State of Minnesota v. TrumpState of Minnesota v. Trump
President Trump and executive agencies acting at his direction understand Title IX to forbid transgender women and girls from participating on athletic teams and using locker
Defendants seek the case’s dismissal on jurisdictional and merits grounds. Defendants don’t seem to dispute that the Title IX-centered legal dispute between them and Minnesota deserves judicial resolution. After all, the United States has sued Minnesota the Minnesota Department of Education and State High School League in a separate case teeing up essentially the same disputed legal issues Minnesota presents in this case. See United States v. Minn. Dep’t of Educ., No. 26-cv-2078 (ECT/DLM) (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2026). Regardless, Defendants argue this case is not a legally viable vehicle for adjudicating these issues.
Defendants’ motion will be granted for the most part. The short story is this: (1) I conclude Minnesota has shown it possesses Article III standing and that the case is ripe. (2) Minnesota has not plausibly alleged final agency action, meaning its claim under the
I
Minnesota law forbids discrimination based on gender identity. The Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) forbids discrimination “in the full utilization of or benefit from any educational institution, or the services rendered thereby to any person” based on “gender identity.”
Beginning with two executive orders, President Trump interprets and applies federal law to forbid the recognition of gender-identity-based rights in some situations where Minnesota law requires it. (1) On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14168, entitled “Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government” (the “Gender Ideology Order”). Am. Compl. ¶ 41; ECF No. 53-1. The Gender Ideology Order defines several terms and prescribes that these definitions “shall govern all Executive interpretation of and application of Federal law and administration policy.” ECF No. 53-1 at 2.2 As relevant here, the Gender Ideology Order defines “sex” as “refer[ring] to an individual’s immutable biological classification as either male or female” and clarifies that the term “is not a synonym for and does not include the concept of ‘gender identity.’”
replaces the biological category of sex with an ever-shifting concept of self-assessed gender identity, permitting the false
claim that males can identify as and thus become women and vice versa, and requiring all institutions of society to regard this false claim as true. Gender ideology includes the idea that there is a vast spectrum of genders that are disconnected from one’s sex. Gender ideology is internally inconsistent, in that it diminishes sex as an identifiable or useful category but nevertheless maintains that it is possible for a person to be born in the wrong sexed body.
The United States Attorney General threatens to sue Minnesota and its responsible agencies because they require athletic participation based on gender identity. On February 25, 2025, then-United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi wrote to Attorney General Ellison and the League’s Executive Director explaining that the Department of Justice “stand[s] ready to sue states and state entities that defy federal antidiscrimination laws,” and that “[r]equiring girls to compete against boys in sports and athletic events violates Title IX.” ECF No. 53-5 at 2; Am. Compl. ¶ 59. Attorney General Bondi warned that “Minnesota should be on notice,” and that “[i]f the Department of Education’s investigation [into the League] shows that relevant Minnesota entities are indeed denying girls an equal opportunity to participate in sports and athletic events by requiring them to compete against boys, the Department of Justice stands ready to take all appropriate action to enforce federal law.” ECF No. 53-5 at 2.
The United States Department of Justice announces it will review Minnesota entities for Title IX compliance. On April 8, 2025, Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Harmeet Dhillon wrote to Attorney General Ellison notifying him that the Justice Department “is commencing a compliance review of
Minnesota files this case. Minnesota filed its original Complaint on April 22, 2025. See ECF No. 1. As Minnesota explained, it believed that Attorney General Ellison’s opinion is “a correct statement of law” and that “President Trump’s Executive Orders do not and cannot reverse the federal and state statutes that prohibit discrimination against
The United States Departments of Education and Health and Human Services investigate and find the Minnesota Department of Education and State High School League are in violation of Title IX. On June 3, 2025, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights announced in a letter that it was commencing a Title IX investigation into the Minnesota Department of Education. Am. Compl. ¶ 68; ECF No. 53-8. The letter noted that the “initiation of an investigation is not itself evidence of a violation of federal civil rights laws and regulations,” but that the Minnesota Department of Education’s “posted guidance for schools . . . appears to adopt a position in irresolvable conflict with Federal law and instruct schools throughout Minnesota to do the same.” ECF No. 53-8 at 3. On June 26, 2025, the federal Department of Health and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights announced in a letter that it was opening a Title IX compliance review into the Minnesota Department of Education “based upon the participation of a male athlete in a female-only high school softball championship.” ECF No. 53-9 at 2; Am. Compl. ¶ 70. The letter explained that the Office for Civil Rights “understands that ‘sex’ as used in Title IX refers solely to biological sex.” ECF No. 53-9 at 3. On September 30, 2025, the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services’ Offices for Civil Rights
Minnesota amends and supplements its Complaint in this case. On November 5, 2025, Minnesota moved to amend and supplement its original Complaint. ECF No. 38. Among other things, Minnesota sought to supplement the Complaint with allegations regarding the Findings issued following the investigations by the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services’ Offices for Civil Rights. See ECF No. 40 at 6; ECF No. 41-2 ¶¶ 68–78. Magistrate Judge Micko granted Minnesota’s motion on November 25, 2025. ECF No. 52.
