72 N.Y.2d 346 | NY | 1988
OPINION OF THE COURT
Under New York’s bipartite corrections system, individuals ultimately subject to State custody may initially be confined in county jails, to be transferred to State correctional facilities after conviction and sentencing. This appeal focuses on the
The legal issue centers on CPL 430.20 (1), which directs —with apparent simplicity — that "[w]hen a sentence of imprisonment is pronounced * * * the defendant must forthwith be committed to the custody of the appropriate public servant and detained until the sentence is complied with.” What is the meaning of the statutory term "forthwith?” We conclude that the State’s responsibility under the statute is to accept without delay inmates in local facilities who have been committed to the custody of the State Department of Correctional Services (see, Penal Law § 70.20). While there may be some limited flexibility in CPL 430.20 (1), the statute does not vest discretion in the State to delay accepting State-ready inmates on the basis of relative overcrowding at State and local facilities.
This article 78 proceeding is brought by 49 of the State’s 58 county Sheriffs,
Petitioners contend that, owing to State prison overcrowding, DOCS as a matter of policy has delayed accepting inmates from county jails, sometimes for six months or more, unless otherwise judicially ordered (see, e.g., Matter of Dooley v Coughlin, 72 NY2d 984 [decided today]; County of Nassau v
While denying petitioners’ statistics and other allegations of the petition, respondent DOCS Commissioner does not dispute the underlying proposition that relative conditions at detention facilities are considered in determining when to accept inmates into State custody. Indeed, he contends that it is entirely appropriate under CPL 430.20 (1), as well as Correction Law §§ 70 (2), 137 and 504 (1) relating to safe, healthy and humane confinement, to weigh crowding in the respective facilities as well as the options available to the county officials to increase the capacity of local jails; he maintains that these are necessary components of the statutory term "forthwith.” Respondents additionally advance several defenses in their response to the petition, including the Sheriffs’ lack of standing to challenge the timeliness of parole revocation proceedings.
Supreme Court ordered that DOCS must accept inmates, including adjudicated parole violators, within 10 days after notification of State-readiness.
We now modify the Appellate Division order, reinstating the judgment of Supreme Court as to the meaning of "forthwith.”
I.
The modern-day prison overcrowding crisis has suddenly focused attention on the statutory term "forthwith,” a word which has been in the English language for centuries and in CPL 430.20 (1) and its predecessor since at least 1881, without significant controversy.
Three times recently we have considered the term. In Crespo v Hall (56 NY2d 856), we concluded that the relevant statutes permitted no discretion as to when juvenile offenders had to be accepted for transfer by the State Division for Youth (DFY), and that "forthwith” means without delay and cannot be read to permit transfer of juveniles whenever DFY deems it prudent. We left undisturbed a 10-day limit for transfer, there having been no showing that this period was inadequate for routine processing or otherwise unreasonable, and we further noted that the limit should yield in particular cases of demonstrated need. Similarly, in County of Nassau v Cuomo (69 NY2d 737, supra), this court affirmed the Appellate Division’s conclusions that "forthwith” in CPL 430.20 (1) means without delay and cannot be read to permit transfer to the custody of State officials only when they deem it prudent or appropriate. Again the court concluded that a 14-day period did not appear to be either inadequate for routine processing
We reiterate that the statutory mandate to commit individuals to the officials responsible for their custody “forthwith” means that it is to be done without delay, at once, promptly. "Forthwith” signals immediacy. It was in fact the very word used in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1881 sections antedating CPL 430.20 (1). Those sections provided that when a judgment is pronounced a certified copy of entry must “forthwith” be furnished to the officer whose duty it is to execute the judgment; if a judgment of imprisonment, the defendant must "forthwith” be committed to the custody of the proper officer, and detained by him until compliance with the judgment (Code Grim Pro §§ 486, 487). The use of “forthwith” in those provisions, as in CPL 430.20 (1) — every one of them directory, none of them discretionary — leaves no doubt that their mandates were to be accomplished with dispatch. Thus, we conclude that State-ready inmates (including adjudicated parole violators) committed to State custody must be accepted by respondent Commissioner without delay, it being the statutory responsibility of the State to provide for their detention until their sentence is carried out.
While the Legislature made clear its intention that commitment to the custody of the appropriate public servant should take place without delay, its choice of “forthwith” rather than the specification of a hard-and-fast number of days left certain limited flexibility in implementing its mandate. But any such flexibility in "forthwith” simply cannot accommodate the Commissioner’s view that the statute vests discretion in DOCS to accept defendants from county jails when it deems it prudent or appropriate to do so (see, County of Nassau v Cuomo, 69 NY2d 737, supra; Crespo v Hall, 56 NY2d 856, supra).
Respondent Commissioner urges that the issue can be resolved only after a court analyzes the circumstances in each locality, determines which facilities are overcrowded and what steps are being taken to alleviate overcrowding, and "prioritizes” the allocation of space in State correctional facilities, dependent in part on a locality’s effort to alleviate overcrowding. Such a construction, however, ignores the fact that it is
The Legislature specified no hard-and-fast number of days in enacting CPL 430.20 (1); nor do we in construing it. We conclude that Supreme Court’s order that transfer be accomplished within the 10 days of State-readiness comports with the mandate of CPL 430.20 (1). While "forthwith” has been held to mean as little as 48 hours (Benjamin v Malcolm, 629 F Supp 713, affd 803 F2d 46, cert denied sub nom. Cuomo v Koehler, 480 US 910, supra), here Supreme Court— exercising discretion appropriate to the judiciary in applying this statute — concluded that the term could also accommodate respondent Commissioner’s representation to the court that DOCS’ "logistic needs require that the Department plan for the receipt of new inmates ten days in advance.” There was no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court’s holding.
The Commissioner’s argument, in the end, is a plea to the courts to redistribute responsibility for housing the State’s vastly expanded prison population, placing a greater burden on the localities, who (he alleges) have — relative to the State— failed to meet increased needs by enlarging their facilities. Such a plea for change in the law is appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of government, not to the courts.
II.
Petitioners’ remaining contentions lack merit.
Both the trial court and the Appellate Division correctly determined that petitioner Sheriffs lack standing to challenge the alleged failure on the part of the Division of Parole to schedule timely parole revocation procedures under Executive
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, with costs, by reinstating the judgment of Supreme Court, Albany County, with respect to the meaning of "forthwith” in CPL 430.20 (1), and otherwise affirmed.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.
Order modified, with costs to appellants, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.
. Petitioners’ request for class action certification was denied and is not before us. Respondents’ request for dismissal for failure to join all other officials responsible for operations of local facilities as "necessary parties” (CPLR 1001 [b] [2], [5]) was correctly denied on the ground that adequate relief can be granted without their joinder. Respondents’ contention that in order for a court to determine the meaning of "forthwith” it must "do a comparative analysis of particular circumstances in each locality and determine which localities are overcrowded and what efforts those localities have taken to alleviate overcrowding” is without merit.
. Petitioners sought to compel timely acceptance of "State-ready” prisoners and adjudicated parole violators, which is the relief that was ordered by Supreme Court. There was no dispute between the parties as to the requirement of State-readiness.