THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DREW PETERSON, Defendant-Appellee.
Docket No. 3-10-0514
Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District
April 12, 2012
2012 IL App (3d) 100514-B
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 09-CF-1048; the Hon. Stephen D. White, Judge, presiding. Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.)
In a murder prosecution, the trial court‘s denial of the State‘s motion in limine to admit eight hearsay statements made by defendant‘s deceased wives under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was reversed, since the trial court‘s decision that the statutory rule of evidence in section 115-10.6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires that such statements be found trustworthy and reliable, supplanted the common law doctrine was manifestly erroneous and the trial court‘s findings that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant murdered his wives with the intent to make them unavailable as witnesses made the statements admissible under
James Glasgow (argued), State‘s Attorney, of Joliet (Colleen M. Griffin (argued), Assistant State‘s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.
Steven A. Greenberg (argued), of Steven A. Greenberg, Ltd., Joel A. Brodsky, Ralph E. Meczyk, Darryl Goldberg, Joseph R. Lopez, and Lisa M. Lopez, all of Chicago, for appellee.
Panel
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Carter specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 The defendant, Drew Peterson, was charged with two counts of first degree murder (
¶ 2 In one of these appeals, No. 3-10-0514, the State argued that the circuit court erred when it denied the State‘s motion in limine to admit certain hearsay statements under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. A divided panel of this court held, inter alia, that we lacked jurisdiction to hear thаt appeal because it was untimely. People v. Peterson, 2011 IL App (3d) 100513, ¶ 75. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal in the Illinois Supreme Court. Our supreme court denied the State‘s petition. People v. Peterson, No. 112875 (Ill. Nov. 30, 2011). However, in the exercise of its supervisory authority, our supreme court directed us to vacate our judgment and to address the State‘s appeal on the merits, vesting us with jurisdiction1 over the State‘s appeal. Upon consideration of the merits
of appeal No. 3-10-0514, we reverse the circuit court‘s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 On March 1, 2004, Kathleen Savio, the defendant‘s third wife, was found dead in her bathtub. At the time оf her death, the Illinois State Police conducted an investigation into Kathleen‘s death and a pathologist performed an autopsy. The pathologist concluded that Kathleen had drowned but did not opine on the manner of death. A coroner‘s jury subsequently determined that the cause of death was accidental drowning. No charges were filed in connection with her death.
¶ 5 Several months before Kathleen‘s death, the judge presiding over divorce proceedings between Kathleen and the defendant entered a bifurcated judgment for dissolution of their marriage. The court‘s judgment reserved issues related to matters such as property distribution, pension, and support. A hearing on those issues had been scheduled for April 2004.
¶ 6 The defendant‘s fourth wife, Stacy Peterson, disappeared on October 27, 2007. Stacy and the defendant had been discussing a divorce. Following Stacy‘s disappearance, Kathleen‘s body was exhumed and two additional autopsies were conducted. The pathologists who conducted the autopsies concludеd that Kathleen‘s death was a homicide.
¶ 7 On May 7, 2009, the State charged the defendant with the murder of Kathleen. During pretrial proceedings, the defendant contested the admissibility of some of the evidence the State intended to present at trial. At issue in this appeal are the court‘s rulings that pertained to the State‘s motions in limine to admit certain hearsay statements allegedly made by Kathleen and Stacy.
¶ 8 On January 4, 2010, the State filed a motion in limine arguing that 11 statements made
¶ 9 The State asked the circuit court to conduct a hearing to determine the admissibility of these hearsay statements under both the statute and the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing and sought the admission of the statements under both the statute and the common law. In January and February 2010, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the State‘s motion. The State argued, inter alia, that the defendant killed Kathleen with the intent of preventing her testimony at the hearing on the distribution of the marital property. The State also argued that the defendant killed Stacy with the intent of preventing her testimony not only at a future divorce and property distribution hearing, but also at a trial for Kathleen‘s murder. Seventy-two witnesses testified at the hearing, including three pathologists. Two pathologists testified for the State that Kathleen‘s death was a homicide. The defense‘s pathologist disagreed with the State‘s pathologist‘s conclusions and testified that Kathleen had drowned accidentally.
¶ 10 The circuit court took the matter under advisement and issued its written ruling on May 18, 2010. Applying the statutory criteria, the court found that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the defendant murdered Kathleen and Stacy; and (2) he did so with the intent to make them unavailable as witnesses. Further, the court found that,
¶ 11 The circuit court‘s May 18, 2010, order failed to address whether any of the proffered statements were admissible under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, as the State had requested in its motion. On May 28, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to clarify the circuit court‘s ruling. The defendant‘s motion asked the court to clarify whether it ruled under the common law doctrine. During a hearing held thе same day, the court stated, “I didn‘t even get to that. There was no request as to any of the others. I ruled strictly pursuant—there was a hearing pursuant to the statute.”
¶ 12 On June 30, 2010, the State filed another motion to admit the hearsay statements in which the State asked the court to reconsider its decision to exclude the statements and again requested the circuit court to rule on the admissibility of the same hearsay statements under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. The defendant objected that the State‘s motion to reconsider was untimely because the State did not file the motion within 30 days of the circuit court‘s May 18 order. At a hearing on July 2, the court stated that it believed section 115-10.6 of the Code codified the common law doctrine and that “[i]f the common law is codified, the codification is what rules.” On July 6, the court issued an order denying the State‘s motion, which it described as a motion to reconsider the May 18 ruling. The court‘s order did not address the defendant‘s argument that the State‘s motion was untimely or provide any specific reasons for its ruling. Two days later, however, the court stated that its ruling was based on its belief that a statute that codifies the common law takes precedence over the common law unless the statute is declared unconstitutional or otherwise invalidated.
¶ 13 The State appealed the circuit court‘s May 18, 2010, order and its July 6 denial of the State‘s motion to reconsider that order (No. 3-10-0514). The defendant moved to dismiss the State‘s appeal as untimely. The defendant argued that the State‘s appeal was jurisdictionally defective because the State hаd failed to file either a motion to reconsider or a notice of appeal within 30 days of the circuit court‘s May 18, 2010, order, as required by
¶ 14 In a consolidated decision, a divided panel of this court dismissed appeal No. 3-10-0514 for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the circuit court‘s rulings in the other four appeals. Peterson, 2011 IL App (3d) 100513, ¶¶ 75-80. We held that appeal No. 3-10-0514 was untimely under
¶ 15 The State filed a petition for leave to appeal in the Illinois Supreme Court. Our supreme court denied the State‘s petition. However, in the exerсise of its supervisory authority, our supreme court directed this court to vacate our judgment and to address the State‘s appeal on the merits.
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 The State argues that the circuit court erred when it denied the State‘s motion in limine to admit certain hearsay statements allegedly made by Kathleen and Stacy. Specifically, the State appeals the circuit court‘s refusal to admit 8 of the 14 hearsay statements proffered by the State under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
¶ 18 Because motions in limine invoke the circuit court‘s inherent power to admit or exclude evidence, a court‘s decision on a motion in limine is typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999). However, “[w]here a trial court‘s exercise of discretion has been frustrated by an erroneous rule of law,” our review is de novo. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369.
¶ 19 The circuit court denied the State‘s motion in limine to admit 8 of the 14 hearsay statements under the common law doctrine because it believed that section 115-10.6 of the Code codified, and therefore supplanted, the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. In so ruling, the circuit court erred as a matter of law.