Subsequent attempts at voluntary resolution fail, and the United States sues Minnesota, alleging Title IX violations. After Minnesota filed its Amended Complaint in this action, the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services “made multiple attempts to reach a voluntary resolution agreement,” but Minnesota was unwilling to accept the proposed resolution. Complaint ¶¶ 212–213, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., No. 26-cv-2078 (ECT/DLM) (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2026), ECF No. 1; ECF No. 66 at 14–16. As a result, on January 26, 2026, the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services referred the matter to the Justice Department for enforcement. Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Departments of Education and Health and Human Services Refer Minnesota Case to U.S.
Minnesota asserts six claims in this case. The claims are as follows: (1) Minnesota claims that the Gender Ideology and Women’s Sports Ban Orders and the Justice Department’s subsequent enforcement correspondence and Findings “are ultra vires and without any legal effect because they each violate the separation-of-powers principle.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93–104 (Claim 1). (2) Minnesota claims that these same materials and actions “conflict with Title IX.”
II
A
Begin with subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants first argue that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking because “Plaintiff lacks an authorized cause of action,” ECF No. 62 at 9, but this confuses subject-matter jurisdiction with the merits. Whether a plaintiff possesses an authorized or viable cause of action is ordinarily a merits question. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647, 690 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (recognizing that “the existence (or not) of a cause of action does not go to a court’s subject
B
Defendants’ second jurisdictional contention is that Minnesota lacks Article III standing. A court addressing this question must first determine whether the movant is making a “facial” attack or a “factual” attack. Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015). Here, Defendants present a facial attack to subject-matter jurisdiction because they accept as true all of Minnesota’s factual allegations relevant to jurisdiction. See Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). A court analyzing a facial attack “restricts itself to the face of the pleadings and the non-moving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (citation modified). Under
Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power (or jurisdiction) to adjudicating “Cases” and “Controversies.” This provision keeps the federal courts out of the business of the legislative and executive branches, and the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence guides the federal courts in determining whether a litigant seeks adjudication of a genuine “Case” or “Controversy” or instead hopes to have the court act as if it were one of the political branches. The general rules governing Article III standing are settled:
Federal jurisdiction is limited by Article III, § 2, of the U.S. Constitution to actual cases and controversies. Therefore, the plaintiff’s standing to sue “is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth [v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)]. To show Article III standing, a plaintiff has the burden of proving: (1) that he or she suffered an “injury-in-fact,” (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). An injury-in-fact is the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation modified). To have standing to obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show that it is likely to suffer future injury by the defendant and that the sought-after relief will prevent that future
The disputed issue is whether the Amended Complaint alleges facts plausibly showing that Minnesota faces a certainly impending threatened injury, and I conclude it does. A state has “Article III standing when ‘quasi-sovereign rights [are] actually invaded or threatened.’” Tennessee v. Dep’t of Educ., 104 F.4th 577, 591 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 802 n.10 (2015)). A state’s quasi-sovereign rights include “the continued enforceability of its own statutes.” Id. (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986)); see Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (recognizing that “the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal” is a sovereign interest). Therefore, “‘when a federal regulation purports to preempt state law,’ states have ‘a sovereign interest to sue the United States.’” Id. (quoting Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 598 (6th Cir. 2022)); see Texas v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 78 F.4th 827, 835–36 (5th Cir. 2023) (concluding that Texas met Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement because federal law
C
Defendants’ contention that this case is not ripe is unconvincing. Minnesota’s claims pose legal questions regarding the correctness of Defendants’ interpretations of Title IX. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93–141. It is difficult to hypothesize what discovery might be necessary to resolve the case. In addition to showing Article III injury for standing purposes, the determination that Minnesota has suffered injury to its sovereign interests demonstrates the hardship Minnesota would face were court consideration of its claims withheld. And there is the United States’ separate suit against the Minnesota Department of Education and the State High School League. Minn. Dep’t of Educ., No. 26-cv-2078 (ECT/DLM). In that case, the United States claims the Minnesota Department of Education and League are in violation of Title IX for allowing transgender women and girls to compete on athletic teams and use restrooms and locker rooms consistent with their
III
Turn to the
Considering “matters outside the pleadings” generally transforms a
A
The
First, the action must mark the “consummation” of the agency‘s decisionmaking process, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which “rights or obligations have been determined,” or from which “legal consequences will flow,” Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970).
