SENSATIONAL SMILES, LLC, d/b/a SMILE BRIGHT v. JEWEL MULLEN, DR., et al.
Docket No. 14-1381-cv
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
July 17, 2015
August Term, 2014 (Argued: April 15, 2015)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
LISA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff
v.
JEWEL MULLEN, DR., in her official capacity as Commissioner of Public Health, JEANNE P. SRATHEARN, DDS, in her official capacity as a Member of the Connecticut Dental Commission, ELLIOT BERMAN, DDS, in his official capacity as a Member of the Connecticut Dental Commission, LANCE E. BANWELL, DDS, in his official capacity as a Member of the Connecticut Dental Commission, PETER S. KATZ, DMD, in his official capacity as a Member of the Connecticut Dental Commission, STEVEN G. REISS, DDS, in his official capacity as a Member of the Connecticut Dental Commission, MARTIN UNGAR, DMD, in his official capacity as a Member of the Connecticut Dental Commission, BARBARA B. ULRICH, in her official capacity as a Member of the Connecticut Dental Commission,
Before: CALABRESI, CABRANES, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Sensational Smiles, LLC, d/b/a Smile Bright (“Sensational Smiles“) appeals from a March 31, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Micheal P. Shea, Judge) granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Sensational Smiles is a company that provides teeth-whitening services that involve shining a low-powered LED light into a customer‘s mouth for 20 minutes. The Connecticut State Dental Commission has issued a declaratory ruling restricting the use of such lights to licenced dentists. Sensational Smiles now challenges that ruling, arguing that the ruling violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause because it lacks a rational basis. Because we conclude that there are several rational reasons for limiting the use of teeth-whitening LED lights to licenced dentists, we affirm.
Judge DRONEY concurs in a separate opinion.
PAUL M. SHERMAN (Dana Berliner, on the brief), Institute for Justice, Arlington, VA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
DANIEL SHAPIRO, Assistant Attorney General, for George Jepsen, Attorney General of Connecticut, for Defendants-Appellees.
The question in this case is whether a Connecticut rule restricting the use of certain teeth-whitening procedures to licenced dentists is unconstitutional under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. Because we conclude that there are any number of rational grounds for the rule, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
BACKGROUND
Under Connecticut law, the State Dental Commission (“the Commission“) is charged with advising and assisting the Commissioner of Public Health in issuing dental regulations. See
Sensational Smiles sued, challenging several aspects of the
DISCUSSION
The claims at issue—that the declaratory ruling violated the Constitution‘s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses—are both subject to rational-basis review. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate government purposes.“); Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 606 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The law in this Circuit is clear that where, as here, a statute neither interferes with a fundamental right nor singles out a suspect classification, we will invalidate that statute on substantive due process grounds only when a plaintiff can demonstrate that there is no rational relationship between the legislation and a legitimate legislative purpose.“) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
As the Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions, rational-basis review “is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of
Reviewing the record de novo, we agree with the District Court that a rational basis, within the meaning of our constitutional law, existed for Connecticut‘s prohibition on non-dentists pointing LED lights into their customers’ mouths. All sides agree that the protection of the public‘s oral health is a legitimate governmental interest. The parties, however, strongly dispute whether the rule at issue rationally relates to this interest. Here, the Commission received expert testimony indicating that potential health risks are associated with the use of LED lights to enhance the efficacy of teeth-whitening gels.2 While
Sensational Smiles argues that even if there was some basis for believing that LED lights could cause harm, there was still no rational basis for restricting the operation of LED lights to licensed dentists. This is so because dentists are not trained to use LED lights or to practice teeth whitening, and are not required to have any knowledge of LED lights in order to get dental licenses. The Commission, however, might have reasoned that if a teeth-whitening customer experienced sensitivity or burning from the light, then a dentist would be better equipped than a non-dentist to decide whether to modify or cease the use of the light, and/or to treat any oral health issues that might arise during the procedure. The Commission might also have rationally concluded that, in view of the health risks posed by LED lights, customers seeking to use them in a teeth-whitening procedure should first receive an individualized assessment of their oral health
Sensational Smiles further argues that the rule is irrational because it allows consumers to shine the LED light into their own mouths, after being instructed in its use by unlicensed teeth-whitening professionals, but prohibits those same teeth-whitening professionals from guiding or positioning the light themselves. The law, however, does not require perfect tailoring of economic regulations, and the Dental Commission can only define the practice of dentistry; it has limited control over what people choose to do to their own mouths. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, individuals are often prohibited from doing to (or for) others what they are permitted to do to (or for) themselves. Thus, while one may not extract another‘s teeth for money without a dental license, individuals can remove their own teeth with pliers at home if they so
In sum, given that at least some evidence exists that LED lights may cause some harm to consumers, and given that there is some relationship (however imperfect) between the Commission‘s rule and the harm it seeks to prevent, we conclude that the rule does not violate either due process or equal protection.
This would normally end our inquiry, but appellant, supported by amicus Professor Todd J. Zywicki, forcefully argues that the true purpose of the Commission‘s LED restriction is to protect the monopoly on dental services enjoyed by licensed dentists in the state of Connecticut. In other words, the regulation is nothing but naked economic protectionism: “rent seeking . . . designed to transfer wealth from consumers to a particular interest group.”3
In recent years, some courts of appeals have held that laws and regulations whose sole purpose is to shield a particular group from intrastate economic competition cannot survive rational basis review. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[N]either precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic protection of a particular industry is a legitimate governmental purpose[.]“); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991, n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[M]ere economic protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is irrational with respect to determining if a classification survives rational basis review.“); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]rotecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.“). The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has squarely held that such a protectionist purpose is legitimate. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a violation of a specific constitutional
Our decision is guided by precedent, principle, and practicalities. As an initial matter, we note that because the legislature need not articulate any reason for enacting its economic regulations, “it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.” F.C.C. v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). Accordingly, even if, as appellants contend, the Commission was in fact motivated purely by rent-seeking, the rational reasons we have already discussed in support of the regulation would be enough to uphold it.
But even if the only conceivable reason for the LED restriction was to shield licensed dentists from competition, we would still be compelled by an unbroken line of precedent to approve the Commission‘s action. The simple truth is that the Supreme Court has long permitted state economic favoritism of all sorts, so long as that favoritism does not violate specific constitutional provisions or federal statutes. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass‘n of Cent. Iowa, 539
These decisions are a product of experience and common sense. Much of what states do is to favor certain groups over others on economic grounds. We call this politics. Whether the results are wise or terrible is not for us to say, as favoritism of this sort is certainly rational in the constitutional sense. To give but one example, Connecticut could well have concluded that higher costs for teeth whitening (the possible effect of the Commission‘s regulation) would subsidize lower costs for more essential dental services that only licensed dentists can
We are buttressed in our decision by the difficulty in distinguishing between a protectionist purpose and a more “legitimate” public purpose in any particular case. Often, the two will coexist, with no consistent way to determine acceptable levels of protectionism. Cf. N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 135 S. Ct. at 1123 (Alito, J., dissenting). And a court intent on sniffing out “improper” economic protectionism will have little difficulty in finding it. Thus,
Of course, if economic favoritism by the states violates federal law, then, like any state action that contravenes stated federal rules, it falls under the Supremacy Clause. This can happen if—whether motivated by rent-seeking or by libertarian ideals—state action, though rational, violates the dormant Commerce Clause, or if a state licensing board that is insufficiently controlled by the state creates a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. See
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
SENSATIONAL SMILES, LLC, d/b/a SMILE BRIGHT v. JEWEL MULLEN, DR., et al.
Docket No. 14-1381-cv
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
I join the majority opinion in its conclusion that the Dental Commission‘s declaratory ruling is rationally related to the state‘s legitimate interest in protecting the public health. Because this is sufficient to resolve the appeal, I would not reach the question of whether pure economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest for purposes of rational basis review. The majority having chosen to address that issue, I write separately to express my disagreement.
In my view, there must be at least some perceived public benefit for legislation or administrative rules to survive rational basis review under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. As the majority acknowledges, only the Tenth Circuit has adopted the view that pure economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004). Two of the circuits that reached the opposite conclusion expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit‘s approach. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2013); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008).
I agree with the Fifth Circuit‘s reasoning in St. Joseph Abbey, particularly insofar as it disputes the Tenth Circuit‘s reliance in Powers on the very Supreme
A review of the Supreme Court decisions confirms the Fifth Circuit‘s conclusion that some perceived public benefit was recognized by the Court in upholding state and local legislation. In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Supreme Court reviewed an Oklahoma statute that, inter alia, forbade opticians from replacing eyeglass lenses without a prescription from an optometrist or ophthalmologist, even when an optician could easily and safely have done the work. See id. at 485-87. In concluding that the legislation
In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam), the Court reviewed a New Orleans ordinance that prohibited food venders from operating pushcarts in the French Quarter. See id. at 298. A grandfather clause exempted existing vendors from the ban if they had been operating continuously in the French Quarter for at least eight years. See id. The Supreme Court held that the exemption survived rational basis review, observing that New Orleans may have concluded that “newer businesses were less likely to have built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation” and that the grandfathered vendors may have “themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm” of the French Quarter. Id. at 305.
The two more recent decisions cited by the majority upheld differential rates of state taxation. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), considered a California property tax regime that tied the assessment of property values to the value of the property at the time it was acquired, as opposed to its current value. See id. at 5. This approach benefitted long-term property owners over newer
In Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003), the Court reviewed an Iowa law that imposed higher taxes on racetrack slot machine revenues than it imposed on riverboat slot machine revenues. See id. at 105. Again finding the differential tax treatment rational, the Court suggested that the state legislature “may have wanted to encourage the economic development of river communities or to promote riverboat history.” Id. at 109. And it again emphasized “reliance interests,” observing that the law preserved the historical tax rate for riverboats, whereas racetracks had not previously been permitted to operate slot machines at all. Id. at 105, 109.
It may be that, as a practical matter, economic protectionism can be couched in terms of some sort of alternative, indisputably legitimate state interest. Indeed, the majority suggests as much when it observes that, in this case, the state may have concluded that protectionism “would subsidize lower costs for more essential dental services that only licensed dentists can provide.” Maj. Op., ante, at 12. But it is quite different to say that protectionism for its own
Nor do I believe that rejecting pure economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest requires us to resurrect Lochner. Accord St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 227 (“We deploy no economic theory of social statics or draw upon a judicial vision of free enterprise. . . . We insist only that Louisiana‘s regulation not be irrational—the outer-most limits of due process and equal protection—as Justice Harlan put it, the inquiry is whether ‘[the] measure bears a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective.’ Answering that question is well within Article III‘s confines of judicial review.” (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted)); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (“We are not imposing our view of a well-functioning market on the people of Tennessee. Instead, we invalidate only the General Assembly‘s naked attempt to raise a
The majority, by contrast, essentially renders rational basis review a nullity in the context of economic regulation. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1226 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“The end result of the majority‘s reasoning is an almost per se rule upholding intrastate protectionist legislation.“); cf. Ranschburg v. Toan, 709 F.2d 1207, 1211 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Although states may have great discretion in the area of social welfare, they do not have unbridled discretion. They must still explain why they chose to favor one group of recipients over another. Thus, it is untenable to suggest that a state‘s decision to favor one group of recipients over another by itself qualifies as a legitimate state interest. An intent to discriminate is not a legitimate state interest.“). If even the deferential limits on state action
I acknowledge that the deference afforded by courts to legislative enactments is significantly greater in the context of economic regulation than it is “in matters of personal liberty.” St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 221 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); see also Allison B. Kingsmill, Note, Of Butchers, Bakers, and Casket Makers: St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille and the Fifth Circuit‘s Rejection of Pure Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate State Interest, 75 La. L. Rev. 933, 936 (2015) (“The [Supreme] Court has not invalidated a single piece of economic legislation on due process or equal protection grounds since [the 1930s], opting for a more deferential, rational basis review of state laws.“). But this difference in degree does not compel the conclusion that our deference in the economic sphere must be absolute. Nor will an insistence on some legitimate, non-protectionist state interest result in sweeping judicial entanglement in the legislative process.