JAMES SEABROOK, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, -against- CITY OF NEW YORK; LYNELLE MAGINLEY-LIDDIE; LOUIS MOLINA; VINCENT SCHIRALDI; CYNTHIA BRANN; RONALD BRERERTON; and ANTHONY MONASTERO, Defendants.
24-cv-2029 (PKC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
August 4, 2025
CASTEL, U.S.D.J.
CASTEL, U.S.D.J.,
Plaintiff James Seabrook was convicted of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 3.5 to 7 years. At the time of his sentencing, Seabrook had already spent over 7.5 years in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC“). Despite having already served more than his 7-year maximum sentence, the state court‘s Sentencing and Commitment Order committed Seabrook to the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (“NYSDOCS“) and directed DOC to deliver him to state custody. In accordance with this Sentencing and Commitment Order, DOC detained Seabrook while it attempted to facilitate his transfer to NYSDOCS custody. Seabrook was ultimately held at Rikers Island for 17 days before he was released.
In this putative class action, Seabrook brings section 1983 claims against current DOC Commissioner Lynelle Maginley-Liddie, former DOC Commissioner Louis Molina, former DOC Commissioner Vincent Schiraldi, former DOC Commissioner Cynthia Brann, and
The City Commissioner Defendants, Monastero, and the City (collectively “defendants“) move to dismiss all claims against them. For reasons that will be explained, the Court will grant defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
For the purposes of defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court accepts well-pleaded allegations in Seabrook‘s Amended Complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Seabrook‘s favor. See Koch v. Christie‘s Intern. PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012).
On May 6, 2016, Seabrook was arrested and charged with six crimes, including Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. (ECF 19 ¶ 68.) On April 17, 2019, the jury in Seabrook‘s first trial found him guilty of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, but was unable to reach a verdict as to other offenses with which he was charged, including Murder in the Second Degree.2 (Id. ¶ 69.) At his second trial in 2022, the jury was
On January 31, 2024, Seabrook was sentenced in the New York Supreme Court, New York County, Criminal Term, to an indeterminate sentence of 3.5 to 7 years for his 2019 conviction of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. (Id. ¶ 74.) Because Seabrook had spent over 7.5 years in DOC custody by the time of his sentencing, he had already served more than his 7-year maximum sentence. (Id. ¶¶ 73, 75.) Rather than order Seabrook‘s immediate release, however, the state court in its Sentencing and Commitment Order committed him to the custody of NYSDOCS and directed DOC to deliver him to the custody of NYSDOCS. (ECF 49-1 at 2.) At his sentencing hearing, Seabrook‘s attorney stated that Seabrook “has served the entirety of his sentence” and recognized that “his entry into [NYSDOCS] will be merely administrative, meaning he will go in, [NYSDOCS] will process time, and he will ultimately be released . . . It may be two days, it may be two weeks before he is processed.” (ECF 53-1 at 18-19.) The state court similarly noted that Seabrook “is going to be released shortly” and “is going to in simply for a time calculation. And we all know how that is going to come out.” (Id. at 26-27.) Seabrook‘s attorney also submitted an affirmation to the state court at the time of sentencing requesting that it order NYSDOCS to not cut Seabrook‘s hair upon taking custody of him. (Id. at 19; ECF 49-3.) In the affirmation, Seabrook‘s attorney stated that Seabrook “is currently in the custody” of DOC, “has served his entire sentence,” and “[h]is entry
The Sentencing and Commitment Order selected the following direction on the preprinted form order:
THE SAID DEFENDANT BE AND HEREBY IS COMMITTED TO THE CUSTODY OF THE: NYS Department of Correctional Services (NYSDOCS) until released in accordance with the law, and being a person sixteen (16) years or older not presently in the custody of NYSDOCS, (New York City Department of Corrections) is directed to deliver the defendant to the custody of NYSDOCS as provided in 7 NYCRR Part 103.4
(ECF 49-1 at 2.)
After his sentencing, Seabrook remained in de facto DOC custody at Rikers Island for 17 days before being released on February 16, 2024. (ECF 19 ¶¶ 76-77.) During this 17-day period, Seabrook and his counsel “notified numerous DOC officials” that he was being detained in excess of his maximum sentence. (Id. ¶ 80.) On February 9, Seabrook‘s attorney “notified a representative of DOC‘s Office of the General Counsel” of Seabrook‘s excess detainment and that he “should be released immediately.” (Id. ¶ 81.) A “member of DOC‘s Office of the General Counsel” responded that Seabrook was “awaiting transfer to state custody. Once he goes upstate his time will be calculated there. [DOC] does not calculate state sentences.” (Id. ¶ 82.) On February 16, Seabrook‘s attorney wrote to “the member of the Office
Seabrook filed the Amended Complaint on June 3, 2024, asserting claims on behalf of himself and others similarly situated against the City Commissioner Defendants and Monastero under section 1983 for violation of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Seabrook contends that his 17-day detainment by DOC in excess of his maximum sentence was unconstitutional. He also asserts a claim against the City of New York under section 1983 for municipal liability. Seabrook contends that the City of New York “has an official policy and practice of continuing the detention of persons who already have spent more time in custody prior to sentencing, as a result of the charges that culminated in the sentence, than the person‘s maximum term of imprisonment.” (Id. ¶ 45.) He claims that “[t]he City‘s official policy and practice is to continue the detention of such persons until they are transferred to [NYSDOCS] custody” and that, separate from his case, this policy and practice also “includes continuing the detention of persons beyond the date on which they were entitled to conditional release.” (Id. ¶¶ 46, 61.)
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under
When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Personal Involvement
Section 1983 “purports to create a damages remedy against every state official for the violation of any person‘s federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997). It is a “fundamental prerequisite” to establishing a section 1983 claim that “a plaintiff must show the defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” Gunn v. Annucci, 20-cv-02004 (PMH), 2021 WL 1699949, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2021) (quoting Boley v. Durets, 687 F. App‘x 40, 41 (2d Cir. 2017)). A failure “to allege that a defendant was personally involved in, or responsible for, the conduct complained of renders a complaint ‘fatally defective on its face.‘” Id. (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1987)). In Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020), the Second Circuit made clear following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) that “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability.”
Seabrook fails to allege that the City Commissioner Defendants were personally involved in the constitutional deprivations of which he complains. The City Commissioner Defendants’ personal involvement is almost entirely premised on the allegation that each of them was “personally involved in the formulation and execution of the City‘s official policy and practice of continuing the detention of persons who already have spent more time in custody prior to their sentencings than their maximum terms of imprisonment.” (ECF 19 ¶¶ 16-20.) Seabrook contends that this allegation alone is sufficient to show personal involvement based on two post-Tangreti decisions where courts in this Circuit have concluded that a policymaker can be deemed to be personally involved in a constitutional violation if the allegations can be read to
In Vives v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit established a framework for assessing under what circumstances a municipality can be held liable under section 1983 for creating a municipal policy when it enforces a state law. The Second Circuit observed that “[t]he word ‘policy’ generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives.” Id. at 350 (quoting Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)). It identified the “foundational question” to its liability inquiry
When a state statute by its own terms mandates its enforcement, municipal officials who merely carry out that law will not have had a “meaningful choice” whether to do so. Vives, 524 F.3d at 353. In Vives, the Second Circuit remanded for further fact-finding on the issue of whether the municipality had a “meaningful choice” as to whether it would enforce the statute that the plaintiff was arrested and detained for violating allegedly in contravention of his constitutional rights. Id. at 354-56. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit “cautioned that the statute in question did ‘not constitute such a mandate because it simply defines an offense without directing municipal officials to take any steps to act when the statute is violated.‘” Juzumas, 33 F.4th at 688 (quoting Vives, 524 F.3d at 354). In contrast, in Juzumas the statute in question “direct[ed] that long guns ‘shall be removed and declared a nuisance’ in the event that they are not surrendered upon the suspension or revocation of a pistol license.” Id. The municipality had adopted a policy pursuant to which it required the plaintiff, whose pistol license had been revoked, to surrender his long guns, allegedly in violation of his constitutional rights.
At least one court in this Circuit has applied Vives to shield a municipality from liability based on its enforcement of a court order issued pursuant to a state law. Vaher v. Town of Orangetown, N.Y., 133 F. Supp. 3d 574, 605-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). In Town of Orangetown, after the plaintiff‘s property was seized by the Orangetown Police Department (“OPD“) under a warrant, the Justice Court of the Town of Orangetown issued a “Return Order” “pursuant to
Here, the state court‘s Sentencing and Commitment Order was issued pursuant to state law.
Seabrook fails to allege that DOC and the City Commissioner Defendants had a “meaningful choice” in enforcing the Sentencing and Commitment Order. Vives, 524 F.3d at 353. Instead of effectuating Seabrook‘s immediate release after sentencing, the Sentencing and Commitment Order required that he initially be detained by DOC so that DOC could then transfer him to NYSDOCS custody. In taking physical custody of Seabrook at Rikers Island and attempting to transfer him to state custody during the 17-day period that he was detained, therefore, DOC was merely obeying the state court‘s Sentencing and Commitment Order. Seabrook does not plausibly allege that DOC or the City Commissioner Defendants had any independent authority to deviate from the state court‘s mandate by declining to take physical custody of him or releasing him before transfer to state custody.5 To the contrary, as the Second
Seabrook‘s remaining allegations against the City Commissioner Defendants also do not give rise to a reasonable inference that they were personally involved in his alleged constitutional violations. Beyond their claimed policymaker status, the City Commissioner Defendants’ alleged roles in Seabrook‘s constitutional deprivations are limited to (1) their positions atop the DOC hierarchy as current Commissioner, in Maginley-Liddie‘s case, former Commissioners, in Molina‘s, Schiraldi‘s, and Brann‘s case, and current Deputy Commissioner of Security Operations, in Brererton‘s case, and (2) that each of them “knew of and disregarded the fact that [Seabrook] was being detained beyond his maximum sentence and [was] deliberately indifferent to the violation of his rights.” (ECF 19 ¶¶ 16-20, 110, 121, 136.) The allegations based on the City Commissioner Defendants’ positions in the DOC hierarchy are insufficient to establish personal involvement. See Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[M]ere ‘linkage in the prison chain of command’ is insufficient to implicate a state commissioner of corrections or a prison superintendent in a § 1983 claim.“) (quoting Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1985)); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that a section 1983 defendant cannot “be held personally responsible simply because he
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Seabrook‘s claims against the City Commissioner Defendants for failure to adequately plead their personal involvement.
As to the remaining individual defendant, Monastero, Seabrook alleges that he was “personally involved in the formulation and execution of the City‘s official policy and
While Seabrook‘s additional allegations against Monastero plausibly suggest some personal involvement in his alleged constitutional violations, for the reasons explained below Seabrook still fails to plead “the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against” Monastero. Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 620. As a result, the Court will dismiss Seabrook‘s claims against Monastero for failure to state a claim.
Seabrook alleges that his 17-day detainment at Rikers Island after he had already spent more time in custody than the maximum term of his indeterminate sentence violated his Eighth Amendment rights. “A plaintiff asserting an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to
Seabrook has plausibly alleged that his 17-day detainment at Rikers Island “qualifies as a harm of constitutional magnitude under the first prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis.” Id. at 1085. At the time that Seabrook was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 3.5
Nonetheless, this alleged harm alone does not mean that Seabrook suffered a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. To state an Eighth Amendment claim, he must also plausibly allege that the charged official, Monastero, acted with at least deliberate indifference to his continued detention. See id. at 1084-86. Seabrook has not done so here. To start, the Second Circuit has noted that if a charged official “could not do anything about [the plaintiff‘s] prolonged detention as a matter of law, then any deliberate indifference on [their] part would likely be irrelevant.” Id. at 1086. That is because “[t]here must be ‘a causal connection between the official‘s response to the problem and the infliction of the unjustified detention.‘” Id. (quoting Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110). In Hurd, the Second Circuit expressed skepticism that the charged official, whom the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate had “any authority or duty” to change erroneous “jail time certifications” issued by DOC that kept the plaintiff in prison beyond his mandatory release date, could be deliberately indifferent to that resulting harm. Id. at 1082, 1086. As previously discussed, it was the state court‘s Sentencing and Commitment Order that
In any event, and despite Monastero‘s lack of independent authority, the Amended Complaint‘s allegations demonstrate that he was part of an effort inside DOC to rectify the problem, rather than that he was deliberately indifferent to Seabrook‘s detention. As DOC Warden Caputo wrote to Seabrook‘s lawyers on February 16, copying Monastero, members of the Custody Management Unit “had been working to ‘expedite’ [Seabrook‘s] transfer to State custody ‘to no avail.‘” (ECF 19 ¶ 84.) Because in his role as Head of the Custody Management Unit Monastero was “extensively involved in all day-to-day DOC custody management practices, decisions, and actions,” it is reasonable to infer that he was involved in this attempt to hasten Seabrook‘s transfer. (Id. ¶ 21.) Additionally, Monastero‘s communication to Seabrook‘s lawyers informing them that “they were waiting for [NYSDOCS] to authorize [Seabrook‘s] release” shows that he was willing to undertake an alternative course of action to Seabrook‘s delayed transfer, so long as NYSDOCS gave its “authorization.” (Id. ¶ 85.) Based on these facts, Seabrook has not plausibly alleged that his continued detention was brought about in any way by deliberate indifference on the part of Monastero. As the Second Circuit has made clear, “If a period of prolonged detention results from . . . processing or other administrative delays, as opposed to the deliberate indifference of prison officials, then there is no Eighth Amendment liability.” Hurd, 984 F.3d at 1086. “[T]he degree to which a harm is ‘unnecessary’ in the sense
For these reasons, the Court will dismiss Seabrook‘s Eighth Amendment claim against Monastero.
Fourteenth Amendment
Seabrook also alleges that his detainment at Rikers Island violated his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. “The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits states from ‘depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.‘” Matzell v. Annucci, 64 F.4th 425, 436 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting
Seabrook‘s Fourteenth Amendment claims against Monastero do not implicate a cognizable liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Without a doubt, “[t]he general liberty interest in freedom from detention is perhaps the most fundamental interest that the Due Process Clause protects.” Id. That interest “implicates the Due Process Clause not only when a jury convicts [a prisoner] or when a court initially sentences him, but also when prison officials interpret and implement the sentence that the trial court has imposed.” Id. at 142. The Second Circuit has specifically recognized that “an inmate has a liberty interest in being released upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment.” Id. (quoting Calhoun v. New York State Division of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1993)). As previously discussed, Seabrook has plausibly alleged that on the date of his sentencing he was entitled to immediate release based on the time he had already spent in DOC custody. Thus, the state court‘s Sentencing and Commitment Order, which instead committed him to the custody of NYSDOCS and required his initial detainment by DOC, likely implicated the Due Process Clause by depriving Seabrook of his liberty interest in freedom from detention. Because Seabrook does not allege that DOC or Monastero played any role in the state judge‘s decision to not order his immediate release, however, the Court‘s inquiry is limited to whether their subsequent course of
The Second Circuit‘s decision in Francis is instructive. There, the court found that state prison officials’ “decision to implement [the plaintiff‘s] sentence in a manner that diverged from the sentence pronounced by the sentencing court implicated a liberty interest of the highest order” and in turn “required them to provide certain procedural protections to safeguard [his] liberty interest in avoiding future incarceration.” Id. In reaching this determination, the Second Circuit distinguished the plaintiff‘s situation from the “typical case” where “implementation of the prisoner‘s sentence follows straightforwardly from the sentencing court‘s commitment order.” Id. Here, the Amended Complaint‘s allegations demonstrate that DOC and Monastero sought to implement Seabrook‘s sentence in a manner consistent with the Sentencing and Commitment Order. DOC was charged with transferring Seabrook to state custody. Accordingly, DOC detained him at Rikers Island while its officials, including Monastero, attempted to arrange his transfer. (ECF 19 ¶¶ 82, 84, 85.) Seabrook has not alleged that DOC or Monastero interpreted or implemented his sentence in a manner that diverged from the Sentencing and Commitment Order.7 Nor has he alleged that they had any authority or duty to deviate from this court order issued pursuant to state law. That there was a delay in transferring Seabrook to state custody is largely attributable to processing or administrative issues that Monastero, among others, tried to overcome. (Id. ¶¶ 82, 84.) Therefore, the Court concludes that DOC‘s and Monastero‘s efforts to implement Seabrook‘s sentence in a manner
Because the implementation of Seabrook‘s sentence did not deny Seabrook any cognizable liberty interest, the Court need not determine whether his allegations against Monastero satisfy the shock-the-conscience standard of the substantive due process analysis or whether the amount of process afforded to Seabrook was sufficient to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. In any event, the Court concludes the Seabrook‘s Fourteenth Amendment claims against Monastero also fail at the second prongs of both the substantive and procedural due process inquiries.
