SCOTT K. CAMP v. RYAN CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS et al.
Case No. S23A0073
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
September 30, 2022
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.
The following order was passed:
SCOTT K. CAMP v. RYAN CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS et al.
Upon consideration, it appearing that the attached opinion decides an election issue, which must be handled in an expedited manner, any motion for reconsideration must be received in the Supreme Court E-Filing/Docket (SCED) System by 12:00 p.m. on Friday, October 7, 2022.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk‘s Office, Atlanta
I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
Therese S. Barnes, Clerk
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court‘s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court‘s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 30, 2022
S23A0073. CAMP v. WILLIAMS et al.
This case is a dispute over who can run for Chief Magistrate Judge of Douglas County in the November 2022 election. After the incumbent successfully challenged the qualifications of the only person who qualified to run for the Democratic nomination, the Douglas County Democratic Party Executive Committee purported to name a replacement. That led to another challenge, this one by the incumbent‘s husband (a registered voter eligible to vote in the election), contending that the substitution was improper. The superior court agreed that the Douglas County Board of Elections and Registration (the “Board“) was not legally authorized to allow the substitution, but ruled that the statutory vehicle through which the challenge was asserted —
We granted an application for discretionary appeal, expedited consideration in the light of the rapidly approaching election, and now reverse. Code section 21-2-6 allows the challenge here because “qualifications,” as that term is used in the statute, includes all of the prerequisites for seeking and holding office. The substitute candidate did not properly qualify to seek office, so the Board lacked authority to put him on the ballot. And because electors have an interest in having the community‘s government offices filled by duly qualified officials, the Board‘s decision allowing an unqualified candidate on the ballot violated a substantial right of an elector. Accordingly, the decision below must be reversed.
1. This controversy began when the incumbent Chief Magistrate Judge (and Republican nominee),1 Susan Camp, successfully challenged in superior court the qualifications of her would-be-opponent, Sylvia Baker, on the grounds that Baker is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia. Baker was the only Democratic candidate who qualified to run for Chief Magistrate, so her removal from the Democratic Primary ballot meant that Camp would run without a Democratic challenger in the general election.
In response, the Douglas County Democratic Party purported to substitute a new candidate before the primary election — Ryan Christopher Williams — who had qualified to run for superior court judge. Scott Camp, Susan Camp‘s husband and a registered voter eligible to vote in the election for Chief Magistrate, challenged that action in a written submission to the Board.
After a hearing, the Board dismissed the challenge, despite the fact that Williams was not on the list of certified Democratic candidates for the chief magistrate seat. See
The Board announced that Williams would appear on the general election ballot as the Democratic nominee for Chief Magistrate Judge. Camp sought judicial
The superior court agreed that the Board should not have replaced Baker with Williams, but refused to reverse the Board‘s decision. The challenge allowed by
Following that decision, Camp sought and obtained discretionary review from this Court. We directed the parties to address one question: “[d]id the Superior Court err in concluding that
2. The answer to that question is yes. Code section 21-2-6 does authorize voters to challenge a candidate who has not satisfied the procedural prerequisites to appearing on the ballot. As explained below, the word “qualifications” is not as a semantic matter limited to the prerequisites for holding office. Moreover, the permission to challenge a candidate‘s qualifications to “seek” office indicates that prerequisites to appearing on the ballot are included in the challengeable qualifications. And this understanding is confirmed by subsection (d) of the statute, which provides that failure to satisfy one particular procedural prerequisite — payment with a valid check — requires an automatic finding of failure to meet the “qualifications” (albeit for “holding” the office) even without any challenge.
Code section 21-2-6 provides that “[e]very candidate for county office who is certified by the county executive committee of a political party or who files a notice of candidacy . . . shall meet the constitutional and statutory qualifications for holding the office being sought.”
“When we consider the meaning of a statute, ‘we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.‘” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (quoting Arby‘s Restaurant Group, Inc. v. McRae, 292 Ga. 243, 245 (1) (734 SE2d 55) (2012)). “To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. at 172-173 (1) (a) (citations and punctuation omitted).
(a) Starting with the text, the ordinary meaning gleaned from a review of dictionary definitions of “qualification” offers little support for Williams‘s and the Board‘s argument that the word as used in the statute can refer only to the attributes required to hold office. And although examination of dictionary definitions of a single word is not a substitute for a broader consideration of context and history, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 602 (3) (820 SE2d 696) (2018) (declining to apply dictionary definitions when an argument based on them “views one word in isolation and ignores the context“), “reviewing dictionaries from the era of the statute‘s enactment may assist in determining its meaning.” State v. Henry, 312 Ga. 632, 637 (3) (a) (864 SE2d 415) (2021) (citing Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227-228 (134 SCt 870, 187 LE2d 729) (2014)).
Around the time the statute was enacted, see Ga. Laws 1980 p. 312, 313-314, § 2, “qualification” was commonly defined to mean things like “the act of qualifying or the state of being qualified“; “any quality, knowledge, ability, experience, or acquirement that fits a person for a position, office, profession, etc.” or “a condition that must be met in order to exercise certain rights.” Webster‘s Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary, 1473 (2d ed. 1983); see also Webster‘s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 963 (1985); Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary, 1858 (1976).
Along the same lines, “qualified” was commonly defined to mean things like “having met conditions or requirements set“; and “having the necessary or desirable qualifications.” Webster‘s Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary, supra at 1473; see also Webster‘s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, supra at 963; Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary, supra at 1858.
As a matter of ordinary meaning, therefore, there is no reason to believe that the General Assembly‘s use of the words “qualifications” or “qualified” compels the conclusion that
(b) Moreover, “[a]s we have said many times before when interpreting legal text, ‘we do not read words in isolation, but rather in context.‘” City of Guyton v. Barrow, 305 Ga. 799, 805 (3) (828 SE2d 366) (2019) (quoting Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 573 (3) (a) (731 SE2d 731) (2012)). Indeed, “[t]he primary determinant of a text‘s meaning is its context[.]” City of Guyton, 305 Ga. at 805 (3). So “[e]ven if words are apparently plain in meaning, they must not be read in isolation and instead, must be read in the context of the regulation as a whole.” Id. (quoting Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 187 (II) (B) (824 SE2d 265) (2019)). To discern that context, “we may look to the provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.” Langley v. State, 313 Ga. 141, 143 (2) (868 SE2d 759) (2022) (quoting Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1) (774 SE2d 688) (2015)). Indeed, “all statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together, and harmonized wherever possible.” Langley, 313 Ga. at 143 (2) (quoting Hartley v. Agnes Scott College, 295 Ga. 458, 462 (2) (b) (759 SE2d 857) (2014)).
(i) Beginning with immediate context, two features of
First, subsections (b) and (c) contemplate a challenge to the candidate‘s qualifications to “seek and hold” office. If the word “seek” is not superfluous, then it suggests that an elector may show that the candidate is not “qualified” to run for office — not merely that he would not be qualified to serve, if elected. See Hill v. Owens, 292 Ga. 380, 383 (2) (a) (738 SE2d 56) (2013) (“this Court avoids interpreting statutes in a manner that renders any portion of them surplusage or meaningless“).
Take
Williams and the Board disagree. They point out that subsection (b) points back to the qualifications of any candidate “referred to in subsection (a)” — and they conclude that this means “qualifications” refers only to the requirements for holding the office.
But even that misreads the statute. Subsection (b) does not simply refer to the “qualifications” mentioned in subsection (a), it makes clear that one may challenge “the qualifications of any candidate referred to in subsection (a).”
Thus, like the ordinary meaning of the words themselves, the context of
(ii) Turning to broader statutory context, this understanding also comports with the use of related terminology and related provisions in the Elections Code.
For candidates, “[q]ualifications” are the prerequisites (whether things like residency and bar membership or procedural steps and processes) to seek and hold office. See
“Qualifying,” in turn, is the process by which a person demonstrates to election officials that he or she possesses or satisfies the necessary prerequisites. See, e.g.,
And completing qualifying makes a person “eligible” to seek
office. See
On this score, the Board argues that many of these examples use “qualification” in isolation, rather than in the context of “holding the office being sought.”
