THE STATE EX REL. THE VILLAGE OF MOSCOW ET AL. v. CLERMONT COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS.
No. 2022-1003
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
September 8, 2022
Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3138
Submitted September 6, 2022
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Moscow v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3138.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3138
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Moscow v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3138.]
Elections—Prohibition and Mandamus—Writs sought to reverse board of elections’ certification of petition to surrender village corporate powers to the ballot—
IN PROHIBITION AND
Per Curiam.
I. INTRODUCTION
{¶ 1} This expedited election case involves a petition to surrender the corporate powers of the village of Moscow. Relators, the village and its mayor, Timothy D. Suter (collectively, “the protesters“), filed a protest to keep the petition off the November 2022 ballot. Respondent, the Clermont County Board of Elections (“the board“), denied the protest and certified the petition to the ballot. The protesters now seek a writ of prohibition reversing the board‘s certification and a writ of mandamus
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal background
{¶ 2}
Villages may surrender their corporate powers upon the petition to the legislative authority of the village, or, in the alternative, to the board of elections of the county in which the largest portion of the population of the village resides as provided in division (B)(1) of this section * * *.
(Emphasis added).
If the legislative authority of a village fails to act upon the petition within thirty days after receipt of the petition, the electors may present the petition to the board of elections to determine the validity and sufficiency of the signatures.
{¶ 3} Only one court has considered whether the current version of
{¶ 4} The Twelfth District denied the protester‘s request for a writ of mandamus ordering the board to remove the issue from the ballot, holding that the board “did not violate
{¶ 5} The Revised Code imposes a second filing requirement on petitioners: “In addition to filing the petition with the board of elections as provided in division (B)(1) of [
B. Factual background
{¶ 6} The village of Moscow is a municipal corporation located in Washington Township, Clermont County. On August 1, 2022, a petition to surrender the village‘s corporate powers was filed with the board of elections. The petition was not filed with the legislative authority of the village prior to its submission to the board; in fact, it has not been presented to the village legislature at any time. Nor was the petition filed with the Washington Township Board of Trustees at the same time that it was filed with the board.
{¶ 7} Suter is the mayor of the village. On August 12, Suter and the village filed a protest against the petition with the board. The protest letter raised two issues. First, it claimed that the petition was defective because it was not submitted to the village‘s legislative authority prior to its submission to the board, as allegedly required by
{¶ 8} On August 22, the board held a hearing on the protest, at which it heard sworn testimony and received evidence. The evidence established that the petition had not been submitted to the village legislature but that a copy of the petition had been filed with the township board of trustees on the morning of the hearing.
{¶ 9} The board concluded that it was bound by Pringle, 2019-Ohio-4528, which held that
{¶ 10} Members of the board gave various reasons for rejecting the protesters’ second argument. The chief reason seemed to be that
{¶ 11} At the close of the hearing, the board voted four to zero to deny the protest. Thereafter, the board held a special meeting and voted four to zero to certify the petition to the November ballot.
C. Procedural history
{¶ 12} The protesters commenced this original action for writs of prohibition and mandamus on August 12, 2022. The parties submitted evidence and merit briefs in accordance with the expedited election schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The prohibition standard of review
{¶ 13} Prohibition will lie to bar the placement of an issue on the ballot, so long as the election has not yet been held. Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 14. To obtain a writ of prohibition, the protestors must show that (1) the board of elections exercised quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unlawful, and (3) the protesters have no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. McCord v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 106 Ohio St.3d 346, 2005-Ohio-4758, 835 N.E.2d 336, ¶ 27. If all three elements are proved, then
{¶ 14} When reviewing the decision of a county board of elections, the standard is whether the board engaged in fraud or corruption, abused its discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions. State ex rel. Holwadel v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 144 Ohio St.3d 579, 2015-Ohio-5306, 45 N.E.3d 994, ¶ 29. There is no allegation that the board engaged in fraud or corruption. Instead, the protesters contend that the board clearly failed to follow the applicable legal provisions in placing the petition on the November ballot.
{¶ 15} That the first and third elements of the prohibition analysis are met here is not in dispute. “Quasi-judicial authority” is “the power to hear and determine controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling a judicial trial.” State ex rel. Wright v. Registrar, Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908 (1999). A board of elections exercises quasi-judicial authority when it decides a protest after a mandatory hearing that includes sworn testimony. State ex rel. Barney v. Union Cty. Bd. of Elections, 159 Ohio St.3d 50, 2019-Ohio-4277, 147 N.E.3d 595, ¶ 12.
B. The prohibition analysis
{¶ 16} In their first proposition of law, the protesters contend that
{¶ 17} Prior to 2017,
{¶ 18} The language is not ambiguous, and the board has not suggested an alternative construction of the statute. And when the meaning of a statute is unambiguous and definite, the statute must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary. Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 146 Ohio St.3d 281, 2016-Ohio-1567, 55 N.E.3d 1082, ¶ 9.
{¶ 20} Ultimately, Pringle was not based on an interpretation of the statute but on a policy decision by the Twelfth District that requiring petitioners to first go to the village legislature with the petition served no purpose. Pringle, 2019-Ohio-4528, at ¶ 6 (“we see no valid reason why petitions to surrender must first be filed with the legislative authority“). But it is not the role of the courts to question the wisdom of the General Assembly‘s policy decisions. State ex rel. Gilmore v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 160 Ohio St. 165, 169, 114 N.E.2d 821 (1953).
{¶ 21} We conclude that Pringle was wrongly decided and that
{¶ 22} The board argues that an extraordinary writ should not be issued in this case, because ”Pringle has not been overruled by this Court * * * [and therefore] the Clermont County Board of Elections was without authority to reject the Petition.” We do not fault the board for following Pringle, but we determine today that Pringle was wrongly decided, which compels the conclusion that the board acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.
{¶ 23} We grant a writ of prohibition reversing the board‘s certification of the surrender petition to the November ballot.
C. The failure to file the petition with the township
{¶ 24} In their original protest letter, the protesters objected to the fact that the surrender petition had not been filed with the board of township trustees, as required by
D. The mandamus claim
{¶ 25} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the protesters must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) they have a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the board has a clear legal duty to provide it, and (3) they do not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13. In this case, the mandamus analysis is identical to the prohibition analysis. Because we grant a writ of prohibition, the request for a writ of mandamus is moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 26} For the reasons stated above, we grant the request for a writ of prohibition
Writ of prohibition granted and writ of mandamus denied as moot.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
Strauss Troy Co., L.P.A., Emily Supinger, Matthew W. Fellerhoff, and Stephen E. Schilling, for relators.
Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian C. Shrive, Julia B. Carney, and Joseph T. Mooney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent.