STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. REGINALD REDDICK
No. 2021-KP-01893
Supreme Court of Louisiana
October 21, 2022
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #046
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
BY Crichton, J.:
2021-KP-01893 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. REGINALD REDDICK (Parish of Plaquemines)
REVERSED. SEE OPINION.
Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Griffin, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
No. 2021-KP-01893
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
REGINALD REDDICK
ON SUPERVISORY WRIT TO THE 25TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES
CRICHTON, J.
We granted the writ application in this case to resolve a circuit split1 as to whether the new rule announced by the Supreme Court in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ---, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020), applies retroactively to cases on state collateral review. Applying the framework of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), but using the authority expressly reserved to the states by the Supreme Court to determine which new rules of criminal procedure will be applied retroactively on state collateral review, we find that the Ramos jury unanimity rule does not apply retroactively in Louisiana.
In making this decision, we are mindful of the strong reliance interests at stake and the high administrative burden that many retrials of final convictions would impose on our system of justice. We further note that in voting to amend the state Constitution to require unanimity in jury verdicts, the citizens of this state chose to
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By a vote of ten to two, a jury convicted Reginald Reddick (“respondent“) of second-degree murder for the killing of Al Moliere in 1993.2 He was sentenced to life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole. His conviction became final in 1998. State v. Reddick, 97-1155 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/11/98), 707 So. 2d 521, writ denied, 98-0664 (La. 9/18/98), 724 So. 2d 755. At the time of respondent‘s trial, the Louisiana Constitution required only ten out of 12 jurors to concur to render a verdict.
In Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ---, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020), the United States Supreme Court overturned Apodaca and held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,3 as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense and this requirement
Because his conviction and sentence were final4 when the Supreme Court decided Ramos, respondent filed an application for post-conviction relief on March 30, 2021, requesting retroactive application of the Ramos rule to his conviction. While respondent‘s application was pending before the district court, in Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. ---, 141 S.Ct. 1547 (2021), the Supreme Court declined to apply the new rule announced in Ramos retroactively to final convictions on federal habeas review. Nevertheless, the district court held Ramos applied retroactively and granted relief. The appellate court declined to review the decision. State v. Reddick, 21-0589 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/18/21) (unpub‘d). We granted the state‘s writ application. State v. Reddick, 21-1893 (La. 2/15/22), 332 So. 3d 1173.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
This case was preceded by decades of development of two separate strains of constitutional jurisprudence: the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and the retroactive application of new criminal rules. In Ramos and Edwards, these two strains came together and ultimately led to respondent‘s application.
Retroactivity jurisprudence is concerned “not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 290-91 (2008). In other words, a determination of retroactivity is not a determination of whether a “violation occurred.” In Ramos, the Supreme Court announced that all nonunanimous guilty verdicts violated the Sixth Amendment. The question in a retroactivity analysis is whether that violation will be remedied in cases where the conviction was final when the case announcing the newly-recognized right was decided.
In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Supreme Court set forth a new framework for retroactivity analysis in cases on federal habeas review and reflected that Court‘s concerns for federalism, comity, and finality. See also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 699 (1993) (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the “prudential concerns” of “equity and federalism” articulated in Teague). The inquiry announced in Teague is multi-step and begins by distinguishing between old and new rules.5 With respect to new constitutional criminal rules in the federal habeas context, the Teague Court explained: “Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. The Supreme Court then articulated two exceptions to this prohibition: (i) substantive rules that “prohibit[] a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,” and (ii) “‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ implicating the
In 1992, Louisiana adopted Teague‘s multi-step framework to determine whether new rules of constitutional criminal law will be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review in Louisiana. State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1297 (La. 1992) (noting that the considerations of finality recognized in Teague are “equally applicable in state proceedings as well as federal proceedings“).
In Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008), the Court clarified that states could give greater retroactive effect to new rules in the state post-conviction context than what the Supreme Court affords in the federal habeas context. Id. at 282 (“[T]he Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.“). This makes sense, as the concerns of comity and federalism that informed Teague are not present when a state court is reviewing a case on state collateral review. The Supreme Court itself recognized this tension in Danforth, explaining that the federal interest in uniformity
does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The fundamental interest in federalism that allows individual States to define crimes, punishments, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal and civil procedure in a variety of different ways—so long as they do not violate the Federal Constitution—is not otherwise limited by any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity.
In this sense, Danforth made clear that Teague provides a floor for when a new rule of criminal law must be applied retroactively, with a state nonetheless free to adopt its own broader test for requiring the retroactive application of a new federal or state constitutional rule. See id. at 289-291 (“A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of trial—only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts.“) (emphasis added). Eight years after Danforth, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the Supreme Court confirmed that state courts, like federal courts “must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law.” Id. at 198.
Particularly pertinent to this case, in Edwards, 141 S.Ct. 1547, the Supreme Court held that Ramos does not apply retroactively to cases on federal habeas review, as it was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure falling within Teague‘s second exception. 141 S.Ct. at 1559. The Court reasoned that the rule announced in Ramos was similar to rules announced in earlier cases, which were likewise “momentous and consequential” and “fundamentally reshaped criminal procedure throughout the United States,” but were not found to be retroactive. Id. The Supreme Court pointed to decisions in which it declined to retroactively apply “momentous” rules, including Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (finding a constitutional right to a jury trial in a state criminal case); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (remedying intentional discrimination in the jury selection process); and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (restricting use of hearsay evidence against criminal defendants pursuant to the Sixth Amendment).
In short, Supreme Court jurisprudence now provides that this Court must apply all new rules to cases on direct review (pursuant to Griffith) and must apply all new substantive rules to cases on collateral review (pursuant to Teague and Montgomery). The only choice remaining for states is whether and how to apply new rules of criminal procedure to cases on state collateral review.
2. Sixth Amendment Right to Conviction by a Unanimous Jury
An understanding of the historical and jurisprudential development of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is also relevant to our decision in this case. Louisiana‘s constitutional provision permitting nonunanimous verdicts arose in the late 1800s. After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Supreme Court held that states could no longer entirely bar black jurors from jury service. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). Before that time, and throughout the 1800s, Louisiana required a unanimous jury verdict for a felony conviction. In the wake of Strauder and other post-Reconstruction developments, Louisiana convened a Constitutional Convention in 1898, the purpose of which was, in the words of a delegate, to “establish the supremacy of the white race.” See generally Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1393-1394. See also Official Journal of Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of
Just a week before the convention, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling for an investigation into whether Louisiana was systemically excluding African-Americans from juries. Seeking to avoid unwanted national attention, and aware that this Court would strike down any policy of overt discrimination against African-American jurors as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the delegates sought to undermine African-American participation on juries in another way. With a careful eye on racial demographics, the convention delegates sculpted a “facially race-neutral” rule permitting 10-to-2 [sic]6 verdicts in order “to ensure that African-American juror service would be meaningless.”
Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1394 (citations omitted). Thus, it was in this document that Louisiana first implemented a system of nonunanimous verdicts for serious crimes, which required only a 9-to-3 vote to determine guilt, through Article 116 (later Article I, § 17) of the state constitution.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided two companion cases, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (together “Apodaca“). In these plurality opinions, despite a majority of justices recognizing that the Sixth Amendment required unanimity, the Supreme Court continued permitting nonunanimous verdicts in state trials, and, as a result, Louisiana retained its nonunanimous verdict system. In fact, the delegates to Louisiana‘s 1973 Constitutional Convention re-adopted the nonunanimous verdict provision, though now in a narrower form—increasing the requirement to at least ten votes to obtain a verdict, up from the nine required by the 1898 Constitution, and referenced Apodaca as a rationale for retaining the system. See generally Records of La. Const. Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts vol. VII pp. 1184-85, 1188 (Sep. 8, 1973). (“This proposal of having less than a majority to reach a verdict in the case has been approved by the United States Supreme Court; this issue of
The delegates’ proffered purpose for this approach was judicial efficiency. Id. at 1188 (“[W]e felt, after putting all of our heads together, that ten was a reasonable amount on this. It leads to a situation where you‘ll get a definitive action in more cases rather than have a hung jury. Because if it required twelve out of twelve to render a verdict, that means if you had anything less than twelve out of twelve, either for innocence or for guilt, you would have what‘s called a hung jury, and that means that you would have to go back and do it all over again.“). See also Jeremy Alford, The Last Constitution: Louisiana‘s Greatest Political Generation and the Document That Defined Them All (2d ed. 2021), pp. 214-16 (explaining the presence of black delegates and noting that the 1973 convention “strived to create a ‘racially neutral’ document“).7 The nonunanimous verdict system thus continued as the prevailing rule in Louisiana until the state Constitution was amended in 2018.
In overruling Apodaca, the Ramos Court explained the history of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of unanimity, and noted that it applies equally to the states and federal system, promotes the fundamental notion of a fair and reliable verdict, and is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” 140 S.Ct. at 1395-1397 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-150). See also id. at 1396 (“The law not only presumes every man innocent, until he is proved guilty, but unanimity in the verdict of the jury is indispensable.“) (quoting 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 777, p. 248 (1833)). Accordingly, any defendant convicted and sentenced based on a nonunanimous verdict has suffered a violation of a fundamental constitutional right. Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1408.
In granting respondent‘s application for post-conviction relief, the district court relied on Taylor, in which this Court adopted the multi-part Teague retroactivity analysis. Taylor, 606 So. 2d at 1300. The district court recognized that the Supreme Court in Edwards found the Ramos rule was not “watershed,” and further noted that Edwards concluded new procedural rules would never apply retroactively on federal habeas review. However, the district court then opined that ”Teague is still the standard to determining the retroactivity of a new rule of criminal procedure in Louisiana” and applied the Teague test in this case—but reached the opposite conclusion from the Supreme Court. The district court found that, despite the Supreme Court‘s ruling to the contrary, the new rule announced in Ramos was “watershed” and applied retroactively to cases on state collateral review in Louisiana.
The state argues this Court should not apply Ramos retroactively to cases on collateral review under two theories. The state first urges us to follow the Supreme Court‘s decision in Edwards, find the new rule in Ramos is not watershed, and then draw a bright-line rule that new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively on state collateral review. In the alternative, the state asserts that even if this Court maintains Teague‘s watershed exception, the rule announced in Ramos does not meet that high standard. The state claims that if Ramos is applied retroactively, it would be overwhelmed by the burden of retrying cases where final convictions rested on nonunanimous verdicts.
Respondent, in contrast, presents two theories under which he argues the rule of Ramos must be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. First, he asserts that Ramos announced a watershed rule of criminal procedure requiring retroactive application under the Teague framework, adopted by this Court in Taylor. Respondent essentially urges this Court to adopt a broader interpretation of the
As an initial matter, we disagree with respondent that the rule announced in Ramos qualifies as watershed. The Supreme Court, which developed, articulated, and defined the scope of the watershed exception, found that the ruling did not apply retroactively. In Edwards, the Court noted that many other cases significant to criminal defendants, which were “momentous and consequential” just like the rule in Ramos, were not found to be retroactive. Though decided before Teague, the Court first pointed to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), in which the Court found a constitutional right to a jury trial in a state criminal case—a “broader jury right” than that in Ramos. Yet the Duncan right was found not to be retroactive in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), and the Court found no “principled basis for retroactively applying the subsidiary Ramos jury-unanimity right” when it declined to find the broader right retroactive. Edwards, 141 S.Ct. at 1558. Likewise, respondent cannot rely upon the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment to assert retroactivity, because in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007), the Court found the new rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) was not retroactive, and that decision relied on the Sixth Amendment to restrict the use of hearsay evidence against criminal defendants. Finally, the Court addressed respondent‘s argument that the Ramos rule prevents racial discrimination, which distinguishes it from other cases and favors watershed status. But in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986), the Supreme Court found the rule announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) was not retroactive, and Batson “revolutionized day-to-day jury selection by holding that state prosecutors may not discriminate on the
The Supreme Court explained:
The Court‘s decisions in Duncan, Crawford, and Batson were momentous and consequential. All three decisions fundamentally reshaped criminal procedure throughout the United States and significantly expanded the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. One involved the jury-trial right, one involved the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment‘s Confrontation Clause, and one involved racial discrimination in jury selection. Yet the Court did not apply any of those decisions retroactively on federal collateral review. Ramos is likewise momentous and consequential. But we see no good rationale for treating Ramos differently from Duncan, Crawford, and Batson. Consistent with the Court‘s long line of retroactivity precedents, we hold that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
Edwards, 141 S.Ct. at 1559. We agree with the Supreme Court here—if Duncan, Crawford, and Batson were not deemed to be retroactive, neither should Ramos. The district court erred in finding otherwise.
Similarly, though respondent urges us to find that Louisiana has a distinct or broader interpretation of watershed under Teague than that of the Supreme Court, we decline to do so. This state has never departed from Teague by finding a rule of criminal procedure applies retroactively in state collateral proceedings where the Supreme Court found it was not retroactive in federal habeas proceedings. In other words, every time the Supreme Court has examined whether a rule of criminal procedure is retroactive, it found it was not; this state‘s courts have mirrored those holdings, and we are not persuaded that a departure is warranted here.
