STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JONES COUNTY, Defendant.
No. 17-1023
Supreme Court of Iowa.
October 13, 2017
811
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellee.
WATERMAN, Justice.
In this case, we must decide whether a retroactive change in the Iowa Department of Corrections’ (IDOC) Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) policy violates the governing statute or the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. The statute provides that “an inmate required to participate in a sex offender treatment program shall not be eligible for a reduction of sentence unless the inmate participates in and completes [SOTP].”
For over a decade, the IDOC policy halted only the ongoing accrual of earned time for inmates upon a refusal or removal from SOTP, without forfeiting previously accrued earned time. We upheld that interpretation at the IDOC‘s request in Holm v. State, 767 N.W.2d 409, 414, 418 (Iowa 2009). In January 2016, however, the IDOC changed its long-standing policy to additionally forfeit all previously accrued earned time upon a refusal or removal from SOTP and applied that change retroactively, delaying the tentative release dates for approximately 150 inmates:
An inmate whose release was thereby delayed by more than three years challenged the new policy. His administrative appeals were denied, and he filed this action for postconviction relief. The district court determined the new IDOC policy interpretation and retroactive application to this inmate was contrary to Holm and violated both the Iowa and Federal Ex Post Facto Clauses. We granted the State‘s motion for a stay and writ of certiorari. On our review, we apply stare decisis and the interpretation fixed in Holm to hold that the IDOC may not forfeit earned time the inmate accrued before his refusal or removal from SOTP.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In April 2011, Marshall Miller was convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree and received a suspended sentence.1 He committed the offense when he was age twenty-one or twenty-two and had sex with someone age fourteen or fifteen. Miller was also ordered to serve a lifetime special sentence after serving his suspended sentence, as provided by
In March 2015, Miller was transferred to the Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility (MPCF) to begin SOTP.2 The availability of a bed for treatment, as well as the projected release date of the inmate, largely determined when an inmate would begin SOTP, which was available at the MPCF at that time.3 Within a day of arriving at the MPCF, Miller was assaulted by another inmate and placed in protective custody.
A month later—while Miller was still in protective custody—he committed a serious disciplinary violation by forging the name of a correctional officer on a store order. Miller also violated the IDOC disciplinary rules by attempting to run an unauthorized business. Because of these violations, Miller was penalized with thirty days of disciplinary detention and a loss of thirty days of earned time. Miller appealed the decision, which was upheld by the deputy superintendent.
After these disciplinary violations, the IDOC provided Miller with a “Sex Offender Treatment Program Classification Hearing Notice.” The notice explained that because of Miller‘s disciplinary detention, he was unable to participate in SOTP or to be housed at the MPCF. The notice informed Miller that his accrual of earned time would be suspended because he was unable to participate in SOTP (as required for his sex-offense conviction). Miller was then transferred from the MPCF to the Clarinda Correctional Facility due to Miller‘s disciplinary detention time and his protective custody status.
A hearing to review the IDOC‘s decision was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in June. On October 6, the ALJ issued a decision upholding Miller‘s
In January 2016, the IDOC revised its interpretation of
An offender required to complete SOTP who refuses or is removed from the SOTP Program will have a hearing with an ALJ. Upon an ALJ decision affirming the classification committee‘s SOTP requirement, the offender‘s records will reflect the offender has not received any earned time sentence reduction. An offender that has refused or been removed from SOTP may begin accruing earned time after successful completion of SOTP, effective the date of completion. An offender who successfully completes SOTP upon initial placement in the program will receive the earned time sentence reduction effective their date of entry into DOC.
Iowa Dep‘t of Corr., Policy & Procedures, SOTP Hearing and Appeal Procedures, OP-SOP-09 (2016). The IDOC informed Miller that, due to the change in interpretation in the new policy and Miller‘s removal from SOTP, his tentative discharge date was changed from March 10, 2016, to December 22, 2019. Miller filed a classification appeal, which was denied. On February 5, Miller was notified that he could pursue a supplemental appeal to the IDOC central office. He did so, and that appeal was denied on March 22.
On June 20, Miller initiated this action for postconviction relief, claiming that the IDOC improperly “removed” him from SOTP and forfeited his earned time. Miller asserted that his hearing before the ALJ was procedurally deficient. Miller also challenged the IDOC‘s 2016 reinterpretation of
The case was submitted on a stipulated record. The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Miller‘s claims challenging his removal from SOTP because Miller had failed to timely appeal that adjudication. The court did, however, reach the merits of Miller‘s challenge to the IDOC‘s reinterpretation of
The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and simultaneously requested an immediate stay of the district court‘s ruling. We granted the stay and the writ of certiorari and retained the case.
II. Standard of Review.
We review certiorari actions for correction of errors at law. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Jones Cty., 888 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Iowa 2016). We review postconviction-relief proceedings for correction of errors at law. Id. We review questions of statutory construction, including the interpretation of
III. Analysis.
We must decide whether the IDOC could lawfully change its interpretation of
A. The IDOC‘s Interpretation of Section 903A.2.
[a]n inmate of an institution under the control of the department of corrections ... is eligible for a reduction of sentence equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the inmate demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in any program or placement status identified by the director to earn the reduction.
A 2005 amendment to
“[O]ur starting point in statutory interpretation is to determine if the language has a plain and clear meaning within the context of the circumstances presented by the dispute.” McGill v. Fish, 790 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 2010). “When the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute....” State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999) (quoting Wesley Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Hansen Lind Meyer, Inc., 594 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1999)). We apply rules of statutory construction if the language is ambiguous. McGill, 790 N.W.2d at 118. Ambiguity in statutory language “exists only if reasonable minds could differ on the meaning.” Id.
The parties disagree on when a party is “required” to participate in SOTP. See
Conversely, Miller argues that an inmate is not “required” to take SOTP until a bed is available in the program and he is told to begin participating. The IDOC previously argued for this interpretation in Holm. Under this interpretation, an inmate keeps earned time accrued before he refuses to complete SOTP or is removed from the program. Interestingly, Miller‘s counsel represented Holm and, to buttress his constitutional ex post facto challenge, argued then the interpretation the IDOC urges now. The IDOC and Miller‘s counsel effectively have reversed positions on the meaning of
This statute should have been understood to mean that sex offenders don‘t get the accrual of earned time until they complete treatment. The statute doesn‘t say that sex offenders get to accrue earned time for maybe two, three, five or seven years until a bed is available for them. The statute says that individuals “required to do treatment” don‘t accrue it at all until they complete the program. That should be a common sense understanding of the statute.
Plaintiff‘s Final Brief at 19, 21, Holm, 767 N.W.2d 409 (No. 07-1095).
We disagreed with Holm‘s counsel and accepted the interpretation urged then by the IDOC: that only the ongoing accrual of earned time would stop upon a refusal or removal from SOTP without forfeiture of previously accrued earned time. 767 N.W.2d at 414, 418. As the parties’ shifting positions help to demonstrate, the statutory language reasonably can be read two ways. Indeed, we view the IDOC‘s change in position interpreting the statute it administers as a strong indication of ambiguity.4 We conclude
Holm was serving a sentence for third-degree sexual abuse for an offense that occurred in 2002. Holm, 767 N.W.2d at 412. The IDOC implemented the 2005 stat-
In one of Holm‘s classification meetings, the IDOC told Holm the new provision would be applied to him, “there was a treatment bed for SOTP available, and he must decide whether to undergo treatment.” Id. Holm refused treatment and signed the prison‘s treatment refusal form. Id. “Holm‘s sentence reduction or earned time stopped accruing when he signed the treatment refusal form[, but] Holm did not lose any credits he had earned prior to that date.” Id. at 414. This changed Holm‘s tentative discharge date from April 9, 2008, to April 9, 2010. Id.
Holm applied for postconviction relief after he exhausted his administrative remedies, claiming that the application of the 2005 amendment to him violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. Id. We rejected Holm‘s argument, holding that application of the 2005 amendment to Holm, who was convicted of a crime in 2002, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because “[t]he 2005 amendment was merely a clarification of the 2001 amendment.” Id. at 416. We explained,
Because the 2005 amendment did not result in more onerous punishment and because the loss of future earned time under the correct interpretation was foreseeable, the application of the 2005 amendment to
Iowa Code section 903A.2(1)(a) to prisoners who committed their crimes before the amendment does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
Id. at 416-17 (emphasis added). Our subsequent decisions have adhered to the interpretation adopted in Holm. See Reilly v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Iowa 2010) (“Upon Reilly‘s removal from SOTP, his ability to accrue earned time was stopped pursuant to the requirement of
We now must confront the IDOC‘s 2016 policy changing its interpretation of
B. Stare Decisis and Legislative Acquiescence.
Stare decisis “is a Latin term meaning ‘to stand by things decided.‘” State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 586 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Stare decisis, Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). “Courts adhere to the holdings of past rulings to imbue the law with continuity and predictability and help maintain the stability essential to society.” Id. “From the very beginnings of this court, we have guarded the venerable doctrine of stare decisis and required the highest possible showing that a precedent should be overruled before taking such a step.” McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 180 n.1 (Iowa 2004)
Furthermore,
[t]he rule of stare decisis “is especially applicable where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has been long acquiesced in by the legislature, by its continued use or failure to change the language of the statute so construed....”
In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Iowa Dep‘t of Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Iowa 2002)). Under the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, “we presume the legislature is aware of our cases that interpret its statutes.” Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 2013). “When many years pass following such a case without a legislative response, we assume the legislature has acquiesced in our interpretation.” Id.
In 2009, we upheld the IDOC‘s interpretation of
The IDOC has not persuaded us that the interpretation it urged and we adopted in Holm was plainly erroneous. It is worth noting that
In any event, we apply stare decisis and conclude that Holm provides the governing interpretation of
C. Miller‘s Additional Arguments.
Miller argues that the application of the 2016 policy to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.7 Miller also asserts that the ALJ‘s decision, which prevented Miller from accruing earned-time credits in the future, is entitled to preclusive effect and that the 2016 interpretation cannot be applied to his theft sentence. Because we conclude the 2016 reinterpretation of
Similarly, we do not address the IDOC‘s arguments that it would be better policy for all inmates to suffer the same loss of earned time for a failure or refusal to complete SOTP regardless of when that failure or refusal occurs. These policy arguments, we believe, are appropriate for legislative consideration if the IDOC wants to pursue a legislative amendment.
IV. Disposition.
For these reasons, we annul the writ of certiorari.
WRIT ANNULLED.