SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Appellants; ROCKETSHIP EDUCATION et al., Real Parties in Interest and Appellants.
No. H041088
Sixth Dist.
Jan. 24, 2017
7 Cal. App. 5th 967
Maribel S. Medina; Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Rex S. Heinke, Michael C. Small, Andrew Scully Oelz; Young, Minney & Corr and Paul C. Minney for Defendants and Appellants.
Reed Smith, Raymond A. Cardozo and Kevin M. Hara for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Ricardo Jesus Soto, Julie Ashby Umansky, Phillip L. Altmann; Latham & Watkins, James L. Arnone, Winston Peter Stromberg and Daniel Jennings Aleshire for California Charter Schools Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants
Akin Gump, Strauss Hauer & Feld, Andrew Scully Oelz; Young, Minney, & Corr and Paul Christian Minney for Real Parties in Interest and Appellants.
Opinion
ELIA, J.—
Appellants, the Santa Clara County Office of Education, the Santa Clara County Board of Education,2 Rocketship Education, and Rocketship Eight Charter School, maintain that county boards of education may issue zoning exemptions pursuant to
We do not need to determine the precise meaning of
I. Background3
A. The Public School System
The Legislature has a constitutionally mandated duty to provide a system of public education. (
The Constitution calls for the election or appointment of a superintendent of schools and a board of education for each county. (
The county superintendent is the head of the county office of education; the county board of education is its governing board. (Today‘s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 207, fn. 4.) Each of the state‘s 58 counties has a county office of education. County offices of education support school districts by, among other things, providing or helping formulate new curricula and designing business and personnel systems.
B. The Santa Clara County Office of Education and the Santa Clara County Board of Education
The Santa Clara County Office of Education (County Office) provides support services to Santa Clara County‘s 31 school districts. The County Office also operates preschool and child development programs, provides environmental education to fifth and sixth graders, partners with districts in
The County Board is the elected governing body of the County Office. According to the County Office‘s 2012 annual budget report, the County Board‘s responsibilities include, but are not limited to, conducting regularly scheduled public meetings, reviewing and adopting the annual budget of the County Office, appointing the county superintеndent of schools, resolving school district attendance and expulsion appeals, adopting textbooks for instructional programs operated by the County Office, and ruling on charter school petitions received by the County Office.
C. Charter Schools
In 1992, the Legislature enacted the Charter Schools Act of 1992 (
Charter schools “can be created in one of five ways: By application to a school district (
Charter schools are part of the public school system. (Wilson, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1139–1140;
“In 2000, California voters enacted Propositiоn 39, which requires school districts to share their facilities with charter schools so that charter school students have access to facilities ‘reasonably equivalent’ to those available to other public school students.” (California Charter Schools Assn. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1221, 1226–1227; see
D. Rocketship Education, Rocketship Eight Charter School, and the Resolution
Rocketship Education (Rocketship) is a network of elementary charter schools targeting low-income students and those who are below basic proficiency on state exams. The County Board has granted Rocketship a county-wide charter to operate up to 25 charter schools.
Rocketship proposed to locate one of its charter schools on property (the Property) owned by the City of San Jose (the City). The Property is located in the District and in the County Office‘s jurisdiction. Use of the Property for a school is not permitted by the City‘s general plan (which designates the Property as open space, parklands, and habitat) or its zoning ordinance (which zones the Property light industrial). Therefore, Rocketship requested that the County Board and the County Office exempt the Property from the City‘s general plan and zoning ordinance. On January 23, 2013, the County Board approved a resolution (the Resolution) exempting the Property from the City‘s general plan and zoning ordinance pursuant to
E. Respondents Seek to Set Aside the County Board‘s Resolution
The District filed a petition for a traditional writ of mandate under
F. Trial Court Ruling
In a March 7, 2014 statement of decision, the trial court ruled that the County Board lacked the authority to invoke
Appellants timely appealed. The California Charter Schools Association has submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants. The League of California Cities has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of respondents.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
” ’ “In reviewing a trial court‘s judgment on a petition for writ of ordinary mandate, we apply the substantial evidence test to the trial court‘s factual findings[, if any].” [Citation.] . . . ’ [Citation.] We independently review findings on legal issues and the interpretation of a statute is a legal issue subject to de novo review.” (Fry v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 539, 549 (Fry).)
“An agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts . . . .” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 (Yamaha).) Thus, we “independently judge the text of the statute, taking into account and respecting the [County Board‘s] interpretation
The parties disagree as to whether the trial court made any findings of fact. Appellants contend it did not. Respondents maintain that deference is owed both to the trial court‘s factual findings and its conclusions of law, and they identify four determinations to which we must defer. In fact, most of those determinations are legal conclusions to which we owe no deference. (Fry, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 549.) In reviewing the statement of decision, we have identified only one factual finding: ” ‘[t]he County Board of Education does not have the unique educational task of mass public education that a school district has.’ ” We need not decide whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence because our construction of
B. Principles of Statutory Construction
” ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature‘s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citations.] The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. [Citation.]” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265.) ” ‘A statutory provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations.’ ” (People v. Dieck (2009) 46 Cal.4th 934, 940.) “[I]f the language allows more than one reasonable construction, we may look to such aids as the legislative history of the measure and maxims of statutory construction. In cases of uncertain meaning, we may also consider the consequences of a particular interpretation, including its impact on public policy. [Citatiоns.]” (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1190.) But ” ‘[w]hen statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895.)
C. Analysis
1. Plain Meaning
The Government Code does not define the phrase “governing board of a school district,” or the term “school district,” for purposes of
We begin with the term “governing board.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines “to govern” as “[t]o direct and control the actions and affairs of.” (Oxford English Dict. Onlinе (2016) <http://www.oed.com> [as of Jan. 24, 2017].) The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines “govern” as “to officially control and lead (a group of people) : to make decisions about laws, taxes, social programs, etc., for (a country, state, etc.).” (Merriam-Webster‘s Online Dict. (2016) <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/govern> [as of Jan. 24, 2017].) The Oxford English Dictionary defines “board” as “the recognized word for a body of persons officially constituted for the transaction or superintendence of some particular business . . . .” (Oxford English Dict. Online, supra, <http://www.oed.com> [as of Jan. 24, 2017].) Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “board” as “[a] group of persons having managerial, supervisory, or advisory powers.” (Black‘s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 208.) The foregoing dictionary definitions reveal that the ordinary meaning of “governing board” is “body that controls or manages.”
Turning tо the term “school district,” the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines that term as “a unit for administration of a public-school system often comprising several towns within a state.” (Merriam-Webster‘s Online Dict., supra, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/school district>
Thus, diсtionaries suggest that the phrase “governing board of a school district” means the “body that controls or manages public schools in a particular region.” However, the term “school district” might also reasonably be construed more narrowly to refer only to those entities commonly referred to as “school districts.” Thus, the meaning of the phrase “governing board of a school district” in
2. Legislative History
” ‘Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent.’ ” (McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group (2010) 48 Cal.4th 104, 110.) The events motivating the enactment of
a. Hall and Town of Atherton
The Legislature enacted
Town of Atherton applied Hall to hold that school districts were not required to comply with municipal zoning ordinances in designating school locations. The court‘s reasoning was twofold: (1) the location and acquisition of a school site is a sovereign activity of the state (Town of Atherton, supra, 159 Cal.App.2d at p. 428) and (2) the state has occupied the field of school site location (id. at p. 422).
b. The Legislative Response
Between 1957 and 1959, the Assembly Interim Committee on Municipal and County Government studied “the problems resulting from the State Supreme Court decision in the case of Hall v. City of Taft.” (Problems of Local Government Resulting From the Hall vs. City of Taft Case Decision Final Report (1959) 1 Appen. to Assem. J. (1959 Reg. Sess.) p. 5; City of Santa Clara, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 158, fn. 3.) Witnesses the Assembly Interim Committee interviewed expressed concern that Hall had immunized a large number of state agencies from local regulation, leaving numerous activities entirely unregulated. By contrast, most witnesses agreed with Hall‘s decision to immunize school districts from complying with local regulations, given that the state had established comprehensive regulations governing school construction. Witnesses reasoned that “uniformity was desirable in school construction in order to attain a high level of safety.” (Problems of Local Governmеnt Resulting from the Hall vs. City of Taft Case Decision, supra, 1 Appen. to Assem. J. (1959 Reg. Sess.) p. 13.) Witnesses “believed school construction should be in a category of its own since it is so closely regulated by the State,” and they recommended that the Legislature “[p]ro-vide that only school districts remain under the immunity provisions of the [Hall] decision.” (Id. at pp. 18, 23.)