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). “To constitute a final agency action, the agency‘s action must have inflicted ‘an actual, concrete injury’ upon the party seeking judicial review.” Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Rsrv. v. U.S. Corps of Eng‘rs, 888 F.3d 906, 915 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting AT&T Co. v. EEOC, 270 F.3d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Final agency action “may either compel affirmative action or prohibit otherwise lawful action.” Id. (citing Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 2015), aff‘d, 578 U.S. 590 (2016)). Courts take a “‘pragmatic’ and ‘flexible’ approach to the question of finality.” Hawkes Co, 782 F.3d at 997 n.1 (quoting Abbott Lab‘ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–50 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
The issue is whether the Findings and Justice Department letters that preceded them are final agency action for APA purposes, and I conclude they are not. Minnesota‘s front-line position is that the Findings are “a final determination of Minnesota‘s noncompliance with Title IX.” ECF No. 66 at 22. This contention fails Bennett‘s second requirement. A brief review of Title IX‘s two available enforcement paths shows why this is so. Title IX authorizes (1) the termination of funding involving “an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with [a requirement]” or
Under this regime, a letter of Findings alone does not “determine[]” “rights or obligations” or impose “legal consequences.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78 (citation modified). Minnesota will not face legal consequences unless and until (1) a hearing is held in which the relevant agency finds that Minnesota is not in compliance with Title IX, or (2) a court finds, in a civil enforcement action, that Minnesota is not in compliance with Title IX. Neither event has occurred here. The Findings themselves impose no legal injury on Minnesota. This conclusion is supported by many cases holding that a mere notice of a statutory or regulatory violation does not constitute final agency action. See, e.g., AT&T Co. v. EEOC, 270 F.3d 973, 975–76 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding EEOC letters finding company had unlawfully discriminated against employee and threatening enforcement did not constitute final agency action); Luminant Generation Co. v. EPA, 757 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding Clean Air Act notice of violation is not final agency action); Saliba v. SEC, 47 F.4th 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding SEC‘s finding of violation was not final agency action because “by itself [it] has no legal consequences”); Royster-Clark Agribusiness, Inc. v. Johnson, 391 F. Supp. 2d 21, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding Clean Air Act notice of violation is not final agency action because, “[a]lthough such notices may determine that the recipient has violated the law and threaten legal action[,] they do not themselves inflict cognizable legal injury nor bind the agency to a particular course of action”).
Cases help to understand this distinction. In Hawkes, the appellants challenged the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ jurisdictional determination that appellants’ property constituted “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. 782 F.3d at 996. The Corps’ determination meant that, to use their land as they desired, appellants were required to “either . . . incur substantial compliance costs . . ., forego what they assert is lawful use of their property, or risk substantial enforcement penalties” under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 1000; see also id. at 997 (“The [Clean Water
Although not binding authority, the Sixth Circuit‘s opinion in Tennessee is also instructive. There, several states challenged Department of Education-issued documents saying the Department would enforce Title IX to prohibit sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the documents’ enforcement. Tennessee, 104 F. 4th at 584. The challenged documents included a Title
Here, the Findings and agency letters that preceded them do not create legal consequences for Minnesota (or other Title IX-funding beneficiaries) in the way that the Eighth Circuit held was sufficient to meet Bennett‘s second prong in Garland and Hawkes. Title IX does not provide for civil or criminal penalties in the way the Clean Water Act, National Firearms Act, and Gun Control Act do. Recall that the first Title IX enforcement path provides a mechanism to stop Title IX funding; it turns off the spigot for future funding, but it does not affect past funding or provide for any penalties for past noncompliance with Title IX. The second enforcement path—a civil suit—is not at issue here because Minnesota explicitly does not argue that an enforcement action is final agency action. ECF No. 75 at 10 (“But Minnesota is not alleging that the Enforcement Action itself is final agency action.”). This argument‘s absence makes sense. In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, the Supreme Court held the FTC‘s filing of an administrative
Minnesota cites two Supreme Court cases to support its position, but the cases are distinguishable. The first case, Sackett v. EPA, involved an agency determination that “expose[d] the [plaintiffs] to double penalties in a future enforcement proceeding” accruing at a rate of $75,000 per day, and “severely limit[ed] [their] ability to obtain a permit” to use their land as they wished. 566 U.S. 120, 126–27 (2012). The threat of significant penalties makes Sackett comparable to Hawkes and GarlandBell v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that an agency‘s decision establishing
B
1
A brief overview of sovereign immunity sets the table for the discussion regarding Minnesota‘s non-APA claims. Generally, the United States may not be sued without its consent. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). This immunity applies to executive officials acting on behalf of the United States. Hagemeier v. Block, 806 F.2d 197, 202 (8th Cir. 1986); Coleman v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1993); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). There are two exceptions to this principle. The Supreme Court has recognized that courts may review executive officials’ actions that exceed statutory authority. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–90 (1949). And the Supreme Court has recognized that the president‘s actions are reviewable for constitutionality. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992); Dalton, 511 U.S. at 469. These exceptions come with two important restrictions.
The first is that claims of actions in excess of statutory authority—or ultra vires—are strictly limited. A claim of ultra vires agency action is a claim to “equitable relief where an agency‘s action was ultra vires—that is, ‘unauthorized by any law and . . . in violation of the rights of the individual.’” Nuclear Regul. Comm‘n, 605 U.S. at 680 (alteration in
The Supreme Court addressed the second limitation in Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). There, the Court addressed whether plaintiffs could seek review of an alleged constitutional violation by the president for accepting procedurally flawed
Courts are not uniform in their application of the principles described in Dalton. See City of Chicago v. DHS, 815 F. Supp. 3d 727, 749–52 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (discussing competing caselaw between the Ninth and D.C. circuits). The Ninth and D.C. Circuits have established opposing positions. In Murphy Co. v. Biden, the Ninth Circuit took “an expansive view of the constitutional category of claims highlighted in Dalton.” 65 F.4th 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2023).
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has taken a more restrictive view of the viability of constitutional claims under Dalton. The plaintiffs in Global Health Council challenged
Plaintiffs contend that Dalton rested on the conclusion that the statute at issue there committed the relevant decision to the President‘s discretion. But Dalton contained multiple distinct rulings, and Plaintiffs’ argument conflates them. See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 476–477 (summarizing the Court‘s four holdings); Glob. Health Council, 153 F.4th at 16–17 (distinguishing between Dalton‘s holdings). As explained above, the Supreme Court first held that nonstatutory constitutional review was unavailable for the plaintiffs’ claim that the President exceeded his statutory authority because the claim was statutory, not constitutional. See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 472–474. The Court then separately considered whether ultra vires review was available and concluded it was not because the statute at issue
did not limit the President‘s discretion. See id. at 474–476; see Nuclear Regul. Comm‘n, 145 S. Ct. at 1776 (explaining the requirements of ultra vires review). Plaintiffs focus on this second holding, but it is the first that is relevant here. And nothing about the second holding narrowed the Court‘s prior conclusion that plaintiffs cannot avoid the limits of ultra vires review by arguing that executive officials’ statutory violations implicate the separation of powers. We therefore reject Plaintiffs’ attempts to do so here.
I conclude the D.C. and Fourth Circuits have the better position. For one, the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Dalton indicates its holdings are separate and distinct. The Court expressed concern that if every claim that the president exceeded his statutory authority were treated as a constitutional violation, the exception allowing for judicial review of unconstitutional executive actions would be “broadened beyond recognition.” Dalton, 511 U.S. at 474. It is difficult to see how the Court‘s concern about unduly broadening that exception would be alleviated by any considerable measure if its refusal to allow statutory claims to be recast as constitutional ones were limited to statutes providing the president with unlimited discretion. A plain reading of Dalton gives no indication that the Court‘s refusal to treat the challenged action as a constitutional claim was due to the president‘s unlimited discretion under the statute. See, e.g., id. at 474 (“So the claim raised here is a statutory one: The President is said to have violated the terms of the 1990 Act by accepting procedurally flawed recommendations. The exception identified in Franklin for review of constitutional claims thus does not apply in this case.”); 476–77 (“The claim that the President exceeded his authority under the 1990 Act is not a constitutional claim, but a
2
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants acted ultra vires by issuing the Executive Orders, the Findings, and the letters that preceded them because the views and conclusions expressed in them “discriminate based on sex and conflict with Title IX” by “requiring the recipients of federal funds to categorically ban all transgender women and girls from participating in sports and using restrooms and locker rooms that align with their gender identity.” Am. Compl. ¶ 108. This claim does not clear the bars set in Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Burwell. Title IX does not contain the requisite “specific prohibition” to lodge an ultra vires claim. See Nuclear Regul. Comm‘n, 605 U.S. at 681. There is no “plain violation of an unambiguous and mandatory provision of the statute.” Burwell, 764 F.3d at 962 (citation modified). As the Eighth Circuit recently explained, “there can be no dispute that whether Title IX . . . permits[] or prohibits the participation of transgender athletes in female athletics remains an open question of law.” Female Athletes United v. Ellison, 172 F.4th 1019, 1029 (8th Cir. 2026). Just this term the Supreme Court overruled the Fourth Circuit in determining that “Title IX allows schools to provide separate women‘s and men‘s sports teams defined by biological sex.” West Virginia v. B. P. J. ex rel. Jackson, 609 U.S. --- , No. 24–38, 2026 WL 1868739, at *9 ( June 30, 2026). Although the Court did not decide “the distinct question of whether, under Title IX . . . , schools may allow biological males who identify as female to participate on girls’ and women‘s sports teams,” id. at *4 n.1, the Supreme Court‘s determination that “sex” in Title IX refers to biological
3
In its separation-of-powers claim, Minnesota contends that the Executive Orders, Findings, and the letters preceding the Findings effectively modify the terms of Title IX grants by prohibiting funding recipients from allowing transgender women and girls to participate on sports teams designated for women and girls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93–104; see also ECF No. 66 at 26 (arguing “the President sought to amend Title IX by Executive Order” and “no constitutional or statutory provision allows” him to do so). Minnesota claims this is an attempt by the executive to “usurp Congress‘s Article I powers.” Compl. ¶ 102. The problem is that Minnesota‘s argument relies entirely on adopting its interpretation of Title IX. The executive will only have amended or modified Title IX if the statute does not in fact prohibit allowing transgender girls to participate in sports designated for girls. In other words, this is a dispute over statutory interpretation, and under Dalton, it cannot be recast as a separate constitutional issue.
Minnesota attempts to analogize this case with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), but Youngstown is inapposite. ECF No. 66 at 27–28. In Youngstown, the Supreme Court held the president was without constitutional authority to
4
Turn next to Minnesota’ Spending Clause claim. Congress enacted Title IX under its Spending Clause powers. See, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999). “[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). “Unlike ordinary legislation, which ‘imposes congressional policy’ on regulated parties ‘involuntarily,’ Spending Clause legislation operates based on consent: ‘in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed
Minnesota alleges a plausible Spending Clause claim. It alleges that the Executive Orders, Findings, and associated letters impose conditions that (1) are unclear, (2) are unrelated to Title IX‘s purpose, (3) “will induce recipients to violate the constitutional rights of students by discriminating against transgender individuals,” and (4) are unlawfully coercive. Am. Compl. ¶ 130. This claim is not a disguised statutory claim. Unlike the separation-of-powers claim, the Spending Clause requirements are not
5
Minnesota claims Defendants have violated the Tenth Amendment by “conditioning the receipt of federal funds on a change in the Minnesota Attorney General‘s opinion on the meaning of Minnesota law,” and “coerc[ing] the Minnesota Attorney General into changing his opinion on state law by exerting economic pressure.” Compl. ¶ 116. As Minnesota sees things, the Defendants’ “actions are all designed to push Minnesota to adopt a federal policy that directly conflicts with Minnesota law” in violation of the Tenth Amendment‘s anticommandeering doctrine. ECF No. 66 at 44.
