occurred, change, dramatically at events issue have law or ever so slightly, any sufficiently require judge in but event the trial to hold that probable there was not cause make arrest and to seize the evidence prosecution. offered [********] ultimately It is true that in cases such the courts have determined their mistaken; making view the officer was but it also that in is true constitutional

judgments general language parts Constitution, under the used in some of our Amendment, including disagreement among the Fourth is much there room for judges, colleagues each of he his whom is convinced that both are Surely men. reasonable when this Court divides five four on issues of cause, it tenable to conclude that the officer at fault or unreasonably making the acted arrest. Powell, 428 U.S. at [Stone L.Ed.2d at (White, J., dissenting).] In such circumstances have officers acted as reason act, public able officers would and expects should and as the them act. When it they turns out that have acted mistaken ly, good grounds, faith and on reasonable the exclusion officers, of such evidence cannot act deterrent. as a “The if they duty, do their will act similar fashion in circum similar future____” stances in the Id. *70 cases, 2d application

L.Ed. at 1114. In such of the rule will result in only keeping probative relevant and evidence thereby jury, substantially from the impairing aborting trial.

I do not share opponents good the fears of the faith exception that necessary law-enforcement officers will lack motivation to secure sufficient information to issue warrants for probable judges, warrants, cause and in reviewing that such stamps. will act as A judge mere rubber a warrant from is a safeguard designed protect rights to individual and insure that a Kasabucki, reasonable for a basis search exists. See State v. suggest N.J. It makes no sense to that a police officer deliberately appear judge would a before with an warrant, affidavit, granted if inadequate knowing that the even instance, might challenge fail to a later in the withstand first stated, require- Succinctly warrant judge. before second assumption judge will proper- that act ment based doing to in authorities act ly and so will cause law-enforcement properly.2 the law-enforcement officers or presume

I do not that either Jersey will their judges of the State of New abdicate Statement apply “Policy the law. The responsibility Jersey County Prosecutors Asso- Attorney General of New and Jersey Regarding New Prosecutorial Review ciation of February should Applications,” Search Warrant issued Policy Statement was issued after dispel such concerns. The decisions, any refuting suggestion that Gates Leon by scrutiny search warrants law will reduce these cases personnel. enforcement good exception in faith majority’s fears of the

I think that Nonetheless, regard are unfounded. this emerge our that, it should from contrary expectations, experience [i]f change good rule in a material results faith exception have to reconsider Amendment, the Fourth we shall police compliance Leon, we have undertaken here. States what [United (Blackmun, concurring).] J., at 702 yet it change has occurred. Until such No behavior does, evidence it to allow the admission of I is better believe objectively good reasonable acting with an an officer seized regarding Office of the Courts the Administrative 2 The conducted survey judges, in n.1, the assumption motions, supports suppression supra reviewing protecting granting warrants, the constitu are effectively search rights files on 82 The examined the suppres citizens. tional private study granted. involved search one of these cases sion that were Only motions majority to indicate these statistics with a interprets executed warrant. significant law-enforcement no threat the exclusionary "poses judges these are I statistics to indicate that interpret at 152. efforts” Ante reviewing such circum acting Under search warrant applications. properly encourage good will faith exception stances is no reason think there *71 judges ignore the law. faith that his require- belief conduct satisfied constitutional case, ments. In exclusionary such deterrent effect of the minimal, nonexistent, rule is if clearly “so that the balance Gates, favors the rule’s supra, modification.” Illinois v. J., (White, S.Ct. at L.Ed. at concurring).

II independent There no are state grounds constitutional justify divergence fact, our from federal law in this area. In “divergence developed Hunt, criteria” State v. (Handler, J., N.J. at concurring), adopted 364-68 State Williams, (1983), 93 N.J. 39 offer compelling why reasons good exception faith Jersey precedents, is consistent with New practice, Furthermore, and traditions. underlying reasons expressed Court in for adopting good Leon faith exception long part have been New Jersey law.

