S.R., а minor by and through his guardian ad litem, JESSICA JUAREZ v. PASCO SCHOOL DISTRICT and RATREE ALBERS
NO. 4:16-CV-5112-TOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
October 23, 2017
THOMAS O. RICE, Chief United States District Judge
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19). This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the motion, the record and files herein, and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
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Plaintiff S.R., a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Jessica Juarez, commenced this action on August 15, 2016, alleging that S.R. was subjected to “ongoing verbal, psychological and physical abuse” while attending Robert Frost Elementary. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 13–14. Plaintiff‘s remaining claims1 at issue in Defendant‘s Motion include
Defendants move for summary judgment on all remaining claims. ECF No. 19 at 3. Plaintiff contends there are genuine issues of material fact for each remaining claim. ECF No. 30 at 2.
FACTS
The following are the undisputed facts unless otherwise noted. S.R. was
In February 2014, a complaint was made against Ms. Albers for allegedly hitting another student in the back and allowing a female student to pinch the student. ECF Nos. 20 at ¶¶ 15–16; 31 at ¶¶ 27–28. Defendants state that the District reported these allegations to law enforcement, which determined that no criminal acts occurred. The District found in its own investigation that the allegations were unfounded. ECF No. 20 at ¶¶ 17–18. Plaintiff contends that the District failed to discipline Ms. Albers аfter placing her on administrative leave for ten days. ECF No. 31 at ¶¶ 36–38.
In March 2014, Plaintiff alleges that S.R. was afraid of a particular book, which Ms. Albers used to get him to sit down and listen. Id. at ¶ 30. Defendants argue that there is no evidence of Ms. Albers using a book to scare S.R. ECF Nos. 19 at 11; 20 at ¶ 35. Feliz Liudahl, a para-educator with special education students
Plaintiff claims that, on several occasions, when S.R. would try to stand up, Ms. Albers would push him into the table so that he could not get out. ECF No. 31 at ¶ 41. Plaintiff states that S.R. had bruises on his thighs, which were consistent with being forcefully pushed forward into a table and consistent with the timeframe. Id. at ¶ 60. S.R.‘s father claims he had never noticed bruises on S.R. before the transfer of schools and has not seen any bruises since S.R. transferred out of Robert Frost Elementary. Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff‘s father took pictures of the bruising. ECF No. 32-4 at 6. Defendants contend that any bruising on S.R.‘s shins and thighs was a “one-time” thing and S.R.‘s parents never shared photos or informаtion about the bruising. ECF No. 20 at ¶ 40. Defendants claim, “It can hardly be said this observation is indicative of any type of event that occurred in Ms. Albers‘s classroom as opposed to elsewhere.” Id.
Ms. Liudahl asserted in her deposition that no student in the classroom required assistance in going to the bathroom and she had never taken a student to wash their hands. ECF No. 32-1 at 3. She also stated that when Ms. Albers took S.R. to the bathroom, “It was just awkward because I had never seen her go into the bathroom with any of the students. And she had went in there and shut the door but the light was not on.” Id. Ms. Liudahl knew the light was not on because she could see a gap underneath the bathroom door. Id. She affirmed that the light was off for about three minutes and the door was fully closed. Id. at 6. After three
In April 2014, S.R. withdrew from Robert Frost Elementary. ECF Nos. 20 at ¶ 43; 31 at ¶ 13.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts, as well as all rational inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court must only consider admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for
A. § 1983 Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated S.R.‘s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the use of unreasonable force. ECF No. 30 at 5. Under § 1983, a cause of action may be maintained “against any person acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,’ of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting
1. Ms. Albers
Defendants contend that Ms. Albers is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 19 at 4. Qualified immunity shields government actors from civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity balances the two important interests of holding public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and also the need tо shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when
In determining a state actor‘s assertion of qualified immunity, a court must assess (1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant‘s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such thаt a reasonable person in the defendant‘s position would have understood that his actions violated that right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. A court may, within its discretion, decide which of the two prongs should be addressed first in light of the particular circumstances of the case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. If the answer to either inquiry is “no,” then the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity and may not be held personally liable for his or her conduct. Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2011).
a. Constitutional Violations
When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds Ms. Albers conduct could support a finding that she violated Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. The right to be free from unreasonable
Here, Plaintiff contends that Ms. Albers seized S.R. by grabbing his arm, escorting him to the bathroom, and closing the door. ECF No. 30 at 6. Plaintiff argues that under such circumstances, “no reasonable seven-year-old student with severe autism … would believe he was free to leave.” Id. Defendants assert that there is no evidence Ms. Albers physically dragged S.R. to the bathroom or
Additionally, Defendants assert that there was no unreasonable restraint when Ms. Albers and other staff members would stand behind S.R. while he was seated. ECF No. 19 at 11. Defendants contend that this action was merely a teaching strategy. Id. It is unlikely that standing behind a child in a classroom is considered a seizure, but regardless, the seizure would be reasonable. The educational objective of assisting students with their work and helping them stay on task is a reasonable intention. Defendants also contend Ms. Albers slamming her hand on the desk would also not be an unreasonable seizure, as it was a
Defendants deny that Ms. Albers restrained S.R. and used a book to scare him. ECF No. 19 at 11. Yet, Plaintiff cites the deposition of Ms. Liudahl who confirmed that she witnessed Ms. Albers scare S.R. with an ocean book. ECF No. 32-1 at 7. Defendants are then incorrect and this claim can still form the basis of a § 1983 claim. See ECF No. 19 аt 11. When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Ms. Albers‘s use of the book could be considered an unreasonable seizure as it confined a young autistic child to his chair through the use of fear so that he reasonably felt he could not leave.
Lastly, Defendants argue that the bruising on S.R.‘s legs is not enough to constitute excessive force or seizure.2 Id. at 12. Defendants note that unexplained
When viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Ms. Albers aggressive actions towards S.R. of grabbing him, confining him in a bathroom, slamming her hand on a desk, pushing him into a table and frightening him with a book reveals evidence which could be found to be an unreasonable sеizure and the use of excessive force beyond mere unexplained bruising.
b. Clearly Established Law
Ms. Albers‘s constitutional violations must have been clearly established at the time of the alleged harm. A right is clearly established when it is “sufficiently clear a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 438 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). A case need not be directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the constitutional
Here, Defendants argue that, in the school setting, courts have found unreasonable seizure when there was a clear use of physical force or a show of authority in restraining a student‘s liberty. ECF No. 19 at 8. Defendants cite an incident where a site administrator taped an eight-year-old student‘s head to a tree for five minutes, constituting an unreasonable seizure. Id.; Doe, 334 F.3d at 907–09. Defendаnts also note an unreasonable seizure of a special education student where the teacher grabbed the student‘s hand repeatedly, slapped him, hit his head and face, and body slammed him into a chair. ECF No. 19 at 8; Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1178. Yet, in the same case, making the student walk barefoot on asphalt did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, as it was not unreasonable to teach the student not to remove his shoes. ECF No. 19 at 8–9; Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1181. Defendants argue such instances were not present in this case.
Plaintiff emphasizes that “the right of a student to be free from excessive force at the hands of teachers employed by the state was clearly established as early as 1990.” Doe, 334 F.3d at 910 (citing Koch, 96 F.3d at 1303 n.4); ECF No. 30 at 8. The Ninth Circuit noted, “There need not be a case dealing with these
Therefore, Ms. Albers is not entitled to qualified immunity because the conduct alleged would violate S.R.‘s clearly established constitutional rights. The Court denies Defendants’ Motiоn for Summary Judgment as to Ms. Albers’ alleged conduct.
2. The District
Plaintiff alleges a § 1983 claim against the District for its alleged official policy of sending teachers to the classroom without warning, training, or disciplining the teacher despite a constitutional violation. ECF No. 30 at 11. To
Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Ms.
As discussed above, Ms. Albers arguably violated S.R.‘s constitutiоnal rights, but Plaintiff fails to show Ms. Albers‘s actions were part of a larger District policy. After the pinching and closed fist incidents, the District reported the allegations to law enforcement and conducted its own investigation, both finding no misconduct. ECF Nos. 20 at ¶¶ 17–18; 32-6 at 5–6. These incidents by a single teacher are not enough to create sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency to constitute an official policy of not disciplining teachers. See Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to show that the District was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional right and the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Rivera v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 397 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 960 (9th Cir. 2010)). There is no evidence that the District was deliberately indifferent to the students’ constitutional rights after it investigated Ms. Albers and decided to return her to the classroom nor is there any evidence that the District and Ms. Flores were the driving force behind Ms. Albers constitutional violation of S.R.‘s rights. Plaintiff is then unable to establish an official policy by the District.
In Plаintiff‘s recently filed Trial Brief, and not in response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff contends the District is liable under the danger creation exception to liability for injuries caused by third parties. ECF No. 59 at 7. Plaintiff reasons that the District was aware of complaints about Ms. Albers abusing special needs children in her care, yet affirmatively returned her to the classroom. While Plaintiff belated makes these allegations in his Trial Brief, he has not come forward with еvidence to support this assertion, thereby preserving a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Absent a genuine dispute as to any material fact, the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B. Disability Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff brings claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
(citing Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)). Title II of the ADA was
Under both the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA, a public entity is liable for the vicarious аcts of its employees. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1141. The Ninth Circuit has “held that, under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (upon which the ADA was explicitly modeled), we apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to claims brought directly under the statute, in part because the historical justification for exempting municipalities from respondeat superior liability does not apply to the Rehabilitation Act, and in part because the doctrine ‘would be entirely consistent with the pоlicy of that statute, which is to eliminate discrimination against the handicapped.‘” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, it is not contested that S.R. is disabled and the first element in both claims is met. ECF No. 19 at 17–18. It is also clear that the District receives federal financial assistance as part of the public school system. ECF No. 13 at ¶ 7. Plaintiff specifically argues that the District provided a worse-quality education than to comparable non-disabled students and Ms. Albers discriminated against
In sum, and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Ms. Albers discriminated against S.R. based on his disability.5 Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find that Ms. Albers was motivated by S.R.‘s disability.
Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the ADA and § 504 claims.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
- Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
- Defendants’ motion concerning Plaintiff‘s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Ms. Albers is DENIED. - Plaintiff‘s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Pasco School District is DISMISSED. Defendants’ motion concerning Plaintiff‘s claims against the Pasco School District under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 and under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 729 are DENIED.
The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish copies to counsel.
DATED October 23, 2017.
THOMAS O. RICE
Chief United States District Judge