State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2025-OHIO-5094
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5094.]
Mandamus—Appropriation proceedings—Under
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 112111, 2023-Ohio-3871.
DEWINE, J.
{¶ 1} The
{¶ 2} Susan Boggs and Fouad Rachid live in a home owned by Fouad, Inc. (We refer to the three parties collectively as “Boggs.“) The home is located on the edge of Olmsted Township, near the Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport. Boggs claims that low overhead flights and other airport operations have interfered with her use and enjoyment of her home to such an extent that it has amounted to a taking of the property. When the government takes private property but has failed to institute formal condemnation proceedings, a property owner may assert a claim for inverse condemnation to recover the value of the property that has been taken. We have held that the way to assert such a claim is to file a claim in mandamus to require the government to commence appropriation proceedings for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation that is owed. State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2001-Ohio-1276, ¶ 21. So Boggs instituted a mandamus action against the owner of the airport, the City of Cleveland, seeking to compel the institution of appropriation proceedings.
{¶ 3} The trial court, however, never reached the merits of the claim. Instead, it dismissed the case for lack of standing. The problem, in the trial court‘s view, was that the home was not located in Cleveland. The court reasoned that a municipality has no authority to take property outside its boundaries, and therefore Cleveland could not be compelled to initiate appropriation proceedings to provide
{¶ 4} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. The command of the
{¶ 5} Our holding today is simply that Boggs has standing to present her claim in court. Whether she will be ultimately successful in establishing an unconstitutional taking remains to be determined.
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 6} Fouad, Inc., has owned the Olmsted Township home where Boggs and Rachid live since 1995. The airport, which is located entirely in Cleveland, has been in operation since 1925. In 1999, Cleveland began a project to expand two runways. As part of the expansion, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA“) required Cleveland to fund sound-dampening measures for neighboring properties that would be affected by the expansion, including Boggs‘s property. See Boggs v. Cleveland, FAA-2016-9557, 2017 WL 11438604, *2 (Jan. 24, 2017). And though the FAA did not require Cleveland to purchase any of the properties, see id., Cleveland obtained “avigation easements” (air easements) from various landowners in Olmsted Township. Boggs declined Cleveland‘s offer to purchase an easement.
{¶ 8} Boggs instituted the lawsuit that is the subject of this appeal in 2008, after Cleveland began work on expansion of the second runway. She sought relief in mandamus, alleging that Cleveland‘s operation of the airport constituted a taking under the
{¶ 9} After Boggs was unsuccessful at the FAA, proceedings resumed in federal court in 2019. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment in Cleveland‘s favor on Boggs‘s federal takings claim. Boggs v. Cleveland, 2021 WL 2188794, *1 (N.D.Ohio May 28, 2021). The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Boggs‘s state-law claims and remanded the case to the common pleas court. Id.
{¶ 10} Following remand, the state-court proceedings picked up in July 2021. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Boggs argued that the evidence demonstrated that she was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Cleveland to
{¶ 11} The trial court granted summary judgment in Cleveland‘s favor. Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-08-666718, 2022 WL 21713279, *9 (Nov. 1, 2022). Although the trial court rejected Cleveland‘s claim that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, it concluded that Boggs had failed to establish standing. Id. at *7, 9. The court reasoned that a municipality lacks authority to appropriate property outside its boundaries absent specific statutory authorization. Id. at *9. Because it determined that no statute authorized Cleveland to appropriate Boggs‘s property, the trial court held that Boggs‘s lawsuit was not redressable by a writ of mandamus. Id.
{¶ 12} The court of appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision that Boggs lacked standing to pursue her mandamus action. 2023-Ohio-3871, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.). It noted that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel a public authority to institute an appropriation action when there has been an involuntary taking of public property. Id. at ¶ 22. But it concluded that Boggs did not have standing to pursue such an action against Cleveland. Id. at ¶ 23. One element of standing, the court explained, is that a litigant‘s injury is “likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Id., citing Moore v. Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 22, and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). This element, the court concluded, was not met because Cleveland did not have the authority to appropriate Boggs‘s property. Id. at ¶ 33, 43.
{¶ 13} In reaching this conclusion, the court first rejected the notion that Boggs had standing by virtue of the guarantee of “compensation” when private property is taken for public use in
{¶ 14} The court of appeals also considered whether any statute authorized Cleveland to appropriate Boggs‘s property. It noted that
{¶ 15} In the court of appeals, Cleveland also sought to defend the trial court‘s judgment on the alternative basis that Boggs‘s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. See
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 17} To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that she suffered (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant‘s alleged unlawful conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561; State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay Mun. Court, 2024-Ohio-5667, ¶ 12. The only issue in this case is the third element—redressability.
{¶ 18} At the heart of the redressability inquiry in this case is a threshold question: Is a property owner entitled to compensation when a municipal government has taken her property even if she doesn‘t live in the municipality that has done the taking? As the court of appeals saw it, the answer is no unless there is a specific statutory grant of authority that allows the municipality to appropriate the property outside its jurisdiction.
{¶ 19} The decision below was grounded in this court‘s precedent. But it leaves Boggs—and others in her situation—in a conundrum. On the one hand, the
{¶ 21} To decide whether Ohio law really imposes such a surprising result, we begin with a closer look at the constitutional framework governing eminent domain proceedings and municipal authority.
A. Constitutional Framework
{¶ 22} Central to this case is the interplay of two provisions of the
1. The Takings Clause of the Ohio Constitution
{¶ 23} The
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare. When taken in time of war or other public exigency, imperatively requiring its immediate seizure or for the purpose of making or repairing roads, which shall be open to the
public, without charge, a compensation shall be made to the owner, in money, and in all other cases, where private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money, and such compensation shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner.
{¶ 24} We have explained, “Any direct encroachment upon land that subjects it to a public use that excludes or restricts the dominion and control of the owner over it is a taking of property, for which the owner is guaranteed a right of compensation under
{¶ 25} We have never directly addressed whether the compensation requirement of
{¶ 26} Indeed, as our earliest caselaw illustrates, we have always provided a remedy to allow property owners to secure just compensation when they have had their property taken by the government. In Cooper v. Williams, 4 Ohio 253 (1831), private property owners had their water diverted for a canal project. This court explained that the owners were “entitled to a compensation for every injury resulting from [the taking].” Id. at 287; see also Symonds v. Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 147, 173 (1846) (“The obligation to make compensation . . . follows [the government‘s right to exercise eminent-domain power], as the shadow does the substance, and is concomitant with it.“); Giesy v. Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville RR. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308, 324 (1854) (“no enlightened government, at this day, attempts to appropriate without compensation, and, in this country, it is everywhere enforced by constitutional provisions“); Kramer v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh RR. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140, 146-147 (1855) (“Full compensation must be made to the owner . . . . A fair and equitable mode for ascertaining the amount of this compensation, and an undoubted fund from which to pay it, must in all cases be provided, as a necessary part of the proceeding to appropriate.“). And throughout the 19th century, this court held that a property owner who alleges an unconstitutional taking has a statutory remedy in probate court. See, e.g., Toledo v. Preston, 50 Ohio St. 361, 365-366 (1893).
{¶ 28} But, of course, sometimes government actions have the effect of taking private property even when the government has not commenced formal condemnation proceedings. Not all takings protected by the Constitution result from the institution of formal eminent-domain proceedings. Takings can occur when government actions lead to persistent flooding, e.g., Doner, 2011-Ohio-6117, when highway improvements deprive an owner of access to his property, e.g., State ex rel. New Wen, Inc. v. Marchbanks, 2020-Ohio-63, when a neglected sewage pump repeatedly overflows into a creek on an owner‘s property, e.g., State ex rel. Gilbert v. Cincinnati, 2010-Ohio-1473, or, as may be relevant here, “whenever airflights are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with enjoyment and use of the land,” State ex rel. Royal v. Columbus, 3 Ohio St.2d 154 (1965), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 29} This court has developed a remedy in such situations. When the government has taken property without providing just compensation, a property owner may institute a mandamus action for inverse condemnation. Elsass, 2001-Ohio-1276, at ¶ 21; Doner at ¶ 53. We have described such an action as “‘a cause of action against the government to recover the value of property taken by the government without formal exercise of the power of eminent domain.‘” Doner at ¶ 62, quoting Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed.Cir. 2005).
{¶ 30} In an inverse-condemnation proceeding, the court in the mandamus action “acts as the trier of fact and law” and determines “whether the private property ha[s] been taken by the public authority.” State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton, 1998-Ohio-287, ¶ 15. If the court determines that there has been a taking, it grants a writ of mandamus compelling the commencement of appropriation proceedings. Shemo, 2002-Ohio-1627, at ¶ 21, 50. The purpose of the appropriation proceedings is to determine the amount of compensation due. Doner at ¶ 86. The court presiding over the appropriation proceedings determines “the extent of the taking.” Id. The amount of compensation is determined by a jury.
2. The Municipal Eminent-Domain Power
{¶ 31} Despite our authority holding that when the government has taken private property without instituting eminent-domain proceedings a property owner may obtain relief through a mandamus action, the court of appeals in this case determined that that remedy was not available because Cleveland had no authority to take property located outside the city, 2023-Ohio-3871 at ¶ 46 (8th Dist.). So we turn now to a municipality‘s power to acquire property through eminent-domain proceedings.
{¶ 32} Under the home-rule provision of the
{¶ 34} In addition to the constitutional provisions, the General Assembly has granted municipalities statutory authority to exercise eminent-domain powers beyond their borders “when reasonably necessary,”
. . .
(C) “Airport” means any location either on land or water which is used for the landing and taking off of aircraft.
(D) “Landing field” means any location either on land or water of such size and nature as to permit the landing or taking off of aircraft with safety, and used for that purpose but not equipped to provide for the shelter, supply, or care of aircraft.
{¶ 35} As the court of appeals correctly found,
3. The Takings Clause Meets the Home-Rule Limit on Municipal Authority
{¶ 36} So far we have outlined two constitutional principles: (1) if property is taken for a public use, the government must pay just compensation, and (2) municipalities do not have the authority to exercise eminent domain outside their boundaries. Now, we consider what happens when those principles run up against each other. What happens when a municipal government takes property beyond its boundaries and fails to pay just compensation? Two cases from this court provide a starting point for our analysis.
{¶ 37} In Clifton, 2012-Ohio-780, a property owner alleged that the Village of Blanchester had made a partial regulatory taking of his property by rezoning a neighbor‘s property. The complaining party‘s property was not located in Blanchester, but the rezoned property was. A majority of this court held that the property owner lacked standing to pursue a mandamus claim to compel Blanchester to commence an appropriation action. Id. at ¶ 30. There were two rationales provided for the decision. First, the majority held that the property owner could not satisfy the “causation” element of standing because there was an insufficient nexus between the rezoning and the alleged diminution in value of the property owner‘s property. Id. at ¶ 31. It reasoned that the zoning imposed no limitation on the landowner‘s use of his property and that any reduced value was a result not of the rezoning but of the neighbor‘s use of the property. Id.
{¶ 38} The majority could have stopped there, but it went on to opine that the landowner also had failed to establish the redressability element of standing.
{¶ 39} Justice Pfeiffer dissented. In his view, “even though Blanchester cannot appropriate [the nonresident‘s] property, it can compensate him as if it had appropriated his property, and therefore [the nonresident property owner] raises an issue that is redressable.” Id. at ¶ 44 (Pfeiffer, J., dissenting).
{¶ 40} Six months after it decided Clifton, this court decided Moore, 2012-Ohio-3897. In Moore, the City of Middletown had rezoned property to allow for the construction of a large-scale industrial coke-production facility. (That‘s coke as it is used in steel manufacturing, not the soda pop.) Owners of adjacent property located in Monroe sued, claiming that the rezoning decreased the value of their properties, was arbitrary and capricious, and violated their due-process and equal-protection rights. Id. at ¶ 5, 9-10. They asserted claims for a declaratory judgment and for a writ of mandamus to compel appropriation proceedings. Id. at ¶ 10.
{¶ 41} Based on the holding in Clifton, the Moore court held that the nonresident property owners lacked standing to pursue their mandamus actions. Id. at ¶ 29. At the same time, the court reminded that it had “expressly cautioned in Clifton that the decision should not be construed too broadly beyond the facts and posture of that case.” Id. It explained:
Despite the breadth of wording in Clifton‘s syllabus, we make clear that that decision does not stand for the proposition that a property owner always lacks standing to bring a mandamus claim against a municipality when the affected property is outside the municipality‘s corporate limits. Rather, Clifton must be understood in conjunction with the unique facts and circumstances upon which it rests, . . . including the fact that it was a mandamus claim against a foreign municipality by a property owner who attempted to challenge the rezoning of contiguous land from one industrial use to another.
Id. at ¶ 30. The Moore court further held that even though the nonresident property owners lacked standing to pursue a mandamus action, they could challenge the constitutionality of the rezoning by way of a declaratory-judgment action. Id. at ¶ 56.
B. Boggs Has Standing to Pursue a Mandamus Action to Obtain Just Compensation for a Government Taking
{¶ 42} With that background behind us, we turn now to the proper resolution of this case. And the resolution is straightforward.
{¶ 44} We disagree. The principle that a municipality cannot use the power of eminent domain beyond its borders should not mean that a municipality does not have to follow the Constitution‘s command to pay just “compensation” when its actions effect an extraterritorial taking of property.
{¶ 45}
{¶ 46} It is true that under our long-standing interpretation of the home-rule power, a municipality generally lacks authority to institute eminent-domain proceedings to appropriate property outside its boundaries. But that doesn‘t mean that a municipality is relieved of its duty to pay compensation under
{¶ 47} The
{¶ 48} It is of course true that a municipality could not ordinarily institute eminent-domain proceedings under
{¶ 49} Under ordinary
{¶ 50} Under the remedy that has been developed by our caselaw, most of the
{¶ 51} In concluding otherwise, the court of appeals in this case found our decisions in Moore and Clifton controlling. And it is true that, read broadly, the logic of those opinions could be understood to foreclose the relief that Boggs seeks here. But Clifton emphasized that its holding was limited to the “facts and circumstances” of that case and did not mean that “an adjoining property owner may never have standing.” Clifton, 2012-Ohio-780, at ¶ 30. Moore repeated the same cautions, making clear that Clifton “does not stand for the proposition that a property owner always lacks standing to bring a mandamus claim against a municipality when the affected property is outside the municipality‘s corporate limits” and stressing the “unique facts” of that case. Moore, 2012-Ohio-3897, at ¶ 30.
{¶ 52} In light of these cautions, we will not extend Clifton and Moore beyond their “unique facts.” Rather, we make clear that in an inverse-condemnation action, a person who alleges that his property has been taken by a foreign municipality may pursue a mandamus action to force the municipality to institute appropriation proceedings for purposes of compensating the landowner for property that has been taken. Thus, we hold that Boggs has standing to pursue her mandamus claim.
{¶ 53} The only issue before us is whether Boggs has standing. That was the sole basis of the court of appeals’ decision and the only issue raised in the propositions of law we accepted. In its briefing before this court, Cleveland attempts to defend the judgment below on the alternative basis that Boggs‘s claim
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 54} The court of appeals asked the wrong question. Instead of asking whether Cleveland has the authority to institute an inverse-condemnation action, it should have asked whether a party whose property has been taken by a municipality has a right to receive compensation, even if the property is not located in that municipality.
{¶ 55} Because the
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
The Lindner Law Firm, L.L.C., and Daniel F. Lindner, for appellants.
Mark D. Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and Elena N. Boop, James R. Russell Jr., and Gilbert E. Blomgren, Assistant Directors of Law, for appellee.