REYES MATA v. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
No. 14-185
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 15, 2015
576 U.S. ___
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
NOTE: Whеre it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
REYES MATA v. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-185. Argued April 29, 2015-Decided June 15, 2015
After petitioner Noel Reyes Mata, an unlawful resident alien, was convicted of assault in a Texas court, an Immigration Judge ordered him removed to Mexico. Mata‘s attorney filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board), but never filed a brief, and the appeal was dismissed. Acting through different counsel, Mata filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, as authorized by statute. See
Held: The Fifth Circuit erred in declining to take jurisdiction over Mata‘s appeal. A court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the BIA‘s rejection of an alien‘s motion to reopen. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 253. Nothing about that jurisdiction сhanges where the Board rejects a motion as untimely, or when it rejects a motion requesting equitable tolling of the time limit. That jurisdiction likewise remains unchanged if the BIA‘s denial also contains a separate decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority. So even assuming the Fifth Circuit is correct that courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review BIA decisions not to reopen cases sua sponte, that lack of jurisdiction does not
The Fifth Circuit‘s contrary decision rested on its construing Mata‘s motion as an invitation for the Board to exercise its sua sponte discretion. Court-appointed amicus asserts that the Fifth Circuit‘s recharacterization was based on the premise that equitable tolling in Mata‘s situation is categorically forbidden. In amicus‘s viеw, the court‘s construal was therefore an example of the ordinary practice of recharacterizing a doomed request as one for relief that may be available. But even if equitable tolling is prohibited, the Fifth Circuit‘s action was not justified. If Mata is not entitled to relief on the merits, then the correct disposition is to take jurisdiction and affirm the BIA‘s denial of his motion. For a court retains jurisdiction even if a litigant‘s request for relief lacks merit, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89, and a federal court has a “virtually unflagging obligation,” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817, to assert jurisdiction where it has that authority. Nor can the established practice of recharacterizing pleadings so as to offer the possibility of relief justify an approach that, as here, renders relief impossiblе and sidesteps the judicial obligation to assert jurisdiction. Pp. 4-8.
558 Fed. Appx. 366, reversed and remanded.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14-185
NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER v. LORETTA Е. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 15, 2015]
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
An alien ordered to leave the country has a statutory right to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. See
I
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended,
Petitioner Noel Reyes Mata is a Mexican citizen who entered the United States unlawfully almost 15 years ago. In 2010, he was convicted of assault under the Texas Penal Code. The federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immediately initiated removal proceedings against him, and in August 2011 an IJ ordered him removed. See App. 6-13. Mata‘s lawyer then filеd a notice of appeal with the BIA, indicating that he would soon submit a written brief stating grounds for reversing the IJ‘s decision. But the attorney never filed the brief, and the BIA dismissed the appeal in September 2012. See App. 4-5.
More than a hundred days later, Mata (by then represented by new counsel) filed a motion with the Board to reopen his case. DHS opposed the motion, arguing in part that Mata had failed to file it, аs the INA requires, within 90 days of the Board‘s decision. Mata responded that the motion was “not time barred” because his first lawyer‘s “ineffective assistance” counted as an “exceptional circumstance[]” excusing his lateness. Certified Administrative Record in No. 13-60253 (CA5, Aug. 2, 2013), p. 69. In addressing those arguments, the Board reaffirmed prior decisions holding that it had authority to equitably toll the 90-day period in certain cases involving ineffective representation. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 7; see also, e.g., In re Santa Celenia Diaz, 2009 WL 2981747 (BIA, Aug. 21,
Mata petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to review the BIA‘s denial of his motion to reopen, arguing that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The Fifth Circuit, however, declined to “address the merits of Mata‘s equitable-tolling claim[].” Reyes Mata v. Holder, 558 Fed. Appx. 366, 367 (2014) (per curiam). It stated instead that “[i]n this circuit, an alien‘s request [to the BIA] for equitable tolling on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel is construed as an invitation for the BIA to exercise its discretion to reopen the removal proceeding sua sponte.” Ibid. And circuit precedent held that courts have no jurisdiction to review the BIA‘s refusal to exercise its sua sponte power to reopen cases. See ibid. The Court of Appeals thus dismissеd Mata‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Every other Circuit that reviews removal orders has affirmed its jurisdiction to decide an appeal, like Mata‘s, that seeks equitable tolling of the statutory time limit to file a motion to reopen a removal proceeding.1 We granted
II
As we held in Kucana v. Holder, circuit courts have jurisdiction when an alien appeals from the Board‘s denial of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding. See 558 U. S., at 242, 253. The INA, in combination with a statute cross-referenced there, gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review “final order[s] of removal.”
Nothing changes when the Board denies a motion to reopen because it is untimely-nor when, in doing so, the Board rejects a request for equitable tolling. Under the INA, as under our century-old practice, the reason for the
Similarly, that jurisdiction remains unchanged if the Board, in addition to denying the alien‘s statutorily authorized motion, states that it will not exercise its separate sua sponte authority to reopen the case. See supra, at 1-2. In Kucana, we declined to decide whether courts have jurisdiction to review the BIA‘s use of that discretionary power. See 558 U. S., at 251, n. 18. Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, havе held that they generally lack such authority. See, e.g., Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F. 3d 246, 249-250 (CA5 2004); Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1003-1004 (CA8 2008) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing other decisions). Assuming arguendo that is right, it means only that judicial review ends after the court has evaluated the Board‘s ruling on the alien‘s motion. That courts lack jurisdiction over one matter (the sua sponte decision) does not affect their jurisdiction over another (the decision on the alien‘s request).
