THE STATE EX REL. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, APPELLANT, v. PIKE COUNTY GENERAL HEALTH DISTRICT ET AL.; PIKE COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER AND CORONER, APPELLEE.
No. 2017-0431
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
September 19, 2018
2018-Ohio-3721
[Until this оpinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike Cty. Gen. Health Dist., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3721.]
NOTICE
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SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3721
[Until this opiniоn appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike Cty. Gen. Health Dist., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3721.]
Mandamus—Coroner‘s records—statute,
(Submitted February 27, 2018—Decided September 19, 2018.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Pike County, No. 16CA873, 2017-Ohio-1084.
{¶ 1} The Cincinnati Enquirer appeals the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals denying its request for a writ of mandamus and requests this court to schedule oral argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the motion for oral argument and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
{¶ 2} This case arises out of the murders of eight members of the Rhoden and Gilley families in Pike County in April 2016. On May 16, 2016, Kevin Grasha, a Cincinnati Enquirer reporter, contacted the Pike County General Health District, asking to view the preliminary autopsy and investigative notes and findings relating to the homicides of Christopher Rhoden Sr., Christopher Rhoden Jr., Dana Rhoden, Clarence Rhoden, Hanna Rhoden, Hannah Gilley, Kenneth Rhoden, and Gary Rhoden. Grasha made his request pursuant to
{¶ 3} On May 25, 2016, the Pike County prosecuting attorney, in his role as counsel for the Pike County General Health District and appellee, Pike County‘s medical examiner and coroner (“coroner“), denied the request to view thе records.
{¶ 4} During further exchanges, counsel for the Enquirer invoked
{¶ 5} Naming the health district and coroner as respondents, in July, the Enquirer filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus asking the Fourth District Court of Appeals to order the respondents to make the records availablе pursuant to
{¶ 6} In September 2016, the coroner released heavily redacted versions of the preliminary autopsy reports to the public, calling the reports “‘confidential law enforcement investigatory records’ under
{¶ 7} On March 17, 2017, the court of appeals denied the Enquirer‘s request for a writ of mandamus. 4th Dist. Pike No. 16CA873, 2017-Ohio-1084. The court of appeals first held that no writ could be issued against the Pike County General Health District, as
{¶ 8} The Enquirer appealed and filed an unopposed motion for oral argument.
The motion for oral argument
{¶ 9} Oral argument in appeals as of right is discretionary. S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A). Whеn deciding whether to hear oral argument, we consider whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among the courts of appeals. State ex rel. BF Goodrich Co., Specialty Chems. Div. v. Indus. Comm., 148 Ohio St.3d 212, 2016-Ohio-7988, 69 N.E.3d 728, ¶ 23. This case does involve a matter of great public importance: whether journalists may review, and presumably report on, preliminary autopsy reports in open homicide cases. But the remaining factors аre not present: the case presents no constitutional question or division among the intermediate
{¶ 10} We therefore deny the request for oral argument.
Legal analysis
{¶ 11} The Enquirer seeks to review certain documents in the custody of the coroner‘s office. The records of a county coroner‘s office are governed by
{¶ 12} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the Enquirer must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the coroner to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Love v. O‘Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3. Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the Ohio Public Records Act,
{¶ 13} The coroner‘s-records statute states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the records of the coroner who has jurisdiction over the case, including, but not limited to, the detailed descriptions of the observations written during the progress of an autopsy and the conclusions drawn from those observations filed in the office of the coroner * * *, made personally by the coroner or by anyone acting under the coroner‘s direction or supervision, are public records.
{¶ 14} However, the statute expressly exempts certain categories of documents from the definition of public rеcords.
Except as provided in division (D) or (E) of this section, the following records in a coroner‘s office are not public records:
(a) Preliminary autopsy and investigative notes and findings made by the coroner or by anyone acting under the coroner‘s direction or supervision;
* * *
(e) Records of a deceased individual that are confidential law enforcement investigatory records as defined in section 149.43 of the Revised Code.
A journalist may submit to the coroner a written request to view preliminary autopsy and investigativе notes and findings, suicide notes, or photographs of the decedent made by the coroner or by anyone acting under the coroner‘s discretion or supervision. * * * If a journalist submits a written request to the coroner to view the records described in this division, the coroner shall grant the journalist‘s request. The journalist shall not copy the preliminary autopsy and investigative notes and findings, suicide notes, or photographs of the decedent.
The Enquirer contends that the plain language of
{¶ 15} The court of appeals disagreed. That court began by interpreting the statutory language to conclude that “records about a deceased individual that are confidential law enforcement investigatory records are not public records.” 2017-Ohio-1084 at ¶ 46. The Enquirer does not dispute this proposition, and indeed we confirmed this holding in State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike Cty. Coroner‘s Office, 153 Ohio St.3d 63, 2017-Ohio-8988, 101 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 44. The question in the case is not whether the preliminary autopsy reports are public records (they are not), but whether journalists are entitled to see them nonetheless.
{¶ 16} In declining to issue the writ, the court of appeals observed that
(a) Preliminary autopsy and investigative notes and findings made by the coroner or by anyone acting under the coroner‘s direction or supervision;
(b) Photographs of a decedent made by the coroner or by anyone acting under the coronеr‘s direction or supervision;
(c) Suicide notes;
(d) Medical and psychiatric records provided to the coroner, a deputy coroner, or a representative of the coroner or a deputy coroner * * *;
(e) Records of a deceased individual that are confidential law enforcement investigatory records as defined in section 149.43 of the Revised Code.
(f) Laboratory reports generated from the analysis of physical evidence by the coroner‘s laboratory that is discoverable under Criminal Rule 16.
{¶ 17} The court next noted that the specific language of the journalist privilege,
{¶ 18} The court bolstered its conclusion by examining two other provisions of the coroner‘s statute that permit designated persons to obtain nonpublic coroner records. The coroner is required, upon request, to provide “a copy of the full and complete records of the coroner” to the next of kin of the decedent,
{¶ 19} The court of appeals examined the specific redacted materials sought by the Enquirer and found them to contain confidential law-enforcement records. It then interpreted
{¶ 20} In our judgment, the court of appeals’ analysis is flawed. When construing the language of a statute, a court begins by examining the intent of the General Assembly. State ex rel. Repeal the Lorain Cty. Permissive Sales Tax Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 151 Ohio St.3d 247, 2017-Ohio-7648, 87 N.E.3d 1234, ¶ 14. The intent of the General Assembly “is primarily determined from the language of the statute itself.” Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676 (1973). And when a statute is unambiguous, the court must apply it as written. State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 151 Ohio St.3d 92, 2017-Ohio-7577, 86 N.E.3d 294, ¶ 19.
{¶ 21} The language of
{¶ 22} The court of appeals disregarded the рlain language of the statute and decided instead to rely upon a canon of statutory construction. However, when the words of a statute are unambiguous, a court has “no cause to apply the rules of statutory construction.” Clay, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, at ¶ 16-17 (declining to interpret an unambiguous statute by applying the in pari materia rule of statutory construction); accord Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc., 142 Ohio St.2d 236, 2014-Ohio-5511, 29 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 22-23. This court has long held that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius “is an aid in interpreting ambiguous statutes” and should not be applied to defeat legislative intent when there is no ambiguity. (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 173 Ohio St. 203, 209, 181 N.E.2d 31 (1962).
{¶ 23} Alternatively, the coroner contends that the documents at issue are subject to the terms of both the coroner‘s statute and the Public Records Act and
{¶ 24} Based on the plain language of
Judgment reversed and writ granted.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, FISCHER, and DEGENARO, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only.
FRENCH and DEWINE, JJ., not participating.
Graydon Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., John C. Greiner, and Darren W. Ford, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Sarah E. Pierce, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.