Ohio Ass'n of Public School Employees v. Twin Valley Local School District Board of EducationOhio Ass'n of Public School Employees v. Twin Valley Local School District Board of Education
The issue presented for review is whether the provisions of
“(A) Newly hired regular nonteaching school employees, including regular hourly rate and per diem employees, shall enter into written contracts for their employment which shall be for a period of not more than one year. If such employees are rehired, their subsequent contract shall be for a period of two years.
“(B) After the termination of the two-year contract provided in division (A) of this section, if the contract of a nonteaching employee is renewed, the employee shall be continued in employment, and the salary provided in the contract may be increased but not reduced unless such reduction is a part of a uniform plan affecting the nonteaching employees of the entire district. ” (Emphasis added.)
“In all school districts wherein the provisions of Chapter 124. of the Revised Code do not apply, each board of education shall cause notice to be given annually not later than the first day of July to each nonteaching school employee, who holds a contract valid for the succeeding school year, as to the salary to be paid such school employee during each year. Such salary shall not be lower than the salary paid during the preceding school year unless such reduction is a part of a uniform plan affecting the nonteaching employees of
From similar facts, the court of appeals in the case at bar came to a conclusion diametrically opposed to the holding of the court of appeals in Balduff, supra. Relying exclusively on its prior decision in Taulbee v. Bd. of Edn. (May 13, 1981), No. 877, unreported, the court below concluded that the provisions of
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals in Taulbee sought to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “salary.” The court first resorted to the definition contained in Black’s Law Dictionary (5 Ed. 1979), which states: “A stated compensation paid periodically as by the year, month, or other fixed period, in contrast to wages which are normally based on an hourly rate.” The court reasoned that the accepted definition of “salary” in everyday business is that the term refers to payments for fixed periods of employment, whereas one employed on an hourly basis is assured of only a fixed rate per hour.
Next, the court examined various provisions of R.C. Chapter 3319. For instance, the court reviewed
The court concluded that the General Assembly adequately demonstrated its ability to distinguish between employees who are compensated hourly, and those employees whose contracts specify a stated salary. Since the General Assembly only specified “salaried” employees under
As in the case at bar, the plaintiffs in Balduff, supra, were regular nonteaching school employees who received hourly wage increases, but whose contract with the board of education remained silent as to a minimum number of hours to be worked. When the plaintiffs’ working hours were reduced, they earned less money than in the previous contractual year.
In contrast to the decision in Taulbee, the court of appeals in Balduff held that the provisions of
In Ohio, it is a settled principle of statutory construction that words used in a statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the legislative intent indicates otherwise. Lake County National Bank v. Kosydar (1973),
In Lake County National Bank, supra, at 192, we recognized at least two methods whereby a court may ascertain whether a word used within a statute carries a meaning other than its plain and ordinary meaning: “One is by the use of an explicit statutory definition of the word * * *.” None exists, however, in the instant case. “[T]he other is by ascertaining that an adherence to the plain and ordinary meaning of the word would defeat the legislative purpose in the enactment of the statute. In the latter case, ‘the strict letter of an act must * * * yield to its evident spirit and purpose * * Fleischmann Construction Co. v. United States (1926),
Additionally, this court has recognized that the cornerstone of statutory construction is legislative intention. As stated in State, ex rel. Francis, v. Sours (1944),
Finally, it is well-established that “ ‘[i]n ascertaining the legislative intent of a statute, “It is the duty of this court to give effect to the words used [in a statute], not to delete words used or to insert words not used. ” ’ ” Dougherty v. Torrence (1982),
The court of appeals below and the court in Balduff have digressed, somewhat, from the aforementioned rules of statutory construction. The judgment of the court below disregards the General Assembly’s intent when it was concluded that appellants’ contracts do not receive the protections afforded by
Specifically,
In view of the fact that the purpose of
The court of appeals in Balduff concluded that not only are the hourly wages of regular nonteaching school employees protected from nonuniform reductions but, so too are the number of hours previously worked by these employees. We are unable to agree with this conclusion as to do so would necessitate the insertion of words not used within the statute. Dougherty, supra. Moreover, nowhere can it be found that the subject statutory provisions extend assurances to appellants that they are to be employed for a specific number of hours from year to year.
We therefore conclude that the General Assembly’s intent when enacting
The record conclusively demonstrates that for the 1980-1981 school year, appellants’ hourly wages actually increased over those earned during the previous school year. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.