THE STATE EX REL. BOHLEN ET AL. v. HALLIDAY, JUDGE.
No. 2020-1245
Supreme Court of Ohio
January 27, 2021
Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-194
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-194.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-194
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-194.]
Prohibition—Compensation trial in eminent-domain proceeding cannot commence during pendency of property owner‘s
(No. 2020-1245—Submitted January 12, 2021—Decided January 27, 2021.)
IN PROHIBITION.
{¶ 1} Relators, Ronald and Barbara Bohlen, Michael and Misty Burns, Ryan and Denay May, and Jeffrey and Holly Dexter, own property over which Ohio Power Company (“Ohio Power“) seeks to take easements by eminent domain. Respondent, Washington County Court of Common Pleas Judge John M. Halliday, ruled that Ohio Power‘s takings were necessary for a public use. Relators timely appealed that decision to the Fourth District Court of Appeals under
I. Overview of Ohio‘s Eminent-Domain Procedure
{¶ 2} After an appropriating agency files a petition to take property by eminent domain, the property owner may assert specific denials to, among other things, the necessity of the appropriation.
{¶ 3} If the court rules in favor of the appropriating agency, then the case proceeds to a second phase, at which the amount of compensation owed to the property owner is determined in a jury trial.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 4} On January 14, 2020, Ohio Power filed complaints for appropriation and condemnation of easements against relators in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas. Ohio Power seeks the easements for the installation and construction of a high-voltage transmission line. Relators denied the necessity of the appropriations under
{¶ 5} Judge Halliday consolidated the cases for a hearing on the necessity of the appropriations, which was held on August 10, 2020. On September 2, he determined that Ohio Power was entitled to an “irrebuttable presumption of the necessity for the appropriation” under
{¶ 6} Relators appealed Judge Halliday‘s necessity determination to the Fourth District under
III. Procedural Motions
A. Motions for Leave to File Amicus Briefs
{¶ 7} Amici curiae, Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, Inc., Buckeye Power, Inc., and Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., seek leave to file amicus briefs instanter. An amicus curiae may participate with leave of court during the motion-to-dismiss stage of an extraordinary-writ proceeding filed in this court. See, e.g., State ex rel. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. O‘Diam, 156 Ohio St.3d 458, 2019-Ohio-1676, 129 N.E.3d 393, ¶ 8. As in O‘Diam, the amici curiae in this case have filed procedurally proper and unopposed motions for leave to file their amicus briefs. We therefore grant the motions.
B. Ohio Power‘s Motion to Intervene as a Respondent
{¶ 8} Ohio Power has moved to intervene as of right in this action under
{¶ 9} In this case, Ohio Power‘s motion to intervene is timely, as it was filed just ten days after relators filed their complaint. And because this action, if successful, would prevent Ohio Power from proceeding with the compensation phase of the appropriation proceedings, it has an interest that could be impaired as a result of this case. Finally, although Judge Halliday and Ohio Power both oppose relators’ complaint, Judge Halliday, as the judge in the underlying matter, must remain impartial, which means that his interest cannot be said to fully align with Ohio Power‘s interest. We therefore grant Ohio Power‘s motion to intervene under
C. Ohio Power‘s Motion for Leave to File Notice of Relators’ Second Appeal
{¶ 10} Ohio Power has filed a motion for leave to file notice of relators’ second appeal to the Fourth District, in which relators appeal Judge Halliday‘s order setting the compensation trial for March 2, 2021. We deny Ohio Power‘s motion.
{¶ 11} The issue to be decided in this prohibition action is whether a trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed with a compensation trial in an eminent-domain case when the landowners have appealed from a necessity determination under
IV. Writ of Prohibition
{¶ 12} Judge Halliday has filed a motion to dismiss relators’ complaint under
{¶ 13} To obtain a writ of prohibition, relators must show that (1) Judge Halliday is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) they lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals for Sixth Appellate Dist., 130 Ohio St.3d 326, 2011-Ohio-5456, 958 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 11. But if jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, relators need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶ 14} There is no dispute that Judge Halliday intends to exercise judicial power by proceeding with a compensation trial on March 2, 2021. The dispute is over whether he lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the trial while relators’ appeal from the necessity ruling under
A. “Subject to” Language in R.C. 163.09(B)(2)
{¶ 15}
Subject to the irrebuttable presumption in division (B)(1)(c) of this section, only the judge may determine the necessity of the appropriation. If, as to any or all of the property or other interests sought to be appropriated, the court determines the matters in favor of the agency, the court shall set a time for the assessment of compensation by the jury not less than sixty days from the date of the journalization of [the trial court‘s] determination, subject to the right of the parties to request mediation under section
163.051 of the Revised Code and the right of the owner to an immediate appeal under division (B)(3) of this section.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 16} “When analyzing statutory provisions, our paramount concern is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the General Assembly.” State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236, 28 N.E.3d 1267, ¶ 7. In ascertaining legislative intent, we start with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. State v. Mohamed, 151 Ohio St.3d 320, 2017-Ohio-7468, 88 N.E.3d 935, ¶ 13. The phrase “subject to” has the plain and ordinary meaning of “contingent or conditional upon.” In re S.N.V., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-432, 2009-Ohio-4219, ¶ 7; see also Purdin v. Hitchcock, 4th Dist. Adams No. CA 531, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 505, *10 (Jan. 21, 1993), citing Webster‘s New World Dictionary 1333 (3d Ed.1988). Thus, the trial court‘s duty to proceed with the compensation trial is “contingent or conditional upon” the landowner‘s right to take an immediate appeal allowed by
{¶ 17} The natural meaning of
{¶ 18} Judge Halliday argues that the “subject to” language in
{¶ 19} Judge Halliday also cites Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pope, 54 Ohio St.2d 12, 374 N.E.2d 406 (1978), in which we held that a trial court‘s order in favor of an appropriating agency on the necessity issue is reviewable only after the trial court has disposed of the entire case. Id. at syllabus. But Pope involved an earlier version of
{¶ 20} Ohio Power‘s statutory-interpretation arguments are likewise unpersuasive. In arguing that the “subject to” language in
Subject to sections 163.07 and 163.09 of the Revised Code, any party may prosecute appeals as in other civil actions from the judgment of the court.
The owner may request, and the court may grant, a stay on appeal, provided that the owner posts a supersedeas bond in an amount the court determines.
{¶ 21} Ohio Power argues that this statute “leaves to the trial court‘s discretion” whether to stay further proceedings after a landowner appeals a necessity determination under
{¶ 22} This understanding of
{¶ 23} Ohio Power also contends that the compensation trial must be permitted to go forward because of the public policy to “advance public projects through litigation with all possible speed.” Ohio Power argues that if this court holds that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed while the landowner‘s
B. A Compensation Trial During the Pendency of an R.C. 163.09(B)(3) Appeal Is Inconsistent with the Court of Appeals’ Jurisdiction
{¶ 25} Our interpretation of the “subject to” language in
{¶ 26} Judge Halliday lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the compensation trial because the issues to be adjudicated there are currently within the Fourth District‘s appellate jurisdiction. Because relators have appealed the necessity of the takings, the scope of the property rights that must be valued at a compensation trial is squarely before the Fourth District. Indeed, should the Fourth District reverse or modify Judge Halliday‘s judgment, the amount of compensation would be based on the scope of the takings as determined by the Fourth District. The trial court‘s proceeding with a compensation trial while relators’ appeal is pending is therefore inconsistent with the Fourth District‘s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm Judge Halliday‘s judgment. See Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow at ¶ 6 and 18 (trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed with trial on claims affected by a defendant‘s appeal of a ruling denying leave to raise a political-subdivision-immunity defense).
{¶ 27} Because common-law principles and
V. Conclusion
{¶ 28} This case presents a pure question of law on undisputed facts, and it appears beyond doubt that relators are entitled to their requested extraordinary relief in prohibition. In such a case, a peremptory writ will issue. Bates, 130 Ohio St.3d 326, 2011-Ohio-5456, 958 N.E.2d 162, at ¶ 10; see also State ex rel. Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 41, 2010-Ohio-2450, 930 N.E.2d 299, ¶ 15, 25. We therefore grant a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Halliday from proceeding with the compensation trial during the pendency of relators’
Writ granted.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Joseph R. Miller, Thomas H. Fusonie, John M. Kuhl, and Daniel E. Shuey, for relators.
Nicole T. Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Ryan P. Sherman, Christopher J. Baronzzi, Jason T. Gerken, Molly S. Crabtree, and Syed Ahmadul Huda, for intervening respondent.
Chad A. Endsley, Leah F. Curtis, and Amy Milam, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, Inc.
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., and Stephanie M. Chmiel; and Kurt Helfrich and Lija Kaleps-Clark, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae Buckeye Power, Inc.
McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., Adam C. Smith, Matthew R. Rechner, and Richard W. Cline, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.