Jones v. HendrixJones v. Hendrix
*1 OCTOBER TERM, 2022 (Slip Opinion)
Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See
United States
v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
Syllabus v . HENDRIX, WARDEN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 21–857. Argued November 1, 2022—Decided June 22, 2023 In 2000, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced
petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones after he was convicted on two
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of
change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) re-
strictions on second or successive
(a) Congress created
Syllabus
access to needed evidence and “aggravated” by the concentration of
federal prisoners in certain judicial districts that therefore faced “an
inordinate number of habeas corpus actions.”
United States
v.
Hay-
man
,
Congress later enacted AEDPA, which, as relevant here, barred sec-
ond or successive
(b) Jones and the United States each advance unpersuasive theories
of when and why
(1) Jones argues that
Syllabus
a
Jones suggests that denying him the chance to raise his
Rehaif
claim
in a
The principles of
Ex parte Watkins
guided this Court’s understand-
ing of the habeas writ throughout the 19th century and well into the
20th. See
Brown
,
Jones’ remaining constitutional arguments are no more persuasive. He argues that denying him a new opportunity for collateral review of his Rehaif claim threatens Congress’s exclusive power to define crimes, but a court does not usurp legislative power simply by misinterpreting the law in a given case. Next, Jones points to Fiore White , 531 U. S. 225 ( per curiam ), which applied the rule that due process requires that the prosecution prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. But due process does not guarantee a direct appeal, McKane v. Durston , 153 U. S. 684, 687, let alone the opportunity to have legal issues redetermined in successive collateral attacks. Finally, the Eighth Amendment’s constraint on the kinds of punishments govern- ments may inflict creates no independent entitlement to a second round of postconviction review. Pp. 12–20.
Syllabus
(2) The Government asks the Court to adopt a novel interpreta-
tion of
The Court sees no indication that the saving clause adopts the Gov-
ernment’s state-prisoner-habeas benchmark. In any event, that
benchmark has uncertain relevance to the question presented here be-
cause federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law. The
Government’s theory ultimately rests instead on its assertion that
The Government asserts that the Court must require “the clearest
command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] courthouse doors”
on “a strong equitable claim” for relief.
Holland
v.
Florida
, 560 U. S.
631, 646, 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). But AEDPA’s re-
strictions embody Congress’s policy judgment regarding the appropri-
ate balance between finality and error correction. The Court declines
to adopt a presumption against finality. Further, the Court typically
has found clear-statement rules appropriate when a statute implicates
historically or constitutionally grounded norms that the Court would
not expect Congress to unsettle lightly. See,
e.g.
,
Alabama Assn. of
Realtors Department of Health and Human Servs.
,
T HOMAS , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and A LITO , G ORSUCH , K AVANAUGH , and B ARRETT , JJ., joined. S OTOMAYOR
Syllabus
and K AGAN , JJ., filed a dissenting opinion. J , J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 21–857 _________________ MARCUS DEANGELO JONES, PETITIONER v. DEWAYNE HENDRIX, WARDEN ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 22, 2023]
J USTICE T HOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the interplay between two statutes:
Separately, since the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or successive
Opinion of the Court
The question presented is whether that limitation on sec-
ond or successive motions makes
I
In 2000, the U. S. District Court for the Western District
of Missouri convicted petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones of
two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of
Years later, in
Rehaif
v.
United States
, 588 U. S. ___
(2019), this Court held that a defendant’s knowledge of the
status that disqualifies him from owning a firearm is an el-
ement of a
After
Rehaif
, Jones hoped to leverage its holding into a
new collateral attack on his remaining
Opinion of the Court
The District Court dismissed Jones’ habeas petition for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.
We granted certiorari.
II
Consistent with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, we hold
that
Opinion of the Court
A
In relevant part,
.
.
.
.
.
“(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in be-
half of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief
by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be enter-
tained if it appears that the applicant has failed to ap-
ply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it
also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
In understanding this statutory text, “a page of history is
worth a volume of logic.”
New York Trust Co. Eisner
, 256
U. S. 345, 349 (1921).
Opinion of the Court
cover “all cases where any person may be restrained of his
or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States.” Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
For most of our Nation’s history, a federal prisoner “claim-
ing the right to be released,”
That changed with the 1948 recodification and reorgani-
zation of the Judiciary Code. See generally 62 Stat. 869. In
enacting the present Title 28 of the United States Code,
Congress largely recodified the federal courts’ pre-existing
habeas authority in
The “sole purpose” of this innovation, as this Court
acknowledged a few years later, “was to minimize the diffi-
culties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording
the same rights in another and more convenient forum.”
United States
v.
Hayman
,
Opinion of the Court
States , 368 U. S. 424, 427 (1962). Experience had shown that processing federal prisoners’ collateral attacks on their sentences through habeas proceedings—and, therefore, through the judicial districts in which they were confined— resulted in “serious administrative problems.” Hayman , 342 U. S., at 212. Most significantly, a federal prisoner’s district of confinement was often far removed from the rec- ords of the sentencing court and other sources of needed ev- idence. Id. , at 212–213. These difficulties were “greatly ag- gravated” by the concentration of federal prisoners in a handful of judicial districts, which forced those District Courts to process “an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions.” Id. , at 213–214.
Traditionally, courts have treated the saving clause as
covering unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or
impracticable for a prisoner to seek relief from the sentenc-
ing court. The clearest such circumstance is the sentencing
court’s dissolution; a motion in a court that no longer exists
is obviously “inadequate or ineffective” for any purpose.
See,
e.g.
,
Witham
v.
United States
,
Opinion of the Court
193 (CA10 1964) (finding
In addition, the saving clause ensures that
Opinion of the Court
depend on the saving clause or proceed under
B
In 1996, Congress enacted AEDPA, which made signifi-
cant reforms to the process of federal-court postconviction
review for both state and federal prisoners. Most relevant
here, AEDPA strictly limited “second or successive”
“(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be suf-
ficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable factfinder would have found the mo-
vant guilty of the offense; or
“(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac-
tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable.”
Mere months before AEDPA’s enactment, this Court de- cided Bailey v. United States , 516 U. S. 137 (1995). That case interpreted the offense of “us[ing]” a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
Opinion of the Court
crime,” in violation of then-existing
Several Courts of Appeals found a workaround for those
prisoners in the saving clause. With minor differences in
reasoning and wording, they held that
Opinion of the Court
that
We now hold that the saving clause does not authorize
such an end-run around AEDPA. In
The saving clause does not undermine this strong nega-
tive inference. Basic principles of statutory interpretation
require that we construe the saving clause and
After AEDPA, as before it, the saving clause preserves
recourse to
Opinion of the Court
make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sen-
tencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other
than collateral attacks on a sentence. Because AEDPA did
not alter the text of
Any other reading would make AEDPA curiously self-
defeating. It would mean that, by expressly excluding sec-
ond or successive
That resistance is particularly acute here, where allow-
ing nonconstitutional claims to proceed under
Opinion of the Court
to put to rest.”
Wright
v.
Spaulding
, 939 F. 3d 695, 707
(CA6 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring).
Here, as often is the case, the best interpretation is the
straightforward one.
III
Resisting this reading, Jones and the United States both
argue that
A
Jones begins with a textual interpretation of the saving
Opinion of the Court
clause that, if accepted, would convert
Next, Jones offers a wide-ranging discussion of the con-
cept of “inadequacy” as a term of art in traditional equity
jurisprudence. While Jones demonstrates that courts of eq-
uity would afford relief from “inadequate” legal remedies in
Despite occasional gestures in its direction, and despite its critical
role in persuading the Courts of Appeals to expand the saving clause,
Jones’ textual arguments place relatively little emphasis on whether
binding precedent foreclosed a prisoner’s statutory argument at trial, on
appeal, and in an initial
14
Opinion of the Court
a broad range of circumstances, we find this excursus irrel-
evant to the question presented here. To the extent that
Congress’ use of “inadequate” in the saving clause harkens
back to equity’s historic use of that term (an issue we need
not address), the most Jones’ evidence proves is that a va-
riety of circumstances might make it impracticable for a
prisoner to seek relief
from the sentencing court
. Cf.
Hay-
man
,
Trying a different tack, Jones suggests that the saving
clause’s use of the present tense (“is inadequate or ineffec-
tive”) means that
As a backstop to his scattershot textual arguments, Jones
invokes the constitutional-doubt canon, arguing that deny-
ing him the chance to raise his
Rehaif
claim in a
Opinion of the Court
Jones’ primary constitutional argument is that denying
him any opportunity to seek postconviction relief based on
Rehaif
would violate the Suspension Clause, which pro-
vides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
At the founding, a sentence after conviction “by a court of
competent jurisdiction” was “ ‘in
itself
sufficient cause’ ” for
a prisoner’s continued detention.
Brown
v.
Davenport
, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 8) (quoting
Ex parte Wat-
kins
,
In rebuttal, Jones argues that pre-founding practice did allow habeas courts to “look beyond the judgment” to ensure that the convicting court had proved every element of the crime for which a prisoner was committed. But Jones fails to identify a single clear case of habeas being used to reliti- gate a conviction after trial by a court of general criminal
Opinion of the Court
jurisdiction. Rather, the cases he cites mostly involve com-
mitments by justices of the peace,
[6]
a distinction reflected in
Watkins
itself. See
id.
, at 208 (discussing
Ex parte Burford
,
Jones also appeals to Bushell’s Case , Vaugh. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670), which has long been under- stood as a case about the independence of criminal juries in determining questions of fact. Clark v. United States , 289 U. S. 1, 16–17 (1933); see also Sparf v. United States , 156 U. S. 51, 90–93 (1895); 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Crim- inal Law of England 375 (1883) (Stephen). There, a judge fined and imprisoned the members of a jury for acquitting William Penn and William Mead on indictments for “assem- bling unlawfully and tumultuously,” a verdict ostensibly against the “manifest evidence.” Vaugh., at 137, 124 Eng. Rep., at 1007. A juror refused to pay the fine, applied to the See Rex v. Brown , 8 T. R. 26, 101 Eng. Rep. 1247 (1798); Rex v. Hall , 1 Cowp. 60, 98 Eng. Rep. 967 (1774); Rex v. Hall , 3 Burr. 1636, 97 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1765); Rex v. Collier , 1 Wils. K. B. 332, 95 Eng. Rep. 647 (1752). The cursory report in Rex v. Catherall , 2 Str. 900, 93 Eng. Rep. 967 (1730), is silent as to the authority under which the petitioner was convicted, and so cannot help Jones overcome Watkins .
Opinion of the Court
Court of Common Pleas for a writ of habeas corpus, and ob- tained discharge in an opinion by Chief Justice Vaughn. Jones points to one part of Vaughn’s opinion, which criti- cized the return of the writ for not specifying that the jurors “kn[e]w and believe[d] th[e] evidence to be full and manifest against the indicted persons,” without which the jurors’ ver- dict was “no cause of fine or imprisonment.” Id. , at 142, 124 Eng. Rep., at 1009. Jones asks us to read this passage as reflecting a supposed common-law rule that habeas relief was available whenever a convicting court had not found the necessary mens rea of a crime. That reading, however, entirely misses the actual basis of Vaughn’s opinion, which was the judge’s absolute want of power to question the jury’s determination of the facts. See id. , at 149, 124 Eng. Rep., at 1013 (“It is absurd a jury should be fined by the Judge for going against their evidence, when he who fineth knows not what it is . . . . [I]f it be demanded, what is the fact? the Judge cannot answer it”); see also Stephen 375 (“[T]he judges who heard the argument . . . decided that the discretion of the jury to believe the evidence or not could not be questioned”). Thus, Bushell’s Case no more undermines Watkins than do the justice-of-the-peace cases.
The principles of
Watkins
guided this Court’s under-
standing of the habeas writ throughout the 19th century
and well into the 20th. See
Brown
,
Opinion of the Court
acknowledged
Watkins
and took pains to reconcile its hold-
ing with the traditional rule. See 100 U. S., at 375–377.
And, when asked to review convicting courts’ substantive
errors of
statutory
law in habeas corpus proceedings, this
Court consistently held that it could not do so.
[8]
It was not
re-try the issues, whether of law,
constitutional or otherwise
, or of fact.”
Id.
, at 429 (emphasis added).
See,
e.g.
,
Knewel
v.
Egan
,
tal that a court upon which is conferred jurisdiction to try an offense has
jurisdiction to determine whether or not that offense is charged or
proved”);
In re Gregory
, 219 U. S. 210, 213 (1911) (“[W]e are not con-
cerned with the question whether the information was sufficient or
whether the acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime,
that is to say, whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found
that the court had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judg-
ment”);
In re Eckart
,
Ignoring this authority, J USTICE ’s dissent cites a handful of
inapposite cases to suggest that 19th-century American courts would
have treated claims such as Jones’ as cognizable in habeas. See
post
, at
31–32, n. 19, 34, 36–37, n. 25.
Grant
v.
United States
,
Opinion of the Court
until 1974, in Davis , that the Court broke with that tradi- tion, holding for the first time that a substantive error of statutory law could be a cognizable ground for a collateral attack on a federal court’s criminal judgment. See 417 U. S., at 342–347.
The Suspension Clause does not constitutionalize that in- novation of nearly two centuries later. Nor, a fortiori , does it require the extension of that innovation to a second or successive collateral attack.
Jones’ remaining constitutional arguments are no more
persuasive. He argues that denying him a new opportunity
for collateral review of his
Rehaif
claim threatens separation-
of-powers principles—specifically, Congress’ exclusive
power to define crimes Cf.
United States
v.
Hudson
, 7
Cranch 32, 34 (1812). But the authority to determine the
facts and the law in an individual case, and to render a fi-
nal, binding judgment based on those determinations,
stands at the core of the judicial power. See
Plaut Spend-
thrift Farm, Inc.
,
Opinion of the Court
Next, Jones points to
Fiore White
,
Jones’ last constitutional contention—that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punish- ments may entitle him to another round of collateral re- view—fails for a similar reason. By its terms, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause expresses a substantive con- straint on the kinds of punishments governments may “in- flic[t].” It creates no freestanding entitlement to a second or successive round of postconviction review, and thus it adds nothing to Jones’ unavailing Suspension Clause argu- ment.
B
The Government agrees with the Eighth Circuit that
Jones is not entitled to relief, but, somewhat surprisingly,
it asks us to adopt a novel, alternative interpretation of the
saving clause, which it constructs via a roundabout argu-
ment. It begins with the premise that the words “inade-
quate or ineffective” imply reference to a “benchmark” of
adequacy and effectiveness. It proceeds to identify that
benchmark as the ability to test the types of claims cogniza-
ble under the general habeas statutes—specifically, those
governing federal habeas petitions by
state
prisoners. The
Government then reasons that
Opinion of the Court
saving clause because Congress has imposed analogous lim-
itations on analogous claims by state prisoners and—by do-
ing so—has
redefined
Opinion of the Court
This elaborate theory is no more convincing than Jones’
arguments. Its most striking flaw is the seemingly arbi-
trary linkage it posits between the saving clause and state
prisoners’ statutory postconviction remedies. While it is
true that
In any event, as the Government acknowledges, a state prisoner could never bring a pure statutory-error claim in federal habeas, because “ ‘federal habeas corpus relief does fault. And, to the extent Sunal addressed that question in dicta, it ap- peared to be of two minds. See id. , at 181–183 (suggesting, in a single unelaborated sentence, that the petitioners’ “cases would be quite differ- ent” had they appealed and lost, then spending two paragraphs empha- sizing that the trial courts’ “error of law” was neither jurisdictional nor constitutional).
Opinion of the Court
not lie for errors of state law.’ ”
Estelle
v.
McGuire
, 502 U. S.
62, 67 (1991) (quoting
Lewis
v.
Jeffers
,
Rather, the narrow base on which the Government’s top-
heavy theory ultimately turns out to rest is its assertion
that
The Government asserts that we require “the clearest command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] court- house doors” on “a strong equitable claim” for relief. Hol- land v. Florida , 560 U. S. 631, 646, 649 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The only two cases the Govern- ment relies on for its clear-statement rule do not sweep as broadly as it suggests. In Holland , we applied the general presumption of equitable tolling to AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations for state prisoners’ habeas claims. Id. , at 645–649. Afterward, in McQuiggin v. Perkins , 569 U. S. 383 (2013), we held that “a convincing showing of actual in- nocence” could enable a prisoner to evade AEDPA’s statute of limitations entirely. Id. , at 386.
Undoubtedly, McQuiggin ’s assertion of equitable author- ity to override clear statutory text was a bold one. But even taking Holland and McQuiggin for all they are worth, there is a significant difference between reading equitable excep- tions into a statute of limitations, on the one hand, and de- manding a clear statement before foreclosing workarounds to AEDPA’s second-or-successive restrictions, on the other.
Opinion of the Court
Statutes of limitations merely govern the
timeframe
for
bringing a claim. AEDPA’s second-or-successive re-
strictions, by contrast, “constitute a modified res judicata
rule,”
Felker
v.
Turpin
,
Accepting the Government’s proposal to apply a clear-
statement rule would be particularly anomalous in light of
the precise question this case presents. Typically, we find
clear-statement rules appropriate when a statute impli-
cates historically or constitutionally grounded norms that
we would not expect Congress to unsettle lightly. See,
e.g.
,
Alabama Assn. of Realtors
v.
Department of Health and Hu-
man Servs.
,
Opinion of the Court
competent jurisdiction to collaterally attack his sentence
based on an alleged error of substantive statutory law. As
far as history and the Constitution are concerned, “there is
nothing incongruous about a system in which this kind of
error—the application of a since-rejected statutory inter-
pretation—cannot be remedied after final judgment.”
George
v.
McDonough
,
IV
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered.
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting S OTOMAYOR and K AGAN , JJ., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 21–857 _________________ MARCUS DEANGELO JONES, PETITIONER v. DEWAYNE HENDRIX, WARDEN ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 22, 2023]
J USTICE S OTOMAYOR and J USTICE K AGAN , dissenting.
We respectfully dissent. As J USTICE J ACKSON explains,
today’s decision yields disturbing results. See
post
, at 23–
25 (dissenting opinion). A prisoner who is actually inno-
cent, imprisoned for conduct that Congress did not crimi-
nalize, is forever barred by
Though we agree with J USTICE ACKSON that this is not
the scheme Congress designed, we see the matter as the So-
licitor General does. As all agree, Congress enacted
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
S OTOMAYOR and K AGAN , JJ., dissenting
(1952).
With that understanding in mind, consider a prisoner
who, having already filed a motion for postconviction relief,
discovers that a new decision of this Court establishes that
his statute of conviction did not cover his conduct. He is out
of luck under
In this case, the petitioner says he is that prisoner, with
that mismatch. But the Court of Appeals never considered
that question, laboring under a mistaken view of the saving
clause that, like the majority’s, assigns it almost no role.
Accordingly, we would remand for the lower courts to con-
sider the petitioner’s claim under the proper framework.
See
Cutter Wilkinson
,
J ACKSON SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 21–857 _________________ MARCUS DEANGELO JONES, PETITIONER v. DEWAYNE HENDRIX, WARDEN ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 22, 2023] USTICE J , dissenting.
Today, the Court holds that an incarcerated individual
who has already filed one postconviction petition cannot file
another one to assert a previously unavailable claim of stat-
utory innocence.
[1]
The majority says that result follows
from a “straightforward” reading of
In any event, putting aside its questionable interpreta-
tion of
of
I am also deeply troubled by the constitutional implica-
tions of the nothing-to-see-here approach that the majority
takes with respect to the incarceration of potential legal in-
nocents. See Part III,
infra
. Apparently, legally innocent
or not, Jones must just carry on in prison regardless, since
(as the majority reads
Thus, in my view, all roads lead to an interpretation of
I
A
To understand why Congress meant for Jones to be able
to invoke the saving clause and bring his statutory inno-
cence claim in a habeas petition filed under
The saving clause is the latter part of
“An application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n be- half of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be enter- tained if it appears that the applicant has failed to ap- ply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention .”§2255(e) (emphasis added); see also§2255 (1946 ed., Supp. II) (§2255 (1948)).
Before
Congress created §2255—an entirely new process for fed-
eral prisoners to use when seeking postconviction judicial
review—to solve these practical problems.
Ante
, at 5–6.
Under the procedures laid out in
Congress crafted (what is now)
There are multiple ways in which
The case before us involves another way that
That much is not in dispute—the majority acknowledges
that Congress intended to maintain equivalence with the
claims available in habeas when it enacted
Thus, the saving clause can be properly interpreted as ef-
fectuating Congress’s intent in this regard. As the Govern-
ment persuasively argues, by inserting a provision that al-
lows prisoners to still file habeas petitions, Congress
“ensure[d] that
This reading of
Fast forward to 1996: Congress reenacted the saving
clause—using identical language—when it passed AEDPA.
This is not to say that Congress necessarily carried for-
ward all of its previous policy determinations with respect
to the availability of postconviction claims, or that it did not
change its mind at all about the appropriate dimensions of
postconviction relief. Indeed, habeas is a dynamic remedy,
and congressional enactments contribute to its evolution.
See
Felker Turpin
,
postconviction relief deliberately and clearly, thereby une-
quivocally expressing its intent to do so. See
Holland
v.
Florida
,
All this means that today (as in 1948) the saving clause
is best interpreted as allowing for the filing of a habeas pe-
tition under
B
That brings us to the situation at issue here. When Con-
gress amended
Moreover, prior to AEDPA’s enactment, a federal pris-
oner could bring such a postconviction claim of statutory in-
nocence
in a successive petition
. This Court had generally
restricted successive postconviction filings by the 1990s,
but a prisoner who had previously filed at least one petition
could still file another one in order to assert innocence.
That was because any bar to the filing of a successive peti-
tion was typically lifted if enforcing that bar would result
in a “miscarriage of justice.”
McCleskey
v.
Zant
, 499 U. S.
467, 494–495 (1991); Hertz & Liebman §28.4[g], at 1757;
see Brief for Respondent 22–24. And under our settled
In this regard,
Davis
merely acknowledged what had been true since
the founding. See
infra
, at 31–34;
Davis United States
,
precedent, legal innocence claims fit that category. See
Da-
vis
,
These background principles relate to the successive pe-
tition that Jones seeks to bring here as follows. If the ma-
jority is right that (by virtue of
In my view, that is where the saving clause comes in.
Reading the saving clause to perform its normal, intended
function of “saving” previously available claims solves this
problem, because it allows prisoners who could have
brought a claim prior to the enactment of AEDPA (like
Jones) to file a habeas petition to the extent that
This understanding of the saving clause also explains the
clause’s application—or, more precisely, its
inapplicabil-
ity
—to the types of claims specifically mentioned in
*42
I disagree. Indeed, in my view, it is precisely because the
text of
claims—which, importantly, the statute does not mention.
To put it bluntly: Congress knows how to speak clearly
when it wants to disrupt the continuity of claims that are
available to prisoners before and after it enacts legislation
that addresses postconviction review procedures. And ra-
ther than providing any such clear statement as to how an
intervening claim of statutory innocence should be treated
vis-à-vis
C
The majority advances an entirely different theory of the
work that
by a mudslide. The majority’s parsimonious perspective on the meaning of “inadequate or ineffective” is flawed in many respects.
First and foremost, it is entirely atextual. The majority
cites exactly zero dictionary definitions of the terms “inad-
equate” or “ineffective.” And while it does reference an ear-
lier draft of the legislation that became
Furthermore, while the majority opinion accurately re-
cites the history and purpose of
Ignoring all this, the majority grounds its analysis of
It appears the majority’s interpretation of
Properly interpreted, a
Thus, the majority has no good answer to interpreting the
saving clause as doing what Congress crafted it to do—
among other things, ensuring equivalence between
II
The foregoing analysis assumes, as the majority does,
that the only hope of a prisoner in Jones’s position is to as-
sert his statutory innocence claim via a habeas petition
filed under
Nothing in the whole of
To reach today’s conclusion, then, the majority draws a
“negative inference” that Congress intended for
First, negative inferences drawn without proper context
can be notoriously unreliable. And, as detailed below, there
are myriad reasons for skepticism here.
Second, I am suspicious of the majority’s choice to resort to inferential reasoning at all, given that this Court has long held that we will not read a statute to displace access to “the great writ” unless Congress has been clear about its intention to accomplish this result. Ex parte Yerger , 8 Wall. 85, 95, 102 (1869). The clear-statement rule is plainly ap- plicable here, and the majority offers the flimsiest of expla- nations for its decision to deviate from its application at the threshold of today’s interpretation.
In short, as shown below, the initial assumption that
Congress necessarily meant for
16
A
The majority says that “since [AEDPA], second or succes-
sive
First of all, while the majority interprets
Explaining this fully requires me to make a preliminary
big-picture point.
Still, when it enacted AEDPA in 1996, Congress was
aware of how
was “essentially giving one bite out of the apple to drasti- cally reduce the ability to have successive petitions unless there is some egregious action that is learned about after the petition is filed, the first petition.” Id. , at 15027.
Thus, Congress enacted
Additional doubts about the majority’s negative inference
surface when one recognizes that the two circumstances
Congress carved out of the successive-petition bar share an
important common thread: Both situations relate to the
newness
of the claim that the prisoner seeks to assert in a
successive petition. That is, both prongs of
[7] See also H. R. Rep. No. 101–681, pt. 1, p. 111 (1990) (explaining that the purpose of a predecessor bill was “to promote finality” but also “to ensure that habeas corpus petitioners have one fair opportunity to pre- sent their Federal claims to the Federal courts”). It appears that, in enacting restrictions on successive petitions, Con-
gress was primarily worried about successive petitions filed by state pris- oners on death row, because a petition could delay the execution of a death sentence. See Stevenson, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 723–730. Indeed, the law is called the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. That concern does not apply to a situation like Jones’s, since he is not serving a death sentence, and nothing about a successive petition delays the ex- ecution of his sentence of imprisonment.
brings a claim that arose after the time in which the pris- oner would or could have filed his first petition. Ibid. (au- thorizing successive petitions raising “ newly discovered ev- idence” or “a new rule of constitutional law” (emphasis added)).
In light of this key observation, the majority’s assumption
that
In short, it is hard to believe that a Congress that ex-
pressly authorized “new” claims involving innocence or
those that arise from developments in Supreme Court case
Prior to this Court’s holding in
Rehaif
v.
United States
,
law despite
The majority’s negative inference also rests on the bald
assumption that Congress
intentionally
left statutory inno-
cence out of its list of carveouts, because it wanted those
claims to be barred if brought in a successive petition.
Ante
,
at 12 (asserting that “Congress has
chosen
finality over er-
ror correction” with respect to statutory innocence claims
brought in successive petitions (emphasis added)). But
there is a perfectly logical alternative explanation for why
statutory innocence claims do not appear as express exclu-
sions in the text of
Thus, as others have observed, when Congress crafted
To me, this contextual revelation rocks the foundation of
the majority’s negative inference. That is, it is plausible
(and perhaps even likely) that Congress did not appreciate
fully that the modeled-after language establishing a succes-
sive-petition bar did not capture the full scope of available
claims for federal prisoners.
[10]
And, of course, if Congress
simply overlooked statutory innocence claims when it
crafted
Given the purpose and history of
Take equity, for instance. When Congress crafted
tention to override that value (assuming that it actually in- tended to completely foreclose new legal innocence claims). Congress did not do so; yet the majority reads its silence to accomplish that same extraordinarily inequitable result.
The practical consequences that inure from the majority’s
reading also undercut substantially the negative inference
upon which the majority relies. We have consistently
warned that courts should “resis[t] an interpretation of
[AEDPA] that would ‘produce troublesome results’ [and]
‘create procedural anomalies.’ ”
Panetti
, 551 U. S., at 946
(quoting
Castro
v.
United States
,
First, there is the quirky procedural anomaly that arises
due to the fact that statutory innocence claims are fully au-
thorized in the postconviction review context. This Court’s
recognition that a statute covers a narrower scope of crimi-
nal conduct than was previously acknowledged falls within
the narrow subset of criminal law decisions that are fully
retroactive, meaning that a federal prisoner can rely upon
that new determination whether his case is still on direct
review or not.
Schriro Summerlin
,
Inferring that
purported finality goals. Consider two individuals who
have been convicted of the same federal crime—perhaps
two codefendants who were tried and sentenced together.
Both complete their direct appeals, but only one files a
Reference to Congress’s interest in “finality” cannot ex-
plain this odd unequal treatment. Under the Court’s inter-
pretation, a prisoner whose conviction became final
30
years ago
can assert a
Rehaif
claim if he never previously
filed a
Interpreting
and for all time, his right to rely on any new retroactive Su- preme Court opinion that suggests he is incarcerated for noncriminal behavior. There is no indication that Congress meant for Jones and other prisoners in his position to have to choose between pursing an ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim and a claim of legal innocence.
* * *
Despite all this, the majority clings to its “straightfor-
ward” negative inference and interprets
B
Instead of drawing an inference about the operation of
A “longstanding rule” of this Court,
INS St. Cyr
, 533
U. S. 289, 298 (2001), the clear-statement rule directs that,
before interpreting a congressional enactment as “ ‘clos[ing
the Court’s] doors to a class of habeas petitioners,’ ” the
Court must search for a “ ‘clear indication that such was
Congress’ intent,’ ”
Panetti
,
The clear-statement rule is plainly implicated here. Un- der the state of the law at the time AEDPA was enacted, prisoners were entitled to bring a petition to assert a new claim of legal innocence, even a second or successive peti- tion. Supra , at 8–9. Congress could change that state of affairs, but, under the clear-statement rule, if it intended to do so, it needed to speak clearly to effectuate that result.
At a more general level of analysis, the clear-statement
rule also applies to these circumstances because the inter-
pretive question in this case touches upon the venerated
writ of habeas corpus—the only writ that is expressly men-
tioned in the Constitution. Art. I, §9, cl. 2;
Holland
, 560
U. S., at 649. We have long recognized that the clear-state-
ment rule serves the core liberty interests protected by the
writ of habeas corpus. See
Ex parte Yerger
,
Furthermore, and significantly for present purposes, we
have already determined that the necessary “clear state-
ment” here—
i.e.
, the signal from Congress that justifies
reading a statute as foreclosing access to venerated post-
conviction review processes—c
annot be derived from nega-
tive inferences
drawn from statutory text. In
Ex parte
Yerger
, for instance, we declared that interpreting a statute
to “[r]epea[l] by implication” habeas jurisdiction is “not fa-
vored.”
generally prohibits a court from inferring that the “in-
clu[sion of] one item . . . is to exclude other similar items”
in order to read a statute as forbidding review of a postcon-
viction claim.
This case would have been easily resolved if we had ap-
plied the clear-statement rule at the outset, as we have al-
ways done in cases of this nature. Doing so would have ap-
propriately eliminated a reading of
In the last few pages of its opinion, the Court makes the
unceremonious (but still startling) announcement that the
clear-statement rule is inapplicable to today’s analysis of
First, the majority suggests that the clear-statement rule
is not appropriate when interpreting provisions related to
It appears that no one but the Court’s majority even thought it pos-
sible to sidestep the clear-statement rule with respect to today’s inter-
pretive exercise. Both Jones and the Government expressly invoked it.
And Court-appointed
amicus
did not dispute its applicability.
*61
29
“finality”—and seems to draw a line between AEDPA’s stat-
ute of limitations, which does get clear-statement treat-
ment, and its provisions governing successive petitions.
Ante
, at 23–24. This is nonsense. Both AEDPA provisions
use similar language.
Next, the majority conspicuously downplays the stakes in
this case. Not once does its opinion make direct mention of
the fact that the claim the majority says
[17] This Court has also treated these two provisions as similarly suscep-
tible to equitable exceptions; for instance, the “miscarriage of justice”
principle that permits bypassing procedural barriers applies to both.
McQuiggin
,
The majority’s most full-throated defense of its jettison- ing of clear-statement principles lies in its attempt to cast statutory innocence claims as not “historically or constitu- tionally grounded.” Ante , at 24–25. The first and most ob- vious problem with this effort is that the historical pedigree of a claim is irrelevant for clear-statement purposes. The clear-statement rule is applicable here because the statute being interpreted involves access to the writ of habeas cor- pus —a significant constitutional value that we would not assume Congress would discard without careful considera- tion. See Manning 121–122; see also Holland , 560 U. S., at 646–649. And, so triggered, our clear-statement canon of construction is not rendered inapplicable just because the particular type of claim that a prisoner seeks to advance in the context of a habeas or postconviction proceeding (if he is afforded one) might not date back to the founding era. This must be why the majority cites no precedent that splices the clear-statement rule in this fashion.
Looking back to the time of the founding to determine
whether the clear-statement rule applies to our interpreta-
tion of a statute passed in 1996 also makes no sense. The
clear-statement question relates to what Congress intended
with respect to the meaning of the statute
at the time it was
enacted
. When Congress introduced
Even if the majority was right with respect to its assump-
tion that founding-era practices bear on whether the clear-
statement rule applies here, historical practice plainly un-
dermines its assertion that legal innocence claims are of re-
cent vintage. Supreme Court Justices riding circuit in the
early 19th century repeatedly considered the merits of ha-
beas petitions filed by individuals who argued they were be-
ing wrongfully incarcerated because the laws that had been
invoked to justify their confinement, properly construed,
did not reach their conduct.
[19]
Moreover, and importantly,
Ex parte D’Olivera
,
The majority has plainly expended a considerable amount of effort to *64 32
since the mid-19th century, the statutory scheme for post-
conviction review has permitted petitions based not only on
a “violation of the constitution” but also on a “violation of
the . . . law of the United States.” Judiciary Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385; see also
To the extent the majority’s assessment of the purport- edly nascent nature of statutory innocence claims rests on its view that, at the time of the founding, habeas relief was rarely available when a petition was brought by a convicted individual (as opposed to a pretrial detainee ), ante , at 15– 19, there are two additional problems. For one thing, even assuming that a detainee-versus-convict scope-of-habeas distinction existed at the dawn of our Nation, Congress has distinguish all of these cases. See ante , at 18–19, and n. 8. Still, its vig- orous attempt falls short. For example, the majority tries to distinguish Wahll on the ground that the court “considered but rejected a similar argument for ordering pretrial release.” Ante , at 19, n. 8. But it ignores that the Wahll court still considered the merits of the statutory argu- ment; the court did not dismiss the case on the ground that such statu- tory arguments were not cognizable after the prisoner’s conviction. 42 F., at 825–826. This argument that statutory claims are not cognizable in the post-
conviction or habeas context has already been considered—and re-
jected—by this Court. For example, in
St. Cyr
, this Court cited various
17th- and 18th-century cases to conclude that the “issuance of the writ”
of habeas corpus “encompassed detentions based on errors of law, includ-
ing the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes.” 533 U. S., at
302. And, in
Boumediene
, the Court reiterated that it is “
uncontroversial
. . . that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a mean-
ingful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the
erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” 553 U. S., at
779 (quoting
St. Cyr
,
now squarely rejected it. [21] However grounded in history and tradition the Court’s own view of the scope of habeas might be, it is obviously not shared by the Legislature that enacted the statute we are now interpreting.
Second, here again, the majority evaluates the historical
pedigree of legal innocence claims based on faulty history.
