Quinn v. DohertyQuinn v. Doherty
OPINION AND ORDER
Steven Ross Gershone, Hennepin County Attorney‘s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants Patricia Doherty, Kathryn Joo, Christina Schultz, Mary Carey, David Hough, Jodi Wentland, Katie Cleveland, and Hennepin County.
Plaintiff Jenifer Quinn is the maternal grandmother and guardian of minor children A.D. and L.J. The seven individual Defendants were involved to varying degrees in Hennepin County District Court juvenile proceedings that resulted in the termination of parental rights of A.D. and L.J.‘s parents and ultimately an order allowing Quinn to adopt the children.
Quinn brought this case on her own and the children‘s behalf, alleging that Defendants violated Minnesota law by failing to give her adequate notice of, and an opportunity to be heard in, the juvenile proceedings concerning A.D. and L.J., and that Defendants’ Minnesota-law violations and other actions in connection with the juvenile proceedings amount to federal constitutional violations that injured her and the children. Plaintiffs assert procedural- and substantive-due-process claims under
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ operative Amended Complaint under
I1
March 2016 – A.D. and L.J. are the subject of a CHIPS petition. A.D. and L.J.
the situation in Quinn‘s home, including that, when the investigating social worker visited the home, L.J. “was only wearing underwear” and that Quinn‘s then-husband, “who reside[d] in the home, has an extensive criminal history, and at one point, was required to register as a predatory offender.” Id. at 4, 5. The petition closed with a request for an adjudication that A.D. and L.J. require “protection or services and a disposition pursuant to”
March 30, 2016 – An emergency protective-care hearing is held on the CHIPS petition in Hennepin County District Court. Several individuals appeared at this hearing: Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Godon; two social workers, one of whom was Defendant Carey; Reese and
June 13, 2016 – The court enters an order for CHIPS adjudication and foster-care placement. This order followed a hearing on May 27, 2016, concerning the CHIPS petition. This hearing was attended by Godon; social worker (and Defendant) Christina Schultz, Reese and her lawyer; Jensen and his lawyer; Dudley‘s lawyer (but not Dudley); a guardian ad litem; and Quinn. ECF No. 11-1 Ex. 3 at 19. The order noted that A.D. and L.J. had been in a “relative foster home” since March 30, but again did not identify the relative or relatives in whose care the boys had been placed. Id. at 20. The order declared the boys “to be children in need of protection or services[]” and transferred their “legal custody ... to the Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department for placement in foster care.” Id. at 22. The order included a finding that “[t]he Department has satisfied the relative search requirements under
December 23, 2016 – The Department files a petition to terminate parental rights. This petition was attested to and signed by Defendant Schultz and signed also by Godon. ECF No. 11-1 Ex. 4 at 37. The petition described several grounds, including that Reese had failed to comply with court-ordered requirements entered following the March 30 emergency protective-care hearing. Id. at 29-30. Chief among these were Reese‘s failures to obtain mental-health care, her failure to appear for many drug tests, and her multiple positive drug tests. Id. The petition described comparable issues with the boys’ fathers, Dudley and Jensen. Id. at 31-34. The petition noted that Reese had been residing with Quinn and Quinn‘s then-husband since the CHIPS proceedings had commenced. Id. at 30. However, the petition also noted that “[t]he Department
January 3, 2017 – The Hennepin County District Court conducts a permanency hearing and enters findings and an order. The order entered following this hearing does not identify who was present or participated at the hearing (other than the assigned judge). ECF No. 11-1 Ex. 5 at 40, 44. Quinn did not receive notice of this hearing and remained unaware of her rights with respect to the termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. Am. Compl. 37-39. The order noted that the Department‘s permanency plan for A.D. and L.J. contemplated either “[r]eunification with the parent” or “[t]ermination of parental rights to free the children for adoption.” ECF No. 11-1 Ex. 5 at 41. However, the order also included findings that the Department was “[c]ompleting a relative search” and that, while the then-current caregiver was “the appropriate permanency resource for the children,” the Department also had identified “[a] potential permanency resource from among the children‘s relatives.” Id. at 42. The order did not identify the relative or relatives who might serve as a potential permanency resource. See generally id.
June 7, 2017 – The Hennepin County District Court enters an order terminating Reese, Dudley, and Jensen‘s parental rights as to A.D. and L.J. The order followed a trial that occurred over two days on May 24 and 25, 2017. ECF No. 11-1 Ex. 6 at 46. Several individuals appeared at the trial: Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Godon; Defendant Schultz; Reese and her attorney; Dudley and his attorney; Jensen and his attorney; and a guardian ad litem and her attorney. Id. The order noted that four witnesses testified during the trial: Reese, Defendant Schultz, the guardian ad litem, and Plaintiff Quinn. Id. at 50. In its order, the court identified many reasons justifying crediting the testimony offered by Schultz and the guardian ad litem in support of the termination of parental rights. Id. at 52-53. The court also identified many reasons supporting its determination that “Reese‘s testimony lacked credibility and was self-serving and defied common sense.” Id. at 53; see id. at 54-55. The order includes no description or findings regarding Quinn‘s testimony. See generally id. The court ordered Reese‘s parental rights—and, based on their consents, Dudley and Jensen‘s parental rights—terminated and appointed the Department as A.D. and L.J.‘s guardian. Id. at 73. The court also ordered a hearing to occur “every 90 days to review the [Department‘s] progress toward adoptive placement of the children.” Id.
September 20, 2017 – The court enters an order denying A.D. and L.J.‘s grandparents’ request for visitation. The grandparents’ visitation request was the subject of a hearing on September 6, 2017. Several persons attended this hearing: the Department was represented by Assistant County Attorney Nancy Jones and Defendant Kathryn Joo, an adoption resource worker; the children were represented by a guardian ad litem; an attorney appeared for Quinn and another grandparent, Crystal Lundquist-Mely; and two other grandparents, Leroy Dudley and Holly Beck, also were present. ECF No. 11-1 Ex. 7 at 77. The court found “credible” an affidavit
July 6, 2018 – The court enters an order granting Quinn‘s motion for adoptive placement, finding “no doubt that Ms. Quinn‘s home is the best place for these children.” ECF No. 11-1 Ex. 8 at 91. Quinn filed her motion for adoptive placement on November 9, 2017. Id. at 83. “After Quinn filed her motion ..., Defendants retaliated against her by blocking her from visiting the boys” and by conspiring with a therapist “to perform a sham ‘parenting assessment,’ with the sole purpose of preventing Quinn from obtaining custody.” Am. Compl. ¶ 49. A hearing on Quinn‘s adoptive-placement motion occurred over three non-consecutive days in late May and early June 2018 before a Hennepin County District Court, Juvenile Division referee. ECF No. 11-1 Ex. 8 at 80. Quinn appeared, represented by counsel, and was one of sixteen witnesses who testified at the hearing. Id. at 80-81. The Department was represented by Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Jones and Defendants Doherty and Joo. Id. at 80. The guardian ad litem also appeared, represented by counsel. Id. Doherty, Joo, and the guardian ad litem all testified. Id. at 80-81. The Department took the position that Quinn‘s motion for adoptive placement should be denied; to support this position, the Department relied on a series of allegations casting Quinn in a negative light. Id. at 83. In detailed factual findings, the referee rejected the Department‘s position. The referee found that several of the Department‘s concerns regarding Quinn‘s background and past behaviors were either untrue or unsubstantiated. Id. at 84-85. The referee rejected a parenting assessment conducted by a Department-retained therapist, finding that the therapist‘s report was not credible and that her concerns regarding Quinn‘s ability to care for the boys were “baseless.” Id. at 85-88. The referee instead attributed greater weight to the opinions of two psychologists who testified essentially that Quinn was capable of being a good parent and “a viable permanency option for the children, with therapeutic support.” Id. at 88. In a series of legal conclusions, the referee was deeply critical of the Department‘s decisions to exclude Quinn from consideration as a permanency option and “to place the children in [a series of] less suitable placements than Ms. Quinn‘s home.” Id. at 90; see id. at 89-95. The following paragraph from the referee‘s legal conclusions summarizes several of the referee‘s concerns:
Ms. Quinn has met her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Department was unreasonable in failing to place the children with her for adoption. The Department completely failed to consider Ms. Quinn as an adoptive placement. Neither the Department nor the Guardian ad Litem interviewed Ms. Quinn or ever visited her home. (Jenifer Quinn Testimony, Kathryn Joo Testimony; Patricia Doherty Testimony; Audrey Brown Testimony). The reasons the Department has given for excluding Ms. Quinn are baseless and/or could have been easily cleared up through minimal investigation – investigation the Department admitted it never actually conducted. (See Kathryn Joo Testimony; Patricia Doherty Testimony). The Court does not find credible Ms. Doherty‘s testimony that the Department
has met several times to consider the best interest factors for these children as they relate to Ms. Quinn. Ms. Quinn has an approved adoption home study, a home large enough for her and the children, an unwavering commitment and deep love for the children, a demonstrated ability to raise a child with significant special needs, sufficient financial resources, a strong support network, and no criminal record. (Amy Hook Testimony; Ex. 106; Jenifer Quinn Testimony; Crystal Lundquist-Mely Testimony; Kiyanu Baker Testimony). Furthermore, she is the children‘s family, and the children lived with her for a significant portion of their childhood prior to their removal from Ms. Reese. (Jenifer Quinn Testimony). It is clear to the Court that a large barrier to the Department‘s (and the Guardian ad Litem‘s) willingness to seriously consider Ms. Quinn for adoptive placement is her past employment as an exotic dancer.
Id. at 91. Based on the referee‘s factual findings and legal conclusions, the court entered an order on July 16, 2018, granting Quinn‘s motion for adoptive placement and requiring the Department to develop a plan and work with Quinn to transition A.D. and L.J. into her home and to finalize Quinn‘s adoption of the children. Id. at 95.
Plaintiffs suffered injuries. These injuries are described in general terms in the Amended Complaint to include: “economic damages, mental and emotional pain, short-and long-term emotional injury, dignitary harm, discomfort, embarrassment, humiliation, fear, anxiety, apprehension, sleeplessness, a generally diminished sense of personal and family safety, increased fear of governmental authorities, and attorneys’ fees and costs.” Am. Compl. 54. Quinn in particular “suffered significant emotional distress resulting from her inability to regularly see, provide for, and care for L.J. and A.D.” Id. ¶ 55. “Her distress was aggravated by seeing the trauma that L.J. and A.D. experienced while being shuffled from one inadequate foster home to another.” Id. “Quinn additionally incurred economic damages associated with retaining an attorney to pursue adoptive placement and paying therapy and medical costs for herself, L.J., and A.D. to address harms caused by Defendants’ unlawful conduct.” Id. A.D. suffered a variety of adverse experiences and consequences resulting from his foster-care placements and separation from Quinn:
While housed at St. Joseph‘s Home for Children (a foster facility), another child attacked A.D. until L.J. intervened. And during one of the foster placements, an older boy forced A.D. and L.J. to watch pornography—despite the fact that A.D. was only four years old, and L.J. was only six years old. By separating Quinn from A.D., Defendants denied A.D. the security and attachment of a loving adult during a developmentally significant time period. As a result, A.D. continues to have difficulty processing his emotions.
Id. ¶ 58. L.J. suffered comparable injuries. “During his time in foster care, [he] developed encopresis—a medical condition often resulting from severe distress.” Id. ¶ 57. “L.J. expressed suicidal ideation during his separation from Quinn, and he has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.” Id.
II
Plaintiffs seek unspecified “injunctive and declaratory relief,” Am. Compl. at 28, and Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek this prospective relief. Though an Article III challenge concerns a federal court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction and is appropriately evaluated under
The United States Constitution limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts to ongoing cases and controversies. See
The Amended Complaint does not include allegations plausibly showing that Plaintiffs here face an ongoing or real and immediate threat of future injury. The basic theory underlying Plaintiffs’ claims seems straightforward: Defendants engaged in a series of actions in the past—some negligent, others purposeful and perhaps retaliatory—that prevented or made it more difficult for Quinn to associate with A.D. and L.J., to exercise her rights under Minnesota law to participate in the Hennepin County District Court proceedings concerning A.D. and L.J., and to seek custody and adoption of A.D. and L.J. Plaintiffs allege that these actions violated Plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process rights under the federal Constitution, giving rise to Plaintiffs’
Plaintiffs’ say they have standing to seek prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, but their arguments are not persuasive. Plaintiffs refer to an “ongoing dispute” between them and Defendants, but neither explain how the Amended Complaint‘s allegations plausibly show the existence of an “ongoing dispute” nor describe facts—whether in the Amended Complaint or not—that might show the presence of any continuing controversy. See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp‘n [ECF No. 20] at 3. Plaintiffs seem to suggest that they require declaratory relief to obtain compensatory damages, but this is not correct. The issuance of declaratory (or other equitable) relief is not a prerequisite to a damages award. Plaintiffs suggest that their assertion of a Monell claim against Hennepin County enables them to seek injunctive relief. Not so. An individual plaintiff asserting a Monell claim must still show that she faces a real and immediate threat of future injury to obtain an injunction
III
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
A
In Count I of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert
1
“As for the Due Process Clause, standard analysis under that provision proceeds in two steps: We ask first whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). If the plaintiff cannot identify any protected liberty or property interest of which he was deprived, “any procedural due process claim necessarily fails.” Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1047 (8th Cir. 2012); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts do not consider what process is due unless a plaintiff has a protected liberty or property interest).
a
i
Plaintiffs identify three liberty interests of which they were deprived to support their
This first argument implicates a series of rules the United States Supreme Court has identified and applied to determine whether state law creates a constitutionally enforceable liberty interest. “A state-created liberty interest arises when a state imposes ‘substantive limitations on official discretion.‘” Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1055 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)). To answer whether a state law creates an enforceable liberty interest, a court must “examine[] closely the language of the relevant statutes and regulations.” Id. (quoting Ky. Dep‘t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989)). “[T]he most common manner in which a State creates a liberty interest is by establishing ‘substantive predicates’ to govern official decision-making, and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met.” Id. (quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462). In Thompson, the Supreme Court “articulated a requirement that statutes and regulations must contain explicitly mandatory language, i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow, in order to create a liberty interest.” Id. (quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463).
Applying these rules, the Eighth Circuit has held that Minnesota‘s child-welfare statutes and associated regulations “do not create a constitutional liberty interest.” Doe v. Hennepin Cnty., 858 F.2d 1325, 1328 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987)); see also Forrester, 397 F.3d at 1055-57 (acknowledging, based on Myers and Doe, that Minnesota child-protection statutes do not create a constitutional liberty interest, and reaching the same holding with respect to Missouri child-protection statutes). In Forrester, the court cited other circuit-court decisions reaching this same conclusion with respect to other child-welfare regimes. 397 F.3d at 1056-57 (citing Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1186 (6th Cir. 1995); and Doe v. Milwaukee Cnty., 903 F.2d 499, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1990)).
On top of those child-welfare-specific holdings, the Eighth Circuit has made clear that, to the extent plaintiffs allege that violations of state procedural rules “themselves constitute a violation of their due process rights, this argument fails under well-established law.” Lee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc). This is because “adopting this argument ‘would conflict with a long line of Supreme Court decisions holding that a violation of state procedural law does not itself give rise to a due process claim.‘” Id. (quoting Gissendaner v. Comm‘r, Ga. Dep‘t of Corr., 794 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2015)); see also Domka v. Portage Cnty., Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Federal judges do not enforce state-created procedures in the name of the Constitution, and a failure to comply with state procedural rules does not violate the federal constitution.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[A] state created procedural right is not itself a liberty interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” “Constitutionalizing
Judged against these rules, Plaintiffs’ assertion that Quinn possessed and was deprived of a Minnesota-created constitutionally-protected liberty interest in participating in juvenile protection proceedings involving A.D. and L.J. is implausible. Binding Eighth Circuit precedents—Myers and Doe—pretty clearly say the opposite, and Plaintiffs do not distinguish them. Leaving these cases aside, Plaintiffs’ argument seems to be that, because Quinn was a “grandparent[] with whom the child has lived within the proceeding two years,” Minnesota law mandated that she be made a “party” to the proceedings concerning A.D. and L.J., and this is enough to show the creation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Pls.’ Mem. in Opp‘n at 4-5. This is not correct. Hutchinson and the other cases cited above establish that this kind of state procedural violation cannot alone support a constitutional claim. If that weren‘t so, Plaintiffs’ position remains unpersuasive. Plaintiffs base this argument on
Any grandparent of the child has a right to participate in the proceedings to the same extent as a parent, if the child has lived with the grandparent within the two years preceding the filing of the petition. At the first hearing following the filing of a petition, the court shall ask whether the child has lived with a grandparent within the last two years, except that the court need not make this inquiry if the petition states that the child did not live with a grandparent during this time period. Failure to notify a grandparent of the proceedings is not a jurisdictional defect.
See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp‘n at 4-5. This statute does not establish discretion-limiting substantive predicates. It does something different. It identifies facts for judicial determination that, if found by the court, vest an individual or individuals with a right to participate in child-protection proceedings. Judicial fact-finding is by nature inherently discretionary. And if the court finds the predicate facts, the statute makes clear that the court retains the power (or jurisdiction) to proceed even if a grandparent is not notified of the proceedings. In other words, the particular outcome Plaintiffs identify—Quinn‘s participation in the proceedings concerning A.D. and L.J.—was not mandated under this statute in the relevant sense.6
The second liberty interest Plaintiffs identify is their right to familial association. To support this interest, Plaintiffs argue that the Eighth Circuit, in Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303 (1997), “recognized that ... grandparents and grandchildren may have familial association rights in the context of child protection proceedings.” Pls.’ Mem. in Opp‘n at 6.
The Supreme Court “ha[s] said that the Constitution protects ‘certain kinds of highly personal relationships.‘” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984)). As the court acknowledged in Overton: “there is some discussion in our cases of a right to maintain certain familial relationships, including association among members of an immediate family and association between grandchildren and grandparents.” Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)); see
also Harpole v. Ark. Dep‘t of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Familial relationships have been protected from many forms of governmental intrusion.“).
Whisman raised—but, as will be explained, did not decide—the question of grandparents’ rights of familial association in the child-protection context. Whisman‘s facts begin with a mother leaving her child in the care of a babysitter. 119 F.3d at 1307. The mother did not return home as planned, and the babysitter—after being told by the mother‘s boyfriend that the mother was “passed out drunk“—contacted a social worker. Id. After failing to locate the child‘s mother, the social worker went to the babysitter‘s home, examined the child, “and found him to be in good health.” Id. Though the babysitter told the social worker that the child‘s grandmother was scheduled to pick up the child “around noon,” the social worker directed the babysitter to hand the child over to a juvenile officer. Id. “The babysitter did so at approximately 11:45 a.m.,” and the child was driven to a shelter some 14 miles away. Id. State officials denied the grandmother‘s repeated requests for custody. Id. at 1307–08. Through a series of allegedly backdated and late-filed court orders, state officials retained custody of the child for seventeen days. Id. at 1308. Custody was restored to the family following a hearing. Id. Both the child‘s parents and grandparents sued the social workers and juvenile officers claiming they had “violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights of familial association, denying plaintiffs due process of law.” Id. at 1307.
The Eighth Circuit addressed whether the district court had properly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Id. at 1309. Though the court discussed the constitutional scope of the grandparents’ familial interest in the society of their grandchild, the case‘s qualified-immunity issue does not seem to have been decided on that basis. Id. at 1312.7 The court never reached the conclusion—essential to its qualified immunity determination—that the grandparents’ right to a familial relationship with the grandchild was clearly established at the time of the violation. Id.; see also id. at 1309 (acknowledging the “clearly established”
This review of Whisman‘s facts and legal reasoning shows that, at least insofar as Plaintiffs’ procedural-due-process claim depends on their right to familial association, the case does not help Plaintiffs. This case‘s facts are materially different. Whisman involved the sudden removal of a “healthy” child from a home, backdated court documents, and deliberate delays in legal proceedings intended at least to delay (and perhaps to prevent) the parents and grandparents from regaining custody. Id. at 1307–08. As the court described things, “[t]here was not, under the allegations of the complaint, any reasonable suspicion of child abuse” like that asserted in other cases. Id. at 1310. We don‘t have anything like Whisman‘s facts here. Plaintiffs do not allege that the children‘s initial removal from their mother‘s home and custody was unwarranted or improper. Nor do they allege any facts suggesting deliberate deceit on the part of Defendants designed to delay judicial proceedings. As to the law, Whisman does not support Plaintiffs’ familial-association-based due process claim because it was not decided on that basis. Nor did it identify a usable framework for assessing a grandparent‘s assertion of a constitutional claim grounded in the right to maintain familial relationships with grandchildren.
In the absence of binding Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit precedent, Defendants argue that whether Plaintiffs have a constitutional right to familial association should be determined by reference to several factors. These include:
whether the [grandparent] plaintiff is a custodial figure or is otherwise acting in loco parentis to the children; whether and for how long the children were residing with the plaintiff at the time of the alleged deprivation; whether the plaintiff has a biological link to the children; and whether there is a potential conflict between the rights of the plaintiff and the rights or interests of the children‘s natural parents.
Rees v. Off. of Child. & Youth, 744 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445 (W.D. Pa. 2010), aff‘d 473 Fed. App‘x 139 (3d Cir. 2012). There are good reasons to evaluate Plaintiffs’ claim with these factors. The district court in Rees settled on these factors after carefully and thoroughly reviewing federal appellate cases from various circuits. 744 F. Supp. 2d at 445–452. The Third Circuit recognized the thoroughness and reasonableness of this approach in affirming the district court‘s decision. 473 Fed. App‘x at 142–43. And Plaintiffs do not dispute the appropriateness of applying these factors here. See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp‘n at 6.
Though it is a closer call, the better answer is that the Amended Complaint and court records it embraces do not set forth factual allegations plausibly showing the presence of these factors to a degree that gives rise to a constitutionally protected right of familial association between Quinn and the children. Plaintiffs allege
iii
The third interest Plaintiffs identify is their right of access to the courts. Pls.’ Mem. in Opp‘n at 6–7. The Eighth Circuit has held that “access to the courts is a fundamental right of every citizen.” Whisman, 119 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm‘n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir. 1986)). To show a deprivation of this interest, Plaintiffs must allege facts plausibly “show[ing] that the defendants acted with some intentional motivation to restrict [their] access to the courts.” Johnson v. Rutledge, No. 4:21-cv-00373-KGB, 2022 WL 990277, at *10 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2022) (citing Whisman, 119 F.3d at 1313). Plaintiffs must also allege facts plausibly showing that they suffered an “actual injury” resulting from the asserted denial of access. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351–52 (1996). As with the first liberty interest Plaintiffs identified—Quinn‘s interest in participating in juvenile protection proceedings involving A.D. and L.J.—Defendants’ violation or violations of state-created procedural rules alone cannot support this claim. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d at 981; see also Gearin v. City of Maplewood, 780 F. Supp. 2d 843, 863 (D. Minn. 2011) (describing as “dubious” the “proposition that a violation of a state procedural rule is, without more, a violation of the
The Amended Complaint‘s allegations do not plausibly show a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights of access to the courts.9 A careful review of the Amended Complaint shows that Plaintiffs assert two types of
1 Ex. 1 at 4, 5; Ex. 3 at 19; Ex. 4 at 30; Ex. 6 at 50; Ex. 7 at 77; Ex. 8. It is difficult to understand how a right-of-access claim might plausibly be alleged in these circumstances.
b
Had Plaintiffs identified the deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, their procedural-due-process claim would remain implausible because the Amended Complaint includes no allegations showing that the extensive procedures Plaintiffs received were constitutionally inadequate. “A procedural due process claim focuses not on the merits of a deprivation, but on whether the State circumscribed the deprivation with constitutionally adequate procedures.” Parrish v. Mallinger, 133 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1998). “This inquiry examines ‘the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law.‘” Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990)). “Relevant factors include the affected private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the government‘s interest, including burdens that additional safeguards would entail.” Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Accepting that Defendants (or some of them) caused Plaintiffs to experience a longer, more difficult, and more expensive adjudication regarding the children‘s custody, the Amended Complaint includes no allegations addressing how the state‘s established procedures were inadequate or how these procedures should be modified to achieve compliance with the
2
The second
In addition to its procedural protections, the Due Process Clause protects individual liberties from government action “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a substantive due process claim against a state official, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a fundamental right was violated and that the official‘s conduct shocks the conscience. Folkerts v. City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2013). Whether conduct shocks the conscience is a question of law. Id. Conscience shocking conduct only includes “the most severe violations of individual rights that result from the brutal and inhumane abuse of official power.” White v. Smith, 696 F.3d 740, 757–58 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “Only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of the government action in question will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process violation.” Folkerts, 707 F.3d at 981 (cleaned up).
Mitchell v. Dakota Cty. Soc. Servs., 959 F.3d 887, 898 (8th Cir. 2020). “The theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases, and it proscribes certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up).
The Amended Complaint does not allege conscience-shocking conduct. At most, it alleges that Defendants failed to give notice required under Minnesota law and advanced positions that lacked support (and ultimately were not accepted by the Hennepin County District Court). If Plaintiffs meant to identify some specific aspect of Defendants’ conduct as conscience-shocking, that is not clear from the Amended Complaint. Count I refers generally to “the conscience-shocking conduct alleged above” without pointing out what particular conduct described in the pleading‘s preceding paragraphs is alleged to be conscience-shocking. Plaintiffs are more specific in their opposition brief. There, Plaintiffs say they “are not asserting harm on the basis of official‘s discretionary judgment in removing the boys, placing them in unsuitable foster homes, or any harm to the boys that came from those foster homes.” Pls.’ Mem. in Opp‘n at 15. Instead, Plaintiffs say their substantive-due-process claim “rest[s] on the . . . denial of automatic party status, continued denial of notice, and purposeful misrepresentations.” Id. at 16. No case, however, has been cited or found to support the idea that these types of activities might plausibly be conscience shocking.
B
In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim against Hennepin County under Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell‘s basic rule is “that civil rights plaintiffs suing a municipal entity under
Plaintiffs do not allege a plausible Monell claim against Hennepin County. Plaintiffs have not alleged plausible
C
As for Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law negligence claim in Count III, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
*
Plaintiffs have not requested leave to amend the Amended Complaint in the event Defendants’ motion is granted, and Plaintiffs have identified no additional allegations they might make to address the pleading deficiencies identified above. In this situation, it makes better sense to dismiss Plaintiffs’
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
- Defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 8] is GRANTED.
- Counts I and II of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
- Count III of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: October 31, 2022
s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court