¶ 20 The common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was recognized by the United States Supreme Court more than 130 years ago. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). In 1997, the doctrine was codified at the federal level by
¶ 21 In 2007, our supreme court expressly adopted the сommon law doctrine as the law of Illinois. People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 272-73 (2007). In Stechly, our supreme court made clear that, as applied in Illinois, the doctrine was “coextensive with”
¶ 22 In contrast to the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, reliability is an element of the statutory hearsay exception for the intentional murder of a witness, under which the circuit court ruled on May 18, 2010. See
¶ 23 On September 27, 2010, our supreme court adopted the Illinois Rules of Evidence, which became effective in Illinois courts on January 1, 2011. The Illinois Rules of Evidence codified the existing rules of evidence in this state, including the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Under
¶ 24 As a matter of separation of powers in Illinois, our supreme court has the ultimate authority to determine the manner by which evidence may be introduced into the courts. See People v. Bond, 405 Ill. App. 3d 499, 508-09 (2010). Thus, “[w]here a statute conflicts with a [supreme court] rule of evidence or supreme court decision adopting a rule оf evidence,
¶ 25 While the circuit court‘s exercise of discretion in excluding the eight hearsay statements was frustrated by a manifestly erroneous rule of law, the court nevertheless made the appropriate and necessary factual findings for the evidence to be admissible under
¶ 26 One further point bears mentioning. The Illinois legislature passed a statute which created a hearsay exception for statements made by a witness whom the defendant killed in order to prevent the witness from testifying in a civil or criminal proceeding.
¶ 27 However, after the circuit court applied the statute as written and excluded certain hearsay statements because it found them unreliable, the State, apparently changing course, filed this appeal, arguing that the statements are nevertheless admissible under the common law because the common law does not require a showing of reliability.
¶ 28 This change in the State‘s position is puzzling. If the legislature intended to facilitate the successful prosecution of criminal defendants who intentionally prevent witnesses from testifying (as the statute‘s legislative history suggests), it is unclear why it passed a statute that imposed restrictions on prosecutors that are not found in the common law.8 Regardless, after passing a more restrictive statute, one would expect the State either to enforce the statute as written or act to repeal the statute, not urge the courts to ignore it.
¶ 29 Nevertheless, because the statute neither trumps nor supplants the common law, we must reverse the circuit court‘s judgment.
¶ 30 CONCLUSION
¶ 31 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
¶ 32 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 34 I concur with the majority‘s judgment that reverses the circuit court‘s ruling, finds the eight excluded statements admissible under
¶ 35 First, I do not join in the majority‘s first footnote (supra ¶ 2 n.1) in which it presumes that its interpretation of the Taylor rule was correct in the majority‘s previous decision (Peterson, 2011 IL App (3d) 100513), and that our supreme court directed this court to vacate our decision in appeal No. 3-10-0514 and to address the appeal on the merits simply because our supreme court can do so. In its supervisory order, our supreme court merely stated the following:
“In the exercise of this Court‘s supervisory authority, the Appellate Court, Third District, is directed to vacate its judgment in People v. Peterson, case No. 3-10-0514, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Appellate Court is directed to address the appeal on the merits.” People v. Peterson, No. 112875 (Ill. Nov. 30 2011) (table).
Nothing in these two sentences can be construed as an approval of the majority‘s interpretation of the Taylor rule in its previous decision or, for that matter, as any explanation as to why our supreme court did what it did.
¶ 36 In an аttempt to support its interpretation of our supreme court‘s supervisory order, the majority cites to three cases, none of which in fact support the majority‘s unsubstantiated assumptions. In all three of those cases, our supreme court provided lengthy explanations as to why it was reinstating appeals or finding jurisdiction. Lyles, 217 Ill. 2d at 217-20; McDunn, 156 Ill. 2d at 302-04; Moore, 133 Ill. 2d at 335-41. We were not given any such explanation. Because we do not know the reason why our supreme court ordered us to vacate our previous decision and address the appeal‘s mеrits, I refuse to speculate and do not join in the majority‘s first footnote.
¶ 37 Second, I do not join in the dicta the majority has included in paragraphs 26 through 28 and the accompanying footnote 7, which merely serves as the majority‘s commentary on the Will County State‘s Attorney‘s actions. What the Will County State‘s Attorney did in this case—and whether those actions were “puzzling” to the majority (supra ¶ 28)—is irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal.
¶ 38 We were instructed by our supreme court to address the merits of appeal No. 3-10-0514. Because neither of the two aforementioned matters is necessary to decide the merits of appeal No. 3-10-0514, I refuse to join in those aspects of the majority‘s opinion.