THE STATE EX REL. DUNN ET AL. v. PLAIN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION.
No. 2019-1723
Supreme Court of Ohio
January 9, 2020
2020-Ohio-40
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-40
THE STATE EX REL. DUNN ET AL. v. PLAIN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Dunn v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-40.]
Mandamus—Elections—Writ of mandamus sought to compel local school board to forward petition under
(No. 2019-1723—Submitted January 7, 2020—Decided January 9, 2020.)
IN MANDAMUS.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relators, nine residents of the village of Hills and Dales,1 seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, the Plain Local
Background
{¶ 2}
{¶ 3} On October 29, 2019, a petition was delivered to the Plain Local school board proposing the transfer of the village‘s territory from Plain Local School District to Jackson Local School District beginning in the 2020-2021 school year. The petition sought to have the proposal placed on the March 17, 2020 primary-election ballot. Under
{¶ 4} At a meeting on November 20, 2019, the Plain Local school board adopted a resolution tabling the petition. The resolution explained that the Plain Local school board had filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the
{¶ 5} On December 3, the village filed an original action in this court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Plain Local school board to perform its duties under
Laches analysis
{¶ 6} The Plain Local school board argues that relators’ claim is barred under the doctrine of laches. We have applied laches in elections cases, which require relators to exhibit “extreme diligence and promptness.” State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 113, 712 N.E.2d 696 (1999). “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.” State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277 (1995).
{¶ 7} We need not decide whether relators unreasonably delayed in filing this action because the Plain Local school board has not established the fourth element of laches—prejudice to the opposing party. The Plain Local school board argues that it has been prejudiced because relators’ delay caused this case to be expedited, but even if relators had filed this action on November 21—the day after the Plain Local school board‘s resolution—it still would have been necessary to expedite this matter so that it could be decided before the December 18 deadline. Because the Plain Local school board has not shown that it has been harmed, laches does not apply in this case.
Mandamus analysis
{¶ 8} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the Plain Local school board to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. Given that relators seek to have their proposal placed on the March 17 primary-election ballot, they lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 27. Therefore, the dispositive questions are whether relators have established a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of the Plain Local school board to provide it.
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} In Lavelle, a school board had satisfied its initial duty to send a petition to a board of elections to check the sufficiency of signatures, but upon receiving the board of elections’ certification, the school board refused to certify the proposal back to the board of elections for placement on the ballot because the school board believed that the petition was not valid. Id. at 25. We held that the governing statute—which provided that the school board “shall promptly certify the proposal to the board of elections“—established a duty on the part of the school board. Id. at 26- 27. We issued a writ of mandamus because “[n]o discretion [was] placed in the board of education.” Id. at 27.
{¶ 11} We reached a similar conclusion when interpreting a prior version of
{¶ 12} Again,
{¶ 13} Once the Plain Local school board received relators’ petition, it was authorized only to examine whether it appeared to be a transfer petition under
{¶ 14} Relators’ use of Form No. 6-I does make some parts of the petition puzzling. For instance, it is labeled as an “initiative petition” and is addressed “[t]o
{¶ 15} But the Plain Local school board also argues that relators have no clear legal right to the relief they seek because relators failed to strictly comply with applicable election laws and because
{¶ 16} In addition, the Plain Local school board argues that it “has only tabled the petition pending resolution of the Federal Lawsuit” and that “it has no clear duty to facilitate Relators’ desire to have the proposal be considered in the March 2020 election.” In short, the Plain Local school board suggests that it may delay
{¶ 17} Finally, the Plain Local school board argues that even if relators are otherwise entitled to a writ of mandamus, relief still is not warranted here because, it says, the board of elections ultimately will be required to keep the transfer proposal off the March 2020 ballot because the December 18 deadline has passed and the petition itself is invalid. We reject this argument because the issues raised by the Plain Local school board are not justiciable in this case.
{¶ 18} “To be justiciable, a claim must be ripe for review, and a claim is not ripe ‘if it rests on contingent events that may never occur at all.‘” State ex rel. Quinn v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 152 Ohio St.3d 568, 2018-Ohio-966, 99 N.E.3d 362, ¶ 37, quoting State ex rel. Jones v. Husted, 149 Ohio St.3d 110, 2016-Ohio-5752, 73 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 21. In Quinn, we held that an issue was not ripe because the Secretary of State had not yet issued a tie-breaking vote on a protest. Id.; see also
{¶ 19} We therefore grant a writ of mandamus on the sole issue that is ripe for our determination and order the Plain Local school board to cause the Stark County Board of Elections to check the sufficiency of the signatures on the petition.
Writ granted.
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Scott M. Zurakowski, Owen J. Rarric, Joseph J. Pasquarella, and Amanda M. Connelly, for relators.
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Amanda Martinsek, William D. Edwards, Daniela Paez, Trevor J. Hardy, Rex A. Littrell, and Rachael Rodman, for respondent.