Soto v. United StatesSoto v. United States
JOHNNET SIMONE JONES, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by ANKUR SHINGAL, EMILY MILY WEXLER, Chicago, IL; ROCHELLE BOBROFF, RENEE A. BURBANK, BARTON FRANK STICHMAN, I, National Veterans Legal Services Program, Arlington, VA.
JENNIFER UTRECHT, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by BRIAN M. BOΥΝΤΟΝ, CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH.
Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.
HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
The government appeals a decision from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas holding that the six-year statute of limitations in the Barring Act,
I
A
Under
Before January 1, 2008, CRSC was only available to veterans who had completed at least twenty years of military service. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, div. A, tit. VI, § 641, 122 Stat. 3, 156. But effective January 1, 2008, Congress expanded eligibility to retirees with fewer than twenty years of military service if they were medically retired under
The CRSC statute directs the Secretary of Defense to “prescribe procedures and criteria under which a disabled uniformed services retiree may apply” for CRSC.
Section 3702 of title 31, known as the Barring Act, provides a mechanism for settling1 military-related claims against the government that are not covered in other statutory provisions. In particular, the Secretary of Defense has authority to settle all “claims involving uniformed service members’ pay, allowances, travel, transportation, pay-
ments for unused accrued leave, retired pay, and survivor benefits.”
B
With that background in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. Simon A. Soto is a retired member of the United States Marine Corps with a combat-related disability rated at least 10%. He was medically retired from active duty in April 2006 with less than twenty years of military service. Although he was eligible for CRSC as of June 2009 (when he received his disability rating), he did not apply until June 2016. At that time, the Navy informed Mr. Soto that his claim was limited under the Barring Act, and as a result, he received six years of retroactive CRSC payments, dating back to roughly July 2010. Mr. Soto did not request a waiver of the statutory time limit under
Mr. Soto filed a class action lawsuit2 in the Southern District of Texas under
situated, arguing that the Barring Act does not apply to settling claims for CRSC. Mr. Soto claimed that, based on Congress‘s expansion of CRSC to veterans with less than twenty years of military service, he was entitled to compensation dating back to the effective date of the amended statute, or January 1, 2008, rather than July 2010, six years prior to his application for CRSC.
The government moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court denied. In denying the motion, the district court held that the Barring Act did not
The government appealed, asking us to consider whether the six-year statute of limitations in the Barring Act applies to settling claims for CRSC. We have jurisdiction under
II
Because there are no disputed issues of fact and the only question on appeal is the proper interpretations of the Barring Act and the CRSC statute, we review the district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
III
The government argues that the district court erred in holding that the Barring Act does not apply to the settlement of CRSC claims because the CRSC statute does not contain its own settlement mechanism that displaces the Barring Act. We agree.
The district court held that the CRSC statute “provides its own settlement mechanism because it defines eligibility for CRSC, helps explain the amount of benefits and instructs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures and criteria for [prospective claimants] to apply for CRSC.” J.A. 5. But establishing eligibility for CRSC payments does not confer settlement authority independent of the Barring Act. See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO-08-978SP, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 14-25 n.54 (2008) (GAO Red Book) (“While section 3702 provides an independent administrative claims handling procedure, it does not provide an independent basis for paying claims.“). To confer settlement authority and displace the Barring Act, a statute must explicitly grant an agency or entity the authority to settle claims. See, e.g., Honorable Slade Gorton, B-215494, 1984 WL 46509, at *2 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 4, 1984) (explaining that “[t]he head of the Federal agency or department concerned is specifically authorized by statute to settle administratively claims brought under” the Military Claims Act or Federal Tort Claims Act (emphasis added)); GAO Red Book 14-20–14-22 (describing claims settlement and listing specific statutes that allow agencies to administratively settle claims).
For example, settlement claims brought pursuant to the FTCA are not subject to the Barring Act because the FTCA explicitly provides that the heads of federal agencies have the right to “consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim for money damages” falling within the scope of the statute.
