People v Ward (Shante)People v Ward (Shante)
Appeal from an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Scott A. Dunn, J.), dated July 29, 2021. The order granted defendant‘s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed.
Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, on April 20, 2020, defendant was charged in an accusatory instrument with driving while intoxicated per se (
On appeal, the People argue that
In support of their contention that
In support of their argument that the May 12, 2021 5-a certification should retroactively validate the November 9, 2020 SoR, thе People contend that their failure to file a 5-a certification (which they describe as a “boilerplate declaration” or a ”pro forma certification“) with the November 9th SoR was, at mоst, a latent defect in the SoR because the failure to certify “is not an impediment to readiness” and “does not implicate the validity of the People‘s [SoR]“; that allowing the Peoplе to cure the defect in their SoR is comparable to allowing the People to cure defects in the accusatory instrument pursuant to
We note that most of the People‘s claims in support of their retroactivity argument—in particular, the claims that the failure to certify under subsection 5-a “is not an impediment to readiness,” “does not implicate the validity of the People‘s [SoR],” and does not change the fact that the People “werе truly ready when they said they were” in their SoR—are arguments against the wisdom of subsection 5-a, which this court is not authorized to consider. The People may doubt the efficacy of subsection 5-a оr believe that it creates consequences that are unacceptable from a policy perspective, but those are arguments for the Legislature to amend or reрeal subsection 5-a, not for this court to read subsection 5-a in a way that undermines its plain language (see People v Thomas, 33 NY3d 1, 10 [2019] [” ‘(t)he courts in construing statutes should avoid judicial legislation; they do not sit in review of the disсretion of the Legislature or determine the expediency, wisdom, or propriety of its action on matters within its powers’ “], quoting McKinney‘s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 73; People v Francis, 30 NY3d at 750-751 [“(appellant‘s) arguments arе for the legislature . . . to consider, and not within the scope of this Court‘s authority” because ” ‘(t)he constitutional principle of separation of powers . . . requires that the Legislature makе the critical policy decisions’ “], quoting Bourquin v Cuomo, 85 NY2d 781, 784 [1995]; People v Smith, 79 NY2d 309, 311 [1992] [“our purpose is not to pass on the wisdom of a statute or any of its requirements, but rather to implement the will of the Legislature as expressed in its enactment“]; People v Boston, 75 NY2d 585, 589 [1990] [where the People‘s assertion of the legislative intent behind a statute “was not made evident in the language or history of the statute,” then “it remain(ed) for the Legislature—not the courts—to rewrite the statute to express that objective“]).
“When resolving a question of statutory interpretation, the primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent” (People v Schneider, 37 NY3d 187, 196 [2021]). ” ‘Generally, inquiry must be made of the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history’ ” (People v Wallace, 31 NY3d 503, 507 [2018], quoting Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]). Here, the legislative memorandum for Senate Bill 1738, which bill was substantially incorporated in the budget bill under which
We reject the People‘s analogy to
In view of the foregoing, we find that the People are correct that subsection 5-a permits the filing of a 5-a certification after the filing of an SoR and that this will cure an SoR that had been defective based on the failure to file the 5-a certification. However, in light of the plain languagе of subsection 5-a and the legislative intent behind its enactment, that cure is not retroactive. Rather, the subsequent filing of a 5-a certification cures a defective SoR as of the date of the 5-a filing, and the People are deemed to have stated ready for trial on that date (see People v Piney, 73 Misc 3d 535, 540 [Pleasant Valley Just Ct 2021]; People v Popko, 71 Misc 3d 1210[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50345[U], *4 [Crim Ct, Queens County 2021]). Because, here, the People did not file a 5-a certifiсation, and therefore state readiness, until after the expiration of their statutory speedy trial time, the Criminal Court correctly granted defendant‘s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and VENTURA, JJ., concur.
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: June 16, 2023