Based on the Assembly Interim Committee‘s report, the сourt in City of Santa Clara concluded that “[s]ections 53090 through 53095 were primarily designed to insure that . . . local agencies [other than school districts] . . . could not claim exemption from city and county zoning requirements by virtue of the language contained in Hall. . . .” (City of Santa Clara, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 158, fn. 3.) That court further concluded that, in
This court has noted that
c. Allowing the County Board to Invoke Section 53094 Here Would Be Inconsistent with the Legislature‘s Intent
Hall and Town of Atherton sought to prevent local interference with the state‘s sovereign activities of school construction and school location by immunizing school districts, the entities the state had empowered to carry out those sovereign activities on its behalf, from local regulation. (Hall, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 181 [“[s]chool districts are agencies of the state for the local operation of the state school system“]; Town of Atherton, supra, 159 Cal.App.2d at p. 428 [“the state has expressly granted the power of location to its agencies, the school districts“].) In enacting
Here, the County Board sought to employ
3. The Permissive Code
Appellants urge us to consider
According to appellants, “the permissive code offers critical insight into how the Legislature construes the term ‘school district’ in light of the evolving authority of county boards of educatiоn and county superintendents of schools to operate public schools.” Their view appears to be that the Legislature has come to view county boards of education and school districts as possessing the same powers, such that we should construe “the governing board of a school district” in
4. Our Construction Does Not Produce Absurd Results
Another “fundamental rule[] of statutory construction is that a law should not be applied in a manner producing absurd results, because the Legislature is presumed not to intend such results.” (Fireside Bank Cases (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1129.) However, ” ‘[i]f [a] construction does not result in patently аbsurd results, we may not construe a statute contrary to its plain language and ostensible intent merely because we disagree with the wisdom thereof.’ ” (Fireman‘s Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280.)
Appellants say our interpretation of
One might question the wisdom of the legislative scheme, given the competitive relationship between local school districts and charter schools.8 But the scheme, approved by the electorate in 2000, does not prevent charter schools from competing with school district schools, as the Legislature intended in enacting the Charter Schools Act of 1992. (Prop. 39, § 6, as
5. Our Construction Does Not Violate the Constitution
” ‘It is the rule that where a stаtute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, in whole or in part, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable.’ ” (In re Huddleson (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 618, 624.) The foregoing principle of statutory construction requires us, if possible, to construe
According to appellants, any construction of
6. Administrative Construction
We may properly consider administrative construction of
Yamaha set forth two categories of factors that are relevant to a court‘s assessment of the weight to be afforded to an agency‘s informal statutory interpretation. (Fonseca v. City of Gilroy (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1193.) “First, there are factors indicating a comparative interpretive advantage the agency has over the court due to, for example, the agency‘s authorship of the regulation at issue or the technical nature of the legal text under consideration.” (Ibid.) Here, there are no factors present suggesting county boards of education have an advantage over courts in interpreting
The second category of factors to be considered are “those suggesting the agency‘s interpretation is likely to be correct.” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 13.) They include “indications of careful consideration by senior agency officials . . . , evidence that the agency ‘has consistently maintained the interpretation in question, especiаlly if [it] is long-standing’ . . . , and indications that the agency‘s interpretation was contemporaneous with legislative enactment of the statute being interpreted.” (Ibid., citation omitted.) Appellants contend that they presented evidence of a consistent and long-standing use of the
Appellants presented evidence that six county boards of education invoked the
In sum, the relevant situational factors in this case counsеl in favor of granting the County Board‘s interpretation of
7. Application of Section 53094 to Community Colleges
Appellants claim that in People ex rel. Cooper v. Rancho Santiago College (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 1281, the court recognized the authority of community college districts to override local zoning controls pursuant to
Appellants also contend that use of the
The judgment is affirmed. Appellants shall bear the costs of appeal.
Rushing, P. J., and Premo, J., concurred.
The petition of defendants and appellants for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 12, 2017, S240474.
Notes
Appellants’ request for judicial notice filed on October 6, 2015, is granted. (