ALLEN v. HARDY ET AL.
No. 85-6593
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 30, 1986
478 U.S. 255
In 1978, petitioner Earl Allen, a black man, was indicted for murdering his girlfriend and her brother. During selection of the petit jurors at petitioner‘s trial, the prosecutor exercised 9 of the State‘s 17 peremptory challenges to strike 7 black and 2 Hispanic veniremen. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury on the ground that the ““State‘s use of peremptory challenges undercut [petitioner‘s] right to an impartial jury selected from a cross-section of the community by systematically excluding minorities from the petit jury.“” People v. Allen, 96 Ill. App. 3d 871, 875, 422 N. E. 2d 100, 104 (1981). The trial judge denied the motion. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts, and the judge sentenced him to two concurrent prison terms of from 100 to 300 years.
On appeal, petitioner repeated his argument concerning the State‘s exercise of peremptory challenges. Relying on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), and on Illinois case law decided under Swain, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the argument. The court reasoned that in the absence of a showing that prosecutors in the jurisdiction systematically were using their challenges to strike members of a particular racial group, “a prosecutor‘s motives may not be inquired into when he excludes members of that group from sitting on a particular case by the use of peremptory challenges.” 96 Ill. App. 3d, at 875, 422 N. E. 2d, at 104. The record in this case did not establish systematic exclusion as required by Swain. 96 Ill. App. 3d, at 876, 422 N. E. 2d, at 104. The court therefore affirmed petitioner‘s convictions. Id., at 880, 422 N. E. 2d, at 107.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit construed as an application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Finding that petitioner failed to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a federal right” or that the questions he sought to raise “deserve[d] further proceedings,” the court denied the request for a certificate of probable cause.
In his petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals’ refusal to issue a certificate of probable cause was erroneous in view of the fact that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), was pending before us at the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The thrust of petitioner‘s argument is that the rule in Batson should be available to him as a ground for relief on remand. We conclude that our deci-
In deciding the extent to which a decision announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure should be given retroactive effect, the Court traditionally has weighed three factors. They are “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 643 (1984) (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967)); see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636 (1965). While a decision on retroactivity requires careful consideration of all three criteria, the Court has held that a decision announcing a new standard “is almost automatically nonretroactive” where the decision “has explicitly overruled past precedent.” Solem v. Stumes, supra, at 646, 647. The rule in Batson v. Kentucky is an explicit and substantial break with prior precedent. In Swain v. Alabama, the Court held that, although the use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on account of race violated the
The first factor concerns the purpose to be served by the new rule. Retroactive effect is “appropriate where a new constitutional principle is designed to enhance the accuracy of criminal trials,” Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S., at 643, but the fact that a rule may have some impact on the accuracy of a trial does not compel a finding of retroactivity. Id., at 643-645. Instead, the purpose to be served by the new standard weighs in favor of retroactivity where the standard “goes to the heart of the truthfinding function.” Id., at 645. By serving a criminal defendant‘s interest in neutral jury selection procedures, the rule in Batson may have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial. But the decision serves other values as well. Our holding ensures that States do not discriminate against citizens who are summoned to sit in judgment against a member of their own race and strengthens public confidence in the administration of justice. The rule in Batson, therefore, was designed “to serve multiple ends,” only the first of which may have some impact on truthfinding. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323, 329 (1980); see also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 414 (1966). Significantly, the new rule joins other procedures that protect a defendant‘s interest in a neutral factfinder.2 Those other mechanisms existed prior to our decision in Batson, creating a high probability that the individual jurors seated in a particular case were free from bias. Accordingly, we cannot say that the new rule has such a fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to compel retroactive application.
Similarly, retroactive application of the Batson rule on collateral review of final convictions would seriously disrupt the administration of justice. Retroactive application would require trial courts to hold hearings, often years after the conviction became final, to determine whether the defendant‘s proof concerning the prosecutor‘s exercise of challenges established a prima facie case of discrimination. Where a defendant made out a prima facie case, the court then would be required to ask the prosecutor to explain his reasons for the challenges, a task that would be impossible in virtually every case since the prosecutor, relying on Swain, would have had no reason to think such an explanation would some day be necessary. Many final convictions therefore would be vacated, with retrial “hampered by problems of lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses.” Solem v. Stumes, supra, at 650; see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S., at 637.
Our weighing of the pertinent criteria compels the conclusion that the rule in Batson should not be available to petitioner on federal habeas corpus review of his convictions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.4
Affirmed.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting.
On all too many occasions in recent years, I have felt compelled to express my dissatisfaction with this Court‘s readiness to dispose summarily of petitions for certiorari on the merits without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to file briefs. See, e. g., Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U. S. 796, 800 (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Cuyahoga Valley R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 474 U. S. 3, 8 (1985) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111, 120-121 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). “[B]y deciding cases summarily, without benefit of oral argument and full briefing, and often with only limited access to, and review of, the record, this Court runs a great risk of render-
The circumstances are even less propitious in this case. Generally when this Court summarily disposes of a petition for certiorari, we have at least benefited from the tendency of both petitioners and respondents to focus excessively on the merits of the question they ask the Court to consider. Here, because the petition was filed prior to our decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), petitioner never had the opportunity to address whether that decision should be applied retroactively to those seeking collateral review of their convictions, and respondent chose to devote but a single sentence to the issue. In addition, that issue has not been addressed by lower courts in this case or any other. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U. S. 263, 271 (1982) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). We write on a clean slate in this case—a position we ordinarily take great pains to avoid.
I believe that the Court‘s opinion today reflects the unseemly haste with which the important question presented here has been resolved. Like the Court, ante at 258, I believe that the impact of a “new constitutional rule” on the accuracy of a trial should be a critical concern in any inquiry into whether that rule should be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review; indeed, I think that factor should generally be decisive. See Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 666 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, I am not at all persuaded by the majority‘s conclusion that the rule announced in Batson lacks “such a fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to compel retroactive application,” ante, at 259. The Court is surely correct to note that the rule “serves other values” besides accurate factfinding.
“When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded form jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude . . . that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.” Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493, 503-504 (1972) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.).
Certainly, one need not assume that the exclusion of any distinctive group from the venire will affect the integrity of the factfinding process to believe, as I do, that where the prosecution uses its peremptory challenges to cull black and His-
The other considerations that the Court finds to counsel against retroactivity here are similarly unpersuasive. While Batson overruled Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), by changing the burden of proof imposed upon both defendants and prosecutors, ante, at 260, the Court seriously overestimates the “reliance interest of law enforcement officials” in the old regime. This is not a case in which primary conduct by such officials was permitted by one decision of this Court and then prohibited by another. Swain made quite clear that the use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on account of their race violated the
Finally, the Court observes that “retroactive application of the Batson rule on collateral review of final convictions would seriously disrupt the administration of justice.” Ante, at 260. Perhaps this is true; perhaps it is not. Certainly, the papers before us in this case allow us no basis for making any estimate of how many defendants pursuing federal habeas relief have preserved a Batson claim in the state courts. In this inquiry, perhaps more than in any other aspect of the case, the need for further briefing, and perhaps the participation of interested amici, is compelling, and the majority‘s readiness to act on its own uninformed assumptions, disturbing.
I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for briefing on the merits and oral argument next Term.