In Re Huddleson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Sullivan
The separate cases present a single common issue: the constitutionality of subdivision (2) of section 647a of the Penal Code. This subdivision provides: “Every person who loiters about any school or public place at or near which children attend or normally congregate is a vagrant, and is punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.’ ’ 1
In No. 4488 defendant Huddleson entered a plea of guilty to a complaint filed in the Municipal Court for the City and County of San Francisco charging him with a violation of the foregoing subdivision. The court granted six months’ probation apparently imposing as a condition of probation 10 days’ imprisonment in the county jail. (
In No. 4602 defendants Hill and Sandness were each charged in separate complaints filed in the Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco with a violation of Penal Code section 647a, subdivision (2), committed on June 3, 1963 “in that said defendant did then and there loiter
In determining whether the attacks on the statute have merit, we are mindful of the settled rule that ‘ ‘ [A] 11 presumptions and intendments favor the validity of a statute and mere doubt does not afford sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of invalidity. Statutes must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively and unmistakably appears.” (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481, 484 [171 P.2d 21, 166 A.L.R. 701] ; State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 365, 371 [310 P.2d 7] ; Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 141, 146 [346 P.2d 737] ; In re Cregler (1961) 56 Cal.2d 308, 311 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305] and cases there cited.)
In the instant case, the challenges made to the constitutionality of the subdivision under attack center about the use of the word “loiter” in the statute. In essence they assert that the word is of such a broad and all-embracing character as to encompass innocent as well as objectionable actions and thus impose an unreasonable proscription upon the conduct
Thus in Cregler, supra, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of former Penal Code section 647, subdivision 4, 4 which made it a misdemeanor for any person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar or confidence operator and having no visible or lawful means of support, to loiter around certain specified public places or assemblies. 5 The court held that the word “loiter” as used in the statute there under consideration “has a sinister or wrongful as well as a reasonable definite implication. As proscribed by the statute the word ‘loiter’ obviously connotes lingering in the designated places for the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered. ” (56 Cal.2d at p. 312.)
In
Merolla, supra,
the Court of Appeals of New York in a unanimous decision upheld the validity of a statute pro
We are persuaded that as used in the statute now before us the term “loiter” was intended to have a restricted rather than a general meaning and that as so employed it has here, as in the statute under consideration in
Cregler,
“a sinister or wrongful as well as a reasonable definite implication.”
(In re Cregler, supra,
56 Cal.2d 308, 312.) We are of the opinion that the word “loiter” was intended to proscribe lingering about schools and public places for the purpose or with the intent of effectuating some criminal act. As the court pointed out in
Cregler,
provisions of the Penal Code “are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice. ’ ’ (
We must so construe the statute before us, if its language permits, as to render it valid and constitutional rather than invalid and unconstitutional.
(Erlich
v.
Municipal Court
(1961) 55 Cal.2d 553, 558 [11 Cal.Rptr. 758, 360 P.2d 334] ;
Bodinson Mfg. Co.
v.
California Employment Com.
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 326-327 [109 P.2d 935] ;
County of Los Angeles
v.
Legg
(1936) 5 Cal.2d 349, 353 [55 P.2d 206].) “It is the rule that where a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, in whole or in part, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable.”
(Franklin
v.
Peterson
(1948) 87 Cal. App.2d 727, 730 [197 P.2d 788]
; City of Los Angeles
v.
Belridge Oil Co.
(1957) 48 Cal.2d 320, 324 [309 P.2d 417];
Palermo
v.
Stockton Theatres, Inc.
(1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 58-60 [195 P.2d 1] ;
People
v.
One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck
(1945) 26 Cal.2d 503, 506-507 [159 P.2d 641].) Our duty in this respect requires us to read the statute in the light of the objective sought to be achieved by it as well as of the evil sought to be averted.
(Wotton
v.
Bush
(1953) 41 Cal.2d 460, 467 [261 P.2d 256].) “Where the words have a broad and also a restricted meaning, if the apparent object of the statute will be subserved by construing them in their restricted sense, whereas a principal object would be defeated by construing them in their broad sense, the restricted interpretation will be preferred and the broad meaning rejected, though the latter may be the more usual meaning.” (45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 140, p. 648.) Thus in
Cregler,
the court in uphold
Guided by these canons of construction we have therefore concluded that the term loiter in the context of the statute under consideration proscribes only that species of “lingering” and “idling” about schools or public places which is engaged in for an evil or sinister purpose. As pointed out above, section 647a was enacted to protect children. Subdivision (1) thereof makes guilty of a misdemeanor or felony as the case may be every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 (see footnote 1, ante). Subdivision (2) provides additional protection for children by removing any opportunity for the child molester to carry out his evil purpose. Both subdivisions label the offender a “vagrant.” Nevertheless it is obvious that the purpose of the first subdivision is largely punitive while that of the second subdivision is largely preventive. (See Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 Hastings L.J. 237, 250-261; Sherry, Vagrants, Bogues and Vagabonds, 48 Cal.L.Bev. 557, 566-567.) But, as we have said, the loitering condemned by the second subdivision is not loitering in its general sense but in its restricted and sinister sense. It includes lingering, waiting and delaying but only for a sinister or wrongful purpose and therefore excludes such activities for a lawful purpose. “Loitering as forbidden includes waiting, but mere waiting for any lawful purpose does not constitute such loitering.” (In re Cregler, supra, 56 Cal.2d 308, 312.)
