Soto v. United StatesSoto v. United States
(Slip Opinion)
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SOTO, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 24-320. Argued April 28, 2025-Decided June 12, 2025
The Barring Act,
Petitioner Simon Soto served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006, including two tours in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was medically retired in 2006 and later received a 100-percent disability rating for post-traumatic stress disorder from the VA. In 2016, Soto applied for CRSC payments. The Secretary of the Navy approved his application but limited retroactive compensation to six years, citing the Barring Act‘s limitations period. Soto filed a class-action lawsuit arguing that the Barring Act‘s 6-year limitations period does not apply to CRSC claims because the CRSC statute constitutes “another law” that provides its own settlement mechanism. The District Court granted summary judgment for the class, but the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the CRSC statute does not explicitly grant settlement authority and therefore cannot displace the Barring Act.
Held: The CRSC statute confers authority to settle CRSC claims and thus displaces the Barring Act‘s settlement procedures and limitations period. Pp. 7-15.
(a) The term “settle” in the Government-claims context refers to determining the validity of a claim and the amount of money a claimant is due. See Illinois Surety Co. v. United States ex rel. Peeler, 240 U. S. 214, 219-220. A statute confers settlement authority so long as it vests an entity with these powers. While the most straightforward way to confer settlement authority may be to use the term “settle,” Congress need not “use magic words.” Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U. S. 42, 48-49. To determine whether a statute constitutes “another law” that displaces the Barring Act‘s settlement procedures, courts must examine the text, context, and structure of “the entire statutory scheme” to analyze whether the law confers authority to determine both a claim‘s validity and the amount due. Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U. S. 516, 523; see Illinois Surety, 240 U. S., at 219-220. Pp. 7-8.
(b) The CRSC statute meets these requirements. The law confers upon “[t]he Secretary concerned” the “[a]uthority” to pay each “eligible” claimant a “monthly amount” “determined” under the statute‘s terms.
(c) The Federal Circuit erred by imposing undue requirements on Congress‘s ability to confer settlement authority and by disregarding the CRSC statute‘s plain text. The court‘s demand for “specific language” and its alternative requirement that a statute provide a specific limitations period to displace the Barring Act are rejected. Congress need not use particular words to confer settlement authority, and, in this unique statutory regime, it is not unreasonable to think that Congress would have provided a settlement mechanism without a specific limitations period. The Government‘s arguments for affirmance are similarly unpersuasive, including its insistence on “hallmark formula- tions” to confer settlement authority and its concern about destabilizing Government programs. The CRSC statute‘s separate subsections, in combination, create a comprehensive benefits regime that authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due on them. Pp. 10-14.
92 F. 4th 1094, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24-320
SIMON A. SOTO, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
[June 12, 2025]
Title
I
A
The Barring Act establishes default procedures for how a variety of “claims of or against the United States Government shall be settled.”
The term “settle” in this context refers to determining the amount of money a claimant is due. See Illinois Surety Co. v. United States ex rel. Peeler, 240 U. S. 214, 219 (1916). This meaning of “settlement” flows from the well-established principle that in the Government-claims context, when the Government “determine[s]” that a claim is “valid,” the claim “should be paid in full.” Office of Gen. Counsel, GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 11-6 (1982). Thus, the inquiries relevant to settling a claim are straightforward: First, we ask whether the claim is valid; and second, if it is, we ask how much the Government owes.
The Barring Act authorizes certain entities to settle certain types of claims. See
But, not all claims against the Government fall within the Barring Act‘s ambit. While the Barring Act provides a default framework for settling and processing claims against the Government, it includes a significant exception: If “another law” creates a separate settlement process, then that process displaces the Act‘s settlement mechanism.
B
In 2002, Congress enacted the CRSC statute,
The CRSC statute establishes a comprehensive framework for CRSC claims, governing everything from a claimant‘s initial application to the ultimate disbursal of payments. And, the statute confers upon “[t]he Secretary concerned”1 authority to effect key determinations throughout this process. At the beginning of the CRSC claims process, the statute expressly requires the Secretary concerned to “conside[r]” whether the applicant is “eligible” for CRSC payments.
retary concerned must confirm that the applicant is “entitled to retired pay” and “has a combat-related disability.”
Section 1413a separately establishes how to determine the monthly amount of CRSC payments to which an eligible claimant is entitled. Subsection (b)(1) states that “the monthly amount to be paid ... for any month is the amount of compensation to which the retiree is entitled under title 38 for that month, determined without regard to any disability of the retiree that is not a combat-related disability.” Subsection (b)(2) sets a cap on the amount a claimant may receive. And, subsection (b)(3) provides specific rules to follow in the case of retirees who are retired under a separate chapter of Title 10.
The CRSC statute does not include a statute of limitations or otherwise expressly limit the number of months for which an applicant may obtain payment.
C
Corporal Simon Soto, petitioner here, served honorably in the United States Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006. During the first of his two tours of duty in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Soto served in Mortuary Affairs. In that role, Soto “was assigned to ‘search for, recover, and process the remains’ of war casualties.” App. 15. He struggled to adjust to civilian life following deployment and eventually received a diagnosis for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which his physicians attributed to
Soto later sought service-connected disability compensation from the VA. The VA ultimately assigned him a 100-percent disability rating for his PTSD, representing “[t]otal occupational and social impairment,”
In June 2016, Soto submitted an application to the Navy seeking CRSC payments based on his combat-related PTSD. The Secretary of the Navy approved Soto for CRSC benefits in October 2016 and authorized him to receive retroactive compensation going back six years, to July 2010. The reason that Soto was eligible for only six years’ worth of CRSC payments, the Government explained, was that “CRSC is subject to the [Barring Act‘s] 6-year statute of limitations.” App. 37.
The following year, Soto filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. He asserted that the Barring Act‘s 6-year limitations period does not apply to CRSC claims and that he was therefore entitled to retroactive CRSC payments for the months dating back to January 1, 2008-the effective date of the statutory amendment that expanded CRSC eligibility to include combat-disabled medical retirees who, like him, had served for fewer than 20 years. See supra, at 3.
After certifying a nationwide class consisting of former servicemembers “whose CRSC applications ... were granted, but whose amount of CRSC payment was limited by [the Barring Act‘s] statute of limitations,” the District Court entered summary judgment for the class. See 2021 WL 7286022, *1 (SD Tex., Dec. 16, 2021). Because the CRSC statute “defines eligibility for CRSC, helps explain the amount of benefits and instructs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures and criteria for individuals to apply for CRSC,” the court concluded that the statute constitutes “another law” that “provides its own settlement mechanism,” and so displaces the Barring Act‘s settlement procedures. Id., at *2-*3.
The Federal Circuit reversed. “To confer settlement authority and displace the Barring Act,” the court reasoned, “a statute must explicitly grant an agency or entity the authority to settle claims.” 92 F. 4th 1094, 1098 (2024). The court determined that Congress typically confers settlement authority “by use of the term ‘settle’ or other ‘specific language‘“; absent such language, a statute “cannot displace the Barring Act, unless another statute provides a ‘specific’ provision setting out the period of recovery.” Id., at 1099. The Federal Circuit thus concluded that the CRSC statute “only establishes who may be eligible for CRSC payments, not how claimants can have those claims settled,” and thus fails to confer settlement authority. Ibid.
Judge Reyna dissented. On his view, several of
We granted certiorari to decide whether the CRSC statute provides a settlement mechanism that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act. See 604 U. S. ___ (2025).3
A
To decide whether the CRSC statute provides a settlement mechanism that displaces the Barring Act, we first address how this Court has construed “settlement” of claims against the Government and what is required for a statute to confer settlement authority.
As both parties recognize, this Court has made clear that “[t]he word ‘settlement’ in connection with public transactions and accounts has been used from the beginning to describe administrative determination of the amount due.” Illinois Surety, 240 U. S., at 219; see Brief for Petitioner 22; Brief for United States 24. As referenced above, agency guidance reflects this established understanding of “settlement.” See supra, at 2 (citing Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 11-6). Simply put, the authority “to settle” a claim against the United States is the power both to “determine upon the validity of” the claim, and to “deter-min[e]... the amount due” on it. Illinois Surety, 240 U. S., at 219-220 (emphasis deleted).
A statute confers settlement authority so long as it vests an entity with the power to determine both a claim‘s validity and amount due. Ibid. We have explained that, in the context of waiving sovereign immunity, Congress need not “state its intent in any particular way,” or “use magic words” to effectuate a waiver. Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U. S. 42, 48-49 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). That same principle applies here. While the most straightforward way to confer settlement authority may be to “use the term ‘settle,‘” 92 F. 4th, at 1099, the presence of that word-or any other specific language-is not necessary. Accord, e.g., Hernandez v. Department of Air Force, 498 F. 3d 1328, 1330-1331 (CA Fed. 2007) (holding that Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994,
To decide whether a statute constitutes “another law” that displaces the Barring Act‘s settlement procedures,
B
The CRSC statute meets these requirements. At the outset, the law confers upon “[t]he Secretary concerned” the “[a]uthority” to pay each “eligible” claimant a “monthly amount” that is “determined” under the terms of the statute.
Regarding validity, the CRSC statute provides that the Secretary concerned shall “conside[r]” whether a CRSC applicant is an “eligible” “combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree.”
Thus, by charging the Secretary concerned to “conside[r]” and evaluate each applicant‘s “eligib[ility],”
The CRSC statute also confers to the Secretary concerned authority to “administrative[ly] determin[e] ... the amount due” on an eligible veteran‘s claim. Id., at 219. Subsection (a) instructs the Secretary to pay a specific “monthly amount ... determined under subsection (b).” Subsection (b), in turn, details precisely how the Secretary will “[d]eter-min[e]” the monthly payments contemplated under subsection (a), sets a “[m]aximum amount” for these payments, and provides “[s]pecial rules” that apply to CRSC payments for certain retirees.
At bottom,
nation of characteristics authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due on them. The statute thus creates a separate settlement mechanism-i.e., “another law“-that displaces the Barring Act‘s default settlement procedures, including its limitations period.
III
A
The Federal Circuit reached the opposite conclusion below by imposing undue
The Federal Circuit reasoned that for a statute to provide settlement authority, Congress must use “specific language” that authorizes a Government entity to “settle a claim-which will typically be done by use of the term ‘settle.‘” 92 F. 4th, at 1099. Absent such language, the court continued, a statute may authorize settlement only if it “provides a ‘specific’ provision setting out the period of recovery.” Ibid.
We reject both premises. As this Court has repeatedly explained, Congress “need not state its intent in any particular way,” and “[w]e have never required that Congress use magic words.” FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 291 (2012); see also, e.g., Kirtz, 601 U. S., at 48. Thus, even if Congress “typically” confers the authority to settle claims “by use of the term ‘settle,‘” 92 F. 4th, at 1099, that standard practice does not bind legislators to specific words or formulations. It is enough that a statute authorizes an entity to determine both the validity of a claim and the amount due on it. See Illinois Surety, 240 U. S., at 219-220.
Nor must a settlement mechanism always feature a “specific” limitations period to fit within the Barring Act‘s “another law” exception. 92 F. 4th, at 1099. If a statute establishes a settlement mechanism and thus constitutes “another law” under
Further, the CRSC statute clearly authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine CRSC claimants’ eligibility according to specific criteria, and those criteria say nothing about time limits. See
The Federal Circuit‘s focus on the absence of specific words and provisions led it to misinterpret the CRSC statute. On the Federal Circuit‘s view, because
B
The Government‘s arguments for affirmance are no more persuasive. To start, the Government agrees that a statute may authorize settlement without necessarily using the word “settle,” Brief for United States 26, 41-42, yet, echoing the Federal Circuit, insists that a statute still must feature “hallmark formulations” to confer settlement authority, Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. Such “hallmark formulations,” the Government tells us, include language that “speak[s] of claims being allowed or disallowed,” “refer[s] to a finding being final and conclusive,” or designates “authority to sue or be sued.” Id., at 38, 65; see also Brief for United States 26-28. But, it is difficult to see how the Government‘s “hallmark formulations” inquiry does not devolve into the same sort of “magic words” test that we have so often denounced. Kirtz, 601 U. S., at 48-49. As with the Federal Circuit‘s demand for specific language and provisions, we reject the Government‘s “formulations“-focused attempt to limit the ways that Congress may convey settlement authority.
The Government similarly reprises the Federal Circuit‘s assertion that the CRSC statute does not authorize settlement because it lacks any “timing requirement,” and further insists that our reading “supplant[s]” the Barring Act‘s limitations period “through [Congress‘s] silence.” Brief for United States 17, 30-32. For the reasons we have already explained, we disagree with the proposition that a settlement mechanism must include a limitations period to displace the Barring Act. See supra, at 10. And, the Government‘s assertion that our interpretation permits the CRSC statute sub silentio to “supplant” the Barring Act misunderstands the CRSC statute. In enacting
The Government also resists the conclusion that
This argument proves too much. The Barring Act indisputably confers settlement authority, yet it says nothing about audits or offsets. Instead, it simply authorizes the settlement of “claims.”
Finally, the Government warns that if the CRSC statute “create[s] an independent settlement mechanism,” then every statute containing even one of
In all events, while we acknowledge that the Barring Act‘s limitations period plays an important role in managing the Government‘s potential retroactive liability, “we will not presume ... that any result consistent with [the Government‘s] account of the statute‘s overarching goal must be the law.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017). Even if we thought sound policy called for a narrower carveout to the Barring Act‘s procedures than the “another law” exception that Congress enacted,
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.