Facts
- The Vieira family trust, created in 1997, became a point of contention between siblings Hyldi and Robert G. following the death of their parents, the original trustees [lines="20-21"], [lines="26-29"].
- Following a history of disputes, the probate court appointed a professional fiduciary as a temporary successor trustee in 2023 after the prior trustee, Lisa Berg, retired [lines="211-328"].
- Hyldi argued for her appointment as trustee of her sub-trust based on the trust's express terms, while Robert G. sought a professional fiduciary to avoid conflicts [lines="34-38"], [lines="50-50"].
- The trust included provisions for equal asset division and designated the siblings as income beneficiaries for their respective sub-trusts upon the death of both parents [lines="83-86"].
- The probate court ultimately ruled in favor of appointing Heather Fisher as the new temporary successor trustee [lines="313-314"].
Issues
- Whether the probate court's appointment of a professional fiduciary as temporary successor trustee violated Probate Code section 15660 [lines="342-344"].
- Whether the doctrine of issue preclusion barred Robert G. and Michael from contesting Hyldi’s appointment as trustee of her sub-trust [lines="515-518"].
Holdings
- The court affirmed the appointment of the professional fiduciary as temporary successor trustee, finding the decision consistent with the trust's terms and aimed at minimizing sibling disputes [lines="449-450"].
- The issue preclusion argument was rejected as the courtroom matters were distinct from those litigated in arbitration, and thus, the doctrine did not apply [lines="578-579"].
OPINION
TYRONE PRICE v. C. CARTER, Warden
Civil Action No.: SAG-24-1444
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
December 4, 2024
Stephanie A. Gallagher, United States District Judge
Case 1:24-cv-01444-SAG Document 14 Filed 12/04/24
Tyrone Price, a federal inmate recently confined at Federal Correctional Institution-Cumberland, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
Price is serving an aggregated one-hundred-and-forty-month term of confinement. ECF No. 10-1, at 3, ¶ 5; ECF No. 10-1 at 9-11. His current projected release date, via Good Conduct Time Release, is August 8, 2025. ECF No. 10-1, at 3, ¶ 5; ECF No. 10-1 at 8.
On September 25, 2023, Unit Manager Holler was reviewing emails when he noticed an email sent on September 1, 2023 to Price from carmexwanda@gmail.com. ECF No. 10-1 at 3, ¶ 6; ECF No. 10-1 at 13. Holler reported that that email address belonged to a third party email service that allows inmates to send text messages directly to phone numbers the inmate places on a list. Id. The email to Price explained the process as follows:
HOW TO SEND/RECEIVE MESSAGES: The process for sending messages has changed. Up until now we have asked that you put a 10-digit phone number in the subject line. We have decided that it might be better to make it to where you use a word in the subject line rather than the 10-digit phone number. When you send messages you can put the word (the one assigned to the phone number) in the subject line rather than the phone number. To respond to emails as a free member you must start a NEW email every time with the word in the subject line. All other messages you send will be ignored.
Id. Additionally, the email showed a number of telephone numbers that Price had placed on his messaging app. ECF No. 10-1 at 4, ¶ 6; ECF No. 10-1 at 13, 24-26.
As a result of the review of the email, Holler wrote an incident report (#3831210) charging Price with violating Code 299 (disruptive conduct—high) most like code 296 (mail abuse, disrupt monitoring). ECF No. 10-1 at 4, ¶ 7; ECF No. 10-1 at 13. Price was provided a copy of the incident report on September 25, 2023. ECF No. 10-1 at 4, ¶ 8; ECF No. 10-1 at 13.
The following day, a hearing was held before the Unit Discipline Committee (“UDC“) which Price attended. ECF No. 10-1 at 4, ¶ 9; ECF No. 10-1 at 14. Because of the severity of the charge, the UDC referred the matter to the DHO for a hearing. Id. That same day Price received and signed for a copy of his inmate rights regarding the DHO hearing. ECF No. 10-1 at 4, ¶ 10;
On September 29, 2023, the DHO conducted the hearing. ECF No. 10-1 at 4, ¶ 11; ECF No. 10-1 at 19. The DHO confirmed that Price had received a written copy of the incident report and reviewed Price‘s due process rights, confirming that Price did not have any documentary evidence to present and that he did not request any witnesses or a staff representative. Id. The DHO read the incident report to Price and provided him an opportunity to give a statement. ECF No. 10-1 at 4, ¶ 12; ECF No. 10-1 at 19. Price responded that “The messages were approved by the bop.” Id.
After considering the written account of the events as described in the incident report, Price‘s denial of the charges and his statement offered at the hearing, and a copy of the email, the DHO found that Price did not commit the prohibited act as charged but instead committed the prohibited act of conduct disruptive to the security of the institution most like mail abuse (attempted), a Code 299A most like Code 296. ECF No. 10-1 at 5, ¶¶ 13-14; ECF No. 10-1 at 20-26. In explaining the finding, the DHO explained that he placed greater weight on the officer‘s written account that Price attempted to use his TRULINCS account to send email to individuals by using an intermediary email address. ECF No. 10-1 at 5, ¶ 14; ECF No. 10-1 at 21. The DHO did not find that Price‘s position that the BOP approved the third party text service excused him from the prohibited act. ECF No. 10-1 at 5, ¶ 15; ECF No. 10-1 at 21. The DHO noted that the inmate handbook explains Code 296 as “Use of the mail for abuses other than criminal activity which circumvents mail monitoring procedures (e.g., . . . directing others to send, sending, or receiving a letter of mail through unauthorized means, . . . sending correspondence to a specific address with directions or intent to have the correspondence sent to an unauthorized person.” ECF No. 10-1 at 5, ¶ 15; ECF No. 10-1 at 21. Additionally, the DHO “explained that similarly misusing
As a result of the findings, the DHO sanctioned Price to 27 days loss of GCT and 90 days loss of email privileges. ECF No. 10-1 at 5, ¶ 16; ECF No. 10-1 at 22. On January 7, 2024, the DHO prepared a written report of the findings and sanctions, which was delivered to Price on January 9, 2024. ECF No. 10-1 at 5, ¶ 17; ECF No. 10-1 at 22. Price was advised of his right to appeal through the Administrative Remedy Procedure. Id.
Price contends that his rights were violated during the disciplinary hearing because Unit Manger Holler, who wrote the disciplinary report, attended the disciplinary hearing. ECF No. 4 at 3. Price also provided the declaration of inmate Demond Proctor averring that Holler attended the hearing. ECF No. 4-3 at 1. Price claims that he argued to the DHO that Holler could not attend the hearing because it violated his right to due process and rules regarding the conduct of disciplinary hearings. ECF No. 4 at 3. Price also states that the hearing was held in Holler‘s office. Id.; ECF No. 4-3 at 1. Price seemingly contends that the foregoing prevented the DHO from being an impartial decision maker. ECF No. 4 at 3.
Additionally, Price contends that he does not have control over what email is sent to him. Id. at 4. He claims he was accused of receiving an email but was not accused of sending an email to anyone. Id. He states that BOP staff approved the emails for Price‘s contact list and as such he could not have misused the service or violated any policies. Id. Additionally, he baldly asserts that his First Amendment right to receive mail was violated. Id. He also seeks to be compensated financially for completing RDAP. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . ., to the extent that they are not inconsistent with statutory provisions or [the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases], may be applied” to habeas corpus proceedings. Rule 12, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the U.S. Dist. Cts.; see also Rule 12, Rules on Motion Attacking Sentence Under Section § 2255; Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the U.S. Dist. Cts. (§ 2254 Rules apply to habeas corpus petitions filed under provisions other than
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
DISCUSSION
It is well-established that a petitioner seeking judicial review of agency actions must first have exhausted available remedies within the agency prior to filing suit. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969). “The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence,” that is, “to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies.” Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972). Petitioners seeking relief under
The Administrative Remedy Procedure provides that if an inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he may file a formal written complaint on the proper form within 20 calendar days of the date of the occurrence on which the complaint is based. See
Here the record evidence demonstrates that Price failed to complete the administrative process regarding his disciplinary hearing. Price contends that under the prison mailbox rule he timely filed the appeal of the disciplinary finding. But the BOP‘s Administrative Remedy Procedure provides that “IF accepted, a Request to appeal is considered filed on the date it is logged into the Administrative Remedy Index as received.”
Nevertheless, Price claims that his effort to have the denial of his appeal reviewed was thwarted because, among other reasons, prison staff refused to provide him the necessary form to appeal the dismissal. Therefore, on this record, the Court cannot say that the administrative process was available to Price. As such, the Court declines to dismiss the Petition as unexhausted and will instead turn to the merits of Price‘s due process claim regarding the conduct of his disciplinary proceedings.
A. Due Process claim
Prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause, but prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full array of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). In prison disciplinary proceedings where an inmate faces the possible loss of diminution credits, he is entitled to certain due process protections. These include: (1) advance written notice of the charges against him; (2) a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for taking any disciplinary action; (3) a hearing where he is afforded the right to call witnesses and present evidence when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional concerns, and a written decision; (4) the opportunity to have non-attorney representation when the inmate is illiterate or the disciplinary hearing involves complex issues; and (5) an impartial decision-maker. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 592.
Here, Price received advanced notice of the hearing, he waived his right to representation or to present evidence at the hearing, and the DHO‘s written decision was based on evidence presented at the hearing. As long as the hearing officer‘s decision contains a written statement of the evidence relied upon, due process is satisfied. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 322, n.5.
Moreover, substantive due process is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was based upon “some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Federal courts do not review the correctness of a disciplinary hearing officer‘s findings of fact. See Kelly v. Cooper, 502 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (E.D. Va. 1980). The findings will only be disturbed when unsupported by any evidence, or when wholly arbitrary and capricious. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 456; see also Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 933 (4th Cir. 1990); Tyler v. Hooks, 945 F.3d at 171-
Price‘s claim that he did not receive an impartial DHO because the unit manager who authored the report was present at the hearing is unavailing. “Adjudicators are entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity [ ], and thus the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is high [ ].” Nicholson v. Carter, DLB-23-380, 2024 WL 895120 at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 29, 2024) (citations omitted). When a petitioner disputes a DHO‘s decision to give the officer‘s written account of the incident greater weight, the petitioner must show “a level of bias that made fair judgment impossible” and “[t]here must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased.” Id. Price presents no such allegation. Rather Price simply points to the reporting officer‘s presence at the hearing as evidence that he was not given an impartial decision maker. But the reporting officer did not conduct the hearing, make the decision to find Price guilty, or write the hearing report. In the same way, the DHO did not prepare the incident report and was not a party to or otherwise involved in the incident. Rather the DHO simply conducted the hearing, weighed the evidence, and concluded that Price committed a prohibited act. There is simply no evidence that the DHO was partial or improperly influenced by the reporting officer‘s presence at the hearing. Price‘s complaint regarding Holler‘s mere presence
Finally, turning to the “some evidence” standard, the record provides ample evidence to support the DHO‘s conclusion that Price violated prison rules. The “some evidence” standard is “an exceedingly lenient standard, requiring only a modicum of evidence.” Tyler v. Hooks, 945 F.3d 159, 170 (4th Cir. 2019) (quotations and citation omitted). In determining whether that standard was satisfied, a court is not required to examine the entire record, make an independent assessment of witnesses, or re-weigh the evidence. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. If the decision of the DHO has “some basis in fact,” it is “sufficient to meet the requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 456.
Here, there is some basis in fact for the DHO‘s decision. The DHO was presented with the email, the written incident report, and Price‘s statement. The DHO weighed the evidence and gave greater weight to the officer‘s written testimony. Contrary to Price‘s argument that he had no control over what those in the outside world sent him and that the BOP had approved the emails, the DHO explained why Price‘s argument was not supported. Price was not found in violation of the rules simply because he received the email but rather for attempting to circumvent the monitoring procedures set forth by the BOP. ECF 10-1 at 21. The DHO found that Price committed the attempted prohibited act in part because the email “show[ed] numerous phone numbers that Price ha[d] placed on his messaging app...[in] violation of the TRULINCS and [which] allow[ed] Price to circumvent the email process.” ECF No. 10-1 at 21. The email to Price made clear that Price had already added numerous phone numbers to the messaging app. Id.; ECF No. 10-1 at 24-26. As such, the DHO found Price had attempted to use his TRULINCS account to send communications to people via an intermediary address, which posed a serious threat to the
B. Remaining Claims
Price‘s claims regarding denial of his First Amendment right and the request for compensation for completion of RDAP are not cognizable in this case. A
The Supreme Court left open the question of whether matters concerning “large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners” may be addressed via a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Ziglar v. Abassi, 582 U.S. 120, 144-45 (2017) (differentiating claims of “individual instances of discrimination . . . which due to their very nature are difficult to address except by way of damages actions after the fact.“); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (“When a prisoner is put under additional and
The Fourth Circuit has stated in unpublished decisions that claims challenging conditions of confinement cannot be brought in habeas petitions. See, e.g., Wilborn v. Mansukhani, 795 F. App‘x 157, 164 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (finding “[t]his case presents no basis to deviate from our previous holdings” and concluding that inmate‘s claim to have the BOP reconsider where he was housed is not one that would fall within the scope of habeas); see also Rodriguez v. Ratledge, 715 F. App‘x 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (holding that an inmate‘s challenge to his transfer to a maximum-security facility was “not a cognizable
Additionally, this District Court and others have held that conditions of confinement claims regarding email, mail, telephone use, and other privileges are not cognizable under
CONCLUSION
Having found no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, the petition shall be denied and dismissed by separate Order which follows.
December 4, 2024
Date
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge