STOLZ v. J & B STEEL ERECTORS, INC., ET AL.
No. 2015-0628
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted December 2, 2015-Decided April 19, 2016.
2016-Ohio-1567
146 Ohio St.3d 281
{¶ 38} Because this court has held that the recreational-user statute,
LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
Arthur C. Graves Co., L.P.A., and Arthur C. Graves, for appellee.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Eric A. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Giorgianni Law, L.L.C., and Paul Giorgianni, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association for Justice.
{¶ 1} This case is before us on the certification of a state-law question by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division. The federal court asks that we determine whether Ohio‘s workers’ compensation laws, specifically
{¶ 2} The unambiguous language of
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
{¶ 3} The federal court provided the following facts and allegations from which the question of law arises.
{¶ 4} The plaintiff in the underlying action, Daniel Stolz, worked as a concrete finisher for Jostin Construction, Inc. (“Jostin“) at the Horseshoe Casino construction project in Cincinnati (“Casino Project“). Messer Construction Company (“Messer“) was the general contractor for the Casino Project, and Jostin was a subcontractor.
{¶ 5} An accident on the job site injured Stolz, who brought negligence claims against Messer and against subcontractors J & B Steel Erectors (“J & B Steel“), Terracon Consultants, Inc. (“Terracon“), Pendleton Construction Group, L.L.C. (“Pendleton“), D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc. (“D.A.G.“), and TriVersity Construction Co., L.L.C. (“TriVersity“). Stolz claims each of the defendants had responsibilities related to the construction project.
{¶ 6} Prior to the accident, Messer had applied for and obtained authority from the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC“) to act as the self-insuring employer on the project under
{¶ 7} Messer, J & B Steel, D.A.G., and TriVersity1 moved for summary judgment on the basis that they were immune from Stolz‘s negligence claims under Ohio‘s workers’ compensation laws, specifically
THE QUESTION OF STATE LAW
{¶ 8} Following the summary-judgment decision, J & B Steel, D.A.G., and TriVersity moved the federal court to certify a question of state law to this court. The federal court granted the motion and certified the following question to this court:
Whether Ohio Rev.Code §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74 provide immunity to subcontractors enrolled in a Workers’ Compensation self-insurance plan from tort claims made by employees of [other] enrolled subcontractors injured while working on the self-insured project.
(Brackets sic.) We accepted the question, 142 Ohio St.3d 1515, 2015-Ohio-2341, 33 N.E.3d 64, and granted Messer‘s motion to be designated as a petitioner alongside the three petitioning subcontractors, 143 Ohio St.3d 1423, 2015-Ohio-3021, 34 N.E.3d 935.
ANALYSIS
Applicable canons of statutory construction
{¶ 9} When a court interprets the meaning of a statute, “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage,”
Ohio‘s statutory scheme for workers’ compensation
{¶ 10} Ohio‘s workers’ compensation scheme is codified in
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} Ohio‘s workers’ compensation laws contain a special carve-out for “self-insuring employers,” who do not pay into the state insurance fund.
{¶ 13} At issue in this case is a specific class of self-insuring employers recognized in the workers’ compensation scheme: those involved in a construction project that is “scheduled for completion within six years after the date the project begins” and has total estimated costs in excess of $100 million.
{¶ 14} A subcontractor who enrolls in the contractor‘s self-insurance program does not pay workers’ compensation premiums to the state for the payroll that it reports for work performed at the construction site by covered employees.
Application of R.C. Chapter 4123 to the certified question
{¶ 15} The parties agree that a general contractor that is a self-insuring employer on the project receives immunity from suits by its own employees as well as the employees of enrolled subcontractors arising from injuries or death occurring in the course of work on the project. It is also undisputed that the subcontractor who actually employs a worker who is injured or killed on the job is protected from that worker‘s claims. At issue here is whether an enrolled subcontractor is subject to claims by an employee of a different enrolled subcontractor working on the same self-insured construction project.
{¶ 16} In support of his argument that enrolled subcontractors are not immune from suits by other enrolled subcontractors’ employees on the project, Stolz relies on the placement of the apostrophes in the phrase “contractor‘s or subcontractor‘s” in the following portion of
The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor‘s or subcontractor‘s employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project.
(Emphasis added). Stolz argues that because the italicized phrase employs singular possessive nouns, each subcontractor is protected only from claims brought by its own employees.