Though we disagree with the respondent‘s watershed analysis, we also decline to adopt in full the state‘s proposal that we declare no rule of criminal procedure can ever be retroactive in Louisiana. Instead, as noted above, we exercise our authority under Danforth to retain the entirety of the Teague approach, as adopted in Taylor, with one exception: replacing the “moribund” watershed exception for new rules of criminal procedure with a consideration of factors that more comprehensively take
* * *
Turning back to respondent‘s case, because his conviction is final and this case is not on direct review, we go through the Teague structure to determine retroactivity. We must first determine whether Ramos announced a “new rule” of criminal law. The Supreme Court already answered that question—the rule announced in Ramos is a “new rule” requiring jury unanimity. Edwards, 141 S.Ct. at 1556. We must next determine whether the new rule is substantive, such that retroactivity is required pursuant to Montgomery. Again, no party contends that the rule in this case is a substantive one. See id. at 1551. It therefore requires that we determine the retroactivity of the rule.
We now apply the analysis set forth above to determine whether the new rule announced in Ramos applies retroactively in this case. The first factor is the purpose to be served by the newly-announced rule or, in other words, the nature of the right at stake. Here, as explained more thoroughly above, Ramos detailed the enormity of the right at stake, deeming jury unanimity to be “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” 140 S.Ct. at 1395-97 (“There can be no question that the Sixth
The second factor we consider is the extent of reliance on the previous rule. This factor implicates both the reasonableness of reliance upon the old rule of criminal procedure and the duration of such reliance.10 In the decades that followed its holding, Apodaca elicited “enormous” reliance by the judicial system of this state, which tried thousands of cases under rules that permitted nonunanimous verdicts. See Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting). That reliance was perpetuated by the United States Supreme Court itself. See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682, 687 n.1 (2019) (Apodaca “conclude[d] that jury unanimity is not constitutionally required“); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 766, n. 14 (2010) (Sixth Amendment “does not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials“); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511, n. 2 (1995) (Apodaca “conclude[d] that jury unanimity is not constitutionally required“); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1980) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of trial by jury” does not prescribe “the exact proportion of the jury that must concur in the verdict“); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 136 (1979) (Apodaca “conclude[d] that a jury‘s verdict need not be unanimous to satisfy constitutional requirements“); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 625 (1976) (Apodaca held that “the jury‘s verdict need not be unanimous“). Indeed, as explained above, delegates to the 1973 Constitutional Convention relied upon Apodaca in incorporating the nonunanimity provision into
The third factor is the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule. This factor takes into account the burden on the judiciary and the justice system that retroactive application of the rule would impose. In the case of the retroactive application of the new rule announced in Ramos, the effect on the administration of justice is substantial. Though the number of individuals who are incarcerated in this state and assert that their convictions were based on nonunanimous verdicts is uncertain,11 it is surely in the hundreds, if not more. Applying Ramos retroactively to these cases would necessarily force the state to re-try defendants many years after the crimes occurred, which would pose practical problems that could impede—rather than promote—the search for justice. These problems include “lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses.” Edwards, 141 S.Ct. at 1554 (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 260). See also United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986) (“The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already
In conclusion, we find that, though the Sixth Amendment violation at issue is a serious one, finality and reliance interests, combined with the burden placed upon the administration of justice, informed by the actions of the citizens of this state and the legislature, outweigh retroactive application of the Ramos rule. Therefore, the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ramos which provides for unanimity in jury verdicts is not retroactive in Louisiana.
CONCLUSION
While we recognize the vitality and importance of the Sixth Amendment right at stake, the nature of the right is not the only issue before us. For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ramos that requires unanimity in jury verdicts is not retroactive on state collateral review in Louisiana. We decline to act as a super-legislature by issuing a broader
REVERSED
STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. REGINALD REDDICK
No. 2021-KP-01893
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
WEIMER, C.J.
With the issue now before this court for consideration, I agree with the majority that the new Ramos rule requiring unanimity in jury verdicts should not be applied retroactively in cases on state collateral review in Louisiana.1
As the opinion explains, the rule announced in Ramos does not fall within the Teague “watershed rule” exception.2 Although much attention has been given to this case considering the undeniable discriminatory origins of Louisiana‘s nonunanimous jury law, the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Ramos was not predicated on that history. Rather, the Supreme Court‘s holding was strictly grounded on Sixth Amendment rights. Even if the Ramos rule indirectly acts to prevent racial discrimination, this fact does not elevate this matter to a watershed rule within the meaning of Teague requiring retroactive application. In evaluating retroactivity, the Ramos rule is comparable to the rule announced in Batson,3 which was designed to prevent
Although I am not convinced there will ever be a new rule of criminal procedure that can meet the high bar set for retroactive application, I agree that this court should not yet relinquish its power and authority under Danforth4 by adopting Edwards in full. Despite the admitted obsolescence of Teague‘s watershed exception, by setting forth factors for consideration when determining retroactivity, this court retains the authority to address state-based concerns in the future. Consideration of these factors also allows this court to properly address concerns of finality. When this court adopted the Teague standards in State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292 (La. 1992), the court discussed the importance of finality:
A rule of law that fails to take account of these finality interests would do more than subvert the criminal process itself. It would also seriously distort the very limited resources society has allocated to the criminal process. While [individuals] languish in jail, not uncommonly for over a year, awaiting a first trial on their guilt or innocence, it is not easy to justify expending substantial quantities of the time and energies of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error when made final. This drain on society‘s resources is compounded by the fact that issuance of the habeas writ compels a State that wishes to continue enforcing its laws against the successful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in the remote past through presentation of witnesses whose memories of the relevant events often have dimmed. This very act of trying stale facts may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more reliable as a matter of getting at the truth than the first.
Taylor, 606 So.2d at 1297 (internal citations removed). The state‘s finality interests are of significant concern in this case. I find that retroactive application of the
In declining to apply the rule retroactively, I take concerns of racial discrimination seriously, and I fully acknowledge and repudiate the racist origins expressed regarding Louisiana‘s original 9 to 3 nonunanimous jury law enacted in 1898. However, any suggestion that, as a result of the racial underpinnings of the original 1898 law, all nonunanimous jury verdicts were tainted fails to take into account the subsequent development of this state‘s nonunanimous jury law. During the 1974 Constitutional Convention, delegates adopted a 10 to 2 nonunanimous jury law with the purpose of judicial efficiency.5 The 1974 delegates also expressly relied on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), which tacitly upheld the constitutionality of nonunanimous verdicts. See Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 1184-89 (La. Constitutional Convention Records Comm‘n 1977). There is nothing to suggest the delegates to the 1974 Constitutional Convention, which included people of color, were motivated by the same invidious discrimination displayed in 1898. Rather, the 10 to 2 nonunanimous rule was motivated by race-neutral legitimate concerns.
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people. It affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for law. Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (internal quotations and citations removed). The existence of a nonunanimous verdict does not mean the verdict was motivated by discrimination, and discriminatory intent should not be presumptively assigned to jurors simply because a racially motivated provision was enacted in 1898.
We must, and do, repudiate the avowed racist purpose of the 1898 Constitutional Convention, and those provisions adopted that were written to achieve a discriminatory purpose, as abhorrent. However, the demand to repair this past wrong by indiscriminately opening the jailhouse doors and conducting retrials of these defendants regardless of the evidence of guilt is not a solution. Society must continue to work together to end unfounded bias and prejudice moving forward, and be realistic and practical about how to rectify that which occurred in the past.
As this court‘s opinion recognizes, allowing retroactive application of Ramos would tremendously burden our judicial system and further victimize innocent victims who have had closure for potentially decades. Innocent witnesses to crimes
Moreover, granting post-conviction relief to everyone convicted by a nonunanimous jury fails to address the heart of the inquiry at trial–whether they committed the crime. Jury verdicts, even unanimous ones, are not unassailable and the judicial system already provides a number of checks aimed at identifying and correcting potential errors. Notably there are numerous opportunities for relief for factually innocent defendants who are nonetheless wrongfully convicted of a crime they did not commit.6 These safeguards are in place to ensure only the guilty serve a sentence. Simply stated, retroactively applying the rule of Ramos would randomly vacate the convictions of too many whose guilt is undeniable and would not serve the interests of justice. A nonunanimous jury verdict should not serve as an escape from punishment for the guilty.
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2021-KP-01893
STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. REGINALD REDDICK
On Supervisory Writ to the 25th Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines
Genovese, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.
The state of Louisiana wallowed in non-unanimous jury verdicts in criminal matters for well over a century prior to the landmark United States Supreme Court holding in Ramos. Ramos, decided in 2020, held that non-unanimous jury verdicts in criminal matters violated the
Hence, I write to collectively consider and address the effect of Ramos, Edwards, and their progeny as it relates to defendants seeking relief on collateral review on the state court level following convictions reached by non-unanimous jury verdicts.