The anticommandeering doctrine is “the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the States.” Murphy v. Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n, 584 U.S. 453, 470 (2018). “Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program,” nor may it “circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State‘s officers directly.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). Notwithstanding these Tenth Amendment principles, however, the Supreme Court has “upheld Congress‘s authority to condition the receipt of funds on the States’ complying with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means by which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according to its view of the ‘general Welfare.’” NFIB, 567 U.S. at 580; see also New York v. DOJ, 951 F.3d 84, 115 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]here Congress places conditions on a State‘s receipt of federal funds—whether directly, or by delegation of clarifying authority
Defendants first contend that Minnesota‘s Tenth Amendment claim is a statutory claim improperly recast as a constitutional claim under Dalton. ECF No. 62 at 13–16. I disagree. Minnesota‘s Tenth Amendment claim does not depend on the correct interpretation of Title IX. As I understand it, Minnesota contends that Defendants are attempting to coerce the Minnesota Attorney General to modify his opinion, which has the force of law. See
C
Minnesota seeks a declaration under the
D
Minnesota seeks only declaratory relief against the President (not injunctive relief). ECF No. 66 at 30–31. Defendants contend that no relief may be granted against the President, meaning all claims against him must be dismissed. This is not convincing. Declaratory judgments have been issued against presidents in the past. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (affirming grant of declaratory judgment against President Clinton); Kingdom v. Trump, No. 1:25-CV-691, 2025 WL 1568238, at *16 (D.D.C. June 3, 2025) (collecting cases). Though some courts have declined to issue declaratory judgments against presidents due to separation-of-powers concerns, see, e.g., Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. & Legal Servs. v. Noem, 793 F. Supp. 3d 19, 105 (D.D.C. 2025) (declining to enter declaratory relief against the president); Make the Rd. New York v. Pompeo, 475 F. Supp. 3d 232, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (dismissing the president from suit when it would have “no substantive effect on the outcome”), “the only real support for dismissing a claim for declaratory relief against [a president is] Justice Scalia‘s concurring opinion in Franklin.” Missouri v. Biden, 662 F. Supp. 3d 626, 682 (W.D. La. 2023). In that opinion, Justice Scalia stated, “I think we cannot issue a declaratory judgment against the President. It is incompatible with his constitutional position that he be compelled personally to defend his executive actions before a court.” Franklin, 505 U.S. at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring). As discussed in Missouri, however, just “six years after Justice Scalia‘s statement in Franklin, in Clinton, the Supreme Court expressly stated that a declaratory judgment against the President could redress the plaintiff‘s injuries.” 662 F. Supp. 3d at 682 (citation modified) (quoting Stone v. Trump, 400 F. Supp. 3d 317, 359 (D. Md. 2019)). The claims against the President will not be dismissed on this basis. See Kingdom, 2025 WL 1568238, at *16; see also Missouri v. Biden, 738 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1145 (E.D. Mo. 2024), aff‘d and remanded sub nom. Missouri v. Trump, 128 F.4th 979 (8th Cir. 2025); Stone, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 360; Missouri, 662 F. Supp. 3d at 680–83.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 60] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
- Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and these Claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
- Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to Claim 5.
Dated: August 10, 2026
s/Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Notes
The attorney general on application shall give an opinion, in writing, to county, city, town, public pension fund attorneys, or the attorneys for the board of a school district or unorganized territory on questions of public importance; and on application of the commissioner of education shall give an opinion, in writing, upon any question arising under the laws relating to public schools. On all school matters such opinion shall be decisive until the question involved shall be decided otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction.