THE STATE EX REL. OHIO ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES/AFSCME, LOCAL 4, AFL-CIO, ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. BATAVIA LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 99-963
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted February 22, 2000 — Decided June 21, 2000.
89 Ohio St.3d 191 | 2000-Ohio-130
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA98-08-068.
In order to negate statutory rights of public employees, a collective bargaining agreement must use language with such specificity as to explicitly demonstrate that the intent of the parties was to preempt statutory rights.
{¶ 1} Appellants in this matter are the Ohio Association of Public School Employees/AFSCME, Local 4, AFL-CIO (“OAPSE“), OAPSE Local 738 (“Local 738“), and certain nonteaching public school employees of the Batavia Local School District. Appellees are the Batavia Local School District Board of Education (“Board“), James Fite, Superintendent, Terry W. Stephens, Treasurer, and Candace Koch, President.
{¶ 2} OAPSE and its Local 738 are the deemed-certified exclusive bargaining representative1 for most of the nonteaching personnel employed by the
{¶ 3} The collective bargaining agreement in effect when this action was initiated was entered into by Local 738 and the Board on February 12, 1996. Its term ran from March 1, 1996 to February 28, 1999. Article 11 of the collective bargaining agreement set forth the management rights of the Board. Article 11 authorized the Board to “[d]etermine matters of inherent managerial policy,” “[m]aintain and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental operations,” “[d]etermine the overall methods * * * or personnel by which governmental operations are to be conducted,” “[d]etermine the adequacy of the work force,” and “[e]ffectively manage the work force.” Article 11 of the collective bargaining agreement also gave the Board the ability to “[s]uspend, discipline, demote, discharge for just cause, lay off, non-renew, transfer, assign, schedule, promote, or retain employees.”
{¶ 4} Article 13 of the collective bargaining agreement set forth the procedures for layoffs and recalls. Article 13 provided:
“When layoff becomes necessary in a job classification due to the abolishment of positions, lack of funds or lack of work, the following procedures shall govern such layoff:
“* * *
“D. The Board shall determine in which classifications the layoff shall occur and the number of employees to be laid off.”
{¶ 5} The terms “abolishment” and “layoff” were not defined by the collective bargaining agreement.
{¶ 6} Following the conclusion of the 1997-1998 academic school year, the Board employed thirteen school bus drivers and one school bus mechanic. Pursuant to
{¶ 7} In June 1998, the Board considered entering into a contract with a private company, Laidlaw Transit, Inc. (“Laidlaw“), to provide bus transportation for the Batavia Local School District. The Board adopted a resolution directing Superintendent Fite and the Board‘s legal counsel to negotiate a contract with Laidlaw. On June 22, 1998, the Board executed a contract with Laidlaw whereby Laidlaw would furnish all student transportation services for the Batavia School District.
{¶ 8} As a result of the contract with Laidlaw, on July 20, 1998, the Board passed a resolution to abolish the positions of bus driver and mechanic and to lay off the fourteen employees who held those positions. Thereafter, pursuant to Article 13 of the collective bargaining agreement, the Board notified the bus drivers and mechanic that they were being laid off due to the abolishment of their positions. The laid-off employees subsequently accepted employment with Laidlaw to perform transportation services for the school district.
{¶ 9} After the Board‘s resolution to abolish the positions of bus driver and mechanic, some of the affected employees filed a grievance in accordance with Article 8 of the collective bargaining agreement. The grievance alleged that the Board had violated the collective bargaining agreement by contracting out the district‘s school bus transportation work to a private company. After Superintendent Fite denied the grievance, the parties submitted the matter to arbitration, the final step of the grievance procedure.
{¶ 10} In a letter dated August 20, 1998, OAPSE demanded, on behalf of the bargaining unit employees, that the Board members “honor their continuing and limited statutory employment contracts previously issued by the Board and still in effect.” Receiving no satisfactory response, appellants sought to enforce their statutory rights in court.
{¶ 11} On August 24, 1998, appellants initiated this cause by filing a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Clermont County. In their complaint, appellants sought to compel appellees to reinstate the laid-off employees to their positions as public employee bus drivers and bus mechanic. Appellants also requested that the court of appeals award the laid-off employees all back pay and lost fringe benefits and that the Board be required to recognize the employees’ continuing statutory employment contracts and honor the contracts in the future. Finally, appellants requested a writ ordering appellees to return all transportation work to the deemed-certified bargaining unit and to maintain the status quo.
{¶ 12} Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In an opinion and judgment entry dated May 10, 1999, the court of appeals granted appellees’ motion
{¶ 13} In May 1999, appellants appealed the decision of the court of appeals to this court. We granted appellants’ request for oral argument, and oral argument was held on February 22, 2000.
{¶ 14} The cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
Buckley, King & Bluso and James E. Melle, for appellants.
Ennis, Roberts & Fischer, C. Bronston McCord III and George E. Roberts III, for appellees.
DOUGLAS, J.
{¶ 15} Appellants initially contend that the court of appeals erred in determining that the collective bargaining agreement prevailed over the statutory rights for nonteaching employees in
I
{¶ 16}
“An agreement between a public employer and an exclusive representative entered into pursuant to this chapter governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of public employment covered by the agreement. * * * Where no
agreement exists or where an agreement makes no specification about a matter, the public employer and public employees are subject to all applicable state or local laws or ordinances pertaining to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment for public employees. * * * [T]his chapter prevails over any and all other conflicting laws, resolutions, provisions, present or future, except as otherwise specified in this chapter or as otherwise specified by the general assembly.”
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} It is axiomatic that
{¶ 20} Moreover, nothing in
{¶ 21} In the case at bar, the collective bargaining agreement, as previously indicated, authorized the Board to abolish positions and lay off employees. Nevertheless, given the protections afforded by
{¶ 22} In State ex rel. Clark v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 19, 548 N.E.2d 940, the court addressed the interplay between public employees’ statutory rights and provisions of a collective bargaining agreement that purport to preempt those statutory rights pursuant to
{¶ 23} In Naylor v. Cardinal Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 162, 630 N.E.2d 725, the court again addressed the applicability of
{¶ 24} As our decisions in Clark and Naylor demonstrate, “a collective bargaining agreement must specifically exclude statutory rights in order to negate the application of those rights.” (Emphasis added.) Naylor, 69 Ohio St.3d at 165, 630 N.E.2d at 728. In the case at bar, appellees contend that the collective bargaining agreement controls the rights and duties of the parties and, therefore, the individual appellants’ statutory employment rights are not implicated. We respectfully disagree. Article 13 of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement is merely a general layoff and recall provision, and says nothing about employees’ statutory rights guaranteed by
{¶ 25} Furthermore, our decision in Clark also turned on the fact that no conflict existed between the statute at issue and the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. See, also, Streetsboro Edn. Assn. v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 288, 291, 626 N.E.2d 110, 113 (“if a collective bargaining agreement makes no specification about a matter [i.e., if there is no conflict between a law and the agreement], then
{¶ 26} Here, because the collective bargaining agreement failed to specifically exclude the employees’ statutory rights, no clear conflict exists between the agreement and the statute. Effect can be given to both
{¶ 27} Moreover, we must construe the language of the parties’ agreement to avoid a “manifest absurdity.” Shifrin v. Forest City Ent., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 638, 597 N.E.2d 499, 501. The result reached herein is consistent with that duty. The parties could not have intended that the Board‘s general authority to abolish positions and lay off employees gave the Board blanket authority to transfer duties performed by public employees to private companies. If the Board had such overriding authority, the job security of nonteaching public school employees guaranteed by
{¶ 28} Accordingly, we hold that, in order to negate statutory rights of public employees, a collective bargaining agreement must use language with such specificity as to explicitly demonstrate that the intent of the parties was to preempt statutory rights. Because the parties’ collective bargaining agreement did not specifically permit the Board‘s actions herein, the individual appellants’ rights pursuant to
II
{¶ 29} The final issue that we must decide is whether appellants are entitled to the requested writ of mandamus. In order for a writ of mandamus to issue, it must be shown that there is a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that there is a clear legal duty upon respondent to perform the requested action, and that the relator has no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Natl. City Bank v. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 81, 84, 6 O.O.3d 288, 290, 369 N.E.2d 1200, 1202.