It follows, as the night the day, that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over this case. Recall: As authorized by the INA, Mata filed a motion with the Board to reopen his removal proceeding. The Board declined to grant Mata his proposed relief, thus conferring jurisdiction on an appellate court under Kucana. The Board did so for timeliness reasons, holding that Mata had filed his motion after 90 days had elapsed and that he was not entitled to equitable tolling. But as just explained, the reason thе Board gave makes no difference: Whenever the Board denies an alien‘s statutory motion to reopen a removal case, courts have jurisdiction to review its decision. In addition, the Board determined not to exercise its sua
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Mata‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. That decision, as described earlier, hinged on “constru[ing]” Mata‘s motion as something it was not: “an invitation for the BIA to exercise” its sua sponte authority. 558 Fed. Appx., at 367; supra, at 3. Amicus‘s defense of that approach centrally relies on a merits-based premise: that the INA forbids equitable tolling of the 90-day filing period in аny case, no matter how exceptional the circumstances. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 14-35. Given that is so, amicus continues, the court acted permissibly in “recharacteriz[ing]” Mata‘s pleadings. Id., at 36. After all, courts often treat a request for “categorically unavailable” relief as instead “seeking relief [that] may be available.” Id., at 35, 38. And here (amicus concludes) that meant cоnstruing Mata‘s request for equitable tolling as a request for sua sponte reopening-even though that caused the Fifth Circuit to lose its jurisdiction.
But that conclusion is wrong even on the assumption-and it is only an assumption-that its core premise about equitable tolling is true.3 If the INA precludes Mata from
Contrary to amicus‘s view, the practice of recharacterizing pleadings so as to offer the possibility of relief cannot justify the Court of Appeals’ alternative approach. True enough (and a good thing too) that courts sometimes construe one kind of filing as another: If a litigant misbrands a motion, but could get relief under a different label, a court will often make the requisite change. See, e.g., 12 J. Moore, Moore‘s Federal Practice, §59.11[4] (3 ed. 2015) (explaining how courts treat untimely Rule 59 motions as Rule 60 motions because the latter have no time limit). But that establishеd practice does not entail sidestepping the judicial obligation to exercise jurisdiction. And it results in identifying a route to relief, not in rendering relief impossible. That makes all the difference be-
And if, as amicus argues, that construal rests on an underlying merits decision-that the INA precludes any equitable tolling-then the Cоurt of Appeals has effectively insulated a circuit split from our review. Putting the Fifth Circuit to the side, all appellate courts to have addressed the matter have held that the Board may sometimes equitably toll the time limit for an alien‘s motion to reopen. See n. 1, supra. Assuming the Fifth Circuit thinks otherwise, that creates the kind of split of authority we typically think we need to resolve. See this Court‘s Rule 10(a). But the Fifth Circuit‘s practicе of recharacterizing appeals like Mata‘s as challenges to the Board‘s sua sponte decisions and then declining to exercise jurisdiction over them prevents that split from coming to light. Of course, the Court of Appeals may reach whatever conclusion it thinks best as to the availability of equitable tolling; we express no opinion on that matter. See n. 3, supra. What the Fifth Circuit may not do is to wrap such a merits deсision in jurisdictional garb so that we cannot address a possible division between that court and every other.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14-185
NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER v. LORETTA Е. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 15, 2015]
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
The Court‘s opinion in this case elides an important distinction between construing a court filing and recharacterizing it. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 386 (2003) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (discussing this distinction). Courts routinely construe ambiguous filings to make sense out of them, as parties-both counseled and uncounseled-sometimes submit documents lacking even rudimentary clarity. See, e.g., Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1287 (MD Ala. 2013) (“The filings and arguments made by the plaintiffs on these claims were mystifying at best“). Recharacterization is something very different: It occurs when a court treats an unambiguous filing as something it is not. That practice is an unusual one, and should be used, if at all, with caution. See Castro, 540 U. S., at 385-386 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Courts should not approach recharacterization with a freewheeling attitude, but with “regard to the exceptional nature of recharacterization within an adversarial system.” Ibid. Recharacterization has, for example, been used “deliberately to override a pro se litigant‘s choice of a procedural vehicle.” Id., at 386 (disapproving of the practice). But it is not the role of courts to “create a ‘better correspondence’ between the substance of a claim and its underlying pro-
In my view, then, it makes all the difference whether the Court of Appeals here properly construed an ambiguous motion or recharacterized an unambiguous motion contrary to Mata‘s stated choice of procedural vehicle. Although the majority‘s opinion does not address this point, Mata‘s motion to reopen does not expressly state whether he was invoking statutory relief under
The Court of Appeals, however, did not purport to construe an ambiguous motion. Instead, it applied what appears to be a categorical rule that all motions to reopen that would be untimely under
The reason it erred, though, has nothing to do with its fidelity to our precedents discussing “the judicial obligation to exercise jurisdiction,” ante, at 7. That obligation does not allow evasion of constitutional and statutory jurisdictional prerequisites. It is true that “when a federal
I would vacate and remand for the Court of Appeals to consider the BIA‘s judgment without the burden of what appears to be a categorical rule demanding that Mata‘s motion be construed (or recharacterized) as a request for sua sponte reopening. Because the majority does more than this by reversing the judgment below, I respectfully dissent.