Initially, Jersey New outspoken courts were in their dis- regard for exclusionary inception, rule. From the rule’s we recognized have that its purpose dominant is to deter over-zeal- ous making law-enforcement from officers unreasonable Nevertheless, searches and seizures.3 early recog- the courts practical nized that the effect of the federal rule “is not to punish the individual who provi- has violated the constitutional making sion by seizure, an unreasonable search and but to shield penalize the criminal and people of this state suppressing tending prove evidence ‘against an offense its ” peace Black, dignity.’ (Quar- State v. 5 N.J.Misc. 1926). Black, ter Sessions heavily court drew from reaffirming Delguidice 3 For recent cases this see v. New principle, Jersey Racing (1985) ("Deterrence Comm., 100 N.J. of future unlawful police ” conduct is the rule, if not the sole 'prime one,’ purpose’ quoting Immigration and Serv. v. 468 U.S. Lopez-Mendoza, Naturalization (1984); (1981) 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 State v. N.J. Burstein, (the conduct"). illegal rule is "meant to deter solely *72 rule, which la Wigmore’s scathing criticism Professor Ac exclusionary remedy “indirect and unnatural.” the beled way upholding of cording Wigmore, “Our courts’] [federal it, but to strike at the man who breaks constitution is not to the Wig something 4 J. somebody who broke else.” off else let 2183, 2184, 2259(b), (2d ed.) quoted in more, Evidence § 51. administration Black, supra, 5 Since N.J.Misc. “[t]he practical and never Jersey always been in New has the law accused,” the court id. at to shield an over-sensitive general the rule exception” to adopt the “new refused to Black admissibility. place the admissibility firmly in when was thus rule of The assembled Convention Jersey’s Constitutional delegates to New proposed at the Con- An amendment of 1947. in the summer I, Article following sentence to added the would have vention 7: paragraph

Nothing into evidence. hereof shall be received in violation obtained exclusionary rule merits of the based delegates debated the proposed amend- the experience, and defeated the federal Proceed- 26. 1 Convention final of 45 to See ment vote 1947). legislative the While (August ings 598-608 Record respect to is silent with fourth amendment4 history of the rejected by specifically rule, rule was exclusionary compelling This is Jersey Constitution. Framers of the New constitution but part of our rule is not a that the evidence remedy. judicial amost Colorado, 69 S.Ct. 338 U.S. after Even Wolf and exclusionary rule (1949), rejected the Court

L.Ed. 1782 admissibility. rule of general rely on continued to Justice Chief Richman, 26 N.J. Eleuteri v. Court, emphasized Weintraub, writing unanimous for a searches unreasonable is to deter the rule purpose dominant paragraph the New 7, of I, and Article fourth amendment 4 The text of the reference contains any Neither are identical. Constitution nearly Jersey rule. expressed We seizures. the same concerns as those ex- pressed by Supreme Court in the high Leon about cost of rule: incriminating The issue arises when evidence is only its thus, guilty. immediate exclusion benefits Unlike the impact, only analogy extorted to which an is confession, the evidence frequently drawn, illegally wrong; is not seized the fruit official it criminal’s own work against which could have been seized product and used him. If such lawfully *73 evidence “the fruit tree” are poisonous “The criminal is suppressed, go v. free because the constable has blundered.” 242 N. Y. People Defore, (Ct.App.1926), N.E. 150 denied, certiorari 13, 585, 587 270 46 L.Ed. 784 wrongs go 70 Two at the of unpunished expense society. Wigmore,

8 supra, § 2184, p. 40. Unlike the Federal Government which was the states must contend conceived, with more many crimes of violence. The are stakes different. N.J. [26 512.] long We have recognized that the rule should be applied only presence culpable police of misconduct. See (“It Rickman, supra, thing Eleuteri 26 N.J. at is one product condemn the an arrogant of defiance of the Constitu tion; it impose is another to the sanction when the official respect intends to mistaken, his of oath office but is found to be say, by vote.”); let us the margin single Gerardo, of a State v. (1969)(holding 53 N.J. that was exclusion not mandat since, ed “important fourth amendment as it is our society, imposition judicial does not call for sanctions [it] enforcing where officers have followed the law such punctilious regard here”); they Zito, have State v. N.J. 206, 211, (1969) (concluding officers’ reliance on a providing person’s “give good statute that a inability to prima account himself” is facie illegal purpose evidence of not “unreasonable” the meaning within of the fourth “Surely,” noted, arrogant amendment. court “it an officer to abide by the statutes of his State. On the contrary, it presumptuous would be of him to sit in constitution judgment.” al In the sup circumstances the court found pression criminal, of the fruits “would a windfall to the end....”); Bisaccia, serve no laudable State 58 N.J. (a (1971) deliberately judgment acquittal false judicial process” contempt “debases the and breeds for the justify deterrent thrust of the criminal law. “To so serious an judicial process, compensating gain some should be insult Moreover, skeptical as to incontestable.” we remained whether genuine all, especially any the rule has deterrent effect case, where, police good as in had acted in faith and insolence.”). “without trace of Bruzzese, (1983), recently we re- State v. N.J. fourth is rea-

affirmed that touchstone amendment search and seizure We held that a officer’s sonableness. objec- only be considered reasonable if it conformed to would tively police standards. This is the same test estab- reasonable Likewise, empha- we lished the Court Leon. Bruzzese necessary application objective sized that the of an standard is citizens, “re- safeguard privacy rights of our since the quirement of reasonableness is not one without teeth.” Id. at 226; Guerra, (1983)(“[I]f see also State v. N.J. validity independently objective of a search can be sustained reasonableness, other the existence of grounds demonstrating derogate objective defects that do not from the overall reason- *74 impugn integrity judicial of the ableness the search or search.”) upon invalidate the process should not be relied added). (emphasis Leon,