By contrast, the CRSC statute conveys no such authority—it only establishes who may be eligible for CRSC payments, not how claimants can have those claims settled. See id.
The dissent focuses on our allegedly narrow understanding of a “claim” and “settlement.” Dissenting Op. 3, 7–8. The dissent would read the CRSC statute to permit the Secretary to settle claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act‘s six-year statute of limitations, because it defines which veterans are eligible for CRSC (
Mr. Soto argues that the DoD‘s Program Guidance suffices to displace the Barring Act‘s statute of limitations because it explains that a veteran “may submit an application for CRSC” and will be paid “for any month after May 2003, for which all conditions of eligibility were met.” Appellee‘s Br. 24 (quoting the Department of Defense‘s 2004 Program Guidance). But this program guidance cannot grant settlement authority where, by statute, there is none. The program guidance Mr. Soto cites does nothing more than authorize the agency to grant retroactive
Mr. Soto also contends that the Barring Act should not apply to the CRSC statute because
Finally, Mr. Soto argues that the statute of limitations in the Barring Act should be tolled because we have been continuously at war since 1990 and
Indeed, the DoD has consistently interpreted that language to apply only to service members who are on active duty during times of war. See Charles V. Waldron, 59 Comp. Gen. 463, 463 (1980) (“The exception to the 6-year statute of limitations . . . tolling the running of the 6-year period for members of the armed forces in wartime, is applicable only to members on active duty.“); id. at 464 (“[I]f an individual serving in the armed services had a claim which accrued during war or his claim accrued and subsequently war broke out, such individual is granted additional time following the establishment of peace to file
Accordingly, we hold that the Barring Act applies to settlement claims regarding CRSC because the CRSC statute does not explicitly provide its own settlement mechanism and these claims are therefore subject to the settlement mechanisms laid forth in the Barring Act. And as relevant here, we hold that the six-year statute of limitations contained in the Barring Act applies to CRSC settlement claims.4
IV
We have considered the remainder of Mr. Soto‘s arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we reverse the district court‘s grant of summary judgment, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COSTS
No costs.
REYNA, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Today, the majority holds that Mr. Soto and other similarly-situated veterans injured as a result of combat cannot recover more than six years of retroactive Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC). I believe that the CRSC statute addresses the settlement of claims against the government and displaces the Barring Act‘s six-year statute of limitations. I would affirm the lower court decision finding that the Barring Act does not apply to CRSC claims.
I respectfully dissent.
By its own terms, the Barring Act and its six-year statute of limitations can be superseded. The Barring Act‘s statute of limitations does not apply to limit the available compensation if “another provision of law” addresses how “claims of or against the United States Government shall be settled.”
In considering the limits on the Barring Act‘s applicability when settling a government claim, it is important to address what it means to “settle” a “claim” against the United States. As the district court recognized, there is no dispute in this case regarding what it means to “settle” such a claim. Soto v. United States, No. 1:17-CV-00051, 2021 WL 7286022, at *2 & n.2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2021). “[T]o settle a claim means to administratively determine the validity of that claim.” Adams v. Hinchman, 154 F.3d 420, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 11-6
The meaning of a “claim” itself has also been defined in the federal appropriations context. In Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 575 (1886), the Supreme Court describes a claim as “a right to demand money from the United States . . . . which can be presented by the claimant to some department or officer of the United States for payment, or may be prosecuted in the court of claims.”1 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 14-10 (2008).
“Settling a claim,” therefore, means administratively determining the validity of the demand for money against the government and the amount of money due. This definition contrasts with a use of the term “settlement” to solely refer to resolving a conflict, often one involving a lawsuit or anticipated lawsuit. And this broader understanding of “settling a claim” deserves more than just the footnote‘s worth of discussion rendered in the majority opinion. See Maj. Op. 3 n.1. Indeed, it must guide any analysis of whether a statute supersedes the Barring Act‘s six-year statute of limitations.