I find that Ramos was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure and generally agree with the majority that the Ramos jury unanimity rule does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review on the state court level. However, while I do not deem Ramos broadly retroactive, I do find that defendants convicted by a non-unanimous jury verdict tainted by racial animus are certainly entitled to relief, regardless of the date of their conviction. I find the majority opinion to be an
In my view, and with due consideration of Ramos, I find, from a constitutional standpoint, only those defendants who were convicted by non-unanimous verdicts due to racial animus are entitled to relief on collateral review. Only upon proof by a defendant by a preponderance of the evidence of racial animus in the jury verdict should there be relief on collateral review via post-conviction relief.
In other words, a non-unanimous jury verdict without racial animus would not qualify for relief on collateral review. To rule otherwise is to defeat the jurisprudential rationale requiring a unanimous verdict. The common thread governing the retrospective application of Ramos is the presence of racial animus poisoning the jury verdict. In my view, racial animus is present when the jury vote of an African American is disenfranchised and discounted, which occurs when a jury can reach a verdict without said African American vote under the prior non-unanimous verdict rule of law.
Thus, I would reverse the lower courts and limit relief on collateral review, regardless of the date of conviction, to those instances where there is proof on collateral review via application for post-conviction relief by a defendant by a preponderance of the evidence of racial animus resulting in said non-unanimous verdict. Because defendant herein failed to establish same in his application for post-conviction relief, the lower courts must be reversed.
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2021-KP-01893
STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. REGINALD REDDICK
On Supervisory Writ to the 25th Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines
J., MCCALLUM, additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
This Court has been asked to do what the highest court in the land has said is unnecessary and what the citizens of this state have determined is inappropriate.1 In concord with the collective wisdom of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the people of Louisiana, I join the majority in finding that Ramos is not retroactive on collateral review. I concur to offer additional analysis.
Half a century ago in Apodaca v. Oregon, 92 S.Ct. 1628 (1972), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
However, in Ramos, the Supreme Court of the United States did away with Apodaca solely on
Undoubtedly realizing the enormity of the injurious consequences that would surely follow a retroactive application of Ramos, in Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S.Ct. 1547 (2021), the Court explicitly rejected the proposition that thousands of legally convicted defendants must be retried. A majority of the Court determined that their recent revelation that unanimous jury verdicts are now required under the
The majority opinion of this Court explains that in considering retroactivity of criminal procedural rules, this Court utilizes the Teague v. Lane, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989) analysis, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, and thereafter,
Justice Harlan recognized the difficulties that arise from the fact that our criminal justice system is ever evolving and “continuously subject to change.” A determination that a provision of federal law applies to the states through the
And it has been the law, presumably for at least as long as anyone currently in jail has been incarcerated, that procedures utilized to convict them must have been fundamentally fair, that is, in accordance with the command of the
Fourteenth Amendment that “(n)o State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908). Moreover, it is too easy to suggest that constitutional updating is necessary in order to assure that the system arrives only at “correct” results. By hypothesis, a final conviction, state or federal, has been adjudicated by a court cognizant of the Federal Constitution and duty bound to apply it. To argue that a conclusion reached by one of these “inferior” courts is somehow forever erroneous because years later this Court took a different view of the relevant constitutional command carries more emotional than analytic force. No one has put this point
“(R)eversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”
Mackey, 91 S.Ct. at 1178-79 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.).
Finality of judgments is recognized as important in civil matters,4 and even more so in criminal cases.5 At some point, cases must reach a terminus. There are substantial, compelling policies that are operative in this determination. Again, Justice Harlan offers guidance:
It is, I believe, a matter of fundamental import that there be a visible end to the litigable aspect of the criminal process. Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in plain view.
Mackey, 91 S.Ct. at 1179 (separate opinion of Harlan, J., citations omitted).
The interests served by our criminal justice system are varied. All involved are justified in expecting an ultimate conclusion to litigation, including criminal prosecutions. Society, in addition to the individual defendant, bears the impact that most assuredly accompanies indecision and vacillation.
Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.
No system of justice can survive for long if it is subject to second guessing in perpetuity. Certainty as a philosophical construct may prove illusory, but its presupposition is a cornerstone of functioning systems of justice in a civilized society.
At some point, the criminal process, if it is to function at all, must turn its attention from whether a man ought properly to be incarcerated to how he is to be treated once convicted. If law, criminal or otherwise, is worth having and enforcing, it must at some time provide a definitive answer to the question litigants present or else it never provides an answer at all. Surely it is an unpleasant task to strip a man of his freedom and subject him to institutional restraints. But this does not mean that in so doing, we should always be halting or tentative. No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.
Mackey, 91 S.Ct. at 1179 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.).
Society owes no less an obligation to criminal defendants who have not yet been convicted and await trial as it does to those who have already had their day in court and stand convicted. Those defendants whose guilt or innocence still hangs in the balance, awaiting trial, are owed our full attention and resources. The backlog of an already crowded criminal docket was exacerbated by the recent Covid pandemic. We would do well to seek to protect the rights of defendants whose cases involve the freshest of minds, witnesses, and evidence rather than a class of defendants whose cases involve the stalest of facts and potentially unavailable witnesses. Any retrial of these half-century old cases would most assuredly have a deleterious effect upon the efficacy of the trials that lie before us.
A rule of law that fails to take account of these finality interests would do more than subvert the criminal process itself. It would also seriously distort the very limited resources society has allocated to the criminal process. While men languish in jail, not uncommonly for over a year, awaiting a first trial on their guilt or innocence, it is not easy to justify
expending substantial quantities of the time and energies of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error when made final. This drain on society‘s resources is compounded by the fact that issuance of the habeas writ compels a State that wishes to continue enforcing its laws against the successful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in the remote past through presentation of witnesses whose memories of the relevant events often have dimmed. This very act of trying stale facts may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more reliable as a matter of getting at the truth than the first.
Mackey, 91 S.Ct. at 1179 (separate opinion of Harlan, J., citations omitted).
To rule as the majority does is not tantamount to leaving those who have been convicted with no recourse. That has never been the case. Our criminal justice system provides many post-conviction remedies for a variety of constitutional violations, particularly those which include racial bias or prejudice. The majority opinion correctly points out some of the remedies available to convicted defendants who assert that they were the victims of unconstitutional bias. In many circumstances, the bar to relief is even lower than might be anticipated. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently further empowered the convicted by throwing open the doors to the jury deliberation room. Pursuant to its decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855 (2017), the Court now permits inquiry into the once sacrosanct area of the jury deliberation process. Therefore, if a defendant has proof of racial animus he is not limited to attacking a non-unanimous verdict, but he may even assail a unanimous jury verdict. In essence, the remedies sought by the retroactive application of Ramos are already available to defendants who feel they have been victimized by racial animus on direct appeal as well as post-conviction relief.
As to the allegations of racial animus underpinning the adoption of non-unanimous jury verdicts in Louisiana, I believe further inquiry is necessary. To begin, the racially motivated origins of Louisiana‘s 1898 law allowing non-unanimous jury verdicts are repugnant and well documented. I repudiate and abhor
First, there are racially neutral, legitimate, and rational arguments justifying a non-unanimous jury rule. See Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1418 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also, Id., 140 S.Ct. at 1426-27 (Alito, J., dissenting). Additionally, as Justice Alito explains, some years ago the British Parliament enacted a law allowing non-unanimous verdicts, and the constitution of Puerto Rico permits non-unanimous verdicts. See Id., 140 S.Ct. at 1427 (Alito, J., dissenting). Non-unanimous jury verdicts were once advocated by the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association. Id.
Second, the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 adopted the 10–2 jury verdict rule with the stated purpose of “judicial efficiency” and “no mention was made of race.” State v. Hankton, 2012-0375, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/13), 122 So.3d 1028, 1038; 7 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 1184-1189 (Louisiana Constitutional Convention Records Commission 1977); Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1426 (Alito, J. dissenting). In addition to judicial efficiency, the Convention transcripts verify that the debate also focused on the proper number of concurring jurors to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsequently, the people of Louisiana ratified the new Constitution.
Next, the 1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention was convened at the urging and under the direction of then governor Edwin W. Edwards. Whatever else may have ever been said of the late Governor Edwards, this writer does not remember him ever being accused of racial animus towards minorities. To the
In conclusion, although I join in the majority opinion, I also write to remind this Court of the significant concerns outlined by Justice Harlan above. Borrowing significantly from Justice Harlan, as cited supra, if we are to maintain law that is worth having and enforcing, we must then continue to ensure the law of this state can provide definitive answers to the questions which litigants present. Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in plain view.