Therefore as we construe the statute before us, persons who merely sit on park benches, loll on public beaches, pause in the vicinity of schools or linger in the many public areas frequented by children cannot be reasonably considered as loitering within the compass of the statute. It is only when the loitering is of such a nature that from the totality of the person’s actions and in the light of the prevailing circumstances, it may be reasonably concluded that it is being engaged in “for the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered”
(In re Cregler, supra)
that such conduct falls within the statute. We therefore hold
We are mindful of the fact that section 647a of the Penal Code as it read prior to its amendment in 1947 easting the statute in two subdivisions was upheld as constitutional in Phillips v. Municipal Court, supra, 24 Cal.App.2d 453. The statute then cast in a single paragraph but with provisions largely the same as those now before us then read as follows: “Every person who annoys or molests any school child or who loiters about any school or public place at or near which school children attend, is a vagrant, and is punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.’’ The court said: “It will be observed that the law does not attempt to entirely prohibit loitering, but that it confines its prohibitions to loitering about any school or public place at or near which school children attend. However, the mere fact that some innocent people may desire to loiter near a public school does not deprive the legislature of its power to prohibit loitering at such a place if the safety of school children require such legislative action. [Citations.]
“The courts will construe general statutes reasonably and not in a manner that will lead to unjust or absurd results. [Citations.] Innocent acts may be prohibited by statutes enacted under the police power when necessary to protect the public peace, safety and welfare. If the Constitution guarantees to the petitioner the right to loiter, it certainly does not guarantee to him the right to do his loitering in places where promiscuous loitering may endanger the peace and safety of our school children on account of the immoral desires of some who may exercise such right. [Citations.] ” (Pp. 455-456.)
It is apparent that the court in
Phillips
did not ascribe to the term loiter a completely sinister significance and therefore did not restrict the impact of the statute to loitering engaged in for a wrongful purpose. Since we have applied the rationale of
Cregler
to the instant ease and have construed
In view of our construction of the statute at hand and our reliance upon Cregler, we are not persuaded to follow the precedents cited by the defendants herein and particularly those urged upon us at oral argument: Commonwealth v. Carpenter (1950) 325 Mass. 519 [91 N.E.2d 666]; Ex parte Mittelstaedt (1956) 164 Tex.Crim.Rep. 115 [297 S.W.2d 153]; City of St. Louis v. Gloner (1908) 210 Mo. 502 [109 S.W. 30] ; Pinkerton v. Verberg (1889) 78 Mich. 573 [44 N.W. 579] ; Bouie v. Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347 [84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894]; Baggett v. Bullitt (1964) 377 U.S. 360 [84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377]. We deem it unnecessary to enter upon a detailed discussion of these cases. Suffice it to say that they involve statutes where the requisite constitutional certainty and definiteness could not be found by reference to the statutory context and where the crucial terms were not susceptible of a sinister and therefore restricted meaning. City of St. Louis and Pinkerton, on which defendants heavily rely, were both discussed at length in support of the holding in Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha (9th Cir. 1931) 48 F.2d 171, 172, a ease which the court in Cregler rejected as lacking persuasive force. (56 Cal.2d at p. 313.) Carpenter involved an ordinance providing that “ [N]o person shall, in a street, . . . wilfully and unreasonably saunter or loiter for more than seven minutes after being directed by a police officer to move on. . . .” The provisions had the same broad sweep as those in the Anduha case on which Carpenter relied for support. Mittelstaedt struck down an ordinance making it unlawful for any person to loaf or loiter within a specified distance of any school or public building, the court relying on Anduha and City of St. Louis v. Gloner, supra. Bouie and Baggett, apart from reiterating the principles dealing with the constitutional requirement of certainty and definiteness in criminal statutes, with which we do not quarrel, are otherwise not in point.
In No. 4488 the order of the superior court discharging defendant and petitioner Huddleson from custody (referred to therein as an order granting defendant a writ of habeas
In No. 4602 the order of the municipal court dismissing the complaints filed therein against defendants Hill and Sandness is reversed with directions to said court to overrule the demurrer of defendants thereto.
Bray, P. J., and Molinari, J., concurred.
The petitions of all the respondents for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied November 10, 1964. Mosk, J., did not participate therein.
Notes
Subdivision (1) of section 647a provides: ’ ‘ Every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 is a vagrant and is punishable upon first conviction by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceeding six months or by both such fine and imprisonment and is punishable upon the second and each subsequent conviction or upon the first conviction after a previous conviction under section 288 of this code by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one year. ’ ’
None of the record in People v. Huddleson is before us. The foregoing facts are gleaned from the statements of counsel in the habeas corpus proceedings in the superior court,
Hill and Sandness urged that section 647a, subdivision (2), was null and unconstitutional (1) “in that it is so vague and indefinite as to deprive defendants of due process of law”; (2) “because it violates the requirement that all laws of a general nature have a uniform application’ ’: and (3) “because it is an unreasonable and arbitrary invasion of persona] rights and liberties.”
As section 647 read before its repeal in 1961 and the enactment at that time of a new section 647.
Former Penal Code section 647 provided in relevant part: “. . . 4. Every person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar or confidence operator, either by his own confession, or by Ms having been convicted of any of such offenses, and having no visible or lawful means of support, when found loitering around any steamboat landing, railroad depot, banking institution, broker’s office, place of amusement, auction room, store, shop or crowded thoroughfare, car, or omnibus, or any public gathering or assembly; . . .
“Is a vagrant, and is punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
At the time of the decision in Pallares, section 647a, subdivision (2), read as follows: “Every person who loiters about any school or public place at or near which school children attend, or who loiters in or about public toilets in public parks, is a vagrant, ...” In. that case Judge Conley, now Presiding Justice Conley of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, observed: “The purpose of the legislation is indicated clearly by reference in the section to section 288 of the Penal Code, by the increase of penalties for second offenders, and by the prohibition in the second sub-paragraph of the section of loitering near schools or public places where school children attend,” (112 Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 900; italics added.)
Cregler cited Phillips for purposes of comparison only (56 Cal.2d at p. 312) and without other comment.