Moreover, in recognized, as did the Court we have police conduct is to be evaluat- the reasonableness of a officer’s long have acknowl- practical ed a and realistic manner. We face edged problems the difficult law-enforcement officials concerning probable cause and realized that sense without a statements must be looked at a common way officer’s [t]he grudging negative an awareness that few or attitude. There must be police- legal training material submitted to demonstrate

men have and that be with the one would cause not described technical nicety expect probable may judge take into account of a member of the bar. should Moreover, State v. Con- knowledge of and work-a-day specialized experience policemen. must tested tursi, N.J. by The facts asserted be life on which reasonably prudent considerations practical everyday officers act. police experienced N.J. at Kasabucki, 117.] [State encourage police We warrants, officers to seek since the by review of a warrant a neutral judge and detached offers a safeguard public further against police unreasonable action. As Justice eloquently Francis wrote in State v. Kasa- bucki, supra, N.J. 115-16: police rely facts, When the officer does not on his own evaluation of independent judgment judicial submits them to the of a officer for a determina- they up probable cause, tion as pursuant to whether add a search to a by judge equated warrant issued a cannot be with “insolence in office” or abuse police power, of the officer’s reasonably can nor it be said that the citizen’s security only Fourth Amendment police. rests in the discretion of the Thus adequacy probable when the of the facts challenged offered to show cause is pursuant warrant, after a search made adequacy appears a and their to be marginal, ordinarily sustaining doubt should be resolved the search. provides That is because the warrant legitimacy clear evidence of the of the purpose. bespeak preference officer’s The decisions accorded a search authorized after the facts and subjected inferences therefrom have been judicial

neutral consideration and found to constitute cause it. [Citations omitted.] foregoing Jersey review New case law demonstrates Jersey that New has no historical attachment to the exclusion- ary fact, rule. have, the cases show that we essence, long recognized good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Thus, I disagree with the majority that the exclusionary rule has been embedded in jurisprudence our for the twenty-five last years. Ante at 149.5

I do not think public personnel law-enforcement perceive will reducing the Court vigilance protect- its ing the state rights constitutional of an if prosecu- individual Macri, (1963), Valentin, (1961), State v. 39 N.J. 250 and State v. 36 N.J. 41 are Macri, majority support position. cited for this In State v. Justice Weintraub, concurring opinion, pointed pal in his out that the affidavit was so pably any magistrate’s devoid of basis for evaluation that the order was no more Hence, stamp good than a rubber officer’s action. faith exception Valentin, applicable. would In State v. we remanded the case suppress shotgun for reconsideration of a motion to recovered in a warrant- prosecutor proof respecting less search so that the who had not submitted *75 so, surrounding circumstances the search and seizure could do because "wheth particular depends upon er a search and seizure are unreasonable the circum police stances under which the officers acted." Id. at 43. tor is by allowed to introduce evidence obtained an officer acting in by reasonable reliance on a search issued warrant a judge, ultimately unsup- neutral and detached found be Indeed, ported by probable cause. unless the officer and the judge reasonably objective matter, act a the evidence will be sense, suppressed. good exception In a faith is a contest individual, not between the state and the but between two seeking protection against police individuals—one officer’s conducting overzealous conduct in an unreasonable search and seeking protection the other officer’s from criminal perceive public I good attack. will view the faith exception rule as a sensible accommodation protecting rights an individual’s constitutional between punishing the guilty.

Ill good application exception We turn now an of the faith policeman’s this case. Whether the conduct here was that of objectively policeman very question. reasonable is a close officer, warrant, drafting He was a new his first which was not by any superiors. his He detective reviewed and another independent investigation conducted an for three hours. Cer- Policy Attorney tainly, present under the Statement of the Jersey, County General and Prosecutors Association of New by screening there would have to an internal of the warrant Attorney County either the General’s Prosecutor’s Staff. Moreover, independent investiga- considering scope Leon, question tion done the officers there is serious investigation in independent whether there was sufficient this below, Nevertheless, majority, case. the courts as well as the objectively good that the officer acted in faith and in an believe and there- manner. I would abide their decision reasonable permit judgment Division and Appellate fore reverse the good exception faith introduction of the evidence under the future, however, in the absence rule. significant investigation pre-application independent *76 screening, I would not hold similar conduct officer objectively to be reasonable. WILENTZ,

For Justice and Justices affirmance —Chief CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and STEIN—6.

Concurring part dissenting part in —Justice GARIBALDI—1.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Novembrino
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Date Published: Jan 7, 1987
Citation: 519 A.2d 820
Court Abbreviation: N.J.
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