RAKESTRAW v GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC
Docket No. 120996
Supreme Court of Michigan
Argued April 10, 2003. Decided July 30, 2003.
Rehearing denied post, 1224.
469 MICH 220
In an opinion by Justice YOUNG, joined by Chief Justice CORRIGAN, and Justices TAYLOR and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
A complainant attempting to establish a compensable, work-related injury based on a preexisting nonwork-related condition must prove that the injury is medically distinguishable from that preexisting condition in order to establish the existence of a personal injury under
- An employee must establish the existence of a work-related injury by a preponderance of the evidence in order to establish entitlement to benefits under
MCL 418.301(1) . - Consistent with the statute and existing Michigan Supreme Court precedent, a complainant attempting to establish a compensable, work-related injury based on a preexisting nonwork-related condition must prove that the injury is medically distinguishable from that preexisting condition in order to establish the existence of a personal injury under
MCL 418.301(1) . Symptoms, such as pain, standing alone, do not establish a personal injury under thе statute. The symptoms must be causally linked to an injury that arises out of and in the course of employment in order to be compensable. A claimant experiencing symptoms consistent with a preexisting condition has the burden of differentiating the preexisting condition from the work-related injury. Where the evidence shows that the symptoms are equally attributable to a preexisting condition or a work-related injury, a plaintiff cannot prove by a prepon-derance of the evidence that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Court of Appeals cases inconsistent with this opinion are overruled.
Remanded.
Justice WEAVER, joined by Justices CAVANAGH and KELLY, dissenting, stated that aggravation of symptoms may constitute a work-related injury compensable under the Worker‘s Disability Compеnsation Act. The magistrate specifically found that the plaintiff‘s cervical symptoms were aggravated by his work activities and that he was disabled as a result of those symptoms. The aggravation of the plaintiff‘s symptoms constitutes an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, entitling the plaintiff to worker‘s compensation benefits until his symptoms return to their preaggravated condition.
Justice KELLY, joined by Justice CAVANAGH, dissenting, stated that she joined Justice WEAVER in her dissent and wrote separately to comment on specific aspects of the majority opinion.
By discounting pain and redefining “injury,” the majority importantly alters the previous definition of the word “injury” under the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act and eliminates many compensation-worthy claims.
The majority‘s questioning and partial disavowal of thе rule that the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act should be construed liberally to grant rather than deny benefits jeopardizes decisions that invoke the rule going back over seventy years. Liberal construction is the established law in worker‘s compensation, so its use in this case will not open the floodgates to increased employer liability.
The majority‘s decision represents a serious departure from established law and a disavowal of established public policy.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals, the Worker‘s Compensation Appellate Commission, and the worker‘s compensation magistrate should be affirmed.
WORKER‘S COMPENSATION — NONWORK-RELATED CONDITIONS — AGGRAVATED SYMPTOMS.
A claimant attempting to establish a compensable, work-related injury must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed injury is medically distinguishable from a preexisting nonwork-related condition to establish a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment (
Libner, VanLeuven, Evans, Portenga & Slater, P.C. (by John A. Braden), for the plaintiff-appellee.
Amici Curiae:
Gerald M. Marcinkoski for the Michigan Self-Insurers’ Association and the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association.
Daryl Royal for the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
YOUNG, J. Plaintiff sought, and the magistrate awarded, benefits under the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act,
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts in this case are not contested. At the time plaintiff began working for defendant in 1996, he had a preexisting neck condition that was asymptomatic.2 According to plaintiff, his work for defendant caused his neck pain to return and increase.
Mr. Rakestraw‘s pathological postsurgical changes and spondylosis of the cervical spine were not contributed to, aggravated or accelerated in a significant manner as a result of his work activities. The medical proofs would not sustain a finding of a change in pathology related to any work injury or work activities. [Emphasis added.]