For Seabrook to satisfy the second prong of his substantive due process claim, “[t]he interference with the plaintiff‘s protected right must be so shocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due Process Clause would not countenance it even were it accompanied by full procedural protection.” Matzell, 64 F.4th at 436 (quoting Southerland, 680 F.3d at 152). “Negligently inflicted harm will not constitute a constitutional violation, but ‘conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest’ can satisfy the shock-the-conscience standard . . . as can, in some circumstances, conduct that ‘resulted from deliberate indifference[.]‘” Id. (citations omitted). Seabrook has not plausibly alleged that merely by seeking to implement his sentence in a manner consistent with the Sentencing and Commitment Order Monastero‘s actions rose to the level of deliberate indifference in violation of his substantive due process rights, let alone that Monastero acted with any intent to unjustifiably prolong Seabrook‘s detention. To the contrary, the Amended Complaint‘s allegations show that after Seabrook‘s attorneys communicated to DOC that he was being detained beyond his maximum sentence, Monastero was part of an effort to expedite his transfer to state custody and
As to the second prong of the procedural due process analysis, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.‘” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). “In determining ‘what process is due,’ . . . ‘due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.‘” Francis, 942 F.3d at 142-43 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). To assess whether the government‘s procedures attendant upon a deprivation meet “that flexible standard under a given set of circumstances,” the Second Circuit applies the three-step framework laid out in Mathews, which considers “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 143 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court assumes solely for the purposes of its procedural due process inquiry that the procedures that DOC and Monastero followed in implementing Seabrook‘s sentence affected his private interest in freedom from detention, which was “an interest of the highest order” and the importance of which “requires no further elaboration.” Id.
Regarding the second Mathews factor, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Seabrook‘s liberty under the procedures used here was virtually nonexistent. The Sentencing and Commitment Order was unambiguous in its commitment of Seabrook to the custody of
Turning to the third Mathews factor, the Court considers the governmental function involved here and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. As previously noted, DOC‘s and Monastero‘s function in implementing Seabrook‘s sentence was “essentially ministerial.” Francis, 942 F.3d at 144. The ministerial nature of their function “makes the addition of extra levels of procedure particularly feasible.” Id. Nonetheless, the fiscal and administrative burdens that the government would sustain as a result of additional or substitute process through which an inmate in Seabrook‘s situation could challenge an alleged over-detention would be high. DOC and Monastero were charged with implementing an unambiguous Sentencing and Commitment Order that on its face did not appear to contradict applicable state law. Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that in the majority of cases DOC will receive commitment orders that do not appear to be in error under
Having considered all three Mathews factors, the Court concludes that Seabrook‘s allegations do not give rise to a plausible inference that the procedures that DOC and Monastero followed in implementing his sentence violated his right to due process.
For these reasons, the Court will dismiss Seabrook‘s Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process claims against Monastero.
Fourth Amendment
Seabrook further alleges that his detainment at Rikers Island constituted a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, because the detainment of which Seabrook complains followed his lawful conviction of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, the Court concludes that his claims arising from that detention must necessarily be brought under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. See Von Stein v. Pruyne, 15-cv-7039 (CS), 2020 WL 3498431, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (“[B]ecause the detention of which
Municipal Liability
As previously noted, while Seabrook did not explicitly assert a separate claim for municipal liability, the Court has interpreted the allegations in his Amended Complaint to assert a claim for municipal liability under Monell against the City of New York. Seabrook‘s Monell
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at ECF 47.
P. Kevin Castel
United States District Judge
Dated: New York, New York
August 4, 2025