A17-2061
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
Filed: May 13, 2020
Hudson, J. Dissenting, Gildea, C.J., Anderson, McKeig, JJ.
Court of Appeals. Office of Appellate Courts.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender; and Emily B. Anderson, Special Assistant Public Defender, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
Teresa J. Nelson, David P. McKinney, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Elliott J. Nickell, Nickell Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota.
S Y L L A B U S
- An examination of a hotel guest registry conducted by law enforcement officers is a search within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota
Constitution because an individual‘s presence at a hotel is sensitive information in which there is an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. - Under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, law enforcement officers must have at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion to search a hotel guest registry.
- Minnesota Statutes §§ 327.10-.13 (2018), are constitutionally valid under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution because the statutory phrases “shall be open” and “always accessible” do not authorize law enforcement to conduct suspicionless searches оf hotel guest registries.
- The district court erred when it denied appellant‘s suppression motion because the evidence found in appellant‘s hotel room was the fruit of the officers’ suspicionless search of the hotel guest registry.
Reversed and remanded.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
The State charged appellant John Thomas Leonard with check forgery based on evidence that law enforcement officers discovered in his hotel room. Leonard moved to suppress the State‘s evidence. He argued, among other things, that the officers violated Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution when they examined the hotel guest registry (hereinafter “the guest registry“), which led them to his room, without the officers having any individualized suspicion of criminal activity. The district court denied his motion and later convicted Leonard of check forgery. The court of appeals affirmed.
We hold that the law enforcement officers conducted a search under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution1 when they examined the guest registry. We hold further that law enforcement officers must have at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion to search a guest registry.
FACTS
Law enforcement officers arrived at a Bloomington hotel on August 14, 2015, for a hotel interdiction.2 The officers were not responding to a particular call. Without a warrant and without any individualized suspicion of criminal activity, the officers told the clerk on duty that they wanted to examine the guest registry and to be provided with the name of any guest who paid in cash. Hotels and all other overnight lodging establishments are
The clerk complied with the officers’ request to examine the guest registry and alerted them that a man had checked into a room for six hours and paid in cash.4 The officers used the guest registry to identify this man as Leonard. The officers then ran a background check and found that Leonard had prior arrests for, among other things, drugs, firearms, and fraud. Based on this information, the officers developed an individualized suspicion that Leonard was involved in criminal activity and decided to conduct a “knock and talk” at the door of Leonard‘s hotel room. When Leonard heard the officers knock, he opened the door and gave them limited consent to search the room, but withheld access to his laptop, cell phone, and a file folder where several checks were visible. The officers subdued Leonard through a physical struggle after he tried to flee. After securing a search warrant, the officers discovered over $2,000 worth of suspicious checks paid to the order of “Spencer Alan Hill,” over $5,000 in cash, and check-printing paper.
The State charged Leonard with two counts of check forgery under
The purpose of “hotel interdictions” is to reduce the use of Minnesota hotels for drug trafficking and prostitution. [This particular hotel] and other Bloomington hotels are targeted by police because they are frequently used for drug trafficking and prostitution, just like the intersection in Ascher was selected for the high rate of DWI violations. As the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Ascher, there must be more than generalized suspicion to justify intrusion into the private affairs of Minnesotans. Here, there is clearly no more than a generalized suspicion.
Finally, Leonard argued that the evidence found in his hotel room must be suppressed because it was the fruit of the officers’ suspicionless search of the guest registry.
Acknowledging that Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches, the district court explained that Leonard had the burden of showing that law enforcement intruded upon his zone of privacy. The district court applied the third-party doctrine5 to determine that Leonard abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in his registry information when he gave it to the hotel employee who recorded it in the guest registry. The court reasoned that a guest has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in his hotel registration information, just like a customer has no such privacy interest in his banking information.
On appeal, Leonard argued that the district court committed reversible error when it denied his motion to suppress. Leonard claimed that hotel guest registries are not analogous to bank records and that his expectation of privacy in the guest registry was legitimate and consistent with existing Minnesota law. He then argued that the guest registry statutes violated Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution because the phrase “shall be open to the inspection of all law enforcement officers” in
The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Leonard, 923 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. App. 2019). Like the district court, it applied the third-party doctrine and held that Leonard could not challenge the officers’ examination because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the guest registry.6 Id. at 56-58. We granted review.
Leonard argues that the district court committed reversible error by denying his pretrial motion to suppress the State‘s evidence. For pretrial motions to suppress, we review the district court‘s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006). “Under the de novo standard, we do not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise independent review.” Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).
The Bloomington Police officers had never heard of Leonard when they arrived at the hotel. They had not procured a warrant to search anything. Nor were they called to the hotel by its employees because of concerns regarding any particular guest. Thus, it is undisputed that they acted without individualized suspicion when they conducted the hotel interdiction and examined the guest registry. We, therefore, begin our analysis with a discussion of the existing protections against law enforcement‘s suspicionless conduct.
We have repeatedly said that we have a responsibility to “safeguard for the people of Minnesota the protections embodied in our constitution.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Minn. 2004); O‘Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979). We have previously condemned suspicionless searches, observing that “a free society will not remain free if police may use . . . crime detection device[s] at random and without reason.”7 State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 211 (Minn. 2005) (quoting
Our condemnation of suspicionless conduct by law enforcement officers extends beyond searches. For example, we condemned suspicionless seizures of the traveling public in Ascher.8 519 N.W.2d at 187. We explained that we had “long held” that Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution “generally requires law enforcement officers to have an objective individualized articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before
In sum, Carter and Ascher demonstrate without a doubt that Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection against suspicionless law enforcement conduct than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Keeping in mind this well-established Minnesota law, we now consider whether the suspicionless examination of a guest registry by law enforcement officers is a search under Article I, Section 10 оf the Minnesota Constitution.
I.
The Minnesota Constitution protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Whether a guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the highly sensitive location information found in a guest registry under Article I, Section 10 is an issue of first
In State v. Jorden, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the Washington Constitution afforded individuals a reasonable expectation of privacy in their guest registry information because “an individual‘s very presence in a motel or hotel may in itself be a sensitive piece of information.” See id. at 897-98. The court noted that the anonymity of
We find the reasoning in Jorden persuasive.10 Imagine instead that Leonard had stayed overnight at the hotel to attend a political or religious conference in the hotel ballroom, or that he had stayed overnight before a medical appointment in hopes of keeping a diagnosis private. In these examples, the guest‘s highly sensitive location information is revealed, regardless of what actually occurred in the hotel room.11 That such information would be accessible to the government through a fishing expedition, where the hotel guest was a stranger to law enforcement before the officers’ random search, offends our core constitutional principles. The particular role that hotels play in society makes a guest‘s presence at that location sensitive information that warrants privacy protections.12 To
Simply put, we think that most Minnesotans would be surprised and alarmed if the sensitive location information found in the guest registries at hotels, motels, or RV campsites was readily available to law enforcement without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity.13 Exercising our responsibility to safeguard for the people of Minnesota the protections afforded in our Constitution, we now hold that hotel guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sensitive location information found in guest registries.
We also agree with Leonard that the court of appeals erred in applying the third-party doctrine. Under this doctrine, a defendant loses a reasonable expectation of privacy in information upon disclosure to a third party. It relies on the long-standing and unchallenged principle that “what a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
matters not before us . . . [n]or do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information.“).
Critical to our analysis is the meaning of public exposure. Society views most third-party institutions as places in which private affairs are not conducted or exposed. But some third-party institutions are generally considered private (e.g., a doctor‘s examination room or a lawyer‘s office).16 Thus, sharing private information in these spaces does not
II.
Next, we turn to the level of suspicion that a law enforcement officer must have to search a guest registry. A search is illegal if the government lacks the necessary level of suspicion. Probable cause is the “typical standard.” State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 211 (Minn. 2005).
In Carter, we diverged from the “typical standard” to require that officers have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a dog-sniff search outside a self-storage unit. Id. We considered this standard the proper balance between an individual‘s reasonable
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). These examples of private spaces, therefore, are not meaningfully distinguishable.
In our view, a suspicionless search of the sensitive location information in a guest registry is at least as intrusive as the dog sniff in Carter. A dog sniff typically reveals only the presence of drugs, and “any interest in possessing contraband is not one that society considers legitimаte.” Id. at 214 (Anderson, Russell, J., dissenting) (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09). A dog sniff does not typically reveal entirely legal and private details—such as political, religious, or sexual associations, business negotiations, or the impacts of domestic violence—like the search of a guest registry can. We recognize that our holding today is in tension with the government‘s significant interest in proactively addressing the serious criminal behavior that often takes place in hotels. See, e.g., Dep‘t of Homeland Security, Hospitality Toolkit (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/blue-campaign/toolkits/hospitality-toolkit-eng.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2019) (educating hospitality industry staff on recognizing signs of human trafficking, because “[t]raffickers often take advantage of the privacy and anonymity offered by the hospitality industry.“).