It maintains that, historically, a court could review a ha-
beas petition filed by a convicted individual only for “juris-
dictional” errors (which the majority defines narrowly).
Ante
, at 15–18, 24–25; cf.
Edwards
v.
Vannoy
,
[21]
to support its purported “jurisdictional” line. Ante , at 15–18. But Wat- kins does not stand for the broad proposition that the majority derives. Watkins “itself relies on contested habeas history,” and is (as scholars have explained) distinguishable. Kovarsky 70–71. That Watkins cannot mean what the majority says is confirmed by the numerous “19th and early 20th century cases . . . that undeniably decided the merits of con- stitutional claims that were not premised on the detaining authority’s lack of jurisdiction or application of an unconstitutional statute or sen- tence.” Hertz & Liebman §2.4[c], at 44.
At the very least, this take on early habeas practice ap-
pears contradicted by
United States
v.
Bainbridge
, 24 F.
Cas. 946 (No. 14,497) (CC Mass. 1816) (Story, J.). There,
Justice Story considered a statutory innocence claim on the
merits even though the individual had already pleaded
guilty.
Id.
, at 949, 951–952. And the postconviction/pre-
conviction distinction also runs headlong into other prece-
dents that have looked back on history and do not subscribe
to such a narrow view.
St. Cyr
, 533 U. S., at 302 (“[T]he
issuance of the writ was not limited to challenges to the ju-
risdiction of the custodian”);
Fay
v.
Noia
,
Thus, assuming, arguendo , that the historical grounding of the particular type of claim Jones sought to bring even matters, the majority is mistaken when it contends that a statutory innocence claim (including one brought in a suc- cessive petition) is not sufficiently historical to warrant ap- plication of our clear-statement rule.
* * *
If the majority had applied the clear-statement rule, as it
should have, to determine whether
we could have (and should have) easily concluded that there
is no statutory impediment to Jones’s
III
Finally, I believe that the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance also does important work to guide—and constrain—
the Court’s interpretation of
First, the Eighth Amendment. There is a nonfrivolous
argument that the Constitution’s protection against “cruel
and unusual punishment” prohibits the incarceration of in-
nocent individuals. See
In re Davis
, 557 U. S. 952, 953
(2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
Triestman United
States
,
36
The majority’s interpretation also implicates the Suspen- sion Clause. Art. I, §9, cl. 2. The majority admits that, at a minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the right of ha- beas corpus as it existed at the time of the founding. [24] See ante , at 15. The majority also seems to acknowledge that, in the late 18th century, an individual—even one who had been convicted of a crime—could invoke habeas to raise a “jurisdictional” error. Ante , at 15, 24–25 . Historically, the term “ ‘jurisdictional’ ” when used by habeas courts “meant something much broader then than it means now.” Ko- varsky 75; see also Siegel 524. And, importantly, a court lacked “jurisdiction”—and thus the writ could issue—when a person was incarcerated for noncriminal behavior.
[24] I reject the majority’s suggestion that the Suspension Clause pro-
tects
only
the scope of the great writ as it existed in the founding era.
Historical habeas practice provides the floor, and not the ceiling, of Sus-
pension Clause protection.
St. Cyr
,
a court’s “authority” to “try and imprison” an individual stems from a
particular statute and therefore a court has “no jurisdiction” if the law
does not lawfully apply to the prisoner);
Ex parte Bollman
,
Thus, it appears that, by its own lights, the majority to-
day renders an interpretation of
IV
I conclude with an observation. Today’s ruling follows a
recent series of troubling AEDPA interpretations.
[26]
All of
these opinions have now collectively managed to transform
a statute that Congress designed to provide for a rational
and orderly process of federal postconviction judicial review
into an aimless and chaotic exercise in futility. The route
to obtaining collateral relief is presently replete with imag-
ined artificial barriers, arbitrary dead ends, and traps for
the unwary. And today’s turn makes the journey palpably
absurd: It begins with the Supreme Court’s (rare) an-
nouncement that a certain claim for release exists and is
retroactively available to incarcerated individuals on collat-
1670); W. Church, Writ of Habeas Corpus §236, p. 327 (2d ed. 1893)
(“[T]he prisoner may be discharged on habeas corpus, either before or
after judgment, where the statute or ordinance under which the proceed-
ings are inaugurated against him, is unconstitutional, as this is a juris-
dictional defect”).
See,
e.g.
,
Shoop
v.
Twyford
,
(restricting the ability of federal courts to use the All Writs Act in
AEDPA cases);
Shinn Martinez Ramirez
,
It is quite clear that the Court’s rulings in this area of the
law reflect a general ethos that convicted prisoners should
not be permitted to file
Given Congress’s silence on this matter, in my view, there
is simply no justification for drawing a negative inference
that Congress meant for
In other words, as I see it, the negative inference that the
majority draws today rests on nothing—and certainly noth-
ing that actually derives from Congress’s intent. Nothing
in the text of
Ultimately, of course, this all begs the question of how (and whether) Congress will respond to the Court’s system- atic neutering of the balanced postconviction processes that the Legislature has established. It seems to me that today’s opinion—which unjustifiably closes off all avenues for cer- tain defendants to secure meaningful consideration of their innocence claims—creates an opening for Congress to step in and fix this problem.