However, the magistrate held that plaintiff‘s employment aggravated the symptoms of the preexisting neck condition.3 The magistrate determined that plaintiff was partially disabled as a result of the aggravated symptoms and granted an open award of benefits. The WCAC reluctantly affirmed on the basis of Court of Appeals authority. However, the WCAC suggested that the Court of Appeals case law, which the WCAC was required to follow, did not properly follow this Court‘s precedent. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Defendant sought leave to appeal with this Court, which was granted.
This Court‘s review of a decision by the WCAC is limited. In the absence of fraud, we must consider the WCAC‘s findings of fact conclusive if thеre is any competent evidence in the record to support them.
In interpreting a statute, our obligation is to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words actually used in the statute. White v Ann Arbor, 406 Mich 554, 562; 281 NW2d 283 (1979). A bedrock principle of statutory construction is that “a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). When the statutory language is unambiguous, the proper role of the judiciary is to simply apply the terms of the statute to the facts of a particular case. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass‘n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). In addition, words used by the Legislature must be given their common, ordinary meaning.
A
An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Under the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, an employee must establish that he has suffered “a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment” in order to be eligible for compensation benefits.
B
Defendant maintains that the magistrate erred in awarding benefits because the pain plaintiff suffered was not a “personal injury” under the act.
On several occasions, this Court has held that symptoms such as pain, standing alone, do not establish a personal injury under the statute. Rather, a claimant must also establish that the symptom complained of is сausally linked to an injury that arises “out of and in the course of employment” in order to be compensable.4
The workers’ compensation law does not provide compensation for a person afflicted by an illness or disease not caused or aggravated by his work or working conditions. Nor is a different result required because debility has progrеssed to the point where the worker cannot work without pain or injury. Accordingly, compensation cannot be awarded because the worker may suffer heart damage which would be work-related if he continued to work. Unless the work has accelerated or aggravated the illness, disease or deterioration and, thus, contributed to it, or the work, coupled with the illness, disease or deterioration, in fact causes an injury, compensation is not payable. [Id. at 116.5]
However, even though arteriosclerosis alone does not justify compensation, neither does it bar compensation. Heart damage, such as would result from a heart attack, is compensable if linked by sufficient evidence to the workplace . . . .
The WCAB, upon remand, accepted medical testimony that Miklik‘s health problems were job-related, and then found them to be сompensable. The board failed to follow Kostamo‘s direction that in order for there to be compensation there first must be an injury. It is impossible to turn arteriosclerosis into compensable heart damage merely by labeling it so. The board‘s opinion, worded in conclusory terms, ignored this premise of Kostamo. Testimony, at most, showed the progressive effects of arteriosclerosis, not separate heart damage. [Id. at 368-369 (emphasis added).]
In Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201; 501 NW2d 76 (1993), this Court reviewed the 1980 legislative amendments that added the “significant manner” test to recovery of benefits for mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process. The Court cited
Thus, several cases from this Court have articulated the principle that, where an employee claims to have suffered an injury whose symptoms are consistent with a preexisting condition, the claimant must establish the existence of a work-related injury that extends “beyond the manifestation of symptoms” of the underlying preexisting condition. Id. at 216.
C
Despite the holdings in Kostamo, Miklik, and Farrington, plaintiff cites a body of case law developed in the Court of Appeals holding that aggravation of the symptoms of a preexisting condition alone constitutes a compensable injury under
Carter should not be read to support the holding that mere symptom aggravation, without a change in pathology, constitutes a “personal injury” under
Holding that the aggravation of symptoms of a preexisting condition is compensable without finding a work-related injury under
D
We reaffirm today that an employee must establish the existence of a work-related injury by a preponderance of the evidence in order to establish entitlement to benefits under
The text of the statute does not specifically demand that a claimant prove that his injury is “medically distinguishable” from a preexisting condition. However, the clear language of the statute does require the establishment of “a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” Where a claimant experiences symptoms that are consistent with the progression of a preexisting condition, the burden rests on the claimant to differentiate between the preexisting condition, which is not compensable, and the work-related injury, which is compensable.10 Where evidence of a medically distinguishable injury is offered, the differentiation is easily made and causation is established. However, where the symptoms complained of are equally attributable to the progression of a preexisting condition or a work-related injury, a plaintiff will fail to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury arose “out of and in the course of employment“; stated otherwise, plaintiff will have failed to establish causation. Thereforе, as a practical consideration, a claimant must prove that the injury claimed is distinct from the preexisting condition in order to
III. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENTS
Justice WEAVER maintains that compensation is available “where the plaintiff‘s disability is the result of symptoms that occur at work.” Post at 235 n 3. Justice KELLY would apparently agree.
Such a view is remarkable, representing a radical departure from the text of the statute, as well as the basic proposition, consistent throughout the history of the WDCA, that a claimant must establish a work-related injury as a necessary precondition to obtain benefits.11 Under the dissents’ analyses, a claimant
However, we disagree with Justice KELLY‘s conclusion that the McKissack quotation does not differentiate between a symptom and an injury. As the language in McKissack indicates, there is a distinction between “pain,” which is a symptom, and the “cause of the pain,” which is an injury, “illness or diseаse.”
In McKissack, a work-related injury was found by the WCAB. 447 Mich 60, 62. In this case, the irrefutable truth is that neither dissenting opinion is able point to any holding that the “cause of [plaintiff‘s] pain” was “illness or disease . . . caused or aggravated by the work or working conditions.” In fact, the magistrate specifically held that the workplace did not cause or aggravate the preexisting injury. Post at 236. Rather, plaintiff‘s disability was premised on aggravated symptoms, without a finding of a work-related injury.
Justice KELLY would apparently excuse plaintiff from having to establish a work-related injury because “[s]imilar to the tip of an iceberg,” pain is frequently “the only symptom showing that an injury was sustained,” while the etiology of the pain “remains submerged.” Post at 239.
The clear language of the statute requires that a claimant prove the existence of an injury “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Simply рut, a claimant must prove the presence of an injury as well as its
The dissents justify their unusual conclusions with little more than invocation of the doctrine that WDCA matters are to be construed liberally because the statute is remedial in nature. Whatever the efficacy of this rule of construction, its application is logically justifiable only where the employer‘s responsibility is established: where the employee proves the injury is work-related.12 We believe it is inappropriate to utilize the “liberal construction” standard when the issue being considered is the initial qualifying matter whether the claimed injury falls within the WDCA regime. That decision, nearly jurisdictional in nature, is not to be tilted for or against either party as it is
cause to establish a compensable claim. It is the responsibility of the Legislature, not this Court, to alter the language of the statute and relieve a plaintiff‘s evidentiary burden in those cases where the pathological basis of the symptom is difficult to ascertain.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this case, we hold that a claimant attempting to estаblish a compensable work-related injury must adduce evidence of the injury that is medically distinguishable from the preexisting nonwork-related condition in order establish the existence of a “personal injury” by a preponderance of the evidence under
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J.
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s holding that a claimant who alleges that he has suffered a work-related injury because of the aggravation of his symptoms “must prove that the injury is medically distinguishable from a preexisting nonwork-related condition . . . .” Ante at 222 (emphasis added). The majority‘s holding reads into the statute a new test that the text of the statute does not require.1
The question whether an aggravation of symptoms constitutes a work-related injury is a difficult determination. The Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA) is a remedial statute that should be construed
Awarding benefits on the basis of the aggravation of symptoms alone accords with the policy underlying the [Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act]. The objective of the WDCA is to compensate a claimant for the loss of an earning capacity caused by a work-related injury. Kuty v DAIIE, 140 Mich App 310, 313; 364 NW2d 315 (1985). Even when a preexisting condition was not caused or aggravated by employment, if an employee is unable to work because work-related events have aggravated the symptoms of the condition to the рoint of disability, the employer should be liable for wage-loss benefits until the symptoms subside to their preexisting level. See McDonald [v Meijer, Inc, 188 Mich App 210, 215-216; 469 NW2d 27 (1991)]. But for the employee‘s work for the employer, the employee would not be disabled. It is therefore appropriate to hold the employer liable for payment of benefits during what is usually a lim-
In the present case, the magistrate specifically found that plaintiff‘s cervical symptoms were aggravated by his work activities and that he was disabled as a result of those symptoms.4 The magistrate‘s decision stated in pertinent part, “The Plaintiff has established, by a preponderance of the proofs, that he suffered a symptomatic aggravation of his cervical spondylosis and postsurgical cervical changes.” (Emphasis added.) The magistrate also stated:
I find Mr. Rakestraw‘s already altered cervical spine, the postsurgical changes, as well as his cervical spondylosis, were symptomatically made worse by his work activities. More specifically, I find that his work activities, through his last day of work, significantly contributed to, accelerated or aggravated his cervical symptoms. That aggravation of his symptoms has not abated. He remains disabled as a result of those symptoms. [Emphasis added.5]
Pursuant to
The reviewing court treats the findings of fact made by the WCAC as conclusive in the absence of fraud. Id. “If there is any evidence supporting the WCAC‘s factual findings, the [reviewing court] must treat those findings as conclusive.” Id. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
The majority asserts that this analysis disregards the requirement of a work-related injury and permits a claimant to recover for a “symptom that simply occurs in the workplace.” Ante at 233. Such an assertion is unfounded. As I have emphasized, the magistrate found that the plaintiff‘s symptoms in this case were aggravated by work. Thus, they cannоt properly be considered symptoms that fortuitously manifested themselves during the workday; instead, they are causally linked to plaintiff‘s work.
For these reasons, I would remand this case to the magistrate for proceedings consistent with this reasoning.
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred with WEAVER, J.
KELLY, J. (dissenting). I join Justice WEAVER in her dissent and write separately to comment on several aspects of the majority opinion.
I. THE MAJORITY‘S UNSUPPORTED EXTENSION OF PAST CASE LAW
The majority1 concludes:
On several occasions, this Court has held that symptoms such as pain, standing alone, do not establish a personal
injury under the statute. Rather, a claimant must also establish that the symptom complained of is causally linked to an injury that arises “out of and in the course of employment” in order to be compensable.4
The cases cited for this proposition conclude that an injury must be causally related to employmеnt. Their focus is on the causal connection between the pain and the preexisting condition, not on whether pain alone could constitute an injury absent a preexisting condition.2 None of them explicitly holds that
Notes
Clearly there is a difference between pain resulting from “illness or disease not caused or aggravated” by the work or working conditions, and pain resulting from a work-related injury. As indicated in Kostamo, worker‘s compensation benefits may not be awarded simply because a worker is unable by reason of pain to continue with the work if the cause of the pain is illness or disease not caused or aggravated by the work or working conditions. But contrariwise, if the WCAB finds that pain is caused or aggravated by a work-related injury, and the worker cannot by reason of pain resulting from the injury continue to work, the WCAB can find that the worker is disabled and award benefits. [McKissack, supra at 67 (emphasis in original).]
Thus, the Court focused on causation, not on the difference between symptoms and injuries. Nowhere does the Court state that pain alone can-
When a physician evaluates a patient‘s condition, frequently the only symptom showing that an injury was sustained is a complaint of pain. Similar to the tip of an iceberg, pain is the sole part exposed to view, while the greatest part by far remains submerged. Using even the best medical technology, that part may not be “medically distinguishable from a preexisting condition.” By discounting pain and redefining “injury,” the majority importantly alters the previous definition of the word “injury” under the act and eliminates many compensation-worthy claims.
Moreover, when carried to its logical conclusion, the majority‘s definition of “personal injury” may adversely affect employers, as wеll as employees, stripping employers of some of the protections of the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act. This is because the act makes the recovery of benefits the employee‘s exclusive remedy against an employer for a personal injury.3 No “injury” means no WDCA exclusivity. If an employee suffers harm at work, but is not “injured” as the majority defines the word under the act, the WDCA would cease to be the employee‘s exclusive remedy.
not establish a personal injury; instead, it concludes that pаin not caused by a work-related injury is not compensable.
II. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WDCA
It is also important to note the danger of the majority‘s questioning and partial disavowal of the rule that the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act “should be construed liberally to grant rather than deny benefits.” The pronouncement jeopardizes decisions that invoke the rule going back over seventy years.4
Michigan courts have always considered the WDCA and its predecessors to be “remedial in nature.” Hagerman v Gencorp Automotive, 457 Mich 720, 739; 579 NW2d 347 (1998). Ballentine‘s Law Dictionary defines a remedial statute as “[a] statute to be construed liberally as one intended to reform or extend existing rights . . . .” Ballentine‘s Law Dictionary (3d ed). Aсcord 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, § 8, pp 234-235.
A. THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION RULE APPLIES TO WHETHER AN INJURY IS WORK-RELATED
Next, I disagree with the majority that liberal construction should be applicable only at a secondary stage of the analysis. I believe that it is applicable also at the “initial qualifying” stage when a determination is made whether a claim is covered by thе WDCA.
The majority asserts that the “work-related” question is resolved at the initial stage, which it terms “nearly jurisdictional.” However, no mention of “work-related” appears in
It is beyond dispute that our courts have consistently used the liberal construction rule to decide the question of entitlement to benefits. As the Bower Court stated:
The Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act was designed to help relieve the social and economic difficulties faced by injured workers. As remedial legislation, it is liberally construed to grant rather than deny benefits. Niekro v The Brick Tavern, 66 Mich App 53; 238 NW2d 537 (1975). See McAvoy v H B Sherman Co, 401 Mich 419; 258 NW2d 414 (1977). [Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172, 191; 312 NW2d 640 (1981) (emphasis added).]
Because the question whether an injury or disease is “work-related” is directly implicated in determining
whether the injury is “medically distinguishable” for purposes of determining whether it is “an injury arising out of and in the course of employment,” is not implicated at the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings. If the majority were to define “work-related” in a broad sense, I might conclude that
B. APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO THE QUESTION OF WORK RELATION IS LOGICALLY JUSTIFIABLE
The majority concludes that liberal construction is “logically justifiable” only after it has first been estаblished that an injury is work-related. My disagreement with the conclusion is based in part on the fact that the application of liberal construction to whether an injury is work-related comports with the Legislature‘s remedial goals.
Our courts have been relying on the liberal construction principle since at least 1933.7 In 1994, Justice BRICKLEY provided an example of its proper application in his lead opinion in Nederhood v Cadillac Malleable Iron Co, 445 Mich 234, 247; 518 NW2d 390 (1994):
In formulating our decision . . . , we must also be mindful of the policies underlying the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act.
MCL 418.101 et seq. ; . . . As a preliminary matter, it must be remembered that the act was designed to be remedial and must not be unnecessarily construed so as to favor a denial of benefits. . . .* * *
It would seem that a permanent forfeiture of benefits is not in accord with a liberal construction of the Workеr‘s Disability Compensation Act.
I also disagree with the majority‘s contention that utilizing the liberal construction rule to determine “whether the claimed injury falls within the WDCA regime” somehow “tilt[s] the scales in favor of the employee. Ante at 233. Construing the statute to find that clаims are within its ambit should be in the interest of employers as well as employees; it prevents costly tort actions and provides methods of encouraging employees who recover from injuries to seek suitable employment. The majority treats the WDCA as a boon to employees and a scourge to employers, but that is not and never was intended to be the case.
III. CONCLUSION
In my judgment, this decision implicates much more than the majority is willing to admit. It will be viewed by many in the area of worker‘s compensation law as a crippling blow to the liberal construction rule. It will be cited for the proposition that the rule cannot be applied in deciding whether an alleged injury was work-related or even whether it constitutes an injury at all.
No matter how the majority spins it, this decision shakes the foundations of established worker‘s compensation jurisprudence. Past case law does not establish that pain alone is never sufficient to prove a personal injury, but the majority so holds today. Michigan courts have historically applied the liberal construction rule to the question whether an injury is work-related, but today the majority holds this illogical. All these conclusions are drawn not from precedent and not from the WDCA itself. They come unmistakably from this majority‘s conclusion that it knows better than the jurists who have decided these cases for the last seventy years.
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.