MOHAMED ISMA SAMIUDDIN, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE RICHARD NOTHWEHR, COMMISSIONER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent Commissioner, STATE OF ARIZONA, Real Party in Interest.
No. CR-16-0422-PR
Supreme Court of the State of Arizona
November 2, 2017
Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County, No. CR2016-130296
JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL, TIMMER, BOLICK, and GOULD joined.
VACATED AND REMANDED
COUNSEL:
James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender, Seth Apfel (argued), Karen Vandergaw, Deputy Public Defenders, Phoenix, Attorneys for Mohamed Isma Samiuddin
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Amanda M. Parker (argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for State
JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court:
¶1 We consider whether Arizona law authorizes Petitioner Mohamed Samiuddin‘s pretrial release conditions requiring that he reside apart from his family and that he have no unsupervised contact with his minor non-victim children and whether the conditions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
¶2 We hold that the
¶3 Samiuddin was charged with five counts of public sexual indecency to a minor, class five felonies under
¶4 At his arraignment, the trial court found Samiuddin bailable as a matter of right and released him on his own recognizance with several pretrial release conditions, including that he reside apart from his family and that he have no contact with minors under any circumstance. Because Samiuddin claims to live with several of his minor children, he sought to modify the release conditions to allow unsupervised contact with his children and to permit him to return home. Samiuddin argued that the conditions were improper for three reasons: (1) the State presented no evidence he harmed or posed a danger to his minor children; (2) his family should remain together because they are recent refugees; and (3) he is likely innocent of the charges. The trial court, after a hearing, modified the release order to allow Samiuddin to have contact with his children if he “is supervised by a court approved monitor” and pays the costs of supervision.
¶5 The record on review is meager: the trial court‘s order modifying Samiuddin‘s release conditions lacks factual findings or justification for the release conditions, although the parties contend the court during the hearing referenced “Form 4,” a police probable cause statement that summarizes the offense conduct but does not mention Samiuddin‘s children; there is no transcript of the hearing; and the recording of the hearing is inaudible due to technical defects.
¶6 Samiuddin argues that Arizona law does not authorize the conditions, but, if it did, the conditions violate his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court of appeals declined jurisdiction of Samiuddin‘s special action, but we granted review because he lacks a sufficient remedy by appeal and the standards that apply to pretrial release conditions restricting a parent‘s access to a minor non-victim child present a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
DISCUSSION
¶7 We review pretrial release conditions for abuse of discretion, Gusick v. Boies, 72 Ariz. 233, 235 (1951), and we interpret statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions de novo. Allen v. Sanders, 240 Ariz. 569, 571 ¶ 9 (2016); Massey v. Bayless, 187 Ariz. 72, 73 (1996). “[T]he words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.” State v. Miller, 100 Ariz. 288, 296 (1966).
I. Law Authorizing Pretrial Release Conditions
¶8 The
¶9 The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (the “Rules“) further elucidate judicial officers’ authority to impose pretrial release conditions.
II. Authority to Impose the “No Unsupervised Contact” Pretrial Release Condition
¶10 Samiuddin argues that a trial court may not prohibit pretrial unsupervised contact with his minor non-victim children as a release condition because Arizona law does not expressly authorize it. We disagree. We give a statute‘s words “their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.” Miller, 100 Ariz. at 296. The
¶11 First, the
III. Due Process and Pretrial Release Conditions
¶12 Samiuddin next contends that, even if Arizona law authorizes the pretrial release conditions, they violate substantive and procedural due process because they impinge his fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his children without an adequate hearing, and they fail to employ the least
¶13 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that states may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
A. Level of Scrutiny
¶14 Samiuddin does not contend that discretionary pretrial release conditions prohibiting or restricting parents’ access to their children are, in all instances, unconstitutional. He argues, instead, that we must apply strict scrutiny review to his conditions because his interest in the care, custody, and control of his children is a fundamental right, and the trial court imposed the conditions here without justification.
¶15 The State concedes that parental rights are fundamental but contends we should not apply strict scrutiny because the contested pretrial release conditions do not unduly infringe Samiuddin‘s fundamental interests, their restrictions are limited in duration under the speedy-trial rules, and the State does not seek to terminate his parental rights. Although
we agree that Samiuddin has a fundamental right to parent his children, and the pretrial release conditions implicate that right, this infringement does not require strict scrutiny review. Cf. Simpson v. Miller (“Simpson II“), 241 Ariz. 341, 347–48 ¶ 22 (2017) (citing cases for the proposition that “the [United States Supreme] Court has not consistently applied strict scrutiny to infringement of fundamental rights“).
¶16 Samiuddin relies primarily on civil cases involving government infringement of parental decisions concerning children‘s familial contact, health, and education for the proposition that strict scrutiny applies here. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69, 72 (2000) (affirming mother‘s right to limit paternal grandparent visits while reasoning that, if a parent is “fit,” “there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent‘s children“); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (preserving parent‘s right to have child admitted to a mental health hospital); Pierce v. Soc‘y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (confirming parent‘s right to enroll child in non-public, religious school). These cases are distinguishable, however, because the purpose of pretrial release conditions that restrict contact with minors is not to substitute the state‘s judgment for that of a presumptively fit parent concerning a child‘s care, but rather to effectuate the state‘s compelling interest in protecting minor children from potential harm by a parent charged with a crime under certain circumstances. Accordingly, a defendant‘s fundamental parental rights may be balanced with the state‘s interests in protecting the accused‘s children. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987) (noting that a defendant‘s fundamental interest in liberty “may, in circumstances where the government‘s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society“).
¶17 Samiuddin cites no cases applying strict scrutiny review to discretionary pretrial release conditions implicating fundamental
¶18 Although we decline to apply strict scrutiny review to Samiuddin‘s release conditions, we note that the
B. Evidentiary Hearing
¶19 Samiuddin further contends that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing when the trial court imposed his initial pretrial release conditions at his arraignment and when he moved to reconsider the conditions. Arizona rules and statutes, however, do not require an evidentiary hearing to impose initial pretrial release conditions or to reconsider the conditions; rather, what is required is an opportunity to be heard on release conditions. See
¶20 Although Arizona rules and statutes do not entitle Samiuddin to an evidentiary hearing when the trial court imposes or subsequently reviews his release conditions, he argues, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), that procedural due process requires it. “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” id. at 334 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)), and the “fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.‘” Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); cf. State v. Hidalgo, 241 Ariz. 543, 548–49 ¶¶ 8–12 (2017) (rejecting the argument that an evidentiary hearing was required concerning a motion in a capital case). The Mathews test, which we approved in the parental rights severance context in Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 285 ¶ 29 (2005), requires courts to consider three factors in assessing whether procedural due process requires additional safeguards such as an evidentiary hearing: (1) the private interest affected; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards“; and (3) “the Government‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335 (quoted in Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 33).
¶21 Here, under the first Mathews factor—the private interest affected—we acknowledge that the pretrial release conditions restraining Samiuddin‘s contact with his children implicate his fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and control of his children, but that infringement is less than in dependency and severance cases because the speedy-trial rules limit the pretrial release conditions to the duration of the criminal case and their objective is not to interfere with, or sever, his parental rights. Further, the second and third Mathews factors, as discussed below, indicate that there is no general right to an evidentiary hearing in this context.
¶22 The second factor—the risk of error due to procedural inadequacies—does not advance Samiuddin‘s cause.
¶23 Finally, the third factor—the state‘s interests—does not convince us that due process requires an evidentiary hearing. Samiuddin concedes the state‘s compelling interest in protecting his children, the trial court is required to fashion release conditions that will ensure public safety, and we are not persuaded that the value of an additional tier of judicially-mandated evidentiary hearings outweighs the state‘s increased fiscal and administrative burdens borne of additional litigation.
C. Individualized Determination
¶24 As noted above, Arizona rules require a trial court to impose “the least onerous condition or conditions . . . that are reasonable and necessary to protect other persons or the community from risk posed by the person or to secure the appearance of the person in court.”
¶25 We hold that due process and, by implication, Rules
¶26 However, we do not reach Samiuddin‘s argument that the conditions imposed here are more restrictive than necessary to meet the State‘s compelling interest in protecting his children, because we cannot assess whether the conditions are the least onerous measures in the absence of a complete record and an individualized determination.
CONCLUSION
¶27 Because we lack an adequate record on which to review whether the trial court‘s pretrial release conditions comply with newly promulgated Rules