STATE OF MINNESOTA, Rеspondent, vs. Rarity Shemeire Abdul Lampkin, Appellant.
A20-0361
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
August 23, 2023
Hudson, J. Concurring, Gildea, C.J., Anderson, Thissen, JJ.
Court of Appeals. Filed: August 23, 2023 Office of Appellate Courts
Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
- The phrase “offense against the person” in Minnesota‘s nonlethal self-defense statute,
Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2022), refers to offenses carrying the threat of bodily harm. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain defendant‘s conviction for felony domestic assault-harm, Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subds. 1(2) ,4 (2022).
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
Appellant Rarity Shemeire Abdul Lampkin was convicted of felony domestic assault-harm under
We conclude that the use of nonlethal self-defense under
FACTS
In October 2018, Lampkin was in a romantic relationship with L.W., and they were living together in an apartment with L.W.‘s three children. At that time, L.W. was 8 months pregnant with Lampkin‘s child.
On October 8, 2018, Lampkin left the apartment after he and L.W. got into an argument. Lampkin returned to the apartment the next morning to retrieve a safe, which contained $10,000 in cash from Lampkin‘s business. As Lampkin tried to leave the apartment with the safe, L.W. began to physically fight him by pushing and hitting him. Lampkin was able to leave their third-floor apartment, but L.W. followed him down the stairs and through the hallway of the apartment building. L.W. then hit Lampkin, which caused him to drop the safe. Lampkin picked the safe up and proceeded to the building‘s exit door.
Surveillance video captured the ensuing struggle at the exit door. L.W. pulled at and pushed against Lampkin and used her body to block him from getting out the exit door with the safe. L.W. also grabbed onto the door‘s crossbar, pulling it to keep the door closed while she maintained her position between the door and Lampkin, who was behind her and attempting to leave the building.
Lampkin was able to get past L.W. and briefly exited the building without the safe. Moments later, however, he returned inside to retrieve the safe. L.W. continued to block Lampkin from leaving the building. Lampkin then pulled L.W. from behind, causing her
L.W.‘s daughter called 911 and reported that “my dad is fighting my mom.” Police officers arrived at the scene after Lampkin had left and discovered L.W. near the exit door with a ripped shirt. L.W. told a responding officer that “she had been pushed down by her boyfriend” and that he “grabbed her from the door and threw her onto the ground.” L.W. was taken by paramedics to a hospital, where she similarly told her physician that she “got in a fight with her significant other and was pushed down twice.”
Lampkin was charged with felony domestic assault-harm based on two prior domestic assault convictions.1
Lampkin requested a self-defense jury instruction, arguing that “[t]here was evidence that [L.W.] assaulted [Lampkin] and that she was attempting to prevent him
The defendant asserts the defense of self-defense. “Self-defense” means that the person used reasonable force against [L.W.] to resist an assault against the person and such an offense was being committed or the person reasonably believed that it was.
It is lawful for a person who is resisting an assault against his person and who has reasonable grounds to believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon the person to defend from an attack. In doing so, the person may use all force and means that the person reasonably believed to be necessary and that would appear to a reasonable person in similar circumstances to be necessary to prevent an injury that appears to be imminent.
(Emphasis added.) The district court‘s jury instruction largely tracked the model jury instruction for self-defense, except that in the model jury instruction, the phrase “offense against the person” is used in lieu of the italicized “assault against the person.” See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass‘n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 7.13 (6th ed. 2022). The model jury instruction defines an “offense against the person” as “an offense of a physical nature with the potential to cause bodily harm.” Id. Neither party objected to the jury instruction. The jury found Lampkin guilty as charged.
Lampkin appealed, raising two arguments. First, Lampkin claimed that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove his intent to inflict bodily harm on L.W. beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, Lampkin argued that the district court plainly erred when it instructed the jury on self-defense because the instruction stated that he could only use reasonable force to defend against an “assault” rather than any “offense against the person.”
Turning to the facts, the court of appeals recognized that L.W.‘s conduct arguably constituted false imprisonment or attempted false imprisonment when she blocked Lampkin from leaving the apartment building, and at that time, she was engaging in an “offense against the person” that he was justified in resisting with reasonable force even though he may not have feared bodily harm. See id. at 291. The court of appeals сoncluded that even though false imprisonment under Minnesota law does not require a threat of bodily harm, a person can still employ self-defense because
Nevertheless, because the plain-error standard of review applied, the court of appeals upheld Lampkin‘s conviction because the district court‘s error wаs not plain. Id. at 296. The court of appeals observed that “caselaw so commonly restated the bodily-harm element without the qualification for other types of offenses against the person that the jury instruction guide relied on by district judges and practitioners recommended the unqualified vernacular.” Id. Given the lack of clarification in the law, the court of appeals could not conclude that the district court‘s error was “so clear or obvious at the time of the appeal” as to be plain. Id.
We granted Lampkin‘s petition for further review.
ANALYSIS
Lampkin argues that the district court committed reversible plain error in instructing the jury on self-defense, and that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We address each argument in turn.
I.
Lampkin first argues that the district court committed reversible plain error in instructing the jury on self-defense. Specifically, Lampkin claims that
All parties agree that plain-error review applies because Lampkin requested a jury instruction on self-defense and failed to object to the form of the instruction. For Lampkin to succeed on plain-error review, he must demonstrate (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affected his substantial rights. See State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012). If these three prongs are met, the remaining question is whether we must “address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998).
A.
“While district courts have broad discretion to formulate appropriate jury instructions, a district court abuses its discretion if the jury instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 14–15 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To evaluate Lampkin‘s claim that the jury instruction in this case materially misstated the law, we must first address the proper use of nonlethal self-defense under
Nonlethal self-defense in Minnesota is codified at
If we were interpreting
But we are not writing on a blank slate here. “Once we have interpreted a statute, that prior interpretation guides us in reviewing subsequent disputes over the meaning of the statute.” Else v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 980 N.W.2d 319, 329 (Minn. 2022) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, when determining if a jury instruction correctly states the law, “we analyze the criminal statute and the case law under it.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 15 (emphasis added). We believe our case law definitively answers the question presentеd in this case.
As the court of appeals recognized, pointing to our prior decision in State v. Johnson, 152 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. 1967), we have interpreted
Minnesota-specific common law on this issue is consistent with the common law on self-defense dating back to Englаnd. “In England, the justification of self-defense evolved as an exception to the general rule, which prohibited persons from engaging in self-help that costs human life.” Cynthia V. Ward, “Stand Your Ground” and Self-Defense, 42 Am.
Accordingly, at common law, the general rule was that “a person may use reasonable force to protect himself against one who threatens him with physical injury.” Note, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 566, 566–67 (1961) (citing Rollin M. Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law 886 (1st ed. 1957)) (emphasis added). For example, Blackstone wrote that “if the party . . . be forcibly attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force,” for the law permits “a man immediately to oppose one violence with another.” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *3–4; see also 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *184 (“self-defense . . . is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the like, in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel“).
In this case, Lampkin contends that
But that is not all. Since Johnson, we have repeatedly stated that nonlethal self-defense may only be used to resist an offense carrying the threat of bodily harm. Just 5 years after the enactment of
Simply put, we have never suggested that self-defense can be invoked to resist an offense that does not carry the threat of bodily harm. In fact, we have steadfastly
The doctrine of stare decisis “directs us to adhere to our former decisions in order to promote the stability of the law and the integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Willis, 898 N.W.2d 642, 647 n.7 (Minn. 2017) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have long held that “[w]hen a judicial interpretation of a statute has remained undisturbed, it becomes part of the terms of the statute itself.” Wynkoop v. Carpenter, 574 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1998) (citing Roos v. City of Mankato, 271 N.W. 582, 584 (Minn. 1937)). Indeed, “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis has special force in the area of statutory interpretation because the Legislature is free to alter what we have done.” Koehnen v. Flagship Marine Co., 947 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 2020) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have reiterated the threat-of-bodily-harm requirement of self-defense in our case law for decades; yet, the Legislature has never amended
Lampkin attempts to sidestep the stare decisis implications of his interpretation by contending that we have referenced a threat-of-bodily-harm prerequisite to the use of self-defense only because the facts of every other case involved the threat of bodily harm. It is true that we have never analyzed a claim of self-defense made by a defendant who was
Lampkin next suggests that our precedent is simply wrong, and he argues that the ordinary and technical mеaning of the phrase “offense against the person” in the statute includes offenses that do not necessarily carry the threat of bodily harm. But “an argument that we got something wrong—even a good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent.” Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015). Rather, we require a “compelling reason” to overrule our precedent. Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 565 (Minn. 2018). Lampkin offers no compelling reason for us to depart from our decades of precedent.
We are convinced that interpreting
B.
We must next determine whether the specific instruction in this case was appropriate in light of the rule we have just articulated. District courts “are afforded broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the language of jury instructions.” State v. Smith, 674 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Minn. 2004). However, “a district court abuses its discretion if the jury instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 14–15. We “will not reverse where jury instructions overall fairly and correctly state the applicable law.” Gulbertson v. State, 843 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Before the district court, Lampkin requested a self-defense jury instruction on the theory that L.W. “attempt[ed] to prevent him from leaving the building” and “assaulted” him. Critically, Lampkin never argued that he was threatened with bodily harm when he was confined by L.W. Rather, the only time that Lampkin claimed that he was threatened with bodily harm was when he was “assaulted” by L.W. Therefore, the only “offense against the person” carrying the threat of bodily harm that Lampkin resisted was assault.