{¶ 17} Petitioners contend that all subcontractors enrolled in the construction project‘s self-insurance plan are immune from suit by any covered employee. They rely on a different portion of the same paragraph that states, “[C]ontractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter * * *.” Id. Petitioners argue that this statutory language does not explicitly limit immunity to the employer-subcontractor and the self-insuring general contractor. Instead, they assert, it offers expansive protection against claims from the employee of any enrolled subcontractor against any other enrolled subcontractor. We find that
{¶ 18} Amid the complex statutory framework for workers’ compensation, the General Assembly has created a legal fiction in which the contractor who is the “self-insuring employer” is the legal employer, for workers’ compensation purposes, of all employees of enrolled subcontractors who are engaged in work at the construction site.
{¶ 19}
A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer * * *.
(Emphasis added.) It is with this language that the General Assembly established the legal fiction that the self-insuring employer is the employer of all covered employees, including employees of enrolled subcontractors, for purposes of workers’ compensation. That fiction is reiterated later in
{¶ 20} When
{¶ 21} It is also through this legal fiction that the General Assembly gives effect to the provision in the law that “[t]he contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter.” As described above,
{¶ 22} Ohio law also limits recovery through tort law by employees or their families for workplace injury or death from any enrolled subcontractor on the project, to the same extent that recovery is limited by workers’ compensation law. This is true because under the law an employee “who is injured as a result of a co-employee‘s negligent acts, who applied for benefits under Ohio‘s workers’ compensation statutes, and whose injury is found to be compensable thereunder is precluded from pursuing any additional common-law or statutory remedy against such co-employee.” Kaiser v. Strall, 5 Ohio St.3d 91, 449 N.E.2d 1 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. See also
Stolz‘s Argument
{¶ 23} In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the language on which Stolz focuses his argument:
The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor‘s or subcontractor‘s employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project.
{¶ 25} Because our interpretation is based on the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, we do not delve into the legislative history of the pertinent provisions. Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus (“An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted“).
{¶ 26} Nor may we reach Stolz‘s policy argument that the social bargain of workers’ compensation begins to break down when a construction project is self-insured. Although we recognize that it has some merit, that argument must be directed to the General Assembly rather than to this court.
CONCLUSION
{¶ 27} We conclude that
So answered.
O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and O‘NEILL, JJ., concur.
FRENCH, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by PFEIFER, J.
FRENCH, J., dissenting.
{¶ 28} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I agree that if the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, we must apply it, and we need not interpret it further. State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School
{¶ 29} The sixth paragraph of
A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer, provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section. No employee of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division shall be considered the employee of the self-insuring employer listed in that certificate for any purposes other than this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code. Nothing in this division gives a self-insuring employer authority to control the means, manner, or method of employment of the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 30}
{¶ 31} The next paragraph—the one the parties primarily contest—extends the protections of
The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor‘s or subcontractor‘s employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 32} This provision is necessary because the enrolled contractors and subcontractors do not actually pay workers’ compensation premiums for their employees on the project. But the contractors’ and subcontractors’ employees remain employees of the contractor and subcontractor employers—even for workers’ compensation purposes—because the contractors and subcontractors retain “the right to control the manner or means of performing the work.” Daniels v. MacGregor Co., 2 Ohio St.2d 89, 206 N.E.2d 554 (1965), syllabus;
{¶ 33} The next paragraph limits the self-insuring employer‘s workers’ compensation responsibility to those employees who actually work on a particular project. It begins:
The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division shall identify in their payroll records the employees who are considered the employees of the self-insuring employer listed in that certificate for purposes of this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code, and the amount that those employees earned for employment on the construction project that is the subject of that certificate.
{¶ 34} This paragraph provides the mechanism that limits the self-insuring employer‘s responsibility for administering and paying workers’ compensation
{¶ 35} The next and, for our purposes, final paragraph of
Nothing in this division shall be construed as altering the rights of employees under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code as those rights existed prior to September 17, 1996. Nothing in this division shall be construed as altering the rights devolved under sections 2305.31 and 4123.82 of the Revised Code as those rights existed prior to September 17, 1996.
{¶ 36} By its plain language, this provision preserves an injured employee‘s rights as they existed prior to September 17, 1996—the effective date of Sub.H.B. No. 245, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2955, which first introduced provisions substantially similar to those now contained in
{¶ 37} In short, based on a comprehensive reading of the relevant provisions, I disagree with the majority‘s ultimate holding that
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Goodson & Co. and Brett C. Goodson, for respondent.
Kohnen & Patton, L.L.P., and Colleen M. Blandford, for petitioner J & B Steel Erectors, Inc.
Patsfall, Yeager & Pflum, L.L.C., Susan M. Falyer, Stephen M. Yeager, and Stephen J. Patsfall, for petitioners D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc., and TriVersity Construction Co., L.L.C.
Green & Green, Jane M. Lynch, and Jared A. Wagner, for petitioner Messer Construction Co.
