State ex rel. Moscow v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of ElectionsState ex rel. Moscow v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections
I. INTRODUCTION
{¶ 1} This expedited election case involves a petition to surrender the corporate powers of the village of Moscow. Relators, the village and its mayor, Timothy D. Suter (collectively, “the protesters“), filed a protest to keep the petition off the November 2022 ballot. Respondent, the Clermont County Board of Elections (“the board“), denied the protest and certified the petition to the ballot. The protesters now seek a writ of prohibition reversing the board‘s certification and a writ of mandamus compelling the board to remove the measure from the ballot. We grant the writ of prohibition and deny the writ of mandamus as moot.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal background
{¶ 2}
Villages may surrender their corporate powers upon the petition to the legislative authority of the village, or, in the alternative, to the board of elections of the county in which the largest portion of the population of the village resides as provided in division (B)(1) of this section * * *.
(Emphasis added).
If the legislative authority of a village fails to act upon the petition within thirty days after receipt of the petition, the electors
may present the petition to the board of elections to determine the validity and sufficiency of the signatures.
{¶ 3} Only one court has considered whether the current version of
{¶ 4} The Twelfth District denied the protester‘s request for a writ of mandamus ordering the board to remove the issue from the ballot, holding that the board “did not violate
B. Factual background
{¶ 6} The village of Moscow is a municipal corporation located in Washington Township, Clermont County. On August 1, 2022, a petition to surrender the village‘s corporate powers was filed with the board of elections. The petition was not filed with the legislative authority of the village prior to its submission to the board; in fact, it has not been presented to the village legislature at any time. Nor was the petition filed with the Washington Township Board of Trustees at the same time that it was filed with the board.
{¶ 7} Suter is the mayor of the village. On August 12, Suter and the village filed a protest against the petition with the board. The protest letter raised two issues. First, it claimed that the petition was defective because it was not submitted to the village‘s legislative authority prior to its submission to the board, as allegedly required by
{¶ 8} On August 22, the board held a hearing on the protest, at which it heard sworn testimony and received evidence. The evidence established that the petition had not been submitted to the village legislature but that a copy of the petition had been filed with the township board of trustees on the morning of the hearing.
{¶ 9} The board concluded that it was bound by Pringle, 2019-Ohio-4528, which held that
{¶ 10} Members of the board gave various reasons for rejecting the protesters’ second argument. The chief reason seemed to be that
{¶ 11} At the close of the hearing, the board voted four to zero to deny the protest. Thereafter, the board held a special meeting and voted four to zero to certify the petition to the November ballot.
C. Procedural history
{¶ 12} The protesters commenced this original action for writs of prohibition and mandamus on August 12, 2022. The parties submitted evidence and merit briefs in accordance with the expedited election schedule in
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The prohibition standard of review
{¶ 13} Prohibition will lie to bar the placement of an issue on the ballot, so long as the election has not yet been held. Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 14. To obtain a writ of prohibition, the protestors must show that (1) the board of elections exercised quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unlawful, and (3) the protesters have no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. McCord v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 106 Ohio St.3d 346, 2005-Ohio-4758, 835 N.E.2d 336, ¶ 27. If all three elements are proved, then a writ of prohibition will issue. State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 122 Ohio St.3d 462, 2009-Ohio-3657, 912 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 40.
{¶ 15} That the first and third elements of the prohibition analysis are met here is not in dispute. “Quasi-judicial authority” is “the power to hear and determine controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling a judicial trial.” State ex rel. Wright v. Registrar, Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908 (1999). A board of elections exercises quasi-judicial authority when it decides a protest after a mandatory hearing that includes sworn testimony. State ex rel. Barney v. Union Cty. Bd. of Elections, 159 Ohio St.3d 50, 2019-Ohio-4277, 147 N.E.3d 595, ¶ 12.
B. The prohibition analysis
{¶ 16} In their first proposition of law, the protesters contend that
{¶ 17} Prior to 2017,
{¶ 18} The language is not ambiguous, and the board has not suggested an alternative construction of the statute. And when the meaning of a statute is unambiguous and definite, the statute must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary. Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 146 Ohio St.3d 281, 2016-Ohio-1567, 55 N.E.3d 1082, ¶ 9.
{¶ 19} The Twelfth District ignored the statutory language, and in doing so, it created a practical problem. After the “presentation” of a surrender petition, the legislative authority of a village is prohibited from incurring any new liabilities until the petition is finally disposed of, either through an election or through litigation.
{¶ 20} Ultimately, Pringle was not based on an interpretation of the statute but on a policy decision by the Twelfth District that requiring petitioners to first go
{¶ 21} We conclude that Pringle was wrongly decided and that
{¶ 22} The board argues that an extraordinary writ should not be issued in this case, because ”Pringle has not been overruled by this Court * * * [and therefore] the Clermont County Board of Elections was without authority to reject the Petition.” We do not fault the board for following Pringle, but we determine today that Pringle was wrongly decided, which compels the conclusion that the board acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.
{¶ 23} We grant a writ of prohibition reversing the board‘s certification of the surrender petition to the November ballot.
C. The failure to file the petition with the township
{¶ 24} In their original protest letter, the protesters objected to the fact that the surrender petition had not been filed with the board of township trustees, as required by
D. The mandamus claim
{¶ 25} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the protesters must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) they have a clear legal right to the
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 26} For the reasons stated above, we grant the request for a writ of prohibition and deny the request for a writ of mandamus as moot.
Writ of prohibition granted and writ of mandamus denied as moot.
O‘Connor, C.J., and Kennedy, Fischer, DeWine, Donnelly, Stewart, and Brunner, JJ., concur.