629 N.E.2d 456 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
Lead Opinion
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *330 This appeal is from a decision of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas which enjoined an arbitration panel from reconvening and further enjoined the panel from making a determination as to prejudgment interest.
Appellant, Hampton Bucklew, was treated by appellee, J. Philip Davidson, D.P.M., a podiatrist, to remove calluses and bunions from appellant's feet. Complications arose and appellant threatened to bring a malpractice action. Apparently prior to the surgery, the parties entered into an "Agreement to Resolve Future Malpractice Claim by Binding Arbitration." A panel was agreed upon; the matter was heard before the panel on January 24, 1991; and, on February 14, 1991, the arbitrators returned an award in favor of appellant in the amount of $80,000.
The award was subsequently satisfied by appellee. The award was never submitted to the court of common pleas for confirmation. Thereafter, appellant requested the arbitration panel to reconvene in order to determine the issue of prejudgment interest under R.C.
On May 30, 1991, the trial court filed its judgment entry which granted appellee's requested relief by enjoining the arbitration panel from reconvening or considering the issue of prejudgment interest. It is from this decision that appellant now appeals raising the following assignments of error:
"1. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss appellee's complaint and motion for reconsideration in view that the appellee failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the court lacked jurisdiction.
"2. The lower court erred in holding that the arbitration panel lacks the authority to consider the issue of prejudgment interest and thus erroneously interfered with the parties' contractual relationship."
In the first assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss appellee's complaint and motion for reconsideration because appellee failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We agree with appellant. *331
First, we think it is worth noting that this was an arbitration contract, as opposed to being mandated by statute. Thus, we believe it is particularly important that the parties' contractual commitment to arbitration should be honored.
Second, there is a very strong public policy argument favoring arbitration. Public policy favors and encourages arbitration, and "every reasonable intendment will be indulged to give effect to such proceedings and to favor the regularity and integrity of the arbitrator's acts." Brennan v. Brennan
(1955),
Clearly, seeking the intervention of the court as to whether an issue is arbitrable does not comport with the public policy favoring arbitration and removing such issues from the court.Reynoldsburg, supra.
Moreover, the language of this particular arbitration clause is very broad, very general. The arbitration clause in this case states:
"In the event of any dispute or controversy arising out of the diagnosis, treatment, or the care of the patient by the provider of medical services, the dispute or controversy shall be submitted to binding arbitration." (Emphasis added.)
Such a general clause essentially provides for unlimited arbitration of any and all disputes.
Further review of the contract indicates that the contract was prepared by appellee. Ohio law is clear that any ambiguity in a contract must be construed against the drafting party.Kelly v. Medical Life Ins. Co. (1987),
In the present case, appellee could have drafted the arbitration clause in a more limited manner but did not. Therefore, any ambiguity must be resolved in appellant's favor.
Moreover, injunctive relief, similar to a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition, should only be invoked when there is no adequate remedy at law. Leaseway Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. OhioDept. of Adm. Serv. (1988),
In the instant situation, any action taken by the arbitration panel would be reviewable by the common pleas court when either a vacation or confirmation was sought. Further, "[i]njunction which is summary and out of ordinary should never be granted, save and except in cases for prevention of great and irreparable injury or mischief, and injury must be so great as to be incapable of compensation in damages." Hassinger v. Kramer
(1927),
Jurisdiction for arbitration must come from one of two places: statutory provisions or common law.
Under R.C.
"The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." See State Farm Mut. Ins.Co. v. Blevins (1990),
A review of R.C. Chapter 2711 reveals no provision which gives a trial court authority to enjoin an arbitration proceeding. While R.C.
A review of the common law indicates that a trial court should not enjoin arbitrators from proceeding with an arbitration. White v. Mann (1897), 5 Ohio N.P. 376, 9 Ohio Dec. 407; Cincinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati S. Ry. (1892), 6 Ohio C.C. 247, 258-260, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 438, 443-444;
Even if the issue to be arbitrated is improper, the court should not interfere. Cincinnati, at 259, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. at 443. If the arbitrators proceed to adjudicate matters not covered by the arbitration agreement, under common law the award was void.
Although not directly addressing the issue, there is case law in which injunctive relief to enjoin arbitration was denied by the trial court and was upheld upon appeal for other reasons.Standard Roofing Co. v. John G. Johnson Sons Constr. Co.
(1977),
Thus, the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss appellee's complaint and motion for reconsideration in that the appellee failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The first assignment of error has merit.
In the second assignment of error, appellant contends that the arbitration panel lacked the authority to consider the issue of prejudgment interest and thus erroneously interfered with the parties' contractual relationship.
We do not find appellant's argument persuasive. We affirm the trial court's conclusion, but for altogether different reasoning.
In the present case, there is no judgment on which appellant can obtain prejudgment interest. There is an arbitration award which has been paid, but which has never been confirmed by the trial court.
R.C.
Other courts have held similarly. Griffith v. Buckeye Ins.Co. (Sept. 29, 1987), Franklin App. No. 86AP-1063, unreported, 1987 WL 17805; Barker v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co. (Apr. 4, 1991), Franklin App. No. 90AP-1406, unreported, 1991 WL 47418. On the other hand, there is some authority indicating that prejudgment interest on an arbitration award could be within the trial court's discretion. Davidson v. Higgins (Mar. 31, 1992), Mahoning App. No. 90 C.A. 207, unreported, 1992 WL 73590. We do not find this latter view persuasive.
The question then becomes whether a party with a satisfied arbitration award may have it confirmed by a trial court. Research in this area indicates a conflict in the law. The Eighth District Court of Appeals determined in Luby v. SafecoIns. Co. (Oct. 29, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52874, unreported, 1987 WL 19250, that a party may not avail herself of the civil proceedings to confirm an arbitrator's award once it has been satisfied. However, the Seventh District Court of Appeals inDavidson, supra, held that an arbitrator's award which has been satisfied was still subject to the trial court's confirmation and judgment thereon. *334
We find the result in Davidson preferable since there are legitimate prospective applications which would be better served by having a judgment entry reflecting a satisfied arbitration award. However, as R.C. Chapter 2711 is silent to this matter, the Ohio legislature may find this area of the law worthy of its further attention.
We believe that the trial court (but not the arbitration panel itself) does have the discretionary power pursuant to R.C.
As we previously noted, there is no such confirmation by the trial court in the present case. Therefore, prejudgment interest was not available. Thus, the second assignment is without merit.
Based on the analysis in the first assignment, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversedand cause remanded.
HARSHA, J., concurs in judgment only.
NADER, J., dissents.
WILLIAM H. HARSHA III, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment of the principal opinion. In Ohio it is the policy of the law to favor and encourage arbitration. Every reasonable intendment will be indulged to give effect to such proceedings and to favor the regularity and integrity of the arbitrator's acts. Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v.Findlay Edn. Assn (1990),
In light of the foregoing policy, Ohio courts have held that an arbitration clause in a contract should not be denied effect by a court unless it may be said with positive assurance that the clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that *335
covers the asserted dispute, with any doubts to be resolved in favor of arbitration. Gibbons-Grable Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co.
(1986),
Given the broad language in the arbitration contract here,i.e., "In the event of any dispute or controversy arising out of the diagnosis [or] treatment * * * the dispute * * * shall be submitted to binding arbitration," I believe the matter was subject to arbitration. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue of arbitrability.
Since our disposition of the first assignment renders the second assignment of error moot, it need not be addressed. See App.R. 12(C).
Dissenting Opinion
The lead opinion finds error in the denial of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. This holding is based upon the public policy favoring arbitration, the belief that the arbitration contract is ambiguous, and the existence of an adequate remedy at law.
Appellee filed an action for declaratory judgment. In conjunction, appellee prayed for injunctive relief preventing the arbitration panel from reconvening. Clearly, the declaration of the rights of the parties to an arbitration agreement sets forth a proper claim for relief under R.C. Chapter 2711.
The lead opinion cites the strong public policy favoring arbitration and finds that pursuing declaratory relief violates this public policy. R.C.
"* * * the court * * *, upon being satisfied that the issue * * * is referable to arbitration * * *, shall * * * stay the trial of the action until arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement * * *."
Accordingly, the public policy favoring arbitration is protected by R.C.
"In the event of any dispute or controversy arising out of the diagnosis, treatment, or the care of the patient by the provider of medical services, the dispute or controversy shall be submitted to binding arbitration."
The lead opinion finds that this language provides for essentially unlimited arbitration, and construes it against appellee, the maker of the arbitration agreement. *336
While the parties may contract for a determination of prejudgment interest through arbitration, there is no express authorization. In the absence of such an express authorization, R.C.
Springfield Local Assn. of Classroom Teachers v. SpringfieldLocal School Dist. Bd. of Ed. (1987),
However, Internatl. Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,Warehousemen Helpers of America, Local 20 v. Toledo (1988),
"It is unquestionably within the province of the court to decide whether a specific grievance is arbitrable. UnitedSteelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co. (1960),
Additionally, Vulcan-Cincinnati v. United Steelworkers ofAmerica (1960),
"In such case, in an action by the employee to enforce arbitration, the arbitrability of the dispute is a matter of law for the decision of the court, and not the arbitrator, where the agreement contains no express provision conferring such power upon the arbitrator, there is nothing in the agreement from which it could be implied, and the subject matter of the arbitration is definite." See Franklin Cty. Sheriff's Dept. v.Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991),
The proper forum to determine the arbitrability of prejudgment interest was the trial court, and the motion to dismiss was properly denied, as prejudgment interest was not referable to arbitration. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's action.
Prejudgment interest may not be granted upon an unconfirmed arbitration award, but the lead opinion also holds that an adequate remedy at law precludes injunctive relief. Instead, the arbitration panel should be allowed to consider the issue of prejudgment interest. If they erroneously grant prejudgment interest, then the award may be vacated under R.C.
The remedy is not an adequate one. American Fedn. of State,Cty. Mun. Emp., Ohio Council 8, Local 100, AFL-CIO v.Cleveland (1990),
"However, we find that appellee had no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. R.C.
State ex rel. Brown v. Canton (1980),
"In reaching this decision, we must analyze what constitutes an `adequate remedy.' This question was addressed in State, exrel. Paul Stutler, Inc., v. Yacobucci (1958),
Appellee must participate in an improper arbitration proceeding, share equally in its expense, R.C.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. *338