Assault is indeed an offense against the person carrying the threat of bodily harm,
Moreover, Lampkin ignores that when the facts of the case warranted it, we have previously approved self-defense jury instructions that asked whether the defendant was resisting an “assault.” Jones, 271 N.W.2d at 539–40; Love, 173 N.W.2d at 426–27; Baker, 160 N.W.2d at 242–43. Here, the facts of the case similarly warranted the tailoring of the model jury instruction to use the term “assault.”
We emphasize, however, that we are not holding thаt “offense against the person” in
But that is not this case. Here, Lampkin argued to the district court that he was only threatened with bodily harm when he was “assaulted” by L.W. It is not error for the district court to modify a model jury instruction “to fit the contentions of the parties.” State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 411–12 (Minn. 2006); see also State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 842 (Minn. 2016) (“Although district courts may favor pattern jury instructions, their use is not required.“). On the facts of this case, the district court “overall fairly and correctly state[d] the applicable law.” Gulbertson, 843 N.W.2d at 247 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
II.
Lampkin next argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove his intent to commit bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt. Intent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence. See State v.
To prove that Lampkin committеd domestic assault-harm, the State had to prove that Lampkin “intentionally inflict[ed] or attempt[ed] to inflict bodily harm” on L.W.
Resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury‘s verdict, thе State proved the following circumstances at trial through witness testimony and the surveillance video: on October 9, 2018, Lampkin attempted to take his safe from the apartment he shared with L.W. An argument ensued, and L.W.‘s daughter called 911 and reported that “my dad is
These circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable inference that Lampkin “intended to do the physical act forbidden,” id. at 830, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that Lampkin acted “accidentally or involuntarily,” id. at 831. Indeed, the theory that Lampkin acted “accidentally or involuntarily” is at odds with Lampkin‘s self-defense claim that he deliberately pulled L.W. from the exit door handle to escаpe her assault and confinement. Thus, the only rational hypothesis from the circumstances proved is that Lampkin “intentionally appl[ied] force to another person without [her] consent.” Id. Any other hypothesis is not reasonable.
Lampkin contends that the circumstances proved by the State point to a rational hypothesis other than guilt: that he “intended a physical act that Minnesota deems to be lawful,” namely, “reasonable force to resist interference with property and the person offense of false imprisonment.” But for the general intent crime of assault-harm, the State does not need to prove that the defendant “meant to or knew that [he] would violate the law.” Id. at 830. Any belief by Lampkin that his use of force against L.W. was legal is
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, but on different grounds.
Affirmed.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, Respondent, vs. Rarity Shemeire Abdul Lampkin, Appellant.
A20-0361
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
August 23, 2023
GILDEA, Chief Justice (concurring).
C-1
C O N C U R R E N C E
GILDEA, Chief Justice (concurring).
I agree with the majority that we should affirm Lampkin‘s conviction. I write separately, however, beсause we do not need to resolve whether the district court erred in instructing the jury. Lipka v. Minn. Sch. Emps. Ass‘n, Loc. 1980, 550 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 1996) (“[J]udicial restraint bids us to refrain from deciding any issue not essential to the disposition of the particular controversy before us.“). In my view, even if the jury instructions were erroneous, Lampkin has not demonstrated that any such error impacted his substantial rights. See State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn. 2007) (“If a defendant fails to establish that the claimed error affected his substantial rights, we need not consider the other factors.“).
In this case, the jury instructions did not affect Lampkin‘s substantial rights because the evidence does not demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood that a properly instructеd jury could have accepted [Lampkin‘s] claim of self-defense.” State v. Baird, 654 N.W.2d 105, 114 (Minn. 2002). A self-defense claim in Minnesota requires the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger. State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014). Even assuming the other self-defense elements are met, Lampkin exited the apartment building, demonstrating he had “somewhere safer to go.” State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Minn. 2001). And once he left the apartment building, it was his duty to retreat from the scuffle. Id. Instead of retreat, surveillance video shows that Lampkin reentered the apartment building and reengaged in a scuffle with L.W. Lampkin‘s decision to reenter the apartment building does not satisfy the duty to retreat requirement
ANDERSON, Justice (concurring).
I join in the concurrence of Chief Justice Gildea.
THISSEN, Justice (concurring).
I join in the concurrence of Chief Justice Gildea.
Notes
Relatedly, the court of appeals suggested that under our precedent, a victim of