MELISSA RUSSELL v. VILLAGE OF SKOKIE; CHIEF BRIAN BAKER, in his individuаl capacity; CHIEF JESSE BARNES, in his individual capacity; and COMMANDER TIMOTHY GRAMINS, in his individual capacity
Case: 1:24-cv-05197
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
May 23, 2025
Judge April M. Perry
Document #: 43 Filed: 05/23/25 Page 1 of 19 PageID #:274
Melissa Russell (“Plaintiff“) brings this employment discrimination case against the Village of Skokie (the “Village“) and command staff from the Skokie Police Department (“SPD“), including Chief Brian Baker, Chief Jesse Barnes, and Commander Timothy Gramins. Plaintiff asserts claims of gender discrimination in violation of
As is appropriate in deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the facts in Plaintiff‘s complaint as true and draws reasonable inferences in her favor. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007).
According to the complaint, Plaintiff is a female who was employed at all relevant times by the SPD and currently holds the rank of Sergeant. Doc. 27 ¶¶ 11-13. Brian Baker and Jesse Barnes are the former and current Chief of Police, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Timothy Gramins is a Commander but is not Plaintiff‘s supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 6, 37.
Plaintiff alleges that she qualifies as disabled within the meaning of thе ADA due to a severe injury to her neck and shoulder that she incurred in the line of duty, as well as an eye injury arising from a firing range training exercise. Id. ¶¶ 62-64. According to Plaintiff, Chief Baker and Chief Barnes made her use vacation time and sick time for procedures and appointments related to these injuries. Id. ¶ 16. Defendants also allegedly required Plaintiff to go to medical appointments and physical therapy sessions without overtime compensation, despite the fact that male officers received overtime pay for similar appointments. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants denied all workers compensation claims and emergency leave requests relаted to her work-related injuries. Id. ¶¶ 25-27, 33.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that Defendants refused to pay her overtime for work related to Plaintiff‘s assignment with the SPD‘s Programs and Planning unit (“P&P“). Id. ¶ 50. In September 2022, Chief Barns instructed Plaintiff that as a member of P&P, she is required to answer communications outside work hours but is not allowed to log or seek compensation for that time. Id. ¶ 51. Plaintiff claims that she was expected to respond at least once or twice a night
Plaintiff also alleges being passed over for promotion eight times, despite exceptional performance reviews. Id. ¶ 71. The promotion process includes input from the promotability committee (made up of Deputy Chiefs and Commanders), Chief, and Village Manager. Id. ¶¶ 80-86. Specifically, each applicant receives a score from the committee, which is then given to the Chief, who ultimately recommends promotions to the Village Manager. Id. ¶¶ 83, 85. Although the Village Manager makes the final decision, he or she routinely accepts the Chief‘s recommendation. Id. ¶ 86. Plaintiff alleges that in 2022, she received the highest assessment score from the promоtion committee, but a male with a significantly lower assessment score was promoted instead. Id. ¶¶ 185-186. Plaintiff further alleges that she consistently received high assessment scores, but males were consistently promoted ahead of her. Id. ¶¶ 67, 184. Plaintiff claims that Commander Gramins was on the committee and thwarted her promotion by criticizing Plaintiff for things like working remotely, spending too much time working out, inappropriately handling firearms, being out of uniform while on duty, and taking too much overtime. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 19, 41. Plaintiff claims that this criticism was a decisive factor in her not being promoted. Id. ¶¶ 17, 20. Plaintiff was most recently passed over for promotion in May 2024. Id. ¶ 72.
Plaintiff‘s complaint further alleges that she was subjected to more onerous standards than other officers. For example, in August 2022, Plaintiff was disciplined for wearing street clothes at work. Id. ¶ 44. That same month, Chief Barnes instructed Plaintiff to write her times of
Plaintiff claims that she complained on numerous occasions about harassment, discrimination, and the fact that she was not promoted. Id. ¶¶ 88-89. Plaintiff claims that the SPD failed to document her complaints or investigate and take action against her harassers. Id. ¶¶ 90-91. Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“) on March 2, 2023. Id. ¶ 93. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on March 25, 2024. Id. ¶ 100. Plaintiff filed this action on June 21, 2024. Doc. 1.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under
ANALYSIS
A. Section 1983 Claims
Counts I, III, V, and VIII are brought against Defendants pursuant to Section 1983. A cause of action may be brought under Section 1983 against “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
i. Section 1983 Claims Against the Village
The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a Section 1983 claim against the Village. Section 1983 provides a civil remedy аgainst any “person” who violates a plaintiff‘s federal civil rights while acting under color of state law.
Plaintiff‘s complaint alleges a widespread custom or practice of discrimination.1 But to survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must do more than repeat the applicable legal standard: Plaintiff “must allege facts permitting a reasonable inference that the practice is widespread and that the specific violations complained of were not isolated incidents.” Id.; see Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 742 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Although this court has not adopted any bright-line rules for establishing what constitutes a widespread custom or practice, it is clear that a single incident—or even three incidents—do not suffice.“); Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 1985) (a plaintiff must allege “a pattern of conduct or a series of acts“). Here, the complaint focuses exclusively on how Plaintiff was treated without idеntifying any other female officer who suffered similarly. In fact, the only other female officer mentioned in Plaintiff‘s
ii. Section 1983 Claims Against Individual Defendants
Plaintiff also brings Section 1983 claims against Chief Baker, Chief Barnes, and Commander Gramins in their individual capacities. To state a claim that a person acting in his individual capacity violated Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts for the Court to reasonably infer (1) conduct that deprived her of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law, and (2) that the Defendant was acting under color of state law when committing the conduct alleged. Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2014).
Most of Defendants’ arguments about the sufficiency of the Section 1983 claims are equally applicable to Plaintiff‘s Title VII claims and are addressed in the section that follows. See Bless v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff‘s Office, 9 F.4th 565, 574 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Discrimination cases brought under § 1983 are governed by the same legаl standards as those brought under Title VII.“); Huri v. Off. of the Chief Judge, 804 F.3d 826, 835 (7th Cir. 2015) (“When a plaintiff uses
With respect to Count V, Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s retaliation claim under the Equal Protection Clause fails because Plaintiff has not alleged that the retaliаtion was based on a protected trait or protected class membership. The Equal Protection Clause provides no right of action against retaliation, generally; the Equal Protection Clause only prohibits retaliation “on the basis of a protected trait or because of [a plaintiff‘s] membership in a particular class.” Boyd v. Illinois State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2004); see Yatvin v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988) (“retaliating against a person for filing charges of sex discrimination is not the same as discriminating against a person on grounds of sex“); e.g. Schloss v. City of Chicago, No. 18-CV-1880, 2019 WL 6716613, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2019) (dismissing Equal Protection retaliation claim where plaintiff contended that defendant “retaliated against her for the filing of an internal sex discrimination complaint and this lawsuit.“). In the cоmplaint, Plaintiff alleges that she “complained that she was being subjected to unequal and discriminatory treatment, negative terms and conditions of employment relative to similarly situated male employees.” Doc. 27 ¶ 153. Plaintiff then alleges that she was retaliated against because of these complaints. Id. ¶ 154 (“After Plaintiff complained about discriminatory conduct, the Defendant took materially adverse employment actions against the Plaintiff“). At no point does Plaintiff allege that she was retaliated against because she was a
As to Count VIII, Defendants argue that Chief Baker, Chief Barnes, and Commander Gramins are not individually liable for the SPD‘s failure to promote Plaintiff because they were not responsible for the decisions of the promotability committee or the final arbiters of who would be promoted. Doc. 35 at 13. Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal fault; to be liable under § 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation. See Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012) (“An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.“). In this case, Plaintiff has adequately pled that each of the individual defendants was personally responsible for the SPD‘s failure to promote Plaintiff. For example, Plaintiff has alleged that Commander Gramins brought up supposed issues with Plaintiff‘s performance “during the promotion process” and “during promotional evaluation meetings when the promotability committee was deciding which candidate(s) to recommend for promotion” and as a result, the committee did not recommend Plaintiff. Doc. 27 ¶ 16(d). Plaintiff has further alleged that “even though the Department found Plaintiff‘s conduct was acceptable, Defendant Gramins continued raising the unfounded complаints during the 2022, 2023 and 2024 promotional process to adversely impact Plaintiff‘s ability to be promoted.” Id. ¶ 16(e)(2). This is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Commander Gramins individually participated in a constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff has also alleged that Chief Barnes and Chief Baker were functionally the final decisionmakers as to who would be promoted because “the Village Manager routinely accepts the Chief‘s decision and recommendation.” Id. ¶ 86. Based upon this,
B. Title VII Claims
Counts II, IV, VI, and IX are brought agаinst all the Village pursuant to Title VII. The Village challenges these counts as inadequately pled under Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For the reasons that follow, the Court disagrees as to Counts II, VI, and IX, but agrees that dismissal of Count IV is appropriate.
i. Gender Discrimination (Count II)
Count II alleges a claim of gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual” with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Here, a plausible claim of gender discrimination exists. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges multiple adverse employment actions that she suffered which similarly situated male employees did not,
ii. Hostile Work Environment (Count IV)
Count IV alleges a claim of hostile work environment discrimination in violation of Title VII. “Title VII‘s general prohibition against ... discrimination by employers includes a prohibition against creating a hostile or abusive work environment.” Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2014). Title VII is violated when “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim‘s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. To state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (3) the harassment was severe or рervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2017). Whether the workplace is hostile depends on the totality of the circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee‘s work performance.” Id. at 549-50. Although “a workplace need not be ‘hellish’ to constitute a hostile work environment, a hostile work environment must be so pervaded by discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment are altered.” Id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged any harassment at all, and therefore cannot establish severe or pervasive harassment. The Court agrees that the allegations in the complaint
iii. Retaliation (Count VI)
Count VI alleges a claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII. Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because that employee has “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII.
Here, Plaintiff states a plausible claim of retaliation. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activities when she complained of gender discrimination and filed an EEOC complaint in March 2023. Plaintiff alleges that Commander Gramins, Chief Barnes, and Chief Baker were all made aware of the EEOC complaint “prior to the most recent promotional process.” Doc. 27 ¶¶ 96-97. Plaintiff alleges that she was highly qualified for promotion – having received exceptional performance reviews and the highest assessment score in the promotional process in 2022. Id. ¶¶ 180, 185. Still, she was not promoted in 2023 or 2024. This is enough to allege an adverse employment action plausibly connected to Plaintiff‘s discrimination complaints. The Court therefore denies dismissal of Count VI.
iv. Failure to Promote (Count IX)
Count IX alleges a claim of failure to promote in violation of Title VII. In order to establish a prima facie case in a failure-to-promote context, a plaintiff “must show that (1) [she] belongs to a protected class, (2) [she] applied for and was qualified for the position sought, (3) [she] was rejected for that position and (4) the employer granted the promotion to someone outside of the protected group who was not better qualified than the plaintiff.” Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2003).
C. ADA Retaliation Claim (Count VII)
Count VII alleges retaliation in violation of the ADA. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff‘s ADA retaliation claim on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege that she suffers from a qualifying ADA disability, engaged in a statutorily protected activity, or that an adverse employment action was taken against her. The Court finds dismissal of this claim appropriate because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged an adverse employment action related to this claim.
The anti-retaliation provision of the ADA provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that she was disabled due to shoulder, neck, and eye injuries. Plaintiff also has pled that she requested reasonable accommodation for that disability, which meets the statutorily protected activity element. See Trahanas v. Northwestern Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 856 n.6 (7th Cir. 2023) (“To have engaged in an activity protected by the ADA, the employee must have asserted her rights under the ADA by either seeking an accommodation or raising a claim of discrimination due to her disability.“). However, Plaintiff does not allege that her statutorily protected activity was close in time to the failure to promote her, or anything else that could lead to the reasonable inference that there was some connection between the two. Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019) (Relevant evidence connecting activity to adverse aсtion may include “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements of animus, evidence other employees were treated differently, or evidence the employer‘s proffered reason for the adverse action was pretextual.“) For all the Court can tell, Plaintiff‘s ADA accommodations were requested and received many years before the failure to promote her (possibly even before she was promoted to Sergeant). The Court therefore dismisses Count VII without prejudice.
D. Overtime and Wage Claims (Counts X, XI, and XII)
Under the FLSA, non-exempt employees must be paid at least the federal minimum wage for all hours worked, and time and a half for hours worked over 40 hours in a week.
To state a claim for failure to pay overtime, a plaintiff need not plead “infinitesimal details,” but “must provide some sрecific facts to ground their claims.” Dobrov v. Hi-Tech Paintless Dent Repair, Inc., No. 20-CV-00314, 2021 WL 1212796 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2021). Indicators that overtime worked was frequently uncompensated can help a claim survive dismissal. Compare Trujillo v. Mediterranean Kitchens, Inc., No. 17-CV-01887, 2017 WL 2958240, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss when plaintiff made no allegation as to frequency of the overtime and did not allege specific weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours per week); with Dobrov, 2021 WL 1212796, at *4 (denying motion to dismiss despite plaintiff not citing specific weeks when he worked over 40 hours and not alleging how many total overtime hours he worked because plaintiff had alleged that failure to
The Court finds that Plaintiff has successfully pled a claim under the FLSA and its state-law counterpart the IMWL. Plaintiff alleges that in September 2022, she was instructed by Chief Barnes that her work with the P&P unit required her to receive and respond to communications outside of work hours. Doc. 27 ¶ 51. She further alleged that she “typically” had to respond to after-hours calls from other officers in her unit, as well as calls or texts regarding traffic grants, rescheduling requests, evidence tech questiоns, firing range issues, lost and found inquiries, medical leave notices, vendor calls, and issues related to body cameras and fleet vehicles. Id. ¶¶ 53-55. It is plausible that these types of communications could create a great deal of after-hours work, and Plaintiff has alleged that she was uncompensated for at least seventy hours of overtime. Id. ¶ 207. This is sufficient to state a claim.
The Court does not reach the same conclusion as to Plaintiff‘s claim under the IWPCA. The IWPCA allows for a cause of action based on compensation wrongfully withheld pursuant to an employment contract or agreement. See
The complaint in this case does not allege that Plaintiff was party to an employment contract or other agreement to pay her for after-hours work with the P&P. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Chief Barnes told her that she was “not allowed to log or seek compensation” for that work. Doc. 27 ¶ 51. Plaintiff references in her response to the motion to dismiss the Village Compensation Policy. Doc. 38 at 17. But the Court generally cannot consider facts outside of the complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege compensation wrongfully withheld pursuant to an employment contract or agreement, the Court dismisses Count XII without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Counts I, III, V, and VIII are dismissed as they relate to the Village without prejudice. Counts III, IV, V, VII, and XII are dismissed in their entirety without prejudice. If Plaintiff believes that she can amend the complaint to state valid claims consistent with the reasоning laid out in this opinion, she is granted leave to do so.
Dated: May 23, 2025
APRIL M. PERRY
United States District Judge