{¶ 30} Appellants had a clear legal right, pursuant to
{¶ 31} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, grant the requested writ of mandamus compelling the reinstatement of the individual appellants to public employment with the Board, and remand this matter to the court of appeals for a determination of an award of back pay and lost fringe benefits.
Judgment reversed, writ granted, and cause remanded.
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissent.
COOK, J., dissents.
COOK, J., dissenting.
{¶ 32} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.
{¶ 33} The majority holds that the appellants are entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to reinstate them as public employees of the state. The majority issues the writ based on the premise that the collective bargaining agreement herein did not evidence an intent to negate rights provided to employees under
{¶ 34} The appellants’ jobs were terminated, but the same jobs were subsequently outsourced. The collective bargaining agreement gave the Board the right to lay off employees. A layoff is “[t]he termination of employment at the employer‘s instigation; esp., the termination—either temporary or permanent—of a large number of employees at the same time.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 896. “Layoff” generally connotes a lack of work or deliberate reduction in work force. Webster‘s Third International Dictionary (1986) 1281.
{¶ 35} The Board believes that its actions in regard to appellants were “layoff[s]” as the term is used in the collective bargaining agreement. While I agree with the majority that a layoff may not contemplate terminating a position and immediately outsourcing the position, I believe the Board‘s actions against appellants were sufficiently within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement to be subject to arbitration.
{¶ 36} Public policy favors the arbitrability of labor disputes. Davidson v. Bucklew (1992), 90 Ohio App.3d 328, 331, 629 N.E.2d 456, 457-458. It is the court that determines whether a specific grievance is arbitrable. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am. (1986), 475 U.S. 643, 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418, 89 L.Ed.2d 648, 656. However, in deciding whether a contract creates a duty to arbitrate a certain grievance, “a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims.” Id. at 649, 106 S.Ct. at 1419, 89 L.Ed.2d at 656.
{¶ 37} In deciding whether the collective bargaining agreement creates a duty to arbitrate a certain grievance, the court must determine whether the claim is governed by the collective bargaining agreement. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co. (1960), 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1346, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403, 1407. A court should not deny an arbitration clause in a contract unless it may be said with positive assurance that the clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, with any doubts resolved in favor of arbitration. Gibbons-Grable Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co. (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 170, 173, 517 N.E.2d 559, 562. An arbitration clause in a contract gives rise to a presumption that the grievance is arbitrable unless expressly excluded or there exists “the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960), 363 U.S. 574, 585, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1354, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1419.
{¶ 38} Under this standard, I believe that arbitration should have resolved the issue of the scope of the Board‘s layoff authority provided in the collective
{¶ 39} In the context of employment contracts, where the dispute between labor and management arises from a collective bargaining agreement, the grievance and arbitration procedures provided therein constitute an adequate remedy at law to the exclusion of extraordinary relief in mandamus. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 449, 663 N.E.2d 639, 641, citing State ex rel. Johnson v. Cleveland Hts./Univ. Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 189, 192-193, 652 N.E.2d 750, 752; State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 34, 641 N.E.2d 188, 196.
{¶ 40} In addition to my dismay at the majority‘s failure to determine that this issue should have been resolved through arbitration, I am equally distressed at the depth of explicit detail that will now be required of drafters of collective bargaining agreements because of the majority‘s syllabus. I believe that the majority‘s mandate that collective bargaining must be extremely specific in order to bring an issue within its coverage will ultimately do the collective bargaining process a disservice. We should be encouraging the resolution of employment issues through the arbitration process. With this new, narrow standard, we have opened the door to litigation, and every matter not specifically itemized in a collective bargaining agreement will become an issue for the courts. I believe that the majority‘s holding will be as detrimental to the unions as to the employees when they each find themselves on the side appealing an issue that might be implied but was not specified sufficiently in the collective bargaining agreement. I do not believe that the law requires that we interpret collective bargaining agreements as narrowly as the majority dictates.
{¶ 41} Therefore, because I believe that the majority‘s syllabus will make collective bargaining agreements overly complex and technical, and because I believe that the majority‘s issuance of the writ of mandamus was improper because appellants had a remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way of arbitration, I respectfully dissent.
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.