State of Kansas v. The United States Department of LaborState of Kansas v. The United States Department of Labor
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ combined motion for a stay, preliminary injunction, or temporary restraining order. Dkt. No. 19. Plaintiffs seek preliminary relief halting the effective date of a rule issued by Defendant Department of Labor. After considering the briefs and hearing oral argument on the motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction for the reasons discussed herein.
BACKGROUND
Seventeen states-Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virgina-seek preliminary injunctive relief against: the United States Department of Labor (“DOL“); Josе Javier Rodriguez, Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training at the DOL; and Jessica Looman, Administrator of the DOL Wage and Hour Division. See generally Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs claim that a recently-enacted DOL regulation, see Improving Protections for Workers in Temporary Agricultural Employment in the United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 33,898 (Apr. 29, 2024) (to be codified at
Analyzing Plaintiffs’ arguments requires a brief outline of the legal backdrop against which the decision must be made. The Court begins by providing an overview of the H-2A visa program, which Defendants argue gives them authority to issue the Final Rule.
I. The H-2A Visa Program
In 1986, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) with passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Through IRCA, Congress created a special class of migrant workers that “com[e] temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services.”
The first step for an employer seeking workers through the H-2A visa program is to apply for a temporary employment certification (“TEC“). To apply for this TEC, it is mandatory that employers submit a job order to the DOL between sixty and seventy-five days prior to the employer‘s initial date of need. The State Workforce Agency (“SWA“) is in charge of reviewing the job order, and upon its completion of the review, the SWA will “place the job order in intrastate clearance and commence recruitment of U.S. workers.” See
An employer‘s next step is to apply for ultimate certification from the DOJ. But before the DOJ can issue such a certification, the DOL must issue its own certification, confirming two things: (1) “there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the time and place needed, to perform
II. The Final Rule
Following the required notice and comment period, the DOL issued the Final Rule on April 29, 2024. See generally 89 Fed. Reg. 33,898. According to DOL, the Final Rule “establish[es] the minimum terms and conditions of employment (i.e., the ‘baseline’ or working conditions) necessary to ‘neutralize any adverse effect resultant from the influx of temporary foreign workers.‘” See id. at 33,987 (quoting Williams v. Usery, 531 F.2d 305, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1976)). Generally, the Final Rule establishes the right for H-2A workers to participate in “concerted activity” to ensure that H-2A employers are not violating the minimum standards as set forth by the DOL.
Speсifically, the Final Rule provides that H-2A employers cannot retaliate against an H-2A visa-holder who “[h]as engaged in activities related to self-organization, including any effort to form, join, or assist a labor organization; or has engaged in other concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection relating to wages or working conditions; or has refused to engage in any or all of such activities.”
Because of those vulnerabilities, the DOL determined the Final Rule was necessary to ensure the protection of H-2A workers. The DOL also asserts that the Final Rule is necessary to ensure that the vulnerabilities of H-2A workers do not encroach upon, or adversely affect, domestic workers that are similarly employed. Plaintiffs disagree with this characterization of the Final Rule and therefore argue that the DOL acted outside of the authority granted to it by Congress in publishing the Final Rule. Plaintiffs also argue that the Final Rule directly сontravenes federal law because it violates the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA“).
III. The NLRA
With passage of the NLRA in 1935, Congress established statutorily-protected rights to collective bargaining to certain employees.3 There are two portions of the NLRA relevant to the Court‘s analysis today: (a) the rights provided by the NLRA and (b) the employees who enjoy those rights.
As to the rights afforded by Congress, the NLRA provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
labor practice” for any employer “to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or оther support to it.”
In terms of which employees enjoy the protections above, the NLRA defines the term “employee.” Congress provides: “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment.”
IV. Procedural History
On or around April 29, 2024, the DOL published the Final Rule in the Federal Register, and on June 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the present action. Dkt. No. 1. Then, on June 13, 2024, Plaintiffs moved the Court for preliminary relief. Thereafter, Defendants filed a response brief, dkt. no. 69, and Plaintiffs filed a reply, dkt. no. 84. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on August 2, 2024. See generally Dkt. No. 94. Plaintiffs’ motion is thus ripe for review.4
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue a temporary restraining order (“TRO“), a preliminary injunction, or a stay of the Final Rule‘s effective date pursuant to
I. Plaintiffs have met their burden to show they are entitled to preliminary relief.
A. Legal Standard
“To receive a preliminary injunction, [Plaintiffs] must clearly establish the following requirements: ‘(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened injury to [Plaintiffs] outweighs the potential harm to [Defendants]; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.‘” Keister v. Bell, 879 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites.” Id. (quotations omitted).
The requirements for a stay mirror those for a preliminary injunction. Under
B. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their case.
According to Plaintiffs, the Final Rule is not in accordance with law because it exceeds the DOL‘s authority under the IRCA‘s H-2A visa program, violates the NLRA, and violates the Major Questions Doctrine.5 Dkt. No. 19-1 at 10-23. The Court begins its analysis with Plaintiffs’ first argument.
1. The Final Rule does not exceed the DOL‘s authority under the H-2A visa program.
Generally, “an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n v. Fed. Commc‘ns Comm‘n (LPSC), 476 U.S. 355, 357 (1986); see also Bayou Lawn & Landscape Servs. v. Sec‘y of Labor, 713 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n agency‘s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated to it by Congress.” (citations omitted)). But “when a particular statute delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it.” Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2273. Put another way, “[w]hen the best reading of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.” Id. (emphasis added).
To determine the extent of rulemaking authority granted to the DOL under the H-2A program, thе Court looks to the
The Final Rulemaking authority Congress conferred upon the DOL can be found in
This reading is supported by the D.C. Circuit‘s interpretation of the same language in AFL-CIO v. Dole, 923 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Dole, the D.C. Circuit was asked to decide whether the DOL‘s “new methodology for computing the adverse effect wage rate (‘AEWR‘), which is the minimum wage that employers who wish to hire aliens as temporary agricultural workers must offer American and foreign workers,” was a valid exercise of the DOL‘s rulemaking authority under
The Court next turns to whether the Final Rule is a valid exercise of the Final Rulemaking authority outlined above. See Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2273. That is, the Court must determine whether the Final Rule is a valid method by which the DOL can ensure that American workers are not adversely affected by H-2A visaholders. To make this determination, the Court finds the Final Rule itself particularly instructive. Therein, the DOL explains that, despite previously-enacted protections, “violations of the H-2A program requirements remain pervasive.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33,989. But even though the DOL is aware of widespread violations, the DOL asserts that it is unequipped to “investigate every farm on which H-2A workers are employеd,” and thus, the DOL cannot take sufficient action to rectify H-2A employers’ violations of the program‘s requirements. Id.; see also
On the other hand, the DOL found that American agricultural workers “may be less likely to face unique vulnerabilities and forms of retaliation experienced by H-2A workers.” Id. 33,992. Accordingly, the DOL asserts that employers are more likely to emplоy H-2A workers, who are more easily exploited, than similarly situated American workers. See id. 33,990 (“[T]he ability of employers to hire this uniquely vulnerable workforce may suppress the ability of agricultural workers in the United States to negotiate with employers and advocate on their own behalf regarding their terms and conditions of employment.“). The DOL specifically notes that “use of the H-2A program has grown dramatically over the past decade while overall agricultural employment in the United States has remained stable, meaning that fewer workers in the United States are employed as farmworkers.” Id. And the DOL posits that “increasing reliance upon the H-2A program makes the entire agricultural workforce as a whole more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation,” thus adversely affecting the American agricultural workers who are similarly situated to H-2A workers. Id. The DOL “concludes that [the Final Rule], which safeguard[s] worker voice and empowerment, will prevent adverse effect on similarly employed workers in the United States by alleviating some of the barriers H-2A workers face when raising complaints about violations of their rights under the program and advocating regarding working conditions.” Id. 33,991. The Court finds that the Final Rule falls within the DOL‘s rulemaking authority under
As the D.C. Circuit found in Dole, “[DOL] is obliged to balance the competing goals of the [IRCA]-providing an adequate labor supply and protecting the jobs of domestic workers.” 923 F.2d at 187. And “[s]triking that balance is a judgment call which Congress entrusted to [DOL].” Id. The DOL made its judgment call. And it provided sufficient reasoning for its decision. See generally 89 Fed. Reg. 33,898; see also Dole, 923 F.2d at 186 (“[DOL] is entitled to change its policy so long as it supplies a reasoned explanation for its choice.” (citations omitted)). The DOL also
2. The Final Rule violates the NLRA because the DOL attempts to unconstitutionally create law.
Finding that the DOL acted within its authority as proscribed by Congress through the IRCA does not end the Court‘s analysis. Indeed, “the [APA] requires federal courts to set aside federal agency action that is ‘not in accordance with law.‘” FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communs. Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 300 (2003) (quoting
“The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to make law.” Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965) (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). Put another way, “[l]anguage in a regulation . . . may not create a right that Congress has not.” Alexander, 532 U.S. at 291; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (To determine whether a federal right exists, courts “must [] determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right.” (emphasis in original)); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[F]ederal rights” cannot be created “by regulations ‘alone’ or by any valid administrative interpretation of a statute creating some enforceable right.“). Through this Final Rule, the DOL seeks to create law by affording some agricultural workers-H-2a workers and American workers similarly situated-the right to collectively bargain. Congress has not created that right. And in fact, the NLRA reflects Congressional intent to not create such a right.
The Court first considers Defendants’ argument that the Final Rule does not create a right to collective bargaining. Dkt. No. 69 at 12-13. Defendants argue that the Final Rule in no way creates such a right because, in their view, the Final Rule “simply expands the existing anti-discrimination provisions of the H-2A program to expressly protect from employer retaliation
Defendants argue that the Final Rule is consequentially different from the NLRA because the Final Rule “does not require H-2A employers to recognize labor organizations or to engage in any collective bargaining activities.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33,901. Point taken. But that is not the issue. The issue before the Court is whether the Final Rule creates a right not previously bestowed by Congress. The Court finds it does so. Regardless of the terminology used in the Final Rule-be it collective bargaining or otherwise-the Final Rule provides for agricultural workers’ right to participate in concerted activity to further their interests. That is a right that Congress has not created by statute. And Defendants have not provided any source indicating that Congress intended to create such a right. See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 283 (To determine whether a federal right exists, courts “must [] determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right.” (emphasis in original)). Instead, the NLRA exhibits Congress‘s intent to refrain from affording agricultural workers the right to participate in such concerted activity.6 See
Both parties spend considerable space arguing whether the NLRA‘s exclusion of agricultural workers from its definition of employee means that agricultural workers are foreclosed from receiving the rights created by the NLRA. And in support of their position, Defendants argue that the NLRA‘s definition of employee “does not set the outer bounds of labor regulation by other means.” Dkt. No. 69 at 14. Defendants also highlight several cases where
Two of the cases cited by Defendants bear further discussion. See generally United Farm Workers v. Ariz. Agric. Emp. Rels. Bd., 669 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1982) (“UFW“); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Jones, 430 F. Supp. 573 (D. Minn. 1977). In both UFW and Willmar Poultry, the court found that the NLRA did not preempt states from regulating аgricultural workers’ collective bargaining rights. UFW, 669 F.2d at 1257; Willmar Poultry, 430 F. Supp. at 576. Specifically, the UFW court found that Congress had not “precluded the states from regulating the collective bargaining process in the agricultural industry.” UFW, 669 F.2d at 1257. Indeed, the court held that “[t]he states [are] fully competent to enact laws governing agricultural labor.” UFW, 669 F.2d at 1257.7 But that is not the issue presently before the Court. This case does not present the question of whether states may constitutionally enact laws protecting the collective bargaining rights of agricultural workers within their boundaries. Instead, this case presents the question of whether an administrative agency can create a right that Congress has not. The answer is no. State governments can create law and protect rights in excess of those provided under federal law. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Federal interests are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for its citizens than the Federal Constitution requires.“).
The Cоurt finds no evidence of federal Congressional intent to create a right to collective bargaining for agricultural workers. The Final Rule does just that. The Court therefore finds that the Final Rule exceeds the DOL‘s constitutional authority because it creates a right. This is not in “accordance with law” as required by the APA. See NextWave, 537 U.S. at 300. “From the beginning of the Government various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations-not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911). Administrative agencies, including the DOL, cannot create law, and the DOL cannot create rights that Congress has not. The DOL cannot make both executive rules and congressional laws. The Court finds that the Final Rule violates federal law and that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim.
1. Plaintiffs have shown that they would suffer irreparable harm if no preliminary relief is granted.
Plaintiffs argue the second Winter factor is satisfied here because the Final Rule will cause two irreparable injuries if allowed to go into effect. First, Plaintiffs contend that the Final Rule will cause irreparable financial harm to both the Plaintiff-States and Plaintiffs Miles Berry Farm and Georgia Fruit and Vegetables Growers Association (“GFVGA“). Dkt. No. 19-1 at 29-31. And second, Plaintiffs assert that Miles Berry and GFVGA will suffer irreparable harm because the Final Rule will negatively impact the “efficient and effective operation of their farms.” Id. at 31.
As to the asserted financial harm, Plaintiffs argue the “States’ workforce agencies will incur administrative costs in the implementation of the [] Rule.” Id. at 29. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the Final Rule will cause additional administrative costs associated with the state workforce agency review of applications for H-2A certification. Id. (“The [] Rulе will result in state agencies having to change their approach and behavior, which will result in additional administrative costs.” (citations omitted)). And “[d]ue to sovereign immunity, Plaintiff[-]States cannot recover damages from the federal government,” so “the unrecoverable costs the [] Rule inflicts on the [] States constitute irreparable harm.” Id. Plaintiffs also argue that Miles Berry Farm and GFVGA will suffer additional monetary injury in two ways. First, employers (like Miles Berry and members of GFVGA) will suffer “an increase in payments to H-2A workers, which stems from changes to the annual effective date of new Adverse Effect Wage Rates (AEWRs).” Id. at 30. “Over a ten-year period, the DOL anticipates this change will cost farms across the country between $12 and $20 million.” Id. (citing 89 Fed. Reg. 34,049). And second, the “Rule would increase [GFVGA‘s] costs and costs to its members by requiring compliance in administering a complex new rule that applies to farmworkers for the first time.” Id. (citations omitted). As to both financial harms, Plaintiffs assert the DOL acknowledges the financial injury in the Final Rule itself. Id. at 30-31 (citing 89 Fed. Reg. 34,047, 34,044).
These arguments are in line with the Eleventh Circuit‘s holding that “unrecoverable monetary loss is an irreparable harm.” Georgia v. President of the United States, 46 F.4th 1283, 1302 (11th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). And “[t]hat includes situations where there is no adequate remedy at law to recover damages for the harm suffered.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit has found that irreparable monetary harm was shown where the district court “identified several obvious costs of complying with [a] mandate-including lost employees, as well as time and effort needed to” implement the mandate. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on that understanding, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown an irreparable harm in the form of the alleged monetary injury. The Court relies not only Plaintiffs’ assertions but also the affidavits submitted on behalf of Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 19-3, 19-9, 19-12.
Defendants argue that any potential financial injury suffered by Plaintiff-States would be too minimal to warrant a finding of irreparable hаrm.8 Dkt. No. 69 at 36-38. This is because, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs have not shown “how the Final
2. Principles of equity and public interest favor relief.
The third and fourth Winter factors “‘merge’ when, as here, the Government is the opposing party.” Gonzalez, 978 F.3d at 1271. And the Court finds both factors are satisfied in this case. Plaintiffs argue that “[a] preliminary injunction would avoid harm to Plaintiffs” and “cause ‘little or no harm’ to Defendants.” Dkt. No. 19-1 at 32 (quoting Moore v. Brown, 448 U.S. 1335, 1339 (1980)). They also point out that “[t]he public is harmed by ‘the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.‘” Id. at 33 (quoting Louisiana v. Biden, 55 F.4th 1017, 1035 (5th Cir. 2022)); see also Florida v. Dep‘t of Health & Hum. Servs., 19 F.4th 1271, 1315 (11th Cir. 2021) (Lagoa, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is ‘no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action. To the contrary, there is a substantial public interest in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.‘” (quoting League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016))). Plaintiffs are right. Because the Court finds that the Final Rule is unlawful, it also finds that principles of equity and public interest favor relief. See, e.g., Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he public, when the state is a party asserting harm, has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law.“).
Plaintiffs have satisfied all four of the Winter factors. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary relief.
II. Plaintiffs are entitled to a tailored preliminary injunction-not universal, nationwide relief.
Because Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary relief, the question now becomes:
A. Nationwide relief is disfavored.
“Injunctions that prohibit the Executive Branch from applying a law or policy against anyone-often called ‘universal’ or ‘nationwide’ injunctions-have become increasingly common.” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 713 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). While a district court may issue a nationwide injunction in appropriate circumstances, “those appropriate circumstances are rare.” Florida, 19 F.4th at 1281-82 (citations omitted). Those rare circumstances include cases “where it is necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs, to protect similarly situated nonparties, or to avoid the ‘chaos and confusion’ of a patchwork of injunctions,” or “where the plaintiffs are dispersed throughout the United States, when immigration law is implicated, or when certain types of unconstitutionality are found.” Id. at 1282 (citations omitted). Although nationwide injunctions may be beneficial to achieving these ends, they also come at a cost.
Fundamentally, federal courts “render a judgment or decree upon the rights of the litigant parties.” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 718 (1838). “Traditionally, when a federal court finds a remedy merited, it provides party-specific relief, directing the defendant to take or not take some action relative to the plaintiff. If the court‘s remedial order affects nonparties, it does so only incidentally.” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 693 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Providing party-specific relief comports with a federal court‘s Article III authority to decide cases and controversies for the parties to the litigation, not for any party anywhere. See
A nationwide injunction “gives a single district court an outsized role in the federal system.” Georgia, 46 F.4th at 1304. “[T]he federal court system allows courts to reach multiple answers to the same legal question, but nationwide injunctions frustrate that end.” Id. “Conflicts are inevitable, and even helpful.” Id. “This divergence of decisions is expected-encouraged-in cases challenging federal government action, because the federal government is often a repeat player in lawsuits that involve significant legal questions.” Id. And when Congress determines
As for a stay, less guidance from the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit exists. Section 705 of the APA provides that “the reviewing court . . . may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.”
b. A nationwide injunction or stay is unwarranted.
Neither a nationwide injunction nor a nationwide stay is appropriate in this case. Plaintiffs argue that universal relief is needed because this case implicates fedеral immigration laws, nationwide relief would protect similarly situated nonparties, and it would be more practical than party-specific preliminary relief. Dkt. No. 19-1 at 35-36. These arguments are unavailing.
Beginning with Plaintiffs’ immigration implication argument, the Eleventh Circuit has said that a nationwide injunction may be appropriate in cases involving immigration laws. See Florida, 19 F.4th at 1282 (“[C]ourts have frequently found that a nationwide injunction can be warranted in the immigration law context.“). That statement, however, was dicta. See Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010) (“All statements that go beyond the facts of the case . . . are dicta” (citations omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit itself explained in Florida that “[t]he rule at issue here . . . has nothing to do with immigration.” 19 F.4th at 1282. Because “dicta is not binding on anyone for any purpose,” Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1298 (citations omitted), the Court is not persuaded to grant a nationwide injunction on this basis.
Plaintiffs’ argument that a nationwide injunction is needed to support a uniform immigration system also fails. “[A] district court [should not] enter a nationwide injunction to serve the general interest of national uniformity.” Georgia, 46 F.4th at 1307. “[N]onuniformity is а deliberate feature of our federal court system, and Congress-not one of the 94 federal district courts or 12 regional circuit courts-is best positioned to choose when to depart from that norm.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court sees no reason to depart from this well-established norm.
Turning next to Plaintiffs’ argument that nationwide relief would protect similarly situated nonparties, “courts should also be skeptical of nationwide injunctions premised on the need to protect nonparties.” Id. at 1306. Issuing a nationwide injunction to ensure that similarly situated individuals are treated the same as Plaintiffs is inconsistent “with the historical limits on equity and judicial power.” Hawaii, 585 U.S. at 720 (Thomas, J., concurring). Historically, “American courts of equity did not provide relief beyond the parties to the case. If their injunctions advantaged nonparties, that benefit was merely incidental.” Id. at 717. This is not a case
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that nationwide relief would be the most practical remedy and avoid inequitable outcomes. Dkt. No. 19-1 at 36. More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that “allowing union-like rights for H-2A workers in non-Plaintiff states but not in Plaintiff States would create an incentive for such labor in non-Plaintiff States, which would funnel foreign migrant agricultural labor away from Plaintiff States” and harm GFVGA‘s members. Id. Yet, national uniformity is not a proper consideration for issuing a nationwide injunction. Georgia, 46 F.4th at 1307. “When, as here, a regulatory challenge involves important and difficult questions of law, it is especially vital that various courts be allowed to weigh in so that the issues can percolate among the courts.” Florida, 19 F.4th at 1283. The Court will not foreclose adjudication on this issue by other courts. See Califano, 442 U.S. at 702.
As the Eleventh Circuit observed in Georgia, “[t]his case shows both the difficulty and the importance of considering whether the courts can offer complete relief to the plaintiffs in federal regulatory challenges without issuing a nationwide injunction. Here, we can. So we must.” 46 F.4th at 1308. The same rationale applies here. The Court can offer complete relief to Plaintiffs without issuing a nationwide injunction. So it must.
c. Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction tailored to the parties.
A party-specific preliminary injunction offers complete relief to Plaintiffs. A tailored preliminary injunction would be no broader than necessary to address the harms that have been demonstrated by Plaintiffs. A preliminary injunction would also be a more workable form of relief than a stay, which both parties agree could have the same effect as a nationwide injunction. See Dkt. No. 94 at 8:1-10, 64:7-8. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to a narrowly tailored, party-specific preliminary injunction.
CONCLUSION
Based on the findings of fact and conсlusions of law stated herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, dkt. no. 19. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Defendants are ENJOINED, during the pendency of this action or until further Order of the Court, from enforcing the Final Rule, Improving Protections for Workers in Temporary Agricultural Employment in the United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 33,898 (Apr. 29, 2024) (to be codified at
SO ORDERED this 26th day of August, 2024.
HON. LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA