State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty (Slip Opinion), 2020 Ohio 5452

Background

In November 2018 Kaylynn Counts allegedly assaulted Lavon Thomas and Felicia Kelly in Thomas’s home; Counts is charged with attempted murder and felonious assault.
Counts moved under Crim.R. 16 for a court-supervised inspection/photography of the victims’ residence to prepare the defense; the prosecutor opposed the motion.
Cuyahoga C.P. Judge McGinty granted the motion and ordered the defendant, defense counsel, and defense expert to inspect the residence while supervised by court officers and with the victims absent.
The state sought leave to appeal and filed a separate original-action challenge; those efforts were unsuccessful. Thomas and Kelly (the victims) then sought a writ of prohibition in the Eighth District to enjoin enforcement of Judge McGinty’s discovery order.
The Eighth District dismissed the prohibition action; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the inspection order (any error was in its exercise), and (2) a writ of prohibition was not appropriate because the victims had an adequate remedy by immediate appeal under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). Marsy’s Law (Ohio Const. Art. I, §10a) does not strip trial courts of jurisdiction but does afford victims the right to seek appellate review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Is a writ of prohibition an appropriate remedy to enjoin the trial-court discovery order allowing a defense inspection of the victims’ home?	Thomas/Kelly: Marsy’s Law gives victims the right to refuse discovery and to petition the court of appeals; prohibition is the proper vehicle to protect that right.	Judge/State: Prohibition tests subject-matter jurisdiction; the common pleas court had jurisdiction over the criminal case and discovery matters, so prohibition is not appropriate.	Writ of prohibition is not appropriate; the order falls within trial-court jurisdiction and any error is in its exercise, not its subject-matter power.
2) Did the trial court lack authority under Crim.R.16 and Ohio law to order inspection of a nonparty private residence?	Thomas/Kelly: Crim.R.16 applies only to items in state possession or reasonably available to the state; the judge lacked authority to compel a nonparty’s home.	Judge/State: Common pleas courts have broad discovery discretion; courts may order discovery from nonparties and may authorize inspections as part of trial preparation.	The court held the order did not show a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; such objections implicate abuse of discretion, not absence of jurisdiction.
3) Does Article I, §10a(B) (Marsy’s Law) require that victims may obtain a writ of prohibition, or otherwise change the available remedies?	Thomas/Kelly: §10a(B) lets victims "petition the court of appeals," which they read to support original writ relief/prohibition.	Judge/State: §10a(B)’s petition right does not automatically create a new route to prohibition when established writ standards do not permit it.	§10a(B) does not divest trial courts of jurisdiction or convert every victim petition into a basis for prohibition; it does, however, preserve a victim’s right to seek appellate review.
4) Did the victims have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (so as to preclude prohibition)?	Thomas/Kelly: As nonparties they cannot obtain an interlocutory appeal and should not be forced to disobey and risk contempt.	Judge/State: The discovery order here is a provisional remedy affecting a constitutional privilege; it is immediately appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), so an adequate remedy exists.	The Court held the order was a provisional remedy implicating the victim’s Marsy’s Law privilege and therefore was final/appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4); appellants had an adequate remedy by immediate appeal, barring prohibition.

Key Cases Cited

State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 117 Ohio St.3d 1 (2007) (extraordinary writ will not control trial court discovery discretion; appeal from contempt may be adequate remedy)
State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 153 Ohio St.3d 560 (2018) (prohibition denied where lower court had general jurisdiction over matter)
State ex rel. News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Div., 77 Ohio St.3d 40 (1996) (prohibition proper to challenge closure/gag orders affecting nonparty press rights)
State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff, 132 Ohio St.3d 481 (2012) (mandamus and prohibition used to challenge sealing orders in criminal case)
State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Williams, 63 Ohio St.2d 51 (1980) (trial court may order nonparty assistance in criminal investigations; order upheld against prohibition)
State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107 (1990) (trial courts have discretion to order discovery beyond the criminal rules)
In re Grand Jury Proceeding of Doe, 150 Ohio St.3d 398 (2016) (orders compelling privileged materials may be final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4))
Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 151 Ohio St.3d 356 (2016) (discussing finality and irreparable loss from compelled disclosure)
State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440 (2001) (interpreting R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) provisional-remedy finality)
State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70 (1998) (prohibition tests subject-matter jurisdiction)
State ex rel. Staton v. Franklin Cty. Common Pleas Court, 5 Ohio St.2d 17 (1966) (prohibition focuses on jurisdiction of inferior tribunals)
State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St.2d 159 (1967) (distinguishing jurisdictional usurpation from errors in exercise of jurisdiction)
State ex rel. Lighttiser v. Spahr, 18 Ohio St.3d 234 (1985) (prohibition did not lie to prevent enforcement of broad discovery order)