WALTERS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE ENRICHMENT CENTER OF WISHING WELL, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 96-1429
Supreme Court of Ohio
April 2, 1997
78 Ohio St.3d 118 | 1997-Ohio-232
Submitted January 8, 1997. CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 69159.
The denial of an asserted statutory privilege of confidentiality is not a special proceeding for purposes of
{¶ 1} This case commenced when plaintiffs-appellants, Robert L. Walters, Jr., and Dawn A. Walters, filed a complaint in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court alleging, inter alia, that defendants-appellees, The Enrichment Center of Wishing Well, Inc. (a day-care center) and its owner/director, Janice A. Carlisle, had made a bad faith report of child abuse, involving the suspected abuse by Robert L. Walters, Jr. of the couple‘s minor son. Appellants asserted in their complaint that on August 19, 1994, Carlisle and perhaps others filed a report of suspected child abuse with the Medina County Department of Human Services, Social Services Section. Appellants claimed appellees filed the child-abuse report in retaliation for appellants’ act of filing a complaint with the North Royalton Police
{¶ 2} Appellants served appellees with discovery requests, including requests seeking documents. Appellees moved for a protective order as to some of the documents, citing several reasons why the various documents should not be discoverable. Specifically relevant to our consideration are the following two of appellants’ requests:
“[4.] Copies of any correspondence between The Enrichment Center and any social service agency or other investigatory agency, including police departments, which pertain to any allegation of abuse by plaintiff Robert L. Walters, Jr.
“[5.] Copies of any document which pertains to any allegation of abuse by plaintiff Robert L. Walters, Jr.”
{¶ 3} Appellees argued that these two requests pertained to reports of child abuse made pursuant to
{¶ 4} Appellees appealed the trial court‘s denial of their motion for protective order as to requests four and five to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. Appellants moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that it was interlocutory and was not taken from a final appealable order. The court of appeals determined that the trial court‘s order was a final appealable order and therefore determined
{¶ 5} Appellants moved the court of appeals to certify a conflict to this court on the issue of whether the order appealed from was a final appealable order, urging that the judgment of the court of appeals on that issue was in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in Turner v. Romans (June 30, 1995), Franklin App. No. 95APE05-528, unreported, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County in Kelly v. Daly (1995), 99 Ohio App.3d 670, 651 N.E.2d 513.
{¶ 6} The court of appeals granted appellants’ motion to certify a conflict on the issue of the appealability of the trial court order. This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists.1
Barbara Quinn Smith, for appellants.
Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Thomas E. Dover and Donald M. Desseyn; Ulmer & Berne and Craig A. Marvinney, for appellees.
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶ 7} The question certified for our review is “whether the denial of an asserted statutory privilege of confidentiality is a special proceeding for purposes
{¶ 8}
“Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse final orders or actions of administrative officers or agencies.”
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} The parties appear to agree that the trial court order appealed from in this case affects a substantial right. However, to be a final appealable order, the order appealed from must first be made in a special proceeding. See Polikoff v. Adam (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 108, 616 N.E.2d 213, 218, fn. 8. Thus, as to the certified issue, resolution of this case turns on the special-proceeding prong of
{¶ 11} In Polikoff, we held at the syllabus that “[o]rders that are entered in actions that were recognized at common law or in equity and were not specially created by statute are not orders entered in special proceedings pursuant to
{¶ 12} In State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 438, 639 N.E.2d 83, 96, this court conducted the following analysis:
“Rulings by a trial court on demands for discovery (whether granting or denying the demand) are not orders which are final and appealable. See State v. Lambert [(1994)], supra, 69 Ohio St.3d 356, 632 N.E.2d 511, and Horton v. Addy (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 181, 631 N.E.2d 123.
“Discovery orders have long been considered interlocutory. In Klein v. Bendix-Westinghouse [Automotive Air Brake] Co. (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 85, 86, 42 O.O.2d 283, 284, 234 N.E.2d 587, 589, this court stated: ‘The sole question for determination is whether a discovery order of a trial court is subject to immediate appellate review. We hold that it is not.’ (Emphasis added.) In Kennedy v. Chalfin (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 85, 89, 67 O.O.2d 90, 92, 310 N.E.2d. 233, 235, we stated: ‘discovery techniques are pretrial procedures used as an adjunct to *** a pending lawsuit. They are designed to aid in the final disposition of the litigation, and are, therefore, to be considered as an integral part of the action in which they are utilized. They are not “special proceedings,” as that phrase is used in
R.C. 2505.02 .’ See, also, In re Coastal States Petroleum (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 81, 61 O.O.2d 333, 290 N.E.2d 844; Collins v. Yellow Cab Co. (1952), 157 Ohio St. 311, 47 O.O. 186, 105 N.E.2d 395; and State v. Smith (1939), 135 Ohio St. 292, 24 O.O. 149, 20 N.E.2d 718.“We deviated from this well-established and workable rule in Humphry v. Riverside Methodist Hosp. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 94, 22 OBR 129, 488 N.E.2d 877, and State v. Port Clinton Fisheries, Inc. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 114, 12 OBR 157, 465 N.E.2d 865. This deviation has caused this court and courts of appeals *** much difficulty. By overruling Amato v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 253, 21 O.O.3d 158, 423 N.E.2d 452, in Polikoff v. Adam (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 616 N.E.2d 213, we implicitly overruled Humphry and Port Clinton Fisheries. We now do so explicitly.”
{¶ 13} The Steckman analysis culminated in paragraph seven of the syllabus:
“Discovery orders are interlocutory and, as such, are neither final nor appealable.”
{¶ 14} The court of appeals below relied on two appellate decisions, Niemann v. Cooley (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 81, 637 N.E.2d 943, and Arnold v. Am. Natl. Red Cross (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 564, 639 N.E.2d 484, both of which have misinterpreted this court‘s decision in Polikoff. Since there appears to be much
{¶ 15} Under Steckman, discovery orders entered in actions that are not special proceedings are interlocutory and are not immediately final or appealable. Although appellants argued to the court of appeals that the appeal from the trial court order should be dismissed on authority of Steckman, the court of appeals chose not to cite Steckman in its opinion, apparently having determined that Steckman was inapplicable to this case. However, Steckman does apply, and in fact directly answers the certified issue. The court of appeals instead relied on two appellate decisions issued before this court decided Steckman: Niemann and Arnold. While we specifically disapprove of the reasoning in Niemann and Arnold, it was understandable for those courts of appeals to have misinterpreted Polikoff in light of our decision in Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 616 N.E.2d 181. However, dicta in Bell were expressly modified in Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 635 N.E.2d 331, paragraph four of the syllabus, precisely in order to eliminate such confusion. Furthermore, the Bell dicta were based upon the Humphry and Port Clinton Fisheries cases, which were explicitly overruled in Steckman as being inconsistent with Polikoff. This court‘s decision in Bell turned only on the “substantial right” prong of the
{¶ 16} Appellees claim it is manifestly unjust not to allow the trial court order in this case to be immediately reviewable. To this end, appellees make several policy arguments why the order should be an appealable order. Appellees appear to be inviting this court to return to the Amato approach in determining when
{¶ 17} As a consequence of Amato, at one time the “substantial right” prong of appealability analysis could subsume the “special proceeding” prong when a substantial enough right was involved. Amato encouraged a subjective view of what constituted a final appealable order that varied greatly from case to case and from court to court. In Polikoff, we recognized that the Amato approach ignored the “special proceeding” consideration specifically required by
{¶ 18} In conclusion, both Polikoff and Steckman are directly applicable to the certified issue. It is only the underlying action that is to be examined to determine whether an order was entered in a special proceeding, and not the order itself which was entered within that action. Polikoff, at the syllabus. Consequently, we hold that the denial of an asserted statutory privilege of confidentiality is not a special proceeding for purposes of
{¶ 19} The order of the trial court at issue in this case was not entered in a special proceeding. It was an interlocutory order, and therefore was neither final nor appealable. The court of appeals thus was without jurisdiction to review it and should have dismissed appellees’ appeal. For all the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeals, dismiss the appeal, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
Judgment vacated and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.