And here, the law enforcement officers at this hotel were acting in their capacity as members of a drug interdiction unit. “But consensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis.” Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 186-87 (quoting Sitz, 496 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
Further, the government may still achieve its legitimate purpose in preventing criminal activity in hotels without substantial burden. Nothing about our decision prevents law enforcement from partnering with hotels to help staff members recognize signs of trafficking or other crimes. And nothing about our decision prevents hotel operators from contacting law enforcement to relay suspicious observations. If such observations provide the officers with reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, they may examine the sensitive location information found in a guest registry.
III.
We must next decide whether the language of the hotel guest registry statutes gives law enforcement officers unfettered access to these guest registries in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. We interpret statutes de novo. Pepper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 813 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. 2012). Statutes are presumed constitutional; we “will strike down a statute as unconstitutional only if absolutely necessary.” In re Welfare of M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 2012). We first analyze the plain meaning of the statute. State v. Eason, 906 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. 2018). “[I]f we can construe a statute to avoid a constitutional confrontation, we are to do so.” In re
Despite Leonard‘s assertions to the contrary, it is not plain from the text of the hotel guest registry statutes that law enforcement officers have “unfettered access” to guest registries. Leonard‘s interpretation ignores that the statutes focus on the obligations of hotel owners and guests, as opposed to what, if any, showing law enforcement must make to search a guest registry. Under
Similarly,
In sum, because we must construe the hotel guest registry statutes as not authorizing an unconstitutional level of police suspicion, see Giem, 742 N.W.2d at 429, the phrase “always accessible” cannot reasonably be read to remove the prohibition in Article I, Section 10 against suspicionless examinations of guest registries.18 We therefore hold that
IV.
We next address whether the district court committed reversible error by admitting the evidence illegally seized from Leonard‘s hotel room. As noted earlier, it is undisputed that the police officers had no individualized suspicion when they examined the guest registry. In arguing that the evidence was properly admitted, the State asserts a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, citing State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 2015).
The State‘s reliance on Lindquist is misplaced. In Lindquist, we recognized a very narrow good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule that is limited to situations where “law
We next consider whether the illegality of the suspicionless search of the guest registry must be extended to the evidence found in Leonard‘s hotel room under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). We weigh several factors to decide whether evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree: 1) the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct, 2) intervening circumstances, 3) whether law enforcement would have obtained the evidence without the illegal conduct, and 4) the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct and allegedly resulting evidence. State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989).
The State argues that the evidence found in Leonard‘s hotel room is not fruit of the poisonous tree because the clerk‘s voluntary and additional disclosures to the officers, as well as the consensual “knock and talk,” were intervening factors that increаsed the likelihood that the officers would have obtained the evidence without the illegal search. The State also asserts that sufficient time had passed between when the officers searched the guest registry and when they froze the scene and sought and executed the search warrant.
In contrast, Leonard contends that the evidence found in his hotel room is fruit of the poisonous tree because the officers engaged in flagrant misconduct when they “identified [him] with no reasonable suspicion, went to his hotel room, and rummaged
Although it is a close call, on balance, the Warndahl factors establish that the evidence found in Leonard‘s room is fruit of the poisonous tree, and therefore the district court erred by admitting the evidence. We question the “vоluntariness” of the clerk‘s cooperation given that refusing to comply with the hotel guest registry statutes is a misdemeanor. See
Having concluded that the district court erred in admitting the evidence from Leonard‘s hotel room, we must consider whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. An error does not require reversal if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires us to determine if “the verdict was surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 37 (Minn. 2016). In Horst, we held that a “verdict was surely unattributable” to evidence obtained from an allegedly illegal search even though it may have shaped the State‘s case. Id. Importantly, the State presented “testimony from multiple witnesses” that sufficiently proved Horst‘s guilt instead of attempting to admit the tainted evidence at trial. Id.
Here, the evidence from Leonard‘s hotel room was the foundation of his conviction. Significantly, this was a stipulated evidence trial, consisting in its entirety of eight exhibits.20 Based on this record, it would have been impossible for the district court to convict Leonard without the checks that the officers discovered through their illegal search. See
Reversal is required here because the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our decision here.
Reversed and remanded.
DISSENT
GILDEA, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The majority holds that the police conducted an unconstitutional search when they obtained Leonard‘s name and address from a registry at a hotel where Leonard rented a room for six hours. I disagree. Because Leonard did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his name and address, and because the majority‘s decision conflicts with our precedent interpreting the Minnesota Constitution, I dissent.
I.
The threshold question in any case where a defendant claims that police conducted an unlawful search is whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item searched. State v. Griffin, 834 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. 2013). In this case, the item searched was the guest registry where the police found Leonard‘s name and address. The majority does not focus on Leonard‘s name and address but insteаd grounds its result in concerns over the privacy interests Leonard had in his activities inside of the hotel room. But those interests are not at issue in this case because Leonard gave consent for the police to enter and search his hotel room. Rather, we must decide whether Leonard had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his name and address in the hotel registry.
To determine whether Leonard had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his name and address, we engage in a two-part analysis. We examine first whether Leonard “exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy” in his name and address. State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 860 (Minn. 2006). If so, we next consider whether his expectation
A.
There is nothing in the record to suggest—much less prove—that Leonard exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in his name and address. As far as I can tell, Leonard willingly gave his name and address to the hotel when he arrived and asked to rent a room.1 Relevant precedent from the United States Supreme Court confirms that where, as here, the defendant willingly gives his information to a third party, the defendant no longer has an expеctation of privacy in the information given to the third party. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). In considering the reasonableness of a person‘s expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court has “drawn a line between what a person keeps to himself and what he shares with others.” Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018). When an individual conveys information to a third party, he or she “assum[es] the risk” that the
Applying Smith and Miller, I conclude that Leonard did not exhibit a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy in his name and address when he gave the information to rent a hotel room.3 Even if Leonard harbored any expectation of privacy in his name
B.
But even if Leonard exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, requiring us to consider the second step of the reasonable-expectation-of privacy analysis, I would still affirm the court of appeals because Leonard has not demonstrated that any expectation of privacy in his name and аddress is reasonable.
As a threshold matter, the statutes at issue in this case,
Moreover, name and address information is widely available in many public formats. Government records containing an individual‘s name and address include real estate sale documents and voter data. See
In addition to government records, phone books containing the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of individuаls residing in a given municipality have existed for more than 100 years. And citizens put millions of pieces of mail containing their names and addresses through the postal system every day. See Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not preclude postal inspectors from copying information contained on the outside of sealed envelopes . . . .“). Finally,
In this day and age, most individuals know and expect their names and addresses to be easily discoverable. Because names and addresses are publically available in so many different ways in our society, I would hold that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an individual‘s name and address.
The majority does not address Leonard‘s expectation of privacy in his name and address and instead focuses on his presence at the hotel. Indeed, the majority examines the “meaning of public exposure” and focuses on the fact that hotel guests sometimes engage in legal but “deeply private activities” in a hotel room. But the question is not whether Leonard had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his activities inside the hotel room.8 The question is whether Leonard had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information in the guest registry. And the answer is no.
II.
But, the majority says, Leonard has broader rights under the Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 10, than he does under the Fourth Amendment. Even if this were true, it does not help the majority because we apply the same reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard under the Minnesota Constitution that the United States Supreme Court applies to the Fourth Amendment. See Gail, 713 N.W.2d at 860 (examining reasonable expectation of privacy in connection with a claim that the Minnesota Constitution was violated).
That we apply the same reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis makes sense because the language of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is identical. Compare
The majority concludes that under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, a government inspection of a hotel guest registry is a search. The majority reasons that “to conclude otherwise would deprive Minnesotans of rights that we have the duty to safeguard” because guest-registry inspections are data “fishing expeditions” that reveal the activity, location, and relationships of law-abiding Minnesotans. Again, this case is not about what happened inside Leonard‘s hotel room; Leonard clearly gave the police consent to enter his hotel room. This case is about Leonard‘s name and address in the hotel registry.9
In choosing to protect Leonard‘s name and address in the hotel guest registry, the majority does not engage in any meaningful analysis of the reasons why it expands the state constitution in this instance. Presumably, the majority expands Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to provide greater protection to citizens of this state because it has determined “that federal precedent does not adequately protect our citizens’ basic rights and liberties.” State v. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d 128, 140 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 828). But instead of creating a clear path for its important decision on the
In Carter, we held that a dog sniff outside of an individual‘s self-storage unit was an unlawful search under the Minnesota Constitution. 697 N.W.2d at 211. The dog sniff in Carter, which permitted the police to gain information about the inside of a personal storage space, is materially different from the police gaining access to Leonard‘s name and address by reviewing the hotel registry. Indeed, in Carter we noted that “storage units like appellant‘s . . . are equivalent in size to a garage and are large enough to contain a significant number of personal items and even to conduct some personal activities.” Id. at 210–11. The dog sniff in Carter invaded the appellant‘s expectation of privacy for purposes of thе Minnesota Constitution because the dog sniff effectively let the police physically intrude into the interior of the storage unit, giving them information regarding the appellant‘s activities inside of the unit. Id. at 211. The facts of this case are not comparable in any respect.10
More importantly, the language in the Washington Constitution is markedly different from the language in the Minnesota Constitution. Unlike the language of
I would instead adhere to our longstanding precedent and decline to extend broader protections under the Minnesota Constitution. The majority‘s decision to expand the protections of Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution goes against the weight of our precedent, as we have repeatedly declined to extend broader protections. See, e.g., Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d at 167–68 (declining to extend broader protections under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution in the context of administrative search warrants); State v. deLottinville, 890 N.W.2d 116, 122 (Minn. 2017) (declining to expand Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to require a search warrant for police to enter а home to arrest a short-term guest); State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 2015) (declining to expand Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to protect against warrantless searches of garbage containers set out for collection); State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 18–19 (Minn. 2008) (declining to expand Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to prohibit collection of DNA samples from convicted felons);
Rather than depart from this precedent, I would follow it and affirm the court of appeals. I would hold that the district court did not err when it denied Leonard‘s motion to suppress evidence because the officer‘s retrieval of Leonard‘s name and address from the hotel registry did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment or the Minnesota Constitution.
ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Chief Justice Gildea.
MCKEIG, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Chief Justice Gildea.
Notes
Every person operating within this state a recreational camping area, lodging house, hotel or motel, or resort furnishing sleeping or overnight stopping accommodations for transient guests, shall provide and keep thereat a suitable guest register for the registration of all guests provided with sleeping accommodations or other overnight stopping accommodations thereat; and every such guest shall be registered therein. Upon the arrival of every such guest, the operator of the establishment shall require the guest to enter in such register, or enter for the guest therein, in separate columns provided in such register, the name and home address of the guest and every person, if any, with the guest as a member of the party; and if traveling by motor vehicle, the make of such vehicle, registration number, and other identifying letters or characters appearing on the official number plate carried thereon, including the name of the state issuing such official plate. Such registration shall be kept in an accurate and orderly manner and retained for one year so that the same will be always accessible for inspection by the proper authorities.
Every person, upon arriving at any lodging house, recreational camping area, hotel or motel or other resort described in sections 327.10 to 327.13 and applying for guest accommodations therein of the character described in section 327.10, shall furnish to the operator or other attendant in charge of the establishment the registration information necessary to complete the registration in accordance with the requirements of section 327.10, and shall not be provided with accommodations unless and until such information shall be so furnished.
“The registration records provided for in sections 327.10 to 327.13 shall be open to the inspection of all law enforcement officers of the state and its subdivisions.”
“Every person who shall violate any of the provisions of sections 327.10 to 327.12 shall be guilty of a misdemeanоr.”
The State cites United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 443 (1976), for the proposition that Leonard had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Based on that proposition, the State contends that Leonard must articulate a principled basis to interpret Article I, Section 10 more broadly than the Fourth Amendment to receive relief. See Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 824-25 (Minn. 2005). We disagree.
In Ascher and Carter, we extended privacy protections to Minnesotans under our state constitution notwithstanding binding Fourth Amendment precedent that failed to do the same. Compare Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (upholding dog sniffs as constitutional), and Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453 (holding systematic but suspicionless checkpoints are constitutional), with Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 208-09 (holding suspicionless searches violate the state constitution), and Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 187 (holding suspicionless checkpoints violate the state constitution). In contrast, the Supreme Court has never applied Miller to hotel guest registry information. In the absence of controlling Fourth Amendment precedent, by definition we do not read Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesоta Constitution more broadly than the Fourth Amendment on this issue. This observation is not, as the dissent suggests, an assertion that the Supreme Court has limited Miller to its facts.
The State also argues that Leonard lacks standing to assert a constitutional violation because the guest registry belongs to the hotel as a business record. See State v. deLottinville, 890 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 2017) (noting that an individual cannot vicariously assert Fourth Amendment rights); see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 437, 440 (concluding that the depositor had no Fourth Amendment rights to copies of his checks because they were better characterized as the bank‘s business records). We disagree. Because we hold that hotel guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sensitive location information found in guest registries under Article I, Section 10, the State‘s standing argument is unavailing.
The majority complains that I do “not squarely address Leonard‘s privacy interest in the sensitive location information found in a guest registry.” I do not address what the majority deems “sensitive location information,” because this case is not about Leonard‘s location or whether his location is “sensitive.” This case is about the information obtained by the police from the hotel registry, Leonard‘s name and address.