People v. PadronPeople v. Padron
Misael Padron appeals the denial of his motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his conviction for carjacking pursuant to a no-contest plea.1 Padron had served his three-year sentence, and he explained in his motion that he was born in Cuba, moved to the United States, and was granted asylum due to persecution by the Cuban government. Padron provided evidence that when he entered his plea, he suffