Rutherford v. United StatesRutherford v. United States
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 24–820. Argued November 12, 2025—Decided May 28, 2026*
Petitioner Daniel Rutherford was convicted of two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of
Held: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to
(a) The plain text of
The disparity created by Congress’s amendment to
As for “compelling”: It is hard to see how Congress’s deliberate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced could be a convincing reason that warrants a sentence reduction. Congress decided to apply the lower prison sentences to some violators of
Petitioners argue that because Congress empowered the Sentencing Commission to describe the grounds for compassionate release with only one express limitation—“rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason,”
Petitioners also note that courts ordinarily enjoy broad discretion to consider all relevant information when imposing or modifying a sentence. But petitioners skip a step. Before determining the extent of a reduction based on the
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, is not to the contrary. That case involved sentence-modification proceedings under a different provision of the Act, where eligibility for a sentencing reduction was conceded and the only question was what information the court could consider in modifying a sentence. Because the provision of the Act at issue in Concepcion lacks any limiting language, we held that a court could consider changes to the Guidelines, as well as intervening facts, when calculating a new sentence under it. Id., at 500. Today’s cases differ from Concepcion because they concern whether a prisoner is eligible for compassionate release in the first place. And on that score, Congress has “expressly cabined district courts’ discretion,” id., at 495, by prohibiting a reduction in sentence unless a court finds that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warrant it.
(c) Petitioners’ contention that the Court’s interpretation of
120 F. 4th 360, No. 24–860, affirmed.
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 24–820 and 24–860
DANIEL RUTHERFORD, PETITIONER
24–820 v.
UNITED STATES
JOHNNIE MARKEL CARTER, PETITIONER
24–860 v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[May 28, 2026]
JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
A prison sentence, once imposed, usually cannot be modified by the district court.
A
Daniel Rutherford, petitioner in one of these consolidated cases, committed two separate robberies at gunpoint in 2003. A jury convicted him of several crimes, including two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of
Johnnie Carter, petitioner in the other case, received an even longer mandatory minimum under
Years after Rutherford and Carter were each sentenced, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194, “a landmark piece of legislation that changed the federal criminal-sentencing system in numerous respects,” Hewitt v. United States, 606 U. S. 419, 424 (2025). Among the changes was the elimination of
Rutherford and Carter acknowledge that they do not qualify for the reduced penalties. Nonetheless, each has invoked the Act as a ground for compassionate release under
B
At this point, some background on the compassionate release provision is helpful. This provision, which was part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, allows a district court to reduce a prison term “after considering the factors set forth in
When Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, it amended the compassionate release provision. While it left the “extraordinary and compelling” standard untouched, it opened a new procedural route for seeking a reduction. Originally, only the Bureau of Prisons could ask a district court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence. The Act gives the prisoner greater agency: He may request that the Bureau file a motion on his behalf, and, if it declines or fails to do so within 30 days, he may file a motion himself.
The Commission lost a quorum shortly after the Act went into effect and did not update its policy statement to address these changes. Most Circuits held that the existing statement—which mentioned only motions filed by the Bureau—did not apply to motions filed by prisoners. See United States v. Andrews, 12 F. 4th 255, 259 (CA3 2021)
They were soon forced into uncharted territory. Relevant here, courts faced a surge of motions from prisoners who invoked the Act’s nonretroactive sentencing amendments as grounds for compassionate release. Most Courts of Appeals held that a nonretroactive amendment to a mandatory minimum cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduced sentence.1 A minority, however, concluded that the disparity produced by such an amendment can justify a reduced sentence—at least when considered in combination with other factors.2
The Commission eventually regained a quorum, entered the fray, and sided with the minority. In 2023, it amended its policy statement to add a new category to the list of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons: “Unusually Long Sentence.”3 See USSG App. C, Amdt. 814. Under this category:
“‘If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether
the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.’” Ibid.
Three Commissioners voted against the amendment and accused the Commission of making “a seismic structural change to our criminal justice system without congressional authorization or directive.” United States Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting Tr. 60 (Apr. 5, 2023).
C
Back to the cases at hand. After the First Step Act became effective, Rutherford moved for compassionate release. He argued that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warrant a reduction because he had received an “unusually long sentence under a statutory provision that Congress has since found too punitive but has not made retroactively applicable.” 2 App. in No. 23–1904 (CA3), p. 58. In addition, he noted that he suffered from obesity and hypertension, which rendered him more vulnerable to the COVID–19 virus.
While Rutherford’s motion was pending, the Third Circuit held that the nonretroactive change to
The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rutherford’s motion. See 120 F. 4th 360, 363 (2024). The court acknowledged that Congress had authorized the Commission to issue a policy statement fleshing out the
Carter’s case is similar. After the Commission amended its policy statement, he moved for a reduction under
The Circuits remain divided over whether the disparity created by a nonretroactive change to sentencing law, like the Act, can constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reaso[n]” that “warrant[s]” compassionate release.4 18
II
Petitioners argue that the Third Circuit’s decisions depart from the plain text of
A
The compassionate release provision empowers a district court to “reduce the term of imprisonment” if it finds, among other things, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”
The disparity created by Congress’s amendment to
As for “compelling”: It is hard to see how Congress’s deliberate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced could be a convincing reason that “warrant[s]” a reduction.
We need not decide whether there are reasons beyond personal circumstances that could qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” Until very recently, no one thought that
B
Petitioners, echoed by the dissent, insist that our reading artificially limits the text. The terms “extraordinary and compelling,” they say, are “‘comprehensive and flexible,’” requiring a “‘case-by-case’ inquiry into the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Brief for Petitioner Rutherford 15, 17; see Brief for Petitioner Carter 41. And under this “‘flexible, all-things-considered approach,’” a judge may consider the disparity resulting from Congress’s amendment to
While the terms “extraordinary” and “compelling” leave room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any consideration. Their meaning depends on context: A reason is “extraordinary” and “compelling” only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to “warrant” compassionate release.
This argument fares no better. We have repeatedly emphasized that “‘[t]he force of any negative implication . . . depends on context.’” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 302 (2017) (quoting Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 381 (2013)); see also A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107–111 (2012). A speaker’s choice to rule out one item does not always mean that the rest of the universe is on the table. Imagine that a dietitian cautions her patient, “Pasta alone is not an acceptable dinner.” Though the patient might fervently wish otherwise, this advice does not license any meal besides standalone pasta. (Fried chicken with a side of funnel cakes? A bowl of Lucky Charms?) Instead, the dietitian surely had some reason—like the patient’s past eating habits—to caution against this specific choice.
So too with
And in petitioners’ telling, the list is long. They emphasize that when imposing or modifying a sentence, a district court ordinarily enjoys “broad discretion to consider all relevant information” unless prohibited by the Constitution or by Congress. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, 491 (2022); see
Petitioners skip a step. Before determining the extent of a reduction based on the
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, is not to the contrary. Concepcion involved sentence-modification proceedings under a different provision of the Act. See id., at 486–487. All agreed that the defendant was eligible for a reduction under that provision; the only question was what type of information the District Court could consider in modifying his sentence. See id., at 488 (explaining that “[t]he Government conceded [the defendant’s] eligibility for relief ”). Because that provision lacks any limiting language, we concluded that a court could consider changes to the Guidelines, as well as intervening facts, when calculating a new sentence under it. Id., at 500. Today’s cases differ from Concepcion because they concern whether a prisoner is eligible for compassionate release in the first place. And on that score, Congress has “expressly cabined district courts’ discretion,” id., at 495, by prohibiting a reduction in sentence unless a court finds that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warrant it.
Finally, petitioners downplay the conflict between the Act and their interpretation of
C
This brings us to the Sentencing Commission. Recall that Congress authorized the Commission to promulgate policy statements that “describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction,”
Petitioners misunderstand the Commission’s role. Congress has empowered the Commission to “give meaning” to the compassionate release provision by identifying the circumstances that constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394 (2024). Even so, the Commission’s policy statements must be “consistent with” the governing statute,
We need not nail down the precise boundaries of the phrase “extraordinary and compelling” to conclude that “with regard to the particular dispute in [this] case,” the statute’s language “has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 340 (1997). The statutory text and structure make clear that Congress’s nonretroactive change to
* * *
Compassionate release is available only when a court finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a sentence reduction.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission, not this Court, to define what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for incarcerated individuals to receive a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute. In 2023, the Commission exercised its statutory authority and issued a policy statement that permitted district courts to consider sentencing disparities created by changes in law. Such disparities, the Commission specified, should be considered rarely and only as part of an inquiry into whether the totality of the circumstances warrant a reduction in a person‘s sentence.
Properly framed, the question presented by these cases is whether the Commission acted unreasonably when it issued that guidance. It did not. The Commission‘s policy statement is consistent with Congress‘s commands and centuries of legal practice in which courts look to the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether to modify a
I
A
In 2003, when he was 25 years old, petitioner Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies in which no one was hurt and during which he took a watch and roughly $1,300 worth of other jewelry and cash. He was convicted of two violations of
In 2007, petitioner Johnnie Markel Carter and others robbed several banks and stole about $250,000. As with Rutherford‘s robberies, no one fired a gun and no one was hurt. Carter, who opted to go to trial, was convicted of three violations of
In the two decades since their convictions, both Rutherford and Carter have turned their lives around. Rutherford has completed over 50 educational courses and received only two minor infractions in the past decade. He also secured a job for after he is released, which would enable him to help support his deceased sister‘s five children.
B
In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act and greatly reduced the mandatory minimum for first-time
In the wake of the First Step Act, the United States Sentencing Commission in 2023 adopted §1B1.13(b)(6), a policy statement allowing courts, in limited circumstances, to consider sentencing disparities created by nonretroactive changes in law. Specifically, courts may grant relief based on such a change in law only when four requirements are met: (1) the defendant received an “unusually long sentence“; (2) the defendant has served at least 10 years of that sentence; (3) the disparity is “gross“; and (4) the district court has taken “full consideration of the defendant‘s individualized circumstances.” USSG §1B1.13(b)(6) (Nov. 2025). Outside of those circumstances, “a change in the law . . . shall not be considered” for purposes of determining
Invoking this policy statement, Rutherford and Carter moved for compassionate release under
II
The question now before the Court is whether the Commission permissibly exercised its delegated authority to permit courts to consider sentencing disparities created by nonretroactive changes in law, among other factors, in deciding compassionate release motions. Answering that question properly begins with Congress‘s express delegation of authority to “[t]he Commission” to define, in the first instance, “what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples” through the “promulgati[on]” of “policy statements.”
Before 1984, federal judges had broad discretion when sentencing defendants. Statutes provided minimums and maximums for judges to work between, but within those ranges, judges could determine for themselves what sentence was appropriate. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363–366 (1989). This system allowed judges to consider individual defendants’ circumstances, but it also led to “[s]erious disparities in sentences.” Id., at 365.
To address those disparities, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission, which Congress tasked with studying federal sentencing and promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines.
Congress gave the Commission an important policymaking role in the compassionate-release context as well. Under the statute, district courts can grant compassionate release and reduce a defendant‘s sentence if they find that there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so.
Congress tasked the Commission with issuing “general policy statements regarding . . . the appropriate use of” compassionate release.
B
Congress‘s express delegation of authority to the Commission limits this Court‘s role in these cases. Congress often “authorize[s]” agencies “to exercise a degree of discretion.” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394 (2024). “For example, some statutes ‘expressly delegat[e]’ to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term.” Ibid. (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 (1977); emphasis deleted). “Others empower an agency to prescribe rules to ‘fill up the details’ of a statutory scheme.” 603 U. S., at 395 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825)). Others still authorize agencies to “regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase that ‘leaves agencies with flexibility,’ . . . such as ‘appropriate’ or ‘reasonable.‘” 603 U. S., at 395.
The Sentencing Reform Act does all those things. It instructs the Commission to issue guidance on the “appropriate use of” compassionate release.
When a statute expressly delegates authority to an agency in this way, “[a] reviewing court is not free to set aside” the agency‘s actions “simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner.” Batterton, 432 U. S., at 425 (citing American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 235–237 (1936)). Instead, the Court must determine “‘the boundaries of [the agency‘s] delegated authority‘” and “ensur[e] the agency has engaged in ‘reasoned decisionmaking’ within those boundaries.” Loper Bright, 603 U. S., at 395.
In short, under the statutory scheme that Congress created, the Commission has the leading role of defining the words “extraordinary and compelling” and thus setting the scope of compassionate release. This Court, by contrast, has the more modest role of ensuring that the Commission does not act unreasonably.
III
With that division of labor in mind, the Court should have upheld the Commission‘s policy statement because the Commission acted reasonably when it construed the terms “extraordinary and compelling” to permit courts to consider sentencing disparities caused by changes in law only in narrow circumstances and only as part of a holistic inquiry. The Commission‘s policy statement falls well within the expansive scope of the terms “extraordinary” and “compelling” and is consistent with longstanding judicial practices, which Congress did not alter here.
A
Start with the terms “extraordinary” and “compelling.” Rather than imposing any bright-line limits on courts’ discretion to consider or weigh information, these terms invite open-ended, fact- and context-specific inquiries into the
This Court‘s cases interpreting similarly broad terms across different contexts support this understanding. This Court has opined that it is “impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might” qualify as involving “extraordinary circumstances” that warrant federal interference with an ongoing state criminal prosecution. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117, 124–125 (1975). It has also “strug-gle[d] in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone” for distinguishing between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” business expenses. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 114–115 (1933).
Given the difficulty in defining with precision what makes something “unusual,” this Court has held, in the sentencing context, that such determinations fall within district courts’ discretion. In Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 (1996), the Court noted that a district court‘s finding that a factor at sentencing was “unusual or exceptional,” such that a departure from the then-binding Sentencing Guidelines was warranted, “embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court.” Id., at 98. That was because such a judgment reflected the district court‘s “‘special competence‘” in evaluating “‘the fact-specific circumstances of the case‘” that set it apart from others. Id., at 99. Similarly, when identifying cases that are “‘exceptional,‘” the Court has explained that the inquiry must be carried out by “[d]istrict courts . . . in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances,” as “‘[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.‘” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U. S. 545, 554 (2014).
The majority‘s chief rejoinder is that nonretroactive changes in law are “the norm.” Ante, at 9. True, but so too are many of the other developments that the majority agrees may support compassionate release. Everyone ages. Everyone falls ill. Everyone loses family members and loved ones. These realities are, unfortunately, also “the norm.” Yet all agree that courts may properly consider a defendant‘s age, physical health, and family circumstances when determining whether to grant compassionate release. See ante, at 10. That concession reflects the basic reality that facts which are ordinary in isolation can nonetheless combine to form an extraordinary whole. Accordingly, the key question is not whether any one reason for granting relief is extraordinary or compelling on its own or in the abstract, but whether a defendant‘s circumstances, taken together, are so extraordinary and compelling as to warrant reducing his sentence. Because answering that question calls for a full assessment of the totality of the circumstances and all relevant information, the words “extraordinary and compelling” do not themselves bar district courts from ever considering nonretroactive changes in law.
Statistics also undercut the majority‘s suggestion that the Commission‘s policy statement permits relief in
B
Longstanding tradition, which Congress has not disturbed, also supports the Commission‘s policy statement. For centuries, courts have enjoyed “broad discretion to consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, consistent with their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, 491 (2022). “That discretion also carries forward to later proceedings that may modify an original sentence.” Ibid. At these proceedings, district courts can modify initial sentences for a variety of reasons, including following a reversal on appeal or a retroactive change in law. They may also consider whatever evidence they find germane, including “intervening changes of law (such as
In light of this centuries-old tradition, if Congress wishes to restrict what courts may consider at sentence-modification proceedings, it must say so expressly. “The only limitations on a court‘s discretion to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.” Id., at 494. (All agree that the Constitution does not expressly bar consideration of nonretroactive changes in law.) When Congress is silent, this Court infers that Congress did not intend to limit sentencing courts’ discretion because “Congress is not shy about placing such limits where it deems them appropriate” and has “‘shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms.‘” Id., at 494, 497 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 103 (2007)).
A compassionate-release proceeding, in which a court decides whether to reduce a defendant‘s sentence (and if so, by how much), is obviously a sentence-modification proceeding. Changes in law are also plainly relevant to a court‘s determination: The fact that a defendant would be eligible for a significantly lower sentence for the same conduct today due to a change in law undoubtedly could inform a court‘s decision as to whether it should reduce his sentence. Allowing courts to consider this information, then, is consistent with courts’ traditional discretion.
Congress‘s words here do not limit courts’ discretion as to what they may consider. As explained, the words “extraordinary and compelling” do not foreclose the approach the Commission adopted in §1B1.13(b)(6). Congress‘s delegation to the Commission, moreover, contained just one express restriction: “Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling
The majority tries to downplay Congress‘s treatment of rehabilitation by analogizing to a conversation with a dietitian. Ante, at 12. An instruction from a dietitian not to eat pasta alone, the majority says, is not a “license” to eat unhealthy food, so Congress‘s express limit on rehabilitation, the majority reasons, “did not impliedly bless all other considerations” either. Ibid. This analogy misses the mark. Unlike a judge who enters a sentence-modification proceeding assuming she may consult all relevant information not expressly excluded by law, see Kimbrough, 552 U. S., at 103, one does not go into a conversation with a dietitian under the assumption that all foods not expressly prohibited are on the table. Those concerned enough about their diets to seek professional help likely do not need to be expressly told that they should avoid “[f]ried chicken.” Ante, at 12.
Congress‘s instructions to the Commission are much the same. An instruction not to grant compassionate release based on rehabilitation alone is not a prohibition against considering any other type of evidence. Instead, courts may consider all relevant information, as they have always done, see Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 491–492, and the Commission may authorize them to do so, as it did here.
IV
The majority disagrees with the Commission‘s judgment, forgetting that this Court “is not free to set aside” the Commission‘s policy statement “simply because it would have
A
First, the majority argues that considering nonretroactive changes in law was, “[u]ntil very recently,” unprecedented. Ante, at 10. Far from it. Again, courts have for centuries considered all relevant evidence at sentence-modification proceedings, and sentencing disparities like those created by nonretroactive changes in law are relevant information. See Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 490–492; supra, at 10–12.
The majority offers a counter-tradition, claiming that the “the heartland of compassionate release” “has long been defined by a prisoner‘s personal circumstances,” such as his physical health. Ante, at 10. It is certainly true that personal circumstances feature prominently in compassionate release proceedings. Even so, nothing in the statute‘s text confines courts to considering only personal circumstances, and “[t]he only limitations on a court‘s discretion to consider any relevant materials” in a sentence-modification proceeding “are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.” Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 494. Without an express limitation, the default remains: Courts may consider facts beyond personal circumstances when deciding whether to modify a defendant‘s sentence.
