THE STATE EX REL. THOMAS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MCGINTY, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
No. 2019-1803
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 1, 2020
2020-Ohio-5452
[Until this оpinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5452.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5452
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5452.]
Prohibition—Marsy‘s Law—Writ of prohibition is not appropriate remedy to challenge discovery order allowing court-supervised defense inspection of appellants’ residence, because judge did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction to issue order—Appellants had adequate remedy in ordinary course of law by way of immediate appeal under
(No. 2019-1803—Submitted July 7, 2020—Decided December 1, 2020.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 108633, 2019-Ohio-5129.
Per Curiam.
{¶
{¶ 2} Although crime victims have a right under the Ohio Constitution to judicial review of discovery orders affecting their Marsy‘s Law rights, a writ of prohibition is not the correсt mechanism to challenge Judge McGinty‘s order. We therefore affirm the Eighth District‘s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 3} Kaylynn Counts allegedly assaulted Kelly and Thomas in Thomas‘s home in November 2018. Counts is awaiting trial for attempted murder and felonious assault before Judge McGinty in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.
A. Judge McGinty‘s Discovery Order
{¶ 4} On April 1, 2019, Counts filed a “Motion for Criminal Rule 16 Entry Upon Land for
{¶ 5} Judge McGinty granted Counts‘s motion. He issued an order allowing Counts and the defense team to inspect Thomas‘s home when appellants and the prosecution are not inside it, supervised by a sheriff‘s deputy and the court‘s bailiff. The court ordered as follows:
The parties communicate to provide 3 available days with a specific time to allow State to confer with homeowner.
The state will indicate to defense counsel the date for the discovery.
The court orders that bailiff shall be the court representative and be present at all times while the defendant, defense counsel and their experts are within the residence. At all times, the defendant, defense counsel and their expert shall be within the view of bailiff.
The court orders that a sheriff‘s deputy shall assist bailiff in this procedure.
The victim shall not be in the residence once the discovery process commences.
The court further orders that Cleveland Police Department and County Prosecutor [personnel] may
be present, but may not be within the residence when the discovery is ongoing.
{¶ 6} The state unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal Judge McGinty‘s order under
B. The Eighth District Proceedings in this Case
{¶ 7} While the state‘s motion for leave to appeal was pending, appellants filed this action in the Eighth District, seeking a writ of prohibition to restrain Judge McGinty from enforcing his discovery order. They argued that Marsy‘s Law and the
{¶ 8} The Eighth District granted Judge McGinty‘s motion to dismiss the prohibition action. The Eighth District held that a trial court “has broad discretion, and thus the jurisdiction, over discovery matters, such that the writ of prohibition will not lie.” 2019-Ohio-5129, 137 N.E.3d 1278, ¶ 26. And to the extent that Judge McGinty‘s order granted discovery beyond that required by
{¶ 9} The Eighth District further determined that appellants’ status as nonparties to State v. Counts did not undermine Judge McGinty‘s discretion. The court explained that “the court of common pleas may order non-parties to assist in criminal investigations.” Id. at ¶ 27, citing State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Williams, 63 Ohio St.2d 51, 407 N.E.2d 2 (1980). And the court found further support in
{¶ 10} Having concluded that Judge McGinty “has the jurisdiction” to issue the discovery order in this case as a matter of Ohio discovery law, the Eighth District next examined whether Marsy‘s Law “deprives him of that power.” Id. at ¶ 30. The court held that a crime victim‘s right to privacy “does not unilaterally deprive the trial court of jurisdiction” to order an inspection of a private residence that is also the crime scene. Id. at ¶ 31. Relying on cases from other jurisdictions to inform its decision, the Eighth District determined that a third party‘s privacy rights “must be weighed against a criminal defendant‘s rights to due process, to confront witness[es], to have compulsory process to obtain evidence, and to effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 42. The Eighth District therefore concluded that a trial court has jurisdiction to order an inspection of a crime scene, even if it is a private residence. Id.
{¶ 11} As an additional ground for dismissal, the Eighth District concluded that appellants had an adequate remedy at law precluding extraordinary relief in prohibition. Specifically, the Eighth District observed that appellants could disobey Judge McGinty‘s order, be found in contempt, and appeal a resulting contempt order. Relying on State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 117 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, the Eighth District determined that “appealing a contempt order is
{¶ 12} Appellants have timely appealed to this court as of right. They have also requested oral argument.
II. Request for Oral Argument
{¶ 13} In exercising our discretion to grant oral аrgument under
{¶ 14} Appellants’ request for oral argument is one sentence long and does not include any discussion of the above factors. But even if the existence of one or more of these factors is self-evident, oral argument is not warranted in this case. Although there is little case law interpreting the scope of a crime victim‘s constitutional rights under Marsy‘s Law, this case turns on familiar principles governing writs of prohibition. See State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 31; State ex rel. Chester Twp. v. Grendell, 147 Ohio St.3d 366, 2016-Ohio-1520, 66 N.E.3d 683, ¶ 18. We therefore deny the request for oral argument.
III. Writ of Prohibition
{¶ 15} This court reviews de novo a lower court‘s dismissal of an extraordinary-writ action under
A. Judge McGinty Acted within His Judicial Power
{¶ 16} In arguing that Judge McGinty‘s discovery order is unauthorized by law, appellants first rely on
Upon receipt of a written demand for discovery by the defendant * * * the prosecuting attorney shall provide copies or photographs, or permit counsel for the defendant to copy or photograph, the following items related to the particular case indictment, information, or complaint, and which are material to the preparation of a defense, or are intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidеnce at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant, within the possession of, or reasonably available to the state, subject to the provisions of this rule:
* * *
(3) Subject to divisions (D)(4) and (E) of this rule, all laboratory or hospital reports, books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or places * * *.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 17} Although
{¶ 18} Appellants further argue that Judge McGinty‘s order is an unauthorized usurpation of power because he “lacks authority from case law” to order inspection of a crime victim‘s property. Though the Eighth District cited cases from New Jersey, Hawaii, Florida, Virginia, Massachusetts, Vermont, North Carolina, and New York to inform its view that Ohio law gives trial courts discretion to order discovery from nonparties to a criminal case, see 2019-Ohio-5129, 137 N.E.3d 1278, at ¶ 32-41,1 appellants contend that decisions from Colorado, Oregon, and Minnesota are more persuasive.2 Finally, appellants argue that Judge McGinty‘s order violates their privacy rights under the
{¶ 19} Appellants’ arguments conflate the trial court‘s jurisdictional power with the court‘s exercise of jurisdiction. Generally, “a court will deny relief in prohibition when a respondent judge has general subject-matter jurisdiction and will deem any error by the judge to be an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.” Sponaugle, 153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, at ¶ 24. A common pleas court has the jurisdictional authority to enter pretrial orders regarding discovery in criminal proceedings.
{¶ 20} Our decision in Mason, 117 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, is instructive. In that case, a prosecutor sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a common pleas court judge from enforcing a pretrial discovery order in a criminal
{¶ 21} Appellants contend that this case is on different footing: whereas Mason (and other cases like it) involved a discovery order directed at the prosecutor, Judge McGinty in this case ordered a third party to provide discovery. Recently, in State ex rel. S.L. v. Judge, Hamilton Cty. Mun. Court, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190248, 2020-Ohio-584, which also involved a trial-court order allowing a criminal defendant to access the alleged victim‘s home (also the crime scene) for purposes of preparing a defense, the First District Court of Appeals relied on this distinction to reject the Eighth District‘s analysis in this case and to grant the alleged victim‘s requested writ of prohibition. Id. at ¶ 14-20. We reject appellants’ argument for two reasons.
{¶ 22} First, it is unclear in this case whether appellants are correct in their premise that Judge McGinty‘s order is directed at them as opposed to the state. A close reading of the order shows that Judge McGinty ordered that “[t]he parties” (i.e., the state and Counts) communicate and provide three available days for the inspection “to allow State to confer with [the] homeowner.” Judge McGinty further ordered that the state then indicate to defense counsel the date chosen by appellants and described the parameters of the inspection. Thus, Judge McGinty‘s order contemplated that appellants would provide access, but it arguably did not order appellants to do so.3 See State ex rel. Beach v. Norblad, 308 Or. 429, 431, 781 P.2d 349 (1989) (granting writ of mandamus compelling trial court to vacate order allowing defendant to have access to victim‘s home; trial court‘s order expressly stated that victim‘s widow “shall make available and grant access to the defense attorneys“).
{¶ 23} Second, we disapprove of the First District‘s grant of a writ of prohibition in S.L. and decline to apply that court‘s reasoning to this case. Even accepting the premise that Judge McGinty affirmatively ordered appellants to give Counts and the defense team access to appellants’
{¶ 24} In Ohio Bell, 63 Ohio St.2d 51, 407 N.E.2d 2, the trial court in a criminal case ordered a nonparty, the Ohio Bell Teleрhone Company, to allow installation of a pen register by the police and to supply all the necessary facilities, technical assistance, and information to aid the police in recording an Ohio Bell subscriber‘s outgoing calls. Ohio Bell filed an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing the order. Among other things, Ohio Bell argued that the trial court “lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction” to order it to allow installation of the pen register and to provide facilities and assistance to law enforcement. Id. at 53. This court denied the writ, holding that the order was issued in connection with a criminal offense that was within the court‘s original subject-matter jurisdiction under
{¶ 25} We also rejected Ohio Bell‘s argument that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to issue a discovery order to a nonparty in the criminal proceeding. Id. at 55-56. The “inherent authority” of the Ohio courts of common pleas allowed the court to issue its order, which was “in the nature of a warrant.” Id. at 56. Accordingly, there was no unauthorized usurpation of judicial authority that would support the issuance of a writ of prohibition. Id. at 57; see also State ex rel. Herdman v. Watson, 83 Ohio St.3d 537, 700 N.E.2d 1270 (1998) (prohibition did not lie when relator, a nonparty to a civil case, alleged that court‘s discovery orders violated
{¶ 26} Prohibition is an extraordinary writ, and this court does not grant it routinely or easily. Fradette v. Gold, 157 Ohio St.3d 13, 2019-Ohio-1959, 131 N.E.3d 12, ¶ 5. We have explained that with few exceptions, “a writ of prohibition ‘tests and determines “solely and only” the subject matter jurisdiction’ of the lower court.” State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998), quoting State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 534 N.E.2d 46 (1988), quoting State ex rel. Staton v. Franklin Cty. Common Pleas Court, 5 Ohio St.2d 17, 21, 213 N.E.2d 164 (1965). In this case, appellants’ arguments that Judge McGinty exceeded his judicial authority are challenges to his exercise of jurisdiction, not to the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Absent some other provision that divests Judge McGinty of subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the discovery order, a writ of prohibition is not appropriate. State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 156 Ohio St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 13.
B. Impact of Marsy‘s Law
{¶ 27} Appellants argue that Marsy‘s Law should inform our resolution of this case and allow them to obtain a writ of prohibition as the proper remedy.
(A) To secure for victims justice and due process throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have the following rights, which shall be protected in a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused:
* * *
(6) except as authorized by
section 10 of Article I of this constitution ,to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request made by the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused; * * *
(B) The victim, the attorney for the government upon request of the victim, or the victim‘s other lawful representative, in any proceeding involving the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim or in which the victim‘s rights are implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this section and any other right afforded to the victim by law. If the relief sought is denied, the victim or the victim‘s lawful representative may petition the court of appeals for the applicable district, which shall promptly consider and decide the petition.
{¶ 28} Importantly for purposes of a writ-of-prohibition analysis, the provision of Marsy‘s Law that applies to this case does not purport to divest a trial court of the jurisdictional power to order a crime victim to respond to an accused‘s discovery request. Even though
{¶ 29} Rather than argue that Mаrsy‘s Law somehow divests a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction, appellants argue that their right under
{¶ 30}
{¶ 31} Amicus curiae National Crime Victim Law Institute (“NCVLI“) contends that a writ of prohibition is appropriate under
{¶ 32} News Herald involved a challenge to a court‘s gag order prohibiting the media from reporting on court proceedings that wеre open to the public. We observed that “[t]here is a long line of cases holding that an action for a writ of prohibition is the proper vehicle to challenge an order of a trial court which orders closure of court proceedings” and that prohibition is “the only remedy available to nonparties who wish to challenge an order which restricts the rights of free speech and press of such nonparties.” (Emphasis sic.) News Herald at 43. Indeed, it has long been settled that a writ of prohibition is the proper remedy to address courtroom restrictions that are alleged to violate the freedom of the press. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Kainrad, 46 Ohio St.2d 349, 355, 348 N.E.2d 695 (1976); In re T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 556 N.E.2d 439 (1990), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 33} But these decisions can be reconciled with traditional writ-of-prohibition concepts. The lesson of the media cases is that trial courts have no jurisdictional power to close their courtrooms or restrict reporting of proceedings unless they follow proper procedures for doing so. Indeed, in both Beacon Journal and Dayon Newspapers, we stated that a writ of prohibition would lie “on authority of” State ex rel. N. Ohio Tel. Co. v. Winter, 23 Ohio St.2d 6, 260 N.E.2d 827 (1970), a case in which this court granted a writ of prohibition because a lower court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Beacon Journal at 355; Dayton Newspapers at 458. The media writ-of-prohibition cases therefore do not provide support for granting a writ of prohibition when the lower court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶ 34} Vindicator Printing Co. is an even less secure anchor for NCVLI‘s broad proposition to allow a writ of prohibition to issue even when subject-matter jurisdiction exists. In that case, we granted a writ of mandamus to compel a judge to release records that he had ordered to be sealed in a criminal case. As a corollary to the writ of mandamus, we also granted a writ of prohibition ordering the judge to vacate his decisions sealing records “and to prohibit the judge from presumptively sealing any records” in the criminal case. 132 Ohio St.3d 481, 2012-Ohio-3328, 974 N.E.2d 89, at ¶ 38-39. Without discussion of the requirements for issuance оf a writ of prohibition, we concluded that prohibition was appropriate “[b]ased on the previous discussion concerning [the] relators’ mandamus claim.” Id. at ¶ 39. Therefore, Vindicator Printing Co. does not provide a solid basis for deciding that a writ of prohibition is the proper remedy in this case.
{¶ 35} Finally, NCVLI relies on State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967), to support the notion that a writ of prohibition may lie even when the respondent judge or court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying
{¶ 36} We held that
{¶ 37} For the foregoing reasons, neither appellants nor NCVLI provides a sound basis for authorizing a writ of prohibition as the remedy to vindicate appellants’ rights under Marsy‘s Law in this case.
C. Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law
{¶ 38} The Eighth District also dismissed appellants’ prohibition action because it determined that they had an adequate remedy at law by disobeying Judge McGinty‘s order and then appealing any resulting contempt order against them. 2019-Ohio-5129, 137 N.E.3d 1278, at ¶ 43. While acknowledging that the remedy “seems harsh” as applied to a crime victim, id., the Eighth District relied on our decision in Mason, in which we determined that the prosecutor had an adequate remedy at law “by appeal to challenge any contempt order,” 117 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, at ¶ 15.
{¶ 39} We do not agree with the Eighth District‘s rationale in this respect. Marsy‘s Law expressly provides that a сrime victim “may petition the court of appeals for the applicable district” when a trial court‘s ruling implicates the victim‘s rights.
{¶ 40} The foregoing analysis begs the question of what
{¶ 41} When applied to the jurisdiction of a court of appeals, the term “petition” is also associated typically with extraordinary-writ actions invoking the court of appeals’ original jurisdiction. See
Thus, the undefined term “petition” in
{¶ 42} We need not determine what “petition” means in the context of all the Marsy‘s Law rights under
{¶ 43} Generally, before amendments to
An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
* * *
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
{¶ 44} A provisional remedy is “a proceeding ancillary to an action, including, but not limited to, * * * discovery of privileged matter.”
{¶ 46} Having determined that Judge McGinty‘s order grants a provisional remedy, it then follows that it is a final, appealable order under
{¶ 47} Judge McGinty‘s order also satisfies
{¶ 48} The matter in dispute is whether Counts and the defense team may have access to appellants’ residence for purposes of preparing a defense, notwithstanding appellants’ qualified right under Marsy‘s Law to refuse such a request. The damage to appellants is the accused‘s mere access to their residence. An appeal after final judgment would not rectify the harm done by a loss of appellants’ right to refuse the аccused‘s discovery request. See State v. Hendon, 2017-Ohio-352, 83 N.E.3d 282, ¶ 10-11 (9th Dist.) (pre-Marsy‘s Law case holding that orders requiring a crime victim to produce medical records were final, appealable orders under
{¶ 49} For these reasons, Judge McGinty‘s order is a final, appealable order under
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 50} The right to “petition” a court of appeals under
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur.
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only.
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FRENCH and DEWINE, JJ.
KENNEDY, J., dissenting.
{¶ 51} Because Marsy‘s Law,
{¶ 52} Further, the lead opinion‘s analysis cоnfuses the law by suggesting that a writ of prohibition is limited to preventing a lower court from exceeding its subject-matter jurisdiction; it also will prevent judicial acts that violate constitutional rights when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by way of appeal. And contrary to the lead opinion‘s analysis, an interlocutory appeal of a discovery order is not available when the subjects of the order are not parties to the underlying case, and it therefore cannot be an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law precluding relief.
{¶ 53} Judge McGinty has failed to demonstrate beyond doubt that Thomas and Kelly can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief, and I therefore dissent and would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing their complaint and would remand the case to that court for consideration of the merits of the complaint.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 54} Because this matter comеs to us on appeal of the dismissal of Thomas and Kelly‘s complaint, we must presume the truth of the allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 8. Dismissal for the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that they can prove no set of facts entitling them to the requested relief. Id.
{¶ 55} According to the allegations of the complaint, Thomas and Kelly are the
{¶ 56} In that criminal proceeding, Counts requested a court order allowing the defense to enter, inspect, and photograph Thomas and Kelly‘s home as the scene of the crimes. Judge McGinty granted the discovery request over the prosecutor‘s objection. According to the discovery order, which the complaint refers to, Judge McGinty directed the prosecutor to arrange the inspection and ordered a bailiff and a sheriff‘s deputy to oversee it. Thomas and Kelly are not allowed to be present when the defense enters their home. The order does not list Thomas and Kelly as parties, nor does it indicate that they were present at the hearing on the discovery request.
{¶ 57} Thomas and Kelly filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the Eighth District Court of Appeals seeking to prevent Judge McGinty from enforcing the discovery order. However, they specifically asserted their right as victims of crime under Marsy‘s Law to refuse the discovery request and “to ‘petition’ the court of appeals for the applicable district * * * when trial courts deny victims their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
{¶ 58} The Eighth District granted Judge McGinty‘s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that he had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the discovery order and that neither
Law and Analysis
Marsy‘s Law
{¶ 59} The people of Ohio adopted Marsy‘s Law,
{¶ 60}
The victim, the attorney for the government upon request of the victim, or the victim‘s other lawful representative, in any proceeding involving the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim or in which the victim‘s rights are implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this sеction and any other right afforded to the victim by law. If the relief sought is denied, the victim or the victim‘s lawful representative may petition the court of appeals for the applicable district, which shall promptly consider and decide the petition.
(Emphasis added.) Lastly,
{¶ 62} And even if styling the complaint as seeking a writ of prohibition was improper, we have previously used our plenary power in reviewing original actions to recast the complaint to seek the appropriate relief. E.g., State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Louden, 91 Ohio St.3d 61, 66, 741 N.E.2d 517 (2001).
{¶ 63} Accordingly, Thomas and Kelly have plainly asserted their right to petition the court of appeals to protect their right to refuse Counts‘s discovery request under
Interlocutory Appeal
{¶ 64} The lead opinion states that the word “petition” as used in
{¶ 65} In adopting Marsy‘s Law, the people of Ohio did not condition the right to petition the court of appeals on satisfying the requirements of
{¶ 66} The lead opinion‘s claim that Thomas and Kelly had a right to an appeal pursuant to
{¶ 67} Here, Thomas and Kelly filed a petition asserting their state constitutional right to refuse to comply with Judge McGinty‘s discovery order. The court of
Prohibition
{¶ 68} The lead opinion, however, reviews this case solely as a prohibition action, and its analysis introduces additional errors that demand a response.
{¶ 69} Initially, I agree with the lead opinion that Judge McGinty possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to issue discovery orders in the underlying prosecution. Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case. State v. Harper, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-2913, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 23, citing Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11-12, 34. ” ‘A court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.’ ” Id., quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. “Rather, the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id., citing 18A Wright,
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017) (“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to the rules that actually allocate judicial authority among different courts“).
{¶ 70} ”
{¶ 71} That does not end the analysis. Prohibition will lie when the inferior court‘s exercise of judicial power is unauthorized by law and would result in an injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.
{¶ 72} Our prohibition cases involving gag orders issued in criminal cases and challenged by members of the press are informative. Those were cases in which the trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal case yet we nonetheless issued writs of prohibition “to prevent courts from enforcing gag orders that unconstitutionally impair the press‘[s] right to gather news,” State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 59 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 570 N.E.2d 1101 (1991). We allowed members оf the media to challenge orders impinging on their constitutional rights to a free press and open courts by seeking a writ of prohibition, recognizing that they had no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, because they were not parties to the case and lacked the ability to appeal. E.g., Toledo Blade, 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, at ¶ 19; T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d at 11, 556 N.E.2d 439.
{¶ 73} According to the lead opinion, “these decisions can be reconciled with traditional writ-of-prohibition concepts. The lesson of the media cases is that trial courts have no jurisdictional power to close their courtrooms or restrict reporting of proceedings unless they follow proper procedures for doing so.” Lead opinion at ¶ 33. This language propagates the confusion
{¶ 74} In the gag-order cases, we reviewed the trial court‘s exercise of jurisdiction, considering whether the court conducted a hearing and made specific findings on the record showing that the accused‘s right to a fair trial would be jeopardized by publicity and that there were no reasonable alternatives to a gag order that would adequately protect the accused‘s right. See Toledo Blade at ¶ 28-30. We have never held, as the lead opinion now suggests, that a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a gag order only if it exercises that jurisdiction properly.
{¶ 75} It is not necessary to decide whether a writ of prohibition would have been available to Thоmas and Kelly. Marsy‘s Law has provided them with the right to petition the court of appeals to vindicate their right to refuse the discovery request, and they exercised that right. That should determine the outcome of this case.
Conclusion
{¶ 76} For these reasons, Judge McGinty failed in his burden to demonstrate beyond a doubt that Thomas and Kelly can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief. I therefore dissent and would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing their complaint and would remand the case to that court for consideration of the merits of the complaint.
FRENCH and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center and Elizabeth A. Well, for appellants.
Law Office of Timothy Farrell Sweeney and Timothy F. Sweeney, for appellee.
Rittgers & Rittgers and Konrad Kircher, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Crime Victim Law Institute.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Katherine Mullin and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging reversal for amicus curiаe Cuyahoga County Prosecutor‘s Office.
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika B. Cunliffe and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defenders, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Public Defender.