*1 Comprehensive Health v COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH McKISSACK SERVICES DETROIT OF 3). (Calendar Argued May No. No. Decided Docket 96458. 30, 1994. post, August Rehearing denied 1202. injuries sought compensation for sus- Clara McKissack a medical technolo- tained in the course of her as gist Health Services of Detroit. A disability, that but referee found she sustained work-related disability continuing she that it was not a because concluded job. Compensation return her The wás able to Worker’s reversed, holding continuing Appeal had a Board that she not her duties because she was able employer adequately, that led to become and this had resignation. Appeals, and The Court of dissatisfied demand P.J., JJ., Fitzgerald, in an Murphy, and Gribbs reversed (Docket 141512). opinion unpublished per curiam No. appeals, was limited to whether there claimant finding continuing support the sufficient evidence wcab’s disability. joined opinion Levin, Chief Justice by In an Justice by Boyle Supreme Mallett, Cavanagh, and Justices Court held: finding the wcab’s sufficient evidence There was continuing suffering disability. from a the claimant was plaintiff speed with which 1. There was evidence accept- carry was the minimum could out duties below contravening Services, by the state- able wholly Appeals by record was void ment the Court of Further, painful evidence that the work was of such evidence. determining properly in considered Clearly is a from it. there was disabled resulting pain not illness or disease difference between conditions, working aggravated by the work or caused or compensa- resulting injury. pain Worker’s from a work-related simply may a worker is awarded because tion benefits be pain the work if the cause to continue with unable reason aggravated by the pain illness not caused or is or disease conditions, pain working if finds that but work or injury, aggravated by and the worker work-related caused Mich pain resulting cannot reason of from the continue to
work, the worker can be found to be disabled and awarded benefits. authority 2. The Court of *2 exceeded its as plaintiff inability keep fact that the was not fired because of to pace employer. thing with the demands of her It is one for the Court of to find that there is insufficient to evidence by wcab; a of fact made the the Court exceeds authority findings its when it its own makes of fact. The
found that Health Services had not shown plaintiff the satisfaction of the wcab the was asked to resign inability keep up for a reason other than her with the work, inability by an that the wcab found to have been caused injury. her work-related 418.301(5)(a); 17.237(301)(5)(a) Although pro- 3. MCL MSA employee voluntarily vides that an is to be deemed removed longer any wage-loss from the work force and no entitled to during period benefits a of a refusal of a bona fide offer of employment, applicable reasonable that stricture is not unless employee employment good the refuses the without and reason- Clearly employee, plaintiff, may able cause. an such as the be by good found wcab to have and reasonable cause to refuse employment even a bona fide offer of reasonable the where refused, employment by resigning, has refused the employment continue the because she was disabled from doing by employer. the work demanded the preponderance 4. The found of the evidence that pre- the work-related to the claimant’s left elbow technologist job cluded her from her medical as the injury, establishing existed before her that she was disabled meaning act, which, within the of the worker’s at time, "disability” employee’s the defined as a limitation of an wage-earning capacity employee’s general in the field of em- ployment resulting personal injury from a or work-related disease. Reversed and remanded. joined by Riley, Griffin, dissenting, Justice Justice stated proper requires resolution of this case an answer to the alleged disability whether was the or the mistakes testing in blood that led to the defendant’s decision to termi- plaintiff. date, questions ordinarily nate the To causation re- disability compensation system solved the worker’s have employment aggravates involved the issue whether causes or qualifies compensation. an or disease that for In this case, plaintiff’s injury whether made her disabled under the Opinion op the Court Compensation Disability Act is not of the Worker’s
terms injury-related it is clear that appropriately reached unless alleged the performance mistakes caused than her rather work Thus, proper of this case would be resolution termination. jurisdiction to whether it has wcac to determine remand to the poor perfor- plaintiff was terminated decide whether injuries, slowdown as a or for work unrelated to mance them, and, so, on consequence there are facts if reality a permit what is in wcac to reverse record to credibility referee. determination made whether, Brickley, dissenting, the issue is stated that Justice law, plaintiff’s that she could not evidence a matter of as employer’s former satisfaction work to her 418.301(4); required by MCL MSA under the standard sufficient 17.237(301)(4). regarding defining whether a standard history with one broader than work is disabled is worker employ- impairment requires in the employer. The statute employability general than rather field ee’s regarding employer. specific evidence Absent with one technologist, general employability plaintiff’s a medical as law, not meet presented, as a matter of did evidence proven proof. if the has *3 Even burden of disability, for a should be remanded case work-related partial or total. is of whether redetermination Hodges O’Hare, Helveston, & Waldman, Sachs, Ries), Barnes, S. P.C. Granner plaintiff. for the (by Ducey, Chuhran, Benham, & Conklin, Listman L. Critchell), P.C. Martin for the defendants. (by Amici Curiae: Rawlings Skutt, Richard M. P.C. Glotta, & (by Jeffrey
Skutt), T. Linkner Farris and Monica Meyers, Association. Michigan Lawyers Trial for Marcinkoski)
Lacey M. (by Gerald for & Jones Mutual Insur- Michigan Corporation Chrysler Company. ance case.
Levin, J. This is worker’s Clara found referee Mich 57 Opinion of the Court McKissack sustained a work-related elbow, her left but concluded that was not a continuing disability because she was able to re- technologist turn to her aas medical defendant Health Services of De- Compensation Appeal troit. The Worker’s Board holding continuing reversed, disability that McKissack had a
because she was able to adequately, duties and that this had led her em- ployer to become dissatisfied and to demand her resignation.
The Court of
reversed.1 This Court
granted
appeal
leave to
limited to the
whether
there was sufficient evidence to
suffering
Wcab’s
that McKissack was
continuing disability.2
from a
We reverse because
we find that there was sufficient evidence.
1Unpublished opinion
curiam,
per
issued December
(Docket
141512).
No.
This Court denied the motion of
Health Services to
following paragraph
Comprehen
add the issues adverted to in the
sive Health Services’ motion:
continuing
A decision
court
on the issue about
disabil-
ity
granting
that was described in the order
leave is the
(i)
gateway
specific
to other issues that
include
extent of
any continuing disability
weekly
to determine the amount of
disability compensation
employee,
for the
Trask v
Co,
692;
Modern Pattern & Machine
Industries
No.
*4
responded
totally
McKissack
to the motion that she had been found
"by
disabled
and that Sobotka
its terms is limited to a
301(5)
partially
employee,”
disabled
and that
is not
§
involved because
employment.
McKissack did not refuse an offer of
Paschke v Retool
Industries,
502;
(1994),
445 Mich
I fifty-four-year medical old senior McKissack, a technologist, with Com- commenced 1977. She fell while prehensive walking in Services parking on lot across of the a fracture 20, She sustained 1983. June hospitalized right elbow, and was and left knee for an addi- initially weeks, returned two September. were re- After casts in tional week right elbow, she was and left knee moved from therapy. regimen physical placed aon acquiesced attending physician in McKissack’s imposed request work, restric- but return to walking, standing against prolonged stren- tions bending, repetitive arm, the left use of uous heavy lifting. full as a to her duties She returned technologist January 18, 1984. She on medical limp. resorted to She often marked with a walked She her in ambulation. to assist use of a cane arm, her in her left motion limitation of had a being testi- site. She at the fracture frozen elbow slowly she fied duties because moved right leg, shoulder, and left left pain, move her arm could not that she arm upward degrees. forty than more
A hearing re- found that referee The signed 1984, was asked after she on November through carry failed to had she to do so because result, and, two tests, as a certain conclusion ana exposing placed care, patients in intensive were litiga- possible Health Services tion. concluded,, the basis on referee physicians testimony examined who
of the *5 57 op Opinion the Court Comprehensive Services, McKissack for Health perform that McKissack was able to her normal occupational day work, duties on her last of 26, 1984, November and that she did not leave injuries 20, 1983, work because of her of June "but as a result of an unfortunate series of inci- neglected through dents in which she to follow on testing procedures she, herself, which had ana establishing.” been instrumental McKissack had proving thus failed to sustain the burden of dis- ability beyond January 18, 1984.
B stating reversed, that, The wcab on the basis of testimony treating examining physi- of the and testimony lay cians, McKissack, and of witnesses, McKissack was "unable to continue to perform job technologist as a medical due to physical residuals of the . . . .” The found as facts that McKissack’s "arm limita- wcab ability perform job, tions affected her to the painful,” perfor- extent that the that "her prior injury,” mance was slower than to the supervisor quickly,” asked her "to work more "speed up” and that the mistake3 was due required by "supervisor McKissack’s when she was quickly.”4 unable work 3Referring apparently to the ana tests.
4The wcab said: range It is uncontested and it is found as fact that approximately motion of degrees left elbow is limited'at extension, although plaintiff range retains supination pronation.
motion job requires on Plaintiff’s substances, mixing reaching extensive use of the hands in supply into cabinets, handling specimen, using machines such centrifuge. testimony treating as a We find credible the physician Wyche, pain Dr. associated with extreme movements of the elbow. Plaintiff testified she soaked her arm Health McKissack Opinion of Court "was not able The added Comprehensive the work” at Services, that, per- even if were able to she work, Health Services form company rules which a violation of "has shown *6 of a non- result in termination normally would explained that The employee.” disabled not the test supervisor "did feel McKissack’s direct termination; and grounds for was performance part problem.” of the blamed herself fact
c the Appeals The Court of reversed decision acknowledged by that "is bound wcab. It are made the which findings by of fact [wcab], 1963, Const art in the absence of fraud. conclusive only to "authority 28” that its review and § . . . .” of law questions compe- there Appeals
The Court of said that was to wcab’s determination tent evidence her duties as a "could perform that McKissack than after technologist slowly medical more testified, morning mobility. She and Ms. in the Jordan for to achieve verified, difficult and awkward some of tests were perform. her to plaintiff’s her find arm limitations affected We as fact job ability painful, injury. perform job, to to the extent was her performance prior slower than to the and that her was plaintiff by supervisor her fact was told We find as quickly. find as that the mistake made work more We fact "speed up” upon plaintiff supervisor fact her forced due to was quickly. find as was unable to work We when she expected heal condition cannot be arm further. law, plaintiff proven findings Applying has' we find our preponderance the work related evidence performing precludes from the left elbow prior injury. job technologist job We as existed medical find Corp, plaintiff pursuant Motors to Kidd General [v disabled (1982)], & 578; Kaarto Calumet [v NW2d 265 414 Mich 327 Hecla, Inc, 128; (1962)]. 116 NW2d Mich op Opinion the Court before, It said that only .pain.” with establish, however, that Mc- finding failed to " After as defined. statutorily Kissack is 'disabled’ regular employ- to her returned injury, plaintiff no of remuneration. ment and suffered diminution that, after record is void of evidence wholly could carry with which injury, speed minimum accept- .the out her duties was below Com- technologist employed by” for a medical able Health Services. prehensive said that while McKissack Appeals The Court of pain,” "could work she "could only resigned her duties when she was employment. Merely from her because her work painful does not establish that she could perform- perform it or that she was disabled Marquette Mining Co, Iron it. Kostamo ing (1979).” 105, 116 NW2d 411] [274 in effect found that The Court *7 inability had not "been fired because of McKissack of her keep pace employer with the demands said, . . . .”5 It that McKissack "estab assuming precluded was nevertheless disability,” lished she yet from "she had not receiving benefits because fired, fide offer working been she under a 'bona was the previous of from employment reasonable ” 301(5)(a) meaning within of employer’ § Disability Compensation Act: of the Worker’s Appeals The Court of said: inability keep pace plaintiff with Had been fired because employer, would be the demands of her presented. a different situation (4), pursuant to subsection entitle If is established pursuant weekly wage shall be determined ment to to this section and as follows: loss benefits (a) employee If a bona fide offer of reasonable receives employer, employment previous employer, or from another Michigan employment security through commission and Health 1994] Opinion of the Court resigna plaintiff’s the motivation "Whatever pressure not, even or under tion, it was whether assuming disabled, re nonetheless she was she signed.”
ii stating erred The Court speed that "the no evidence —that there was carry out her could with which acceptable” minimum was below duties Services; painful not does work was —that evidence disabled McKissack "was establish performing it”; from "fired because McKissack was —that keep pace inability the demands employer”; and —assuming "had established that McKissack 301(5)(a) precludes disability,” §
a
receiving
not been
she had
because
benefits
the motivation
rather, "[w]hatever
fired but
for
resignation,
it was
assuming
pressure
not,
she
even
under
resigned from a
disabled,”
had
she
"
employment
reasonable
fide offer of
'bona
”
employer.’
previous
from the
A
speed with which
that "the
evidence
There was
good and rea-
employee
without
refuses that
cause,
to have volun-
considered
shall be
sonable
*8
no
force and is
the work
tarily
longer
herself from
himself or
removed
during
wage
this act
under
loss benefits
entitled to
17.237(301X5),
418.301(5); MSA
period
refusal. [MCL
of such
by
with and "couldn’t handle the load supervisor previously [she] could handle.” Her that complained speed "[She] of her work. about supervisor] constantly [by [she that was told employees holding up [her] not end. The was] [her], [she work[ed] was] [her] extra save holding up constantly [her] end. This was brought supervisor. A [her] attention” that on co- she worker testified a number occasions remonstrating supervisor so overheard up McKissack her failure to hold her end about the work. testimony testimony
McKissack’s and the of her by the Court co-worker contravene the statement wholly that the "record is void of speed evidence” that with which McKissack carry minimum could out her duties was below the acceptable by Comprehensive Health Services.
B painful prop- the work was was Evidence determining erly considered in performing it.” "was disabled citing Appeals said, The Court of this Court’s Mining Marquette Co, Iron decision Kostamo v supra "[m]erely at because work was painful per- does not establish that she could not form it or that she disabled from Kostamo, it.” In compensation the worker’s this said Court provide act "does not person by an or disease not for a afflicted illness working aggravated by his caused or work *9 Comprehensive 67 Health Opinion op the Court required result be- is a different Nor conditions. point progressed debility where has cause pain injury.” or work without the worker cannot Id. pain
Clearly result- a difference between there is aggra- ing not caused or "illness or disease working by conditions, and work or vated” injury. pain resulting As indi- from a work-related Kostamo, benefits in cated may simply a worker is be awarded because not pain of to continue with the reason unable pain of the is illness or disease work if the cause working aggravated by the work not caused or contrariwise, if the wcab finds But conditions. aggravated by pain a work-related is caused or pain injury, resulting cannot reason and the worker work, the from the continue to is disabled and can find that worker award benefits.
c authority Appeals in exceeded its The Court of that McKissack was in effect as a fact pace inability keep with the "fired because employer . . . .” demands of her thing to find the Court of It is one support evidence to there is insufficient that finding Appeals the Court of of fact made wcab; authority its it makes exceeds its when findings Co, 8 v Griffin Wheel of fact. Thomas own (1967). App 35, 45; NW2d Moreover, found that wcab shown a violation had "not Health Services company normally result rules which would employee.” The termination of a non-disabled Ser- thus found wcab to the satisfaction had not shown vices Opinion of the Court resign for McKissack was asked wcab keep up inability than her reason other inability work, found to have injury. by her work-related been caused D *10 301(5)(a) provides employee Although an § that voluntarily removed from deemed shall be work wage-loss longer entitled to force and no during period fide of a refusal of a bona a benefits previous employment from a offer reasonable employer, Services, Health such as through employer, or, indeed, igan the Mich- another or Security Employment Commission, that stric- 301(5)(a), applicable by not, §of ture is the terms "employee employment that unless the refuses good and reasonable cause.”7 without employee, may Clearly McKissack, as be such "good by to have and reasonable found the wcab a "bona fide offer reason- cause” to refuse even finding employment” on a that able resigning, employment refused, refused the employment in the because she was to continue doing by work demanded disabled from implicit finding by. employer.8 wcab is Such findings. v Griffin Wheel other See Thomas its supra. Co, that was disabled
The found McKissack 301(5)(a). for text of § See n 6 employment”: Section 301 defines "reasonable section, employment,” used in this means "Reasonable as perform employee’s capacity to that work that is within the employee’s poses proximate to that health no clear and threat safety, distance from that and employee’s and that is within a reasonable capacity perform employee’s shall residence. employment. jobs general her field of not be limited to in his or 17.237(301X9). 418.301(9); Emphasis MSA added.] [MCL 1994] Opinion op the Court doing by Comprehensive from the work demanded Health Services; it said: "we find has proven by preponderance of the evidence that pre- the work related to the left elbow cludes her from her medical technolo- gist job job prior injury.” as the existed That finding supported by findings wcab’s of fact that McKissack’s "arm limitations affected her ability job, to the extent painful,” performance was "her prior injury,” slower than "was she supervisor quickly,” told to work more the "mistake” made her was due to the "speed up” required by supervisor when she quickly. was unable to work The wcab’s that McKissack was disabled doing by Comprehensive the work demanded Health Services established that she was disabled meaning within the of the worker’s act, which, "disability” time, at the defined as "a employee’s wage earning capacity limitation of an employee’s general in the resulting field of *11 personal
from a or work related opinion, disease.”9 As set forth at the outset of this we conclude there was sufficient evidence to wcab’s that McKissack was suffering continuing disability. from a
hi totally The wcab found that McKissack was January day 19, 1984, disabled from after she Comprehensive returned to Health Services and technologist. resumed full duties as a medical Comprehensive Health Services declares in its 9 200, 17.237(301X4). 418.301(4); 1981 PA MCL MSA 1987 PA qualifications substituted "work suitable to his or her training” "employee’s general employment.” and for field of Mich 57
70 op Opinion the Court boggling: "It is is mind that this in this Court brief time oxymoron the same once and to declare at an totally injured a from is resuming disabled that an upon in that work of endeavor field field!” original.)10 (Emphasis in if contends Health Services partially, all, at she was was disabled totally, should disabled, that the not required residual to determine a all events be wage-earning capacity partially McKissack as person pursuant decision to this Court’s disabled in Trask v Modern Co, 222 & Machine
Pattern (1923), of and the decision 692; 193 830 Mich NW Corp Chrysler in Sobotka Court Rehearing), (On App 455; 499 NW2d (1993). (After Remand), Corp Chrysler In Sobotka v (1994), reversed we 1; 523 NW2d Appeals. lead and of the Court
decision concurring opinions any prog- held that Trask legisla- subsequent superseded by eny have been gen- they consideration as allowed tion insofar changes "to a factor conditions as in economic eral proportionate extent of to determine the be used p earning capacity,” impairment id., 29. argument: its continues with Health Services Moreover, Employee agreed did the it is an fact any technologist just as other medical of a certified work alteration, working right alongside no person There was no her. Employee provided to the assistance and no accommodation that was provided anyone the work. short, Employee apprehend how the is difficult to In living entirely totally work and earn unable to disabled and actually technologist after she a certified medical in her field as alteration, job, accommodation without resumed the had no and had other such worker different assistance complaint [Empha- ability always represented to work. *12 original.] sis in Comprehensive Health McKissack v Riley, J. Dissenting Opinion employer to a is not entitled holds that an Sobotka wage-earning capacity of a residual determination wages of a and evidence the absence of injury permits maximum an award of work-related accept reject is free to The factfinder benefits. wages earned, avoided, or re- evidence of actual fused, affecting employee’s factors or other employability. opposed theoretical, actual as case, concluded In the instant doing totally disabled from McKissack was by Comprehensive Services work demanded resignation. No the date of her from and after wage-earning capacity was established evidence wages avoided, earned, or refused after of actual accepted by addition, no evidence was that date. In questioning of McKissack’s the extent affecting employability. factors or other By Sobotka, reason of this Court’s decision no need to remand to the Court there is to consider other issues not addressed by the Court Appeals. to the Worker’s Com- Reversed and remanded pensation Appellate implementa- Commission tion of the award benefits. Boyle JJ.,
Cavanagh, C.J., Mallett, J. Levin, concurred with respectfully I J. I dissent. realize While Riley, grant appeal this Court’s of leave to question there was suffi- limited the Worker’s cient evidence on record Compensation Appeal of continu- Board’s persuaded ing disability, I am the failure question squarely the reason another address Simply why stated, this case is before us. Compensation the Worker’s is whether Appellate (formerly, wcab) has Commission *13 Mich Dissenting Opinion Riley, J. surrounding authority to decide issues the reasons related asserts the necessarily that are not for termination disability. injury-related Plaintiff to an disability right as a benefits to alleged inability to ade- result of her perform up quately consequence standards as a to defendant’s injury. Defendant claims that
of the pur- performing adequately plaintiff poses for its was resulted the decision to terminate and that plaintiff in defendant’s some mistakes made blood-testing process that, case, led at least one consequences put to threatened to serious litigious into a situation. defendant plaintiff and a co-worker Testimonial evidence employ- plaintiff’s claim that lends ment was terminated keep up inability for her Documentary evi- with defendant. with her duties gen- reports dence, work which includes favorable plaintiff’s supervisor, supports defen- erated dant’s quately position ade- purposes. supports turn, most In this plaintiff’s employment was termi- the notion nated as a result of
mistakes made in the blood- testing process perform any inability than for rather question Thus, the should be
her duties. positions is the real reason behind which of these way, plaintiff’s proper Stated another termination.1 requires an answer resolution of this case question alleged whether was the disabil- blood-testing process ity or the in the mistakes plain- to terminate that led to defendant’s decision tiff_ encompasses only grant of This Court’s leave supporting the wcab’s decision in this
there is evidence on record properly respects review case. While this the deferential standard of 418.861; enjoy under MCL MSA that decisions of wcac 17.237(861) 6, 28, it limits the focus of this and Const art § earlier, inquiry plaintiff’s version of the facts. As noted Court’s importance plaintiff’s alleged to defendant’s decision to disputed terminate is a issue. Comprehensive Health McKissack v Dissenting Opinion Riley, J.
I majority notes, referee con- As the plaintiff resigned threat of ter- cluded that under in the mination for the mistakes she made course testing samples. conclusion, blood To reach this pos- injuries and the referee considered Presumably, purpose sible work restrictions. provide inquiry this was to the referee enough background to determine whether the rea- *14 plaintiff’s inability was son for termination up appropriate perform her duties standard plaintiff allegedly in the or the errors made blood- sampling process.
The wcab reversed the referee’s deci- premised on its that the reason for sion belief nothing termination to do the flawed had with " testing blood because defendant 'has not shown a company normally violation of rules which would result employee.’ in termination of a non-disabled ”2 majority, p ante, 63. The See wcab, opine plaintiff however, did was a victim of a resignation” forc[ed] "tactic of and that it sus- pected plaintiff "that was fired of her because disability.” slip op, p However, 7. WCAB the wcab specific finding I did not make a on what consider pivotal to be the nor able to do so.” Id. issue because was "not asked to Recognizing finding plaintiff’s wcab’s binding injury-related it, limitations was on the Court of nonetheless ruled that the facts failed to establish as defined MCL 17.237(301). justification 418.301; MSA for the ability Court’s to so conclude was the "so-called policies justifications Company for termination of termination employment subject employment law rather than at will are disability. laws of worker’s This inherent distinction traditional goes to the root of the difficulties involved in this case. Dissenting Opinion Riley, J. ” relationships’ 'jural v Difco in Deziel as described Inc, 466; 232 NW2d Laboratories, (1975).3 Taking "ordinary of the facts”4 proof emphasized binding, the lack the Court as on the pace slowed unacceptable Moreover, to defendant.5 would have a different situation noted that Court plaintiff presented fired because been "[h]ad been keep pace inability the demands of of employer Finally, the Court concluded . . . .”6 301(5) inquiry § controlled that plaintiff’s resignation constituted an unreasonable under reasonable refusal an employer’s bona fide offer.7 3 Deziel, majority of this Court stated: In place we consider it in order to discuss claim In the first viz., cases, ruling by that the is in each of these that the upon asserted binding Appeal is made Board is a of fact which 1963, 6, supported by any 28. Const art § us if evidence "jural always is a relation”—a What is at issue in these cases claimant, liability right for it in in the and a (3rd Wigmore pointed out in 1 on Evidence
the defendant. As ed), 1, rests, p material on which this claim of § "[t]he successful, composite.” if determining any jural simply relation- This means in relationship predicated ship, upon is to be the facts which such (which relationship jural "ordinary are a or "conclusion” of law. facts” and the itself fact) "ruling,” "holding,” very is also a is deemed a *15 real sense former, upon jural which the relation- It is to the the facts ship itself, generally, based—"ordinary addresses facts”—that the constitution See, legal principles. and not the latter-—which are called "(a) Fact, Wigmore, distinguished.” supra, Law and at [Id. 474-475.] n 3. See curiam, Unpublished opinion per December issued 141512). (Docket No. 6 Id. termination, 418.301(5); plaintiff’s MCL MSA 7 At the time of 17.237(301X5) provided: (4), pursuant entitle- If is established to subsection wage pursuant weekly to loss benefits shall be determined ment
to this section and as follows: Dissenting Opinion Riley, J. II legal on three authorities to rule the Of the only hearing date, the ref- merits of this case plaintiff’s and defendant’s eree decided between regarding for termi- the reason theories purportedly to address nation. The wcab declined stating asked nor the that was neither issue Ap- question. the The Court able peals consider "jural to reach its on the relation” relied plaintiff was not disabled under conclusion that plaintiff resigned from wdca on the basis employment a bona fide offer of reasonable perform up physically to defen- she was able to pain. my requirements, In albeit with some dant’s opinion, the failure of the and the Court of squarely the address referee’s regarding compli- has conclusion causation led necessitating appeal. cations this precedent sure, on the To be there is little if supports anything in the issue whether wdca authority different to decide between two wcac’s clearly being within theories of causation with one jurisdiction (compensable its work-related disabil- ity) commonly and the other addressed under an- employment body law, i.e., date, To other law. questions ordinarily causation resolved the disability compensation system in- have employment causes or volved issue aggravates qualifies an' or disease that compensation. case, however, In this (a) employee If an receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment previous employer, employer, another through Michigan employment security commission and employee good refuses that without and rea- cause, sonable tarily longer shall be considered to have volun- no removed himself or herself from the work force and is during any wage entitled to loss benefits under this act period of such refusal. *16 57 Opinion Dissenting Riley, J. injury disabled under made her whether appropriately reached the is not terms of act the injury-related work her is clear that unless performance alleged mistakes than rather case of this is the termination.8 Resolution caused made difficult support to facts the existence of both theories.9
hi
opinion,
proper
my
this
resolution of
case
In
the
to
whether it
to the wcac
determine
to remand
plain-
jurisdiction
decide the issue whether
has
tiff
to her
performance
poor
unrelated
was terminated for
consequence
injuries or
as a
work slowdown
and,
so,
if
are facts on
there
thereof
injury
of
the
could be the cause
the
It is also conceivable that
Indeed,
led to
decided as a
mistakes that
matter
termination.
by plaintiff
"that
made
was due
the
of fact
the mistake
upon
supervisor
up’
'speed
she was unable to
forced
when
disability,
aspect
quickly.” By treating
of
case as a
work
this
regard
attempted to
conclusion
neutralize
referee’s
wcab
Thus,
primary
ing
manipulated
wcab
the causation issue.
purportedly
was asked nor was able to address.
that it
neither
issue
Further
manipulation is
of the
evidence of this
the statement
wcab
company
regarding
a
the fact that defendant failed
demonstrate
blood-sample
testing, the violation
which would
rule on
of
slip op,
plaintiff’s employment
pp
at
WCAB
will. See
termination
manner,
theory
By disposing
this
3-4.
avoided the conflict between the
defendant’s
two theories
of causation.
recognized
already
have
certain occurrences
ter-
Our courts
work-related,
disability
compensable
link
minate the
between
example,
wage
For
a heart attack unrelated to conditions of
loss.
employment has been
to terminate an
causal connec-
held
established
wage
a
loss. See MacDonald v
tion between work-related
State Farm
(1984).
Co,
146;
Mutual
419 Mich