Williams, for his part, adds that the process or means of qualifying is neither equivalent to nor interchangeable with a candidate‘s qualifications. That is true, so far as it goes, but (for the reasons just discussed) it does not show that procedural hurdles are not qualifications necessary “to seek and hold” office,
In short, our conclusion — that the “qualifications” referenced in
(c) Thus,
That conclusion is enough to resolve this case. It is undisputed that Williams did not qualify for the election through the Democratic primary in the time prescribed by law. See
Thus, Williams did not “qualify for [the] election” under
3. Williams and the Board also urge us to affirm the judgment below under the “right for any reason” rule, arguing that Camp has not shown that his “substantial rights” were prejudiced within the meaning of the statute‘s remedial section. See
Code section 21-2-6 (e) provides that “[t]he [reviewing] court may reverse or modify the decision [of the county elections and registration board] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the superintendent are” unlawful on one of several specified bases. See also
Georgia law recognizes voters’ “interest in having the public offices in their community held by legally qualified persons[.]” Lilly v. Heard, 295 Ga. 399, 404-405 (2) (c) (761 SE2d 46) (2014) (citing
Williams and the Board argue that we have described interests like the one Camp attempts to vindicate here as a “public . . . as opposed to a private right.” Lilly, 295 Ga. at 405 (2) (c). True enough. But Lilly said so only in the context of explaining that one such challenge had preclusive effect on a subsequent similar challenge to the same candidate. Because the interest in qualified candidates is common to the political community as a whole, voters “have an identity of interests” making them “in privity” for purposes of res judicata. Id. at 404-405 (2) (c). That is all that Lilly meant by “public right.”
Nothing about Lilly‘s holding means that voters, as individuals, do not have an interest sufficient for vindication under this statute — quite the opposite. The first challenger in Lilly was himself an individual voter — and his individual assertion of the public right was both permissible (the relevant point here) and had preclusive effect on the second set of challengers (the key point in Lilly). Id. at 400 (1), 404-405 (2) (c). Indeed, we have held in other contexts that voting rights are individually cognizable for litigation purposes, even if
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
BETHEL, Justice, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in full.
I write separately to note and address a September 28, 2022, filing in this Court by the Board and Kidd, which they styled as a “Notice to Court.” While acknowledging that the information contained therein is not part of the record in the case and thus does not provide a basis for the Court‘s decision, the Notice indicates that before placing Williams on the ballot, the Board sought guidance from the Elections Division of the Georgia Secretary of State‘s office, and was advised that “allowing . . . Williams‘s candidacy was the appropriate course of action given the novel situation and lack of clear guidance in state statutes.” The Notice states that “[t]he Board therefore took its obligations seriously. . . .”
I accept the representations made by the Board and Kidd through their counsel (who are officers of the Court) and appreciate the difficulty that government agencies often have in the absence of a statute or court decision expressly on point. I also trust that the Court‘s opinion in this case will provide sufficient guidance in any future such situation and will reinforce that, for a government entity whose authority on the relevant point is purely a creature of statute, the absence of statutory authority is the absence of legal authority to act.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs, Presiding Justice Peterson, Justice Warren, and Justice Colvin join in this concurrence.
Notes
- “qualify,”
OCGA §§ 21-2-9 (d) ;21-2-130 ;21-2-132 (d) (5) ,(j) (1) ;21-2-132.1 (b) ;21-2-134 (b) (1) (B) ,(b) (1) (C) ,(b) (1) (D) ;21-2-137 ;21-2-153 (a) (1) (B) ,(b) ,(c) ,(f) ,(g) (1) ;21-2-153.1 (a) ,(c) ;21-2-157 (b) ;21-2-214 (b) ;21-2-217 (a) ; or - “qualifies,”
OCGA §§ 21-2-131 (b) (1) ,(c) (3) -(5);21-2-135 (a) (1) ;21-2-153 (d) (1) ;21-2-154 (a) ; and even - “qualification(s),”
OCGA §§ 21-2-131 (c) (1) -(2);21-2-153 ,21-2-153.1 ;21-2-182 .