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2021-KP-01893
STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. REGINALD REDDICK
On Supervisory Writ to the 25th Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines
GRIFFIN J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Injustices from Louisiana‘s past call for a remedy from this Court. I must therefore dissent from the majority‘s adoption of a Teague/Linkletter hybrid test and its denial of retroactive relief to those convicted by non-unanimous jury verdicts. I would instead use a holistic approach to the Teague watershed test and find Ramos applies retroactively.1
In Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. ---, 141 S.Ct. 1547, 1559 (2021), the Supreme Court held that its decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ---, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020), did not rise to the level of a watershed rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Supreme Court examined individual aspects of Ramos to determine if those aspects – considered separate and apart from each other – made the decision watershed. Edwards, 141 S.Ct. at 1558-59. Specifically, the Supreme Court determined that the importance of the unanimity right did not make Ramos watershed because it had previously held that the right to a jury trial itself was not watershed. Id. at 1558 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) and
Prior to Edwards, the issue of whether a new constitutional criminal procedural rule was watershed was determined holistically. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 421 (“a new rule must itself constitute a previously unrecognized bedrock procedural element“) (emphasis added). Not once has this Court required that some or every aspect of a new rule be watershed – it has examined the new rule as a whole with all of its aspects considered together.2 See State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292, 1299 (1992); Stewart v. State, 95-2385 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So. 2d 87, 89; State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, 840, abrogated on other grounds by Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. at 212 (finding retroactivity applies
A case, being judged holistically in relation to jurisprudence and society generally, will come within the watershed exception and be applied retroactively if these four interrelated elements are met: (1) it prevents an actual or generally understood3 impermissibly large risk of erroneous convictions;4 (2) it can be said to be in the same category as Gideon in having effected a profound and sweeping change in the law; (3) it is not narrowly applicable to only a small subset of defendants; and (4) it can be said to touch on fundamental aspects of our understanding of the basic procedural elements of essential fundamental fairness. See Tate, 12-2763, pp. 15-16, 130 So.3d at 840-41. Ramos meets these requisite elements for a number of interdependent reasons.
Ramos is sufficiently broad in its application because it applied the jury unanimity right in all felony cases to the states. It therefore covers the same universe of defendants as Gideon and is unlike Miller where the new constitutional criminal procedural rule applied only to a small subset of cases.
Ramos is a profound sweeping change in the law which touches on basic fundamental fairness. Not only did it restore the original intent of the Framers in regard to the
Ramos, as Gideon, set aside a system that disproportionately discriminated against poor individuals and racial minorities. Ramos is even greater than Gideon on this point because Ramos addressed a system that was explicitly racist in origin. Further, the right to a unanimous jury verdict enhances the protections under Batson which prohibits racially motivated juror strikes. See Allen-Bell, 67 MERCER L. REV. 585, 609 (a “nonunanimous-jury system readily facilitates effective Batson violations” as a prosecutor “need only strike enough black jurors to make sure that ten white jurors remain“). The jury verdict is the capstone of the trial. If the jury returns an erroneous verdict due to racial prejudice or because it failed to listen to the reasonable doubt within a dissenting juror, then the Gideon right is virtually worthless. Ramos therefore assists and protects Gideon in preserving fundamental fairness and the legitimacy of a trial and the criminal justice system as a whole.
The requirement for unanimous verdicts was adopted into the Louisiana Constitution prospectively for all cases relating to crimes committed on or after January 1, 2019.
Duncan did not overturn a system that was specifically designed for racially discriminatory purposes. Batson did not restore the original meaning of a
Intentional racism has no place in our criminal justice system. The Supreme Court “has emphasized time and again the imperative to purge racial prejudice from the administration of justice generally and from the jury system in particular.” Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1418 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (citing Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 137 S.Ct. 855, 867-68 (2017)). The racially discriminatory nature of convictions secured by non-unanimous verdicts does not change over time. Such convictions were racially discriminatory in 1898. They were racially discriminatory in 1975. They remain racially discriminatory today.
The imperative to correct past injustices manifest in the deprivation of a constitutionally guaranteed right should not cede to reliance interests and administrative concerns. Rather, “it is a cost we must bear if we mean to show that we guarantee all Louisianans equal justice.” Gipson, 19-1815, p. 9, 296 So.3d at 1056 (Johnson, C.J., would grant and docket). We must not perpetuate something we all know to be wrong only because we fear the consequences – and costs – of being right. See Ramos, 140 S.Ct. at 1408. Accordingly, I would apply Ramos retroactively to all defendants convicted by non-unanimous jury verdicts. The integrity of our criminal justice system and legitimacy of the rule of law demands no less.