*1 LA VINE, COMMISSIONER, NEW HAGANS et al. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL YORK
SERVICES, et al. Argued 72-6476. December
No. Decided March *2 J., opinion Court, delivered of the in which White, Douglas, JJ., joined. and BrenNAN, Stewart, Marshall, BlacicmuN, J., opinion, J., dissenting filed a which C. and Powell, Burger, J., joined, post, p. J., 550. filed a dissent- Rehnquist, Rehnquist, ing opinion, J., J., joined, post, p. C. Burger, Powell, 552. Jay
Carl Nathanson argued petitioners, the cause him With on the briefs were Steven J. Henry Cole and A. Freedman. Colodner,
Michael Attorney Assistant General of New argued York, respondent the cause for Lavine. With him Louis on the brief were J. Lejkowitz, Attorney Gen- Hirshowitz, Attorney Samuel A. First Assistant eral, General. opinion delivered the
Me. White Justice Court. under the recipients public assistance
Petitioners, Depend- Aid cooperative federal-state to Families With (AFDC) brought ent Children this action program,1 the District Court for themselves and their infant chil- similarly dren of other representatives and as situated recipients. challenged provision AFDC Their suit major categorical public pro AFDC is one of several assistance grams Security established the Social Act of and as we King Smith, described in it is *3 cooperative founded on a scheme of federalism: largely by Government, matching “It financed is the Federal aon basis, by fund and is administered re- States. States are not quired participate program, in to but those which desire to take advantage of the substantial federal funds available for distribution needy required to children are plan to submit an AFDC for the approval Secretary Health, Education, (HEW). of the and Welfare 627, 49 601, 602, 603, Stat. 42 U. S. C. and 604. See S. §§ [U. Advisory Report Intergovernmental Relations, Commission Statu- tory and Administrative Controls Associated with Federal Grants (1964)]. for Public plan Assistance 21-23 The must conform with requirements several Security of the Social rules and Act and with regulations promulgated by amended, 42 HEW. 49 Stat. as (1964 ed., Supp. II). U. HEW, S. C. See also Handbook of § Administration, pt. IV, Public §§2200, Assistance 2300 . . . Wyman, (1970). See also Rosado v. Security Act, Under the Social HEW withholds federal funds for implementation plan compliance state AFDC until with the Department's regulations. may Act and the HEW also terminate partially entirely payments or federal if "in the administration of plan comply substantially an)- there is a failure to with [state] provision required by (a) section included to be [the Act] plan.” King Smith, supra, in the 42 U. S. C. 604. See § Wyman, 12; supra, n. Rosado v. at 420-422. Regulations permitting York and the New Code Rules prior payments recoup to for rent State unscheduled subsequent program.2 grants from under the AFDC They alleged recoupment regulation violated Equal Protection Clause Amendment Fourteenth pertinent provisions and contravened the of the Social Security pro- governing regulations Act AFDC and the mulgated administering agency, thereunder Department Health, Education, Welfare (HEW).3 injunctive sought declaratory The action challenged regulation provides, pertinent part: “(g) Payment supplies already services and received. Assist- for grants only ance shall be made to meet current needs. Under the following specified payment supplies circumstances for services already received is deemed a current need:
“(7) recipient public being For a evicted assistance who for nonpayment grant previously issued, of rent for has been provided prevent advance allowance such eviction family; or rehouse the and such advance be deducted from shall subsequent grants equal the next amounts over more than month, six months. When there is a advance more than one rent for period, subsequent or more than one advance in a 12 rent month grants provided payments for rent shall be accord- restricted (g) ance with Part of this Title.” 18 N. R. R. 352.7 Y. C. § recipients, monthly grants As petitioners AFDC receive calculated provide shelter, family fuel, of their needs and other 90% another, petitioner basic necessities. For one reason or each was rent, pay eviction, unable her she and faced with imminent *4 emergency payments received rent from Nassau De- Count}' partment these of Social Services. Because the State characterized payments “advances,” was as the amount of these disbursements monthly recouped petitioners’ subsequent familial deducted or from (7). grants pursuant (g) assistance to 352.7 § regu alleged recoupment Petitioners the New York State contrary provisions lation following was to the statute regulations fact, funds, assumed, contrary and that those because to emergency need, recipient satisfy a rent extended to a current to and 28 C. pursuant to 42 C. U. S. § relief C. invoked under 28 U. S. § and was (3) and The District Court found that the §§ equal protection provided claim was substantial and adjudicate basis for the so-called “statutory” and alleged claim —the conflict between state hearing, federal law. After the trial court declared the recoupment contrary Security regulation Social regulations enjoined Act and and implementa- HEW its family’s during remain as available income for the need the mandated recoupment period. six-month
Title 42 (a) (7) (a) (10) U. S. C. pertinent and state in §§ part:
“(a) plan needy A State for aid and services to families with (7) except children provided must ... as otherwise clause (8), provide [administering] agency shall, that the State in determin- ing need, any take into consideration other and income resources of any child or claiming dependent aid relative to families with chil- dren, any (living other individual in the same home as such child relative) whose needs the State determines should be considered determining the need claiming of the child aid, or relative such as any expenses well reasonably as earning any attributable to the such income ....
“(10) provide, July 1, 1951, effective wishing that all individuals application to make dependent for aid to families with children shall opportunity have so, to do and that aid de- to families with pendent children shall promptness be furnished with reasonable eligible all individuals . .. .” (a) (3) 45 CFR (ii) (c): 233.20 § “(a) Requirements OAA, State Plans. A Plan State for AFDC, AB, must, APTD specified or AABD below: “(3) .... (ii) that, establishing eligibility Provide financial and the payment: amount of (c) only the assistance . . such net income as is . actually regular considered, available for current use will be basis only currently available will resources be considered . . . .”
533
of
Following
remand,4
or enforcement.
Court
tion
had
reversed, holding
petitioners
that because
Appeals
present
claim,
failed
substantial constitutional
lacked
either the
jurisdiction
District Court
entertain
471
2d
protection
statutory
claim.
F.
347
equal
jurisdictional
(CA2 1973).
being
impor-
question
granted
(1973).
we
certiorari.
412
938
one,
tant
forth
hold
below,
For
set
we
that
the District
reasons
had
under
(3)
28 U. S. C. 1343
to con-
§
petitioners’
sider
recoupment
attack
regulation.5
4
appeal
On
injunction,
from
entry
the District Court’s
Appeals
the Court of
without extended discussion found
(3).
for the
28
passing
1983 action under U. S.
C.
Without
§
§
findings
conclusions,
on the
merits of
District Court’s
and
Appeals,
judge dissenting,
Court of
with one
ordered a remand to
recoupment
prior
that court to determine whether the
advance
payments
grants
grant”
from
rent
current
is a “reduction
trigger
fair-hearing procedures
would
the New York
under 18
(CA2
N. Y. C. R.
1972).
R. 351.26.
I 42 C. under U. S. brought Petitioners this action provides: 1983, § any person who, statute, under color
“Every any or State ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, three-judge requiring court. law been denominated a claim not a has Wickham, (1965). itself Co. v. 382 Ill But & Swift Swift recognized se- a suit to have a state statute declared void and to law cure the benefits of the federal statute with which state allegedly in cannot without ultimate resort to the Fed- conflict succeed any sure, eral Constitution —“to be determination that a state statute obstructing Supremacy is void a federal statute does rest on Id., Moreover, Clause of the Federal Constitution.” at 125. when previously we have determined that state AFDC laws do not conform Security regulations, they to the Social Act or HEW have been in- Supremacy Swank, validated under the Clause. Townsend v. See 282, (1971). urged It is therefore that the “secured by language (3) the Constitution” of 1343 should not be construed § Supremacy exclude Clause issues. That we leave for day. another rights
Petitioners contend that 1983 authorizes suits to vindicate § under the “laws” of the well United States as as under the Con- brought stitution and that suit under 1983 to vindicate § statutory right Act, Security under the Social is a suit under Congress “providing protection rights, Act for the civil includ- ing right meaning (4). They within to vote” § any (3) argue event, further that in in particular, and 1343 § § general, should be construed to invest district courts with any by to hear we suit authorized 1983. These issues § S., 7; Wyman, also do reach. See Rosado at 405 n. Herzer, Statutorily-Based see also Federal Over Jurisdiction Welfare Claims, Rights-Civ. 1, (1970); Note, 6 Harv. Civ. L. 16-18 Lib. Rev. Programs, Federal Challenges Jurisdiction Over Welfare State (1972); Note, Col. L. Rev. 1405-1435 Federal Judicial Practices, Review of State Welfare 67 Col. L. Rev. past challenges by- concerning
Several decisions of this Court categorical recipients regulations assistance to state welfare have either assumed that under 1343 or so existed § any or causes to be Territory, subjects, subjected, within person or other citizen of the United States any deprivation thereof to by Con- or immunities secured rights, privileges, party injured be liable to the laws, stitution and shall proper in an or other law, equity, action at suit proceeding for redress.”
By petitioners’ its claims that terms, § embraces by state regulation respondent enforced challenged county deprives officials them of a right welfare viz., laws,” equal “secured the Constitution and *7 protection of laws. But the federal cause of action by by jurisdic- created the section does not itself confer tion upon adjudicate the federal courts to these district claims. Accordingly, petitioners principally upon relied 28 (3): U. S. C. 1343 § jurisdic-
“The district courts shall have original
analysis.
See,
g.,
Remillard,
stated
406
without
e.
v.
Carleson
Stanton,
(1972);
(1972);
669,
S.
Carter v.
671
U.
598
405 U. S.
Swank,
S.,
2;
v.
404
Re
Townsend
U.
at 284 n.
Human
California
Dept.
Java,
(1971); Dandridge Williams,
sources
v.
402
S. 121
v.
U.
(1970); Goldberg
Kelly,
(1970);
Concededly, 1343 authorizes a civil action to § “redress . any under color of State . . deprivation, regula tion any right ... . . . secured the Constitution (3) United States." Section 1343 therefore con jurisdiction upon ferred the District Court to entertain the constitutional claim if it was of sufficient substance jurisdiction. to support federal If was, it is also clear that the District Court could hear matter the claim between conflict federal and state law, without determining that latter claim in its own right encompassed was § within 1343. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 Y. (1970); see also N. Dept. Dublino, Social Services S. n. 11 (1973). *8 Appeals
The Court of petitioners ruled that had not tendered a substantial and ordered dismissal of the entire action subject for want of matter jurisdiction. principle The applied by the Court of Appeals a “substantial” question was necessary to —that support unexceptionable under prior —was cases. Over years this Court has repeatedly held that courts federal are power without to entertain claims otherwise within their they if are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid Newburyport merit,” Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193
537 v. Bailey “wholly insubstantial,” 561, (1904); 579 Patterson, frivolous,” “obviously 31, (1962); 369 U. S. 33 Distilling Baltimore, Hannis Co. v. 216 U. 285, S. Garrigues (1910); Levering & “plainly unsubstantial,” longer Co. v. “no Morrin, 103, (1933); 289 U. S. Ross, open discussion,” 70, McGilvra v. 215 U. S. (1909). Ex principal subject, One of the decisions on U. ;parte Poresky, 30, (1933), held, first, S. that diversity the absence of it is essential citizenship, “[i]n a should question that substantial presented”; second, be was not three-judge court pass jurisdiction; initial necessary upon question this plainly unsub- question and third, “[t]he 'obviously stantial, either because it is without merit’ or because 'its so results from clearly unsoundness previous decisions of court as the sub- to foreclose ject question and leave no room for the inference that the controversy.’ subject to be raised can sought be the Levering Garrigues & Co. v.” Hannis supra; Morrin, Distilling v. McGilvra Baltimore, 285, 288; Co. 216 U. S. Ross, 80.”
Only recently this again general reviewed this convening where arose the context of three-judge court under 28 § U. S. C. 2281:
“
insubstantiality’
purpose
'Constitutional
for this
‘essentially
has been equated
concepts
with such
Bailey
Patterson,
fictitious,’
S.,
33;
ibid,.;
‘wholly
‘obviously
insubstantial,’
frivolous,’
y. Baltimore,
Distilling
Hannis
Co.
tionally insubstantial previous frivolous; the claims inescapably render merely doubtful render claims decisions that them insubstantial merit do not render questionable is 2281. A claim § 28 U. S. C. purposes for the ' clearly so if “its unsoundness only insubstantial court previous results from decisions for the no room subject and leave to foreclose can to be raised questions sought inference that ’ Poresky, parte Ex controversy.” subject Distilling Co. v. supra, Hannis quoting from at 32, Baltimore, Levering & Garri- supra, at also 288; see Morrin, gues (1933); 289 103, Co. v. U. S. Ross, 70, (1909).” McGilvra v. U. S. Osser, Goosby 512, 409 U. v. S. substantiality jurisdic-
The doctrine as statement principles affecting power tional of a federal court adjudicate been questioned, claims has Hood, Bell v. S. and character- analytically ized as “more ancient than Rosado sound,” Wyman, supra, at 404. But remains the rule and here, needs no re-examination con- we are accepted vinced that petitioners' within com- doctrine plaint alleged a constitutional claim sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the pass District Court controversy. essentially
Jurisdiction authority conferred Congress given type decide case one or the way other. Fair Kohler Die Co., 228 (1913). Here, (3) §§ and 1983 unquestionably authorized federal courts to entertain to redress suits under color of deprivation, law, state of constitu- tional rights. plain It is also complaint for- mally alleged deprivation. such a The District Court’s jurisdiction, a matter for threshold turned determination,
S39 on was insubstantial whether the too consideration.
In v. 471 AFDC Dandridge Williams, 397 U. S. recipients grant regu- maximum challenged Maryland the protection held equal grounds. lation We that the by inquiring issue should be resolved whether the classifi- did, Finding cation had a rational basis. we that Dandridge regulation. sustained the But evinced no suspend Equal intention to the Pro- operation tection field law. Clause of social welfare State rationally must regulations laws and still “be based and Id., free from invidious See discrimination.” at 487. v. 406 Hackney, (1972); U. S. 546 Carter Jefferson Stanton, v. (1972); Antonio cf. San Rodriguez, School District v. 1 (1973). by say Judged standard, equal we cannot that the protection complaint tendered issue either was beyond frivolous or insubstantial as to juris- so be any diction the District Court. areWe unaware of specifically cases in this Court dealing any with this or similar regulation settling way the matter one or the immediately Nor is it other.6 to us from the obvious district similarly 6 Those courts that have ruled on drafted state recoupment provisions they rationally have found that were not purposes program related the declared AFDC and were regula Security therefore invalid under the Social Act and HEW Cooper Laupheimer, (ED tions. In Supp. F. Pa. 1970), Court, finding equal protection District after substantial, Pennsjdvania regulation recouped invalidated a period alleged family’s over overpayments a two-month from a grants. regulation assistance with The found the court inconsistent Security including, alia, reasons, Social inter Act for several punishment dependent by depriving child him of a substan tial amount of his AFDC mother either assistance because his mistakenly payment ago. fraudulently obtained extra months justify [arbitrary] state cannot its method restitution “[T]he by asserting management proper produce would funds such complaint
face of the that recouping emergency pay- rent ments from future welfare disbursements, which petition- argue deprived ers needy children parental because of permit reserve. The state cannot a child [cash] to starve or deprived of aid that budgetary he needs because mother’s mismanagement. Security specifies Social Act remedies for Id., such a situation . . . .” at 269. Juras, Supp. (Ore. In 1971), 331 F. the District Bradford *11 subject-matter
Court found that it had over the con- statutory challenge Oregon stitutional and regulation to an au- thorizing recoupment overpayments grants. of from current assistance Measuring regulation against goals the program, the of the AFDC the court invalidated as it inconsistent with federal law. primary Congress establishing
“The concern of in pro- the AFDC gram protection needy dependent was the welfare and of the child. King §601; Smith, (1968). U. S. C. v. 392 U. S. 313 .. . recoupment This grants concern thwarted when from current money penalize takes parent. from the-child to the misconduct of its policy program requires ". . The . child-oriented the AFDC equal equally. with that children needs be treated The fact that parent-recipient- wrongfully a past withholding has acted in the justify reducing information does not the subsistence level of her needy Supp., children that below of other children.” 331 F. 170. at Holloway Parham, (ND 1972), In Supp. 340 F. Ga. equal protection process challenge Georgia and due to a statute mandating recoupment grants past pay- unlawful from future for enough convening ments was deemed warrant substantial to three-judge inconsistency Addressing court. claim of regulations, Security ruled with the Social Act and HEW the court required prerecoupment the law was valid it de- because currently part overpayments all termination that are parent available to the and the children.
Although explore question depth, it did not in the first Court Appeals panel injunction passed upon in found this case that (3) pursuant in the C. 1343 District Court to 28 U. S. § Stanton, authority on the in Court’s decision Carter challenging There we a state welfare noted a suit regulation that “if the characterization of court’s [federal district] question presented as insubstantial was [Fourteenth Amendment] complaint, been, based on the face of the as it have it was seems to no mean- patently require rational to default, was so ingful consideration. Appeals rightly obliged felt to measure
petitioners’ complaint
challenged regulation
“by
Equal
discriminating
violated the
Protection Clause
irrationally
invidiously
between
classes
different
recipients”7 against
prescribed by
the standard
Dan-
dridge. The
Appeals
Court of
then reasoned that without
the recoupment
regulation,
subject
those who were
preferred
would be
those
had paid
over
who
full
their
rent out of their normal monthly
The court fur-
grant.
ther reasoned that
regulation provided
an incentive
recipients
properly manage
welfare
their
grants
not become
delinquent
their rent.8 It concluded that
Id.,
majority’s
error.”
at 671. The dissent did not
jurisdictional
930-931,
2d,
F.
determination.
932.
“No doubt there are other which the state could accom- plish regulation. by recoupment the ends served use of the However it is not for evaluate the wisdom of the state’s us rationally proper If choice of means. these means are related to end, they case, power go we no as are have further.” 471 F. 2d 349-350. that no substan- rationally based and was regulation within question
tial constitutional presented. had been District Court rationality of respect to the with reasoning This Protection Equal under the propriety and its regulation not but prove correct, may ultimately Clause “very or so the decided cases from immediately obvious think Protection Clause. We Equal under the plain” Hood, of Bell v. the admonition should be followed here: respondents ... is not defeated
“Jurisdiction aver- that possibility seem to contend, on which fail to a cause of action might ments state is well petitioners actually could recover. For it proper cause settled that failure state not for a merits and judgment action on the calls jurisdiction. for a dismissal for Whether want complaint a cause of action on states just of law and granted relief could is a not of fact it must be decided after and as issues court has over the before the assumed controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to in the allegations determine do not complaint ground relief, state a then dis- missal of the would be on merits, case jurisdiction.” Id., (citations for want at 682 omitted).10 Hood, in Bell “say
As the case we was cannot the cause of patently action is so alleged without merit
9Hart Keith Exchange, 10Once plaintiff’s jurisdiction- a federal court has ascertained that a conferring Engineers claims face,” are not “insubstantial on their *13 Chicago, Co., 423, v. R. I. P. R. & 382 U. S. “no further consideration of the merits of the claim is relevant to a deter [s] subject mination of the court’s v. matter.” Baker Carr, 186,199 (1962). 369 U. S. noted, under justify, qualifications as to even Id., jurisdiction.” for want of at 683. court’s dismissal say petitioners’ insubstantial, can claim is Nor we "so implausible, by foreclosed prior decisions completely otherwise devoid of merit not to involve controversy a federal of the Dis- within Court, trict whatever be the ultimate resolution the federal on the merits.” Oneida Indian Nation issues v. County Oneida, (1974). 414 U. S. (Citations omitted.)
II Given over the District Court had had jurisdiction, also over “statutory” supra, claim. at 536. The latter See was be decided first and former if not reached the statu tory claim dispositive. Human was Resources California Java, Dept. v. Dandridge (1971); Williams, 397 S., 475-476; U. Rosado v. Wyman, S., at 402; King U. Smith, U. S. 309 constitutional claim could adjudicated only aby three- judge court, but statutory juris was within the Wickham, diction of a single district judge. & Co.v. Swift IllS. (1965); supra, Rosado v. at 403. Wyman, Thus, the District sitting Judge, moved alone, directly statutory claim. His decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, although a three-judge had court been convened, injunction issued, and the statutory ground alone decided, appeal would be only to this Court under 28 S. C. § U. 1253.
The procedure followed the District Court —initial determination substantiality adjudication then “statutory” claim without convening three-judge may appear at odds with some of prior our court — g., Engineers See, decisions. e. v. Chicago, R. I. & R.P. Co., 382 U. S. (1966); Florida Lime & Avocado Grow-
544 it we think But, Jacobsen, 73 U. S. 362
ers v. three-judge- recent evolution accurately reflects the for efficient concern “this Court's jurisprudence, court “the constric courts,” lower operation of the which three-judge view of the [court] tive Wick Co. v. & traditionally taken.” has this Court Swift omitted). In Rosado ham, (citations 129 supra, at 128, 403, suggested we Wyman, supra, v. not been claim the constitutional had
“[e]ven may well course appropriate most moot, the declared for judge district single been remand to have statutory claim and the determination findings time at a the district court, encumber rather than overburdened, calendars are court when district in a judges of three federal the time consuming aby be determined required not matter that was Wickham, Co. v. 382 & court. See three-judge Swift Ill (1965).” warrant claim would true that It is single judge that if a a court and convening three-judge statutory court must be rejects claim, three-judge Neverthe- consider the constitutional issue. called to statutory a constitutional less, the coincidence of automatically require single-judge should which, three-judge panel, district court to defer to a supra, in Rosado v. Wyman, view of what we have said merely pass statutory could then claim back to the Co., single judge. Kelly Telephone See v. Illinois Bell (CA7 Chicago, 325 F. 2d 151 Duluth & Geor- 148, 1963); gian Nims, Bay Transit Co. v. F. 2d 317, (CA6 Doe F. 1958); Supp. Lavine, 357, 359-360 (SDNY Carleson, Bryant cf. 1972); 444 F. 2d 358- (CA9 “In 1971). fact, would be inefficient grossly a three-judge send court a claim only will immediately back. sent This inefficiency especially is case, if decision resolves apparent single judge’s court.” three-judge no to convene the there then need Richardson, (Md. 1972) Supp. Norton v. F. not forbid (citations omitted). Section 2281 does “in to read that statute and we are not inclined practice, *15 Lime . .” Florida with . . mutilating isolation literalness Jacobsen, supra, (Frank- & Avocado Growers furter, dissenting). J.,
Ill claim, Taking jaundiced of constitutional view dismiss would dissenters have District Supremacy three- (“statutory”) issue, Clause convene a all judge of court, reject claim, and this, apparently, as exercise discretion Gibbs, Court, District under Workers v. Mine U. S. 715 (1966), pendent is claimed to have over the federal claim. Gibbs But was oriented to state law pendent claims federal claims conferring on the District Court. Pendent over state claims was described as a doctrine of discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering advantages of judicial economy, and convenience, litigants. fairness For, decisions state “[n]eedless law should be avoided both as a of comity promote matter justice and to between parties, by procuring for them a reading surer-footed of applicable Id., law.” (footnote at 726 omitted).11
In light of the Gibbs, dissent’s treatment several observations are appropriate. First, is evident from Gibbs pendent that state law claims are not always, or even almost always, to be dismissed and adjudicated. not 11The approval Court also cited with Judge Magruder’s Chief con Palmer, currence in Strachman v. (CA1 F. 2d 1949), advising that overeager courts should “‘[f]ederal not be to hold on to the determination might issues that be appropriately more ” left to litigation.' settlement state court S., 383 U. at 726 n. 15. economy advantages given contrary,
On the Gibbs con- litigants, unfairness to convenience no these claims. templates adjudication reasonably other con- follow that Second, it would adjudication than rather dis- siderations warrant Louisville missal state claims. In Siler v. Co., (1909) & Nashville R. the Court held S. the state should decided first and because issues dispositive, questions these claims need not were be reached:
“Where case this court can be decided with- questions arising out reference to under the Federal Constitution, is usually pursued course and is departed from without important reasons. In this case we think it much better to decide it with regard of a local nature, involving the construction of authority the state statute and the *16 given therein to the commission to make order in question, rather than unnecessarily decide the various questions constitutional appearing in the Id., record.” at 193.
Siler is not an oddity. The Court has characteristically
dealt
first with possibly dispositive state law claims
pendent
to federal constitutional
See,
claims.
g.,
e.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. Garrett,
v.
231 U.
298,
S.
303-304, 310 (1913);
Cases,
Ohio Tax
232 U.
576,
S.
586-587 (1914); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.
Co., 244
499,
U. S.
508-509 (1917); Louisville & Nash-
ville
Greene,
R. Co. v.
244 U.
522,
S.
527 (1917); Davis
Wallace,
v.
547 and, very least, it presumes advisability plied,12 deciding of the pendent, first nonconstitutional issue.
Gibbs did not cite Siler cases, or like nor did it purport to change rule that a ordinary federal court should not decide federal questions constitutional where a dis- positive ground nonconstitutional is available. The dissent uncritically relies on Siler but ignores pref- erence stated in that case for deciding nonconstitutional though claims even they and, standing are alone, beyond are federal court.13
12Numerous
general propo
decisions
this Court have stated the
sition endorsed in
properly
Siler —that a federal court
vested with
jurisdiction may pass
on the state or local law
without
deciding the
proceeded
federal constitutional
issues—and have then
solely
dispose
ground. See,
g.,
the case
on the nonfederal
e.
Hillsborough
Cromwell,
620,
(1946); Waggoner
v.
S.
326 U.
629-630
Chicago
v.
County,
113,
Estate Wichita
(1927);
116-119
U. S.
Kendall,
R.
(1924);
G. W.
Co. v.
Rail
S.
United Gas Co. v.
Comm’n,
300,
Risty
road
(1929);
Chicago,
278 U. S.
R. I. &
Co.,
378,
P. R.
270 U. S.
These
other cases illustrate
practice
policy
avoiding
wisdom the federal
adjudication
absolutely
disposition
where not
essential to
a case.
Other decisions have
both the
addressed
federal and
in a
state claims
fashion, see,
g.,
random
e.
Laughton,
Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v.
413,
U.
(1923);
S.
421-426
Southern R. Co. Watts,
(1923);
they
generally
but
have
on both the
denied relief
grounds
federal and
asserted,
nonfederal
nonfederal claim
being dispositive. Daughton
and Watts were both written
Brandéis,
Mr. Justice
who
his
concurring opinion
celebrated
A,
Ashwander v.
TV 297
upon
relied
Siler in
summarizing
general
rule that “if a case can be
decided
either
*17
grounds,
involving
of two
one
a
question,
the other a
question
statutory
general
law,
construction or
the Court will
only
decide
the latter.”
upon
The dissent
Oursler,
also relies
Hurn v.
The dissent warning notes Hurn’s that Siler does not “permit a federal court separate to assume of a distinct However, non-federal cause of action Ibid. certainly Siler rule adjudicate allows the trial court to “a case where grounds two distinct support single cause of action are only alleged, presents one of which Id., a federal . . .” . (emphasis added). here, Hurn, We can thus see that as in [complaint] alleges single right "[t]he violation aof [here right to nondiscriminatory receipt public treatment as to assist And it is this ance]. violation which constitutes the cause of action. Indeed, the claims of equal protection [violation and the Social Security precisely so upon Act] rest identical facts as to be little equivalent more than the epithets of different to characterize the same group of circumstances. primary sought relief is an injunction put an end essentially to an single wrong, however differently characterized, enjoin wrongs distinct constituting independent basis for causes of Id., action.” at 246. Armstrong See also Paint & Varnish Corp., Works Nu-Enamel S. 14In closely analogous context, this recognized Court has special capability of federal adjudicate courts pendent federal
549 course, purposes, for our most relevant cases Smith, 309 King v. 392 U. S. such as are decisions those (1970), v. and (1968), Wyman, Rosado U. S. Dandridge (1970), where Williams, v. 397 U. S. Constitution jurisdictional claim arises under the Federal and the denominated “statu although claim, reality a under tory,” arising is In has Supremacy Clause. these cases the Court characteristically “statutory” dealt with the claim first if appellees’ position “because is is correct, there no occasion reach the constitutional TV A, Ashwander v. issues. 346-347 Rosenberg Fleuti, (Brandéis, J., v. concurring); Dandridge Williams, supra, 449.” 475-476. at In none of did the these cases think that jurisdiction fairly with a established, federal court, Operating In Romero v. International Co., claims. Terminal injured U. Spanish S. 354 seaman filed suit in federal claiming damages court general under the Act Jones and under maritime ship, law of the United for States unseaworthiness of the cure, negligence. maintenance and Jurisdiction was invoked (46 688) under the Act general Jones U. C.S. and under federal- § question (28 1331) (28 U. diversity 1332) S. C. U. S. C. § § jurisdiction. expressing petitioner After alleged view that its Jones Act enough claim substantial to confer under that statute, the Court held that general his maritime law claims were cognizable under 28 U. By means, however, S. C. 1331. no § was this the inquiry. end District Court have [petitioner’s “[T]he general maritime ‘pendent’ law to its claims] under the Jones Of Act. course the considerations which call exercise pendent jurisdiction of a state claim related to pending federal of action cause within the appropriate scope of the doctrine of Hurn Oursler, 289 U. S. are not the when, here, same what involved are related claims based on the maritime law. We perceive no barrier to the ‘pendent jurisdiction’ exercise in the very limited circumstances before us.” S., (emphasis added). Gibbs, under must nevertheless decide the constitu- *19 upon claim statutory if, tional issue and avoid the statutory strong the the claim is weighing claims, two contrary, and the constitutional claim weak. On Rosado Harlan, Mr. for the Court writing Justice Wyman, principles and with the of Gibbs well statutory pendent noted that was mind, essentially one of federal and that policy argu- “ ment for the exercise pendent ‘par- was ” ticularly strong.’ S.,U. at 404. And Gibbs itself observed “special pendent reason for the exercise of jurisdiction” where Supremacy implicated: Clause is “the federal particularly appropriate courts are bodies for application pre-emption principles.” S.,U. at 729. judgment
The Appeals Court of is reversed the case remanded to that court proceedings for further consistent with opinion.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice
with
whom The Chief
Powell,
Justice
Rehnquist
Mr.
dissenting.
Justice
join,
I join the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist
I
because
believe
expresses
he
the correct view of
the appropriate result when a claim over which a district
court has no independent
jurisdiction is appended to a
constitutional claim that has
hope
no
of success on the
A
merits.
wise exercise of discretion lies at the heart
of the doctrine
jurisdiction.
g.,E.
Rosado v.
Wyman,
I view that write opinion, supra, import the Gibbs misread the has which links Gibbs in the manner particularly Co., R. v. Louisville & Nashville S. Siler a state claim (1909), and like cases. Gibbs involved law the federal that arose out of same transaction as jurisdiction. majority federal conferred mandating together Gibbs and Siler apparently reads regard law claim without to the decision of the state of the federal claim on frailty ante, at In words, See 549-550. other rests. appears majority opinion to be federal con- saying claim as as the at issue marginal stitutional one here *20 of a capable supporting pendent federal over indeed, state claim that claim be and, is to state I decided to the exclusion of the federal issue. As view is a it, particularly interpretation that erroneous pendent doctrine. That reading would question jurisdiction encompass broaden federal mat- to ters of state law whenever an can imaginative litigant up think a federal no matter claim, insubstantial, how is that related to transaction rise to giving the state claim.
This quite extension Gibbs is we unnecessary, since are not confronted with a case where the claim is a matter of state law. The dictum Court’s could prompt nevertheless other courts to follow it. In view potential I mischief, this repeat a quotation from Gibbs relied on by my Brother how Rehnquist indicates far departed the Court has from the rationale of that precedent:
“[R]ecognition of a federal wide court’s latitude decide ancillary questions of state law does imply it litigant’s must tolerate a effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state law case. constitutes claim a state appears
Once claim federal which the a case, body real fairly claim the state only appendage, at 727. S., dismissed.” Gibbs, of common a matter reading of The correct federalism, notions of rooted light deeply sense and glimmer a have more than claim must federal is that the until sub- to do so at least continue of merit and must to the been committed have resources judicial stantial met, is not If those conditions lawsuit. either of deciding issues of state court has no business district expositors of state law when courts are not law. District diversity citizenship. is not based The Chief Rehnquist, Mr. with whom Justice join, dissenting. Mr. Powell Justice Justice ques- legal resolves a decision this case The Court’s necessarily properly legal cast terms. tion and is having federal district Court, court, to the According wholly over a “not insubstantial” acquired jurisdiction related claims power to decide other has claim, Apply- basis. independent jurisdictional which lack an present Court finds the analysis case, to the ing by petitioners sufficient equal protection pleaded satisfy hazy definition of “substan- this somewhat *21 tiality” appears approve to the District Court’s exer- alleging cise of over a claim conflict and federal welfare But regulations. between state since eyes we been admonished that we our have shut judges practical as to what we know as as well men, this legal consequences as decision should squarely faced. Smith, King
In the wake U. S. 309 (1968), Wyman, Rosado 397 U. S. the lower by courts have been confronted federal massive influx of regulations. state welfare challenging cases The principal case the state typical in the plaintiffs claim of regulations governing conflicts with regulation of the United Supremacy Clause and is invalid under presents a federal allegation This States Constitution. require- satisfy jurisdictional the first claim sufficient to ques- “federal 1331,1 the so-called § ment of 28 U. S. C. find the many plaintiffs jurisdictional statute, tion” but matter contro- requirement, second statute’s meet. versy impossible $10,000, exceed the sum Congress therefore, left, these cases would be Normally, jurisdictional surely imposed when it this understood enforcing likewise with limitation, charged to state courts the United States Constitution. plaintiffs disposition, however,
To avoid this natural turned C. a more § in these cases have to 28 U. S. narrowly jurisdictional requiring drawn federal statute amount. The jurisdictional provision no minimum case C. 1343 relevant reads: § S. original jurisdic- “The district courts shall have by any tion of civil action authorized law to be by any person: commenced “(3) To redress the under color of deprivation, any law, ordinance, State custom statute, regulation, any or usage, privilege immunity secured right, any the Constitution of the or by United States equal Act of Congress providing rights of citizens persons or of all within of the United . . .” States . provision
1 The relevant of 28 U. S. C. reads as follows: §1331 “(a) original The district courts shall have of all civil controversy actions wherein the matter exceeds the sum or $10,000, value exclusive of costs, interest and and arises under Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." jurisdictional $3,000 $10,000 raised amount was from in 1958. *22 not hold does and held, has never however, Court, This the Constitution Clause of Supremacy now, section. under this jurisdiction a basis provides itself by grant- decision need for such a escapes the The Court Supremacy to hear the power courts the federal ing jurisdiction. theory pendent under a claim Clause pro- plaintiffs pleaded equal here have Finding that sufficiently satisfy tection claim substantial seems to requirements § 28 U. S. C. the Court Supremacy consideration of the Clause claim suggest that I follow as matter course. do not believe Since equal protection was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under or that pendent § the doctrine appropriately was I invoked this case, dissent.
I The history in this Court long complex. Its roots back Osborn Bank go States, the United 9 Wheat. where the said that of the federal courts extended not only to federal issues themselves but also to nonfederal issues essential to the settlement of the federal claim. No subsequent decision any has cast upon doubt the wisdom of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's exposition in that case, since a different result would have forced substantial federal cases into state courts for adjudication simply they because involved nonfederal issues as well as federal ones.2 The doctrine was
2 “Under construction, judicial power of the Union extends effectively beneficially important to that most cases, class of depend which on the character of the cause. opposite On con struction, judicial power never can be extended case, to a whole expressed by constitution, parts but to those only of cases present particular involving the construction of *23 Co., 213 R. Nashville & v. Louisville in Siler expanded of power the upheld the Court where (1909), S. 175 U. upon jurisdiction its founded having court, a district constitutional bypass the to claims, constitutional federal The Court law. local of an issue decide and to questions all the decide to right “had the court the lower said that Federal it decided though even case, in the questions them, or even raising party adversely to the questions the case but decided all, at decide them to if omitted it 3 Court at only.” But questions local or state on ques- Federal course, “Of time cautioned: the same fraudulently up set or merely colorable not be tion must the court give to endeavoring purpose the mere 4 jurisdiction.” say can be extended it never law. We the constitution or the points are because, case, if circumstance that other the whole authorizing the Courts of Congress from it, in shall disable involved cause, equally original dis- it take the Union to authorizing Congress Courts to take from those ables single cause, will be restricted to appeal, and thus the whole on cause; to secure question in and words intended that obvious& laws, rights constitution, under the or treaties of those who claim Courts, States, in federal will be restricted a trial United remedy appeal upon point, an insulated after to the insecure of an that, given shape received to it another has against tribunal, will.” Osborn v. Bank into which he is forced his (1824). States, the United Wheat. S., 191. U. at 4Id., specifically Siler at 191-192. In the Court noted that juris fraudulently pleaded the constitutional claim was not to confer pendent diction over the claim. today, by heavy emphasis deciding
The Court its on state issues preference ones, ante, 546-547, imply to constitutional seems to controlling that should be when a doctrine even pleaded purpose give claim is “for endeavoring the mere jurisdiction.” agree. court I cannot The numerous cases cited juris pendent question to the returned The Court Oursler, in Hurn diction Morrin, Co. v. Levering Garrigues & S. federal a substantial agreed cases
The Court both necessary initial to confer was test must be met whether court,5 a the district in Hum and then jurisdiction is pendent involved, attempted necessary relationship to define the further conferring claim and between jurisdiction. Court, to the a lower According *24 separate court could exercise over a opinion policy long-recognized the stand for the Court’s sensible grounds should where that cases be decided nonconstitutional they possible; proposition but do not stand for the that claims which would be principles otherwise dismissed under discussed the Gibbs, in Mine be Workers U. S. 715 should heard simply jurisdic- avoid to the constitutional which conferred place. in tion the first competing See n. In such cases the infra. equally important policy safeguarding of the limited weight of the federal courts is ap- entitled to more than the Court pears give to it. in Levering, supra, The Court stated: objection complaint “Whether that a bill or a fails state a case to question under a federal statute raises a of of or merits by is to application be determined the a well of settled rule. If the complaint bill or the claim, pre- sets forth a substantial a. case is sented within the jurisdiction, federal court, upon however the con- sideration, may legal sufficiency decide as to the alleged of the facts support the claim. jurisdiction, distinguished But merits, from wanting is where the pleading claim set forth in plainly is un- substantial. The cases have variety stated rule in a ways, of but all . effect. . And . the federal averred plainly be obviously unsubstantial either because merit, without 'because its clearly unsoundness so previous results from deci- sions of this court subject as to foreclose the and leave no room for questions inference sought that the to be raised subject can be the ” controversy.’ of S., at 105-106. ground action, a of but support single of cause alleged a action itself.6 separate cause of over
The Court’s most recent extensive treatment Gibbs, subject occurred in Mine Workers v. spoken Hurn Because had in terms “causes of superseded
action,” adoption a term which was Rules Gibbs Federal of Civil redefined Procedure, necessary relation the federal and nonfederal claims in more understandable terms. Restating substan- test much the tiality pretty language the earlier cases, the Court then continued:
“The state and federal claims must from derive of operative common nucleus fact. But consid- if, ered without federal or regard to their state char- acter, plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily try all expected judicial them in one proceeding, then, assuming substantiality issues, power there federal courts to hear Id., (footnote the whole.” omitted) (empha- in original). sis clarify
This language jurisdictional served to questions proved had Hurn troublesome after v. Oursler. *25 But, then importantly, the decision went on to emphasize Oursler, 238, Hurn v. (1933): S.U. go
“But the permit rule does not far as so to a federal court to separate assume of a and distinct non-federal cause of joined complaint action because it is in the same with a federal cause of action. The distinction be observed is between a case grounds support single where two distinct in aof cause of action alleged, only are presents one of which question, a federal and a case separate where two and alleged, distinct causes of action are one only of which is in former, federal character. In the where the plainly federal wanting averred is not substance, court, federal though ground even established, federal not be may dispose retain upon nevertheless of the case the non-federal ground; in the latter upon it not do so the non-federal cause (Emphasis original.) action.” juris- independent an power lacking to hear claims that indiscriminately. should not be exercised dictional basis doc- “pendent reiterated that is Court id., not at discretion, plaintiff's trine of right/’ urged that the district courts exercise caution not to abuse that discretion. For the Court example, suggested that
“if the federal are trial, claims dismissed before jurisdictional though even insubstantial sense, state claims should be dismissed well.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). impor-
Furthermore, that the relative stressed tance of the claims should be considered:
“Similarly, if appears issues sub- state stantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, scope the issues compre- or of raised, remedy hensiveness of the the state sought, claims may be prejudice dismissed without and left for Id., resolution state tribunals.” at 726-727. Although the Court’s in Gibbs language necessarily discussed relationship the- between federal and state claims, opinion’s much of rationale applicable is when jurisdiction is over sought federal claims lacking an independent jurisdictional basis.7 Of course, a
7The Gibbs, Court in Mine S., Workers v. also stated: “[Recognition of a federal court's ancillary wide latitude to decide
questions of state law imply does not it must tolerate a liti- gant’s impose upon effort to only it what is in effect a state law appears case. Once it that a state claim body constitutes the real case, of a to which only the federal claim appendage, the state may fairly be dismissed.” I why also see no reason required courts should impose “tolerate” upon efforts to them Congress federal cases which *26 has chosen to leave to the state courts. deny ground decision to pendent that state courts should law questions consider state naturally involves issues relevant to the abstention, especially applicable not consideration when the claim primarily questions involves federal law. But the presence questions of federal should not induce expand proper federal courts to their jurisdiction. previously As noted, requir- Congress, a minimum ing juris- dollar for federal question amount made a diction, legislative decision to certain leave claims to state judi- courts. Considerations of convenience and economy may cial justify hearing those claims when genuine federal business, as to weak contrasted claims merely .intended jurisdiction, secure is before the fed- eral but these considerations should be subordi- court, nated considerations of federalism when claims without independent jurisdiction constitute “the real body” of the case. In this situation the lower courts should remember that federalism embodies system
“a in which is sensitivity there to the legiti- mate interests of both State and National Govern- ments, and which the National anx- Government, though may ious protect to vindicate and fed- eral rights federal interests, always endeavors to ways do so in that will unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of Younger the States.” Harris, 401 U. 44 (1971). S.
The majority rejects this analysis, seemingly'finding state greater courts’ familiarity with state law only is the reason for declining pendent under Gibbs. But Congress left to state only courts not those claims state involving law but also those claims involving federal law which it felt did not merit time of federal courts. This says Court now courts should hear those cases anyway they since can *27 interpretation an “at least as sure-footed” render ” “ bodies’ appropriate ‘particularly federal law and are undoubtedly reflects opinion, while it to do This so. equal reflect with does not Court, the view of this accuracy purpose Congress. heavily Wyman, 397 (1970),
In Rosado there support position, to its upon relied Court claim was a that was no intimation pleaded purpose securing for the weak one Rather consti- stronger over claim. proved plainly claim moot. stated: tutional This Court apparent which is at the insubstantiality, “Unlike beyond mootness, frequently a matter outset, parties, control of the not occur until after substantial time and been energy expended have looking toward dispute plain- the resolution of a that Id., tiffs were entitled in bring a federal court.” at 404.
Thus Rosado any in way does settle the issue before the Court today. Its offers no in holding aid resolving practical the real and issues that confronts this case.
The Gibbs decision must be understood its separate parts. First, the Court held could not attach unless the claim for was asserted met the requirement of substantiality and pendent unless the claim sufficiently was related to the jurisdictional claim to constitute single case under Constitution. Second, the Court admonished that jurisdiction, even if found to exist, should be exercised judiciously. The relatively permissive applied standards to the issue of whether the Court could consider a pendent claim were guide not to the ultimate decision of whether the Court should consider the pendent claim. Only where judicial “considerations of economy, conven- served and were litigants” and fairness ience predominate did not pendent where the doctrine was judicial claim, worth over the scope or 726. S., applied. U. jurisdiction to juris- Court lacked I that the District am convinced While one, claim as thin as this equal protection diction over clear me that point I it seems wrong even if am *28 over the Su- pendent to exercise its decision discretionary was not based on the Clause claim premacy Gibbs, in supra. outlined considerations
II equal protection simply The District Court found proceeded with- in be “substantial” and claim case to this The statutory claim. Court further to the out discussion of the District of the determination Appeals, reversing and therefore Court, found the claim to be insubstantial merely disagrees go had no need to further. This Court of the District substantiality, reinstating on the of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, process this Court’s analysis to me to be in its treatment wrong seems both treat and in its failure to jurisdictional question of the discretionary jurisdiction. aspects of applied equal legal terminology Whatever is to in protection plaintiffs case, claim of the this the one claim In very good. clear is that brief, fact recipients public who of under petitioners, assistance are Dependent the Aid to Families with Children program, from all received New over and above their York, funds monthly' grants, prevent usual eviction from their nonpayment for places lodging of of rent. The State, pursuant provision a the New York Code Rules in the Regulations challenged District Court, sought unusual, expenditures' by these to recover deduc- making the next succeeding petitioners’ tions over months from petitioners complaint In their monthly grants. normal procedure recoupment New York contended that the laws.8 equal protection deprived them of brief or in petitioners’ vain, either searches One Court, any District or this opinions minimal claim a test why meets even reason extraordinary substantiality. if, having It would seem monthly than normal entitle paid petitioners more their meet an the State emergency ment order to situation, period a recoup payments had not over sought Court, finding substantial, time. The District Juras, Supp. (Ore. cited 331 F. 1971), Bradford three-judge decision district court which found jurisdiction on a similar constitutional claim and then statutory decided In Bradford, the case on grounds. however, simply the Court stated that it had under 28 S. C. (3) § U. without further discussion.9 opinion of this Court sheds no more than light did opinion simply the District Court. The Court states:
“This reasoning respect with the rationality and regulation propriety the its under the Equal may ultimately Protection Clause prove but correct, it immediately is not obvious from the decided cases portion petitioners’ The complaint of the setting equal forth their protection claim in states full: regulation irrationally “Said invidiously and against discriminates plaintiff victims of eviction. No basis in fact, exists law or con- sistent purposes with the Security Act, reducing Social the payments level of plaintiffs who are then forced to live far below the provided subsistence levels persons. to all other Said regulation applies wholty a different determining standard in grant plaintiffs levels of than the income exemptions 'resource and levy from standard, applicable to all persons other in violation of Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Supp., 331 F. at 168. Equal Clause.” plain’ under the Protection 'very so
Ante, at 542. Williams, Dandridge But cases such as on legislative discredited attacks largely have (1970), wel- state apportionment decisions about limited a not found At Court has fare funds. least where the as interstate penalty on race or considerations based such upheld a travel, legislative judgment whenever Dandridge Although rational basis” “conceivable exists. “suspend operation did not Protection Equal assuredly particular Clause” in this makes this area, claim a marginal one.10
I protection cannot agree equal therefore that the pleaded was sufficient to confer on the here may District Court. Even that the lower assuming court only refer in pleadings making its determination question analysis on the jurisdiction, need not be made, majority as the seems to in legal a vacuum. imply, say previous To decisions have not foreclosed prior “specifically unless case with deal[s]” neglects the same regulation the second branch Levering Garrigues Morrin, test enunciated & Co. v. and repeated S. 103 later that a cases, Dandridge stated: “Conflicting morality intelligence by op- claims of are raised ponents proponents every measure, certainly including of almost one us. economic, social, before But the intractable and even philosophical problems presented by public pro- welfare assistance grams are not the business of this Court. The Constitution impose procedural safeguards upon systems certain ad- welfare ministration, Goldberg Kelly, U. S. 254 [397 But the (1970)]. *30 empower second-guess Constitution does not this Court to state offi- charged responsibility cials allocating with difficult of pub- limited among myriad lic welfare potential funds recipients. of Cf. Davis, Steward Co. Mach. 584-585; Helvering Davis, S., 644.” 397 U. 487. at “obviously merit.” without because claim is insubstantial Id., appears rationale it sufficient today’s 105. Under plead claim plaintiff is able to his that able straight But a district court should be with a face. jurisdiction any plainly of that for want dismiss of lack of hope no success on the merits. This carries from promise turn could evident recent decisions rejecting laying this Court claims with similar thesis or on the clearly down rules which would dismissal require merits. did however, District Court here
Assuming, that Gibbs clear to under jurisdiction, have seems me that equal protection support claim should not Supremacy by petitioners. Clause claim also asserted exercising The test for discretion must be a practical one, type judgments involving the that a reasonable lawyer, evaluating the respective strengths and weak- nesses of his In case, might undertake. this case it is highly improbable lawyer that a familiar with this place cases much Court’s would faith in the success of In equal protection his claim. fact, examination complaint itself shows substantially more attention paid was Supremacy Clause claim than to the claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. very At the least, Court, the District before it chose to exercise should have made jurisdiction, an identifiable determina- tion the Equal Protection simply Clause was not asserted for purpose of giving the Court over plaintiffs’ the heart of the my case. To mind this to be seems a classic case the statutory tail wagging dog.
Ill
Thus, even if the
of Appeals may
have erro-
neously
resolved the
of jurisdiction,
the result it
reached was correct in
terms
juris-
exercise
wise
protection
diction. Whether the equal
claim pleaded in
*31
substantiality
juris-
threshold
this case meets the
surely
the claim
should
in the federal courts,
diction
any-
main
was
purpose
a
court that
its
convince
district
more
jurisdiction
for the
other
than
secure
thing
Supremacy
claim. Presented with
promising
Clause
the District
should have declined to
situation,
pendent
jurisdiction
Supremacy
over
Clause
exercise
protection
claim to
three-
equal
claim and referred
a
me
judge court.11
its failure to do so seems to
Since
Gibbs, I
abuse
discretion under
dissent.
originally sought
three-judge
Petitioners
to convene a
court to
request.
their
consider
constitutional claims but later withdrew that
stipulation
parties,
Pursuant
to a
then
between the
the case was
judge
single
statutory
tried before a
issue
of the claimed
only. Goosby Osser,
(1973), specifies
conflict
In rare disagree court with single judge's view that a constitutional claim lacks merit plaintiff’s resolve the constitutional issue in the point, favor. At that plaintiff relief, go will have his and the case need no further. Concededly, a constitutional decision will have been when rendered statutory might possible, decision have been cost, but that in the likely arise, few cases where it is expensive seems less than the allowing cost of to be unnecessarily expanded.