Nor does historical practice supply a personal-circumstances limit. The parties have identified only two published opinions in which district courts reduced a sentence under the predecessor to the compassionate-release statute, which was in effect from 1976 to 1984. In one of those two decisions, the District Court reduced a defendant‘s sentence not based on the personal circumstances of the
Further, this Court has also acknowledged that, apart from a defendant‘s personal circumstances, compassionate release might be appropriate to reduce a sentence to account for later legal developments. In fact, in Setser v. United States, 566 U. S. 231 (2012), the Court addressed whether federal courts have authority to order federal sentences to run consecutively to anticipated state sentences that have not yet been imposed. Id., at 233. After holding such sentences to be permissible, Justice Scalia explained that, when unexpected sentencing developments in state court “produc[e] unfairness to the defendant,” the Sentencing Reform Act “provides a mechanism for relief“: compassionate release under
B
Without a foothold in the compassionate-release statute or its history, the majority looks for one in the First Step Act instead. According to the majority, Congress‘s decision not to make its changes to
To start, Congress‘s decision not to make its changes retroactive simply means that Congress did not intend for every person who committed
The majority would have a point if the Commission instructed courts to grant relief based solely on a nonretroactive change in law; such an approach would amount to granting relief on a categorical basis, which would be in tension with the categorical nonretroactive nature of Congress‘s amendments here. The Commission‘s guidance, however, permits consideration of changes in law only when the disparity is “gross,” the sentence is “unusually long,” and the defendant has served at least 10 years of his sentence. §1B1.3(b)(6). It also requires courts to give “full consideration of the defendant‘s individualized circumstances” while weighing any change in law.
Even the Government agrees that individualized analysis is consistent with Congress‘s intent at least at one step of the compassionate-release analysis. Once a defendant establishes extraordinary and compelling reasons, the Government concedes that courts may consider a sentencing disparity created by nonretroactive changes in law when weighing the
This attempt at statutory surgery does not cure the problem. For one thing,
In any event, even assuming Congress intended to impose a rigid, two-step process, it is hard to “see how a court may be thought to subvert congressional intent by considering nonretroactive changes to the law at the ‘extraordinary and compelling’ stage of the analysis but not while weighing the §3553(a) factors.” United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F. 4th 14, 32 (CA1 2022) (Barron, J., concurring). “[I]f Congress truly intended to bar district courts from considering [the First Step Act‘s] changes to mandatory minimums in the compassionate release context by making the changes non-retroactive, then it is doubtful those changes should be considered at all.” United States v. Chen, 48 F. 4th 1092, 1099 (CA9 2022). It also remains that, no matter how the Court may try to slice it, a compassionate-release proceeding is a “sentence-modification proceeding,” and courts have long enjoyed broad discretion to consider relevant information in such proceedings unless Congress expressly says otherwise. Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 491. Nothing in the First Step Act specifically addresses what courts may consider when deciding whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction.
Those fears are unfounded. A judge‘s policy disagreement with a statutory mandatory minimum is not, and has never been, a relevant consideration at sentencing. Although district courts may disagree with the nonbinding Sentencing Guidelines “‘based solely on policy considerations,‘” they are “constrained by the mandatory minimums Congress prescribed” by statute regardless of their policy views. Kimbrough, 552 U. S., at 101, 108; see United States v. Fanfan, 558 F. 3d 105, 110, n. 6 (CA1 2009) (“Though district courts may sentence based on policy disagreements with the . . . guidelines, they may not do so on the basis of disagreements with statutes“); see also
Reflecting that norm,
In addition, no evidence supports the specter that the majority invokes. District judges around the country routinely impose mandatory-minimum sentences in tens of thousands of cases every year, as it is their oath-bound duty to apply the laws of the United States. See
Even if a district court were to start using compassionate release as an opportunity to usurp Congress‘s role and elevate its own policy preferences, the Government could appeal those outlier grants of compassionate release to the courts of appeals and, if necessary, to this Court. If a systemic solution were necessary, the Commission could issue another policy statement or Congress could enact legislation to prevent misuse of the compassionate-release statute. The solution is not, however, for this Court to conjure categorical limitations on courts’ discretion that neither Congress nor the Commission imposed.
The majority is right on one point: The extraordinary-and-compelling analysis is indeed subject to “independent and ascertainable limits.” Ante, at 14. Yet one need only read the Commission‘s policy statement to determine those limits. The majority nevertheless searches high and low for other statutory limits on what courts may consider when deciding compassionate-release motions. Because the Commission‘s narrow, limited guidance is consistent with what Congress has previously said and with what courts have previously done, I respectfully dissent.