*1 WOODS, DeSTEFANO SHERIFF. 559. Decided June
No. 1968.* R. Anna Lavin for petitioner 559. No. J.
John Stamos Elmer C. Kissane for respondent 559. No. Thornton, Attorney Robert Y. of Oregon, General Blunt, David H. Attorney Assistant for General, respondent 941. No.
Per Curiam. robbery
Petitioner Carcerano was convicted armed sentenced, May on imprisonment. to life Oregon Art. Constitution, I, permits a §11, *Together with v. Gladden, Warden, peti- No. Carcerano Supreme writ of Oregon. tion for certiorari Court jurors noncapital cases convict *2 affirmed Court Oregon Supreme The conviction. support 923, 390 P. 2d 208, Ore. conviction. 238 petitioner’s sought 1967, petitioner In 380 S. 923. denied, U. cert. statute. Oregon’s post-conviction relief under collateral and was that the State upon relied ground The sole when was were violated Federal Constitutions though the guilty a of even return verdict it could told unanimously favor verdict. This that not members did direct by petitioner on his had been raised issue not relief. Oregon Supreme Court denied appeal. contempt in criminal was found Petitioner DeStefano and sentenced to three concurrent Illinois court of an by affirmance the Illinois Su- one-year After terms.1 by Court, certiorari and denial of Court preme unsuccessfully sought petitioner state col- 989, 385 S.U. petition a corpus then filed for habeas lateral relief and of Illinois. for the Northern District the District Court he was unconstitution- contention was that Petitioner’s by District ally trial Both the Court and jury. denied held that the Constitution did not Appeals of the Court contempt proceedings. for state criminal require jury trial Louisiana, 391 S. we that In Duncan v. held U. deny request for trial serious cannot the States Illinois, in Bloom v. cases, and 391 S. criminal U. trials for right to extends to serious that open Duncan contempts. question criminal left of by DeStefano was ordered released on bail Mr. Justice Petitioner appeals in his pending his direct the Illinois courts and first Clark again granted was petition for a writ of certiorari. He release pending appeal Clark his to on bail Mr. Justice the Court corpus denial of Appeals from District Court’s habeas pending relief; continued in this second bail order has force con petition. present order, Prior the first bail sideration order, first denial certiorari and the bail and between the second days petitioner one-year a total of 207 of his served concurrent sentences. Maxwell vitality
the continued of the statement Dow, that the Sixth Amendment U. right includes a not to jury be convicted Duncan by a unanimous verdict. except Both Bloom left open question whether a contempt pun- by imprisonment year for one ished virtue of is, a sufficiently sentence, serious matter to require a request for jury trial be honored. These two posed in issues Nos. and 559 must be considered the decisions Duncan Bloom only at this time that Duncan apply retroactively. hold, We however, Bloom Louisiana v. Illinois only should receive prospective application. Accordingly, the denials of *3 collateral to petitioners relief must be regardless affirmed of whether, for cases to which the rules in announced Duncan Bloom apply, the Fourteenth Amendment requires jury unanimous verdicts and a right affords to jury trial contempts by for criminal punished imprison- year. ment for one Denno,
In Stovall 388 U. the Court stated the considerations that affect the judgment whether a reversing prior case in doctrines area the of crim- the inal applied only law should be prospectively:
“(a) purpose by the to be served the new standards, (b) of the the by extent reliance law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the justice administration of of a retroactive application of the new standards.” only All factors favor prospective three application of Duncan v. Louisiana. Duncan held rule stated the States must respect right jury to because in the context of the institutions and practices by adopt which we apply our criminal laws, the right generally to jury to prevent tends arbitrari- repression. As we stated in Duncan, “We ness assert, would not however, every criminal trial— is alone judge a before particular trial —held any or fairly treated be as may never or that a defendant unfair S., 158. by 391 U. at jury.” be a a as he would by judge trial would by right jury to implemented The values all per- of by retrial measurably requiring be served not consistent not past procedures in the convicted sons Second, trial. jury right Amendment with the Sixth upon past good faith undoubtedly relied States Sixth Amend- to the effect that the of this Court opinions to the States. applicable trial was not jury ment re- Dow, denied supra. Several States g.,E. Maxwell v. trial would have trial in cases where for quests they within Sixth Amend- mandatory fallen had been been construed Court. guarantee ment as it had Louisiana, Third, n. 30. supra, Duncan at See retroactivity law holding general of a of the effect of would be justice and the administration enforcement because the denial of trial has occurred significant, not very great those States number cases guarantee. accepting now the Sixth Amendment until in Louisiana those convicted non- example, For all a Sixth Amendment capital serious crimes could make And, depending on the Court’s decisions argument. all and 12-man convictions juries, about unanimous *4 crimes in certain States would be in for serious other jeopardy. evenly bal- considerations somewhat more are Bloom v. regard with rule announced in
anced the ground Bloom was the Illinois. One for the result trials, which often occur before contempt belief that very allegedly who was the of the judge object the fairly behavior, be more contemptuous would tried guilt. jury- the jury judge, determined Unlike the men will not or the alleged have witnessed suffered con- suggested prosecution nor for it. tempt, However,
635 tradition of nonjury contempts trials for more was firmly than established dis- view States could pense with trial in normal criminal prosecutions, and reliance on the cases Bloom Illinois v. overturned was therefore more justified. Also, adverse effects of justice the administration invalidating all seri- ous contempt likely convictions would be substantial. regard with to the Bloom Thus, we feel decision, also is application retroactive not warranted. For these reasons we will not reverse convic- state tions to grant began for failure where trials prior May 20, 1968, date Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Bloom Louisiana and v. Illinois.2 The petitions for writs of granted certiorari are are judgments affirmed. R is w order&± Mr. Justice Stewart would Harlan Mr. Justice deny certiorari for the reasons stated in Justice Mr. dissenting opinions Louisiana, in Duncan v. Harlan’s Illinois, 391 U. S. and Bloom v. 391 U. S. 194, 215. Douglas,
Mr. Justice with whom Mr. Justice Black joins, dissenting.
1 am of the view that the deprivation to a given be effect, retroactive as should I thought should been have done with con comparable stitutional decisions. See Gideon Wainwright, 372 Douglas U. 335; California, 353; 372 Link U. S. Walker, letter v. 381 S. 618, (dissenting U. 640 opinion); Jersey, Johnson v. New U. S. (dissenting opinion); Denno, Stovall v. (dissent U. S. ing opinion).
2We see no basis for a distinction between convictions that have stages become final appeal. and cases at various of trial and See *5 Denno, supra, Stovall v. at 300-301.