271 N.W. 582 | Minn. | 1937
Employer and insurer now seek to vacate the award, not because of anything new having arisen respecting the facts upon which the award was founded nor because any change has taken place as to the rights of respondent, his widow. They rely wholly upon the same facts as were presented to and considered by the referee and commission. Their claim as stated in the brief is that: "This award was entered prior to the decision of this court in the case of Stanton v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.
Counsel concede that at the time this matter was determined and award made by the commission they were of opinion that Wicks v. Nortliland AM. I. C. Co.
At the outset we are faced with this question: Where, as here, there is no claim of discovery of new or additional facts, and there being no suggestion of fraud, concealment, or deceit practiced by or in respondent's behalf in securing the award, may relators now, after the statutory time for review has elapsed, secure a vacation thereof?
1. Relators' theory is that jurisdiction of the commission is a continuing one, and for that reason its decisions do not have the quieting effect of a judgment. "Within limits, the jurisdiction of the industrial commission over a compensation case is continuing." Rosenquist v. O'Neil Preston,
"If there were no limit to that rule, there would be equally no end to the liability of employer and insurer, at least no procedure whereby it could be determined with finality that liability was at all end. That would be bad from the practical standpoint, because it would impose on compensation insurers great difficulty in establishing any dependable basis for calculation of premium charges. No employer going without insurance could know just how to set up the reserve needed to cover the risk. Doubtless because of that the legislature has included in our law the provisions of G. S. 19231 § 4295, as amended, 1 Mason, 1927, id. which we consider determinative. That section, unlike § 4319, does not deal with all compensation issues in general, but only with the special one that arises where compensation is allowed, and for a time paid, and then it is asserted on tile one hand that the right to compensation has ceased and on the other that it has not." When that issue has been thus determined "the right is at an end. * * * The intention is that, once an award has been made, jurisdiction shall continue only as long as there is continuing right to compensation. And it is for the commission to determine that fact question — subject only to 'the right of review' and not to the right of rehearing provided by the statute. If § 4295 means that the decision shall be subject to *287 rehearing as well as review, then there could not be what the statute says shall be, that is, a termination of liability."
2. After that decision was handed down the legislature by L. 1933, c. 74, amended § 4295 by inserting at the end of the second paragraph thereof this clause: "and subject to the right of the Commission, at any time prior to said review, to set aside its decision, or that of the referee, and grant a new hearing pursuant to Section 4319, General Statutes 1923." As a consequence, these sections became and are in harmony so that jurisdiction in the commission is retained "until divested as provided in § 4319." Hawkinson v. Mirau,
"At any time after an award has been made and before the same has been reduced to judgment or writ of certiorari issued by the Supreme Court, the commission may for cause, upon application of either party and no less than five days' notice" to interested parties, "set the award aside and grant a new hearing." And, said the court, "it has been decided that, barring the statute of limitation, that section continued jurisdiction of the commission whenever it attached in an accidental injury. Kummer v. Mutual Auto Co.
Upon application for reargument the court further clarified the change made by the 19133 amendment,
"The rights of the parties became fixed" as of the time of accident, but these were limited to "the right of compensation, the amount thereof, if within fixed schedules, and the times of payment." (Citing Warner v. Zaiser,
3. From what has been said it is obvious that the 1933 amendment affects procedure only, not the "rights of the parties." This must be so because a contractual relationship exists under the law between the employe on the one hand and the employer and his insurer on the other. Hence their respective rights and obligations as to compensation and other benefits to the employe "become fixed at the date of a compensable accident; as to benefits and liabilities arising because of the employe's death, they become fixed at the time of the death. * * * The rate of compensation, whether for injury or death, may not be changed after the event takes place that fixes the rights of the parties tinder the lam in force at that particular time." Warner v. Zaiser,
4. There is also the recognized and well-established principle of law that "judicial construction of a statute, so long as it is unreversed, is as much a part thereof as if it had been written into it originally." 6 Dunuell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed.) § 8936b; Congdon v. Congdon,
Writ discharged and order affirmed.
Respondent will recover $75 attorney's fees plus statutory costs and taxable disbursements.
So ordered.