Here, the CRSC statute permits the government to administratively determine the validity of a veteran‘s demand for CRSC, as well as the amount of CRSC due to the veteran in retroactive and future monthly compensation. In light of these provisions, the Barring Act does not apply.
First, the CRSC statute defines eligible retirees,2 including by clarifying what constitutes a “combat-related
disability.”3
Second, the CRSC statute specifically grants the “Secretary concerned” authority to pay eligible retirees “a monthly amount” for the combat-related disability covered by the statute.
(1) is entitled to retired pay (other than by reason of section 12731b of this title); and
(2) has a combat-related disability.
of authority is not limited to future monthly payments and is directed to more expansive authority for the Secretary to determine an “amount” due to an eligible veteran.
Finally, the CRSC statute specifies the “source of payments” for CRSC.
By these common and plain terms, the CRSC statute specifies the “settlement” of a “claim” against the government.4 It therefore takes precedence over the Barring Act,
such that a veteran eligible to receive CRSC is not subject to the Barring Act‘s six-year statute of limitations.
The majority opinion concludes that the CRSC statute does not address the settlement of government claims and that the Barring Act‘s six-year statute of limitations thus applies. See, e.g., Maj. Op. 7.
Citing to the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) and the Military Claims Act (MCA), the majority praises their use of the words “settle” and “claim” and faults the CRSC statute for not “convey[ing]” the same “authority.” Id. at 6–7. The majority overlooks that both the FTCA and the MCA involve circumstances where an individual believes that the government or a government representative has injured or caused harm to the individual or the individual‘s property.
pro-veteran canon should play a role in its ultimate interpretation.
The majority exacerbates its error by then asserting that “specific language” is required for a statute to settle a government claim: a statute should “typically” use the word “settle.” Maj. Op. 7. If it does not, the majority contends that it can still settle a claim only if it provides a “specific” provision setting out the period of recovery. Id. But the long-understood meaning of “settling” a “claim” against the government includes no such limitations. Raising these new requirements, the majority also raises the bar to a new and unprecedented standard for what a statute must state to supersede the Barring Act. Although a statute involving resolution of conflict may “typically” use the words “settle” and “claim,” the majority does not explain why this phrasing should be “typical” for statutes that involve a more general, remedial, administrative determination of eligibility for money from the government and the amount due. And the majority‘s alternative requirement—that a statute state a “specific” period of recovery—requires a level of specificity in statutory language that finds no support in our canons of statutory interpretation.
The majority asserts that the CRSC statute only establishes who may be eligible for CRSC, not how eligible veterans’ claims are settled. Id. at 7, 8. This is belied by the provisions of the CRSC statute itself, which provide information regarding eligibility for CRSC as well as how to calculate the “monthly amount” of CRSC owed to the veteran. But the majority similarly discounts these provisions, falling back on its demand for “clear language” authorizing the Secretary to “settle” claims. Id. at 8.
The majority‘s decision today is contrary to both the common meaning of “settling” a “claim” against the government and to the CRSC statute itself. The majority opinion reviews select language from unrelated statutes and relies on that language to redefine these terms and legislate its preferences. And in rendering this decision, the majority denies benefits to a highly-deserving class of veterans seeking compensation granted by statute for combat-related injuries incurred in service to this country.
Notes
(c) ELIGIBLE RETIREES.—For purposes of this section, an eligible combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree referred to in subsection (a) is a member of the uniformed services who—
(e) COMBAT-RELATED DISABILITY.—In this section, the term “combat-related disability” means a disability that is compensable under the laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and that—
(1) is attributable to an injury for which the member was awarded the Purple Heart; or
(2) was incurred (as determined under criteria prescribed by the Secretary of Defense)—
(A) as a direct result of armed conflict;
(B) while engaged in hazardous service;
(C) in the performance of duty under conditions simulating war; or
(D) through an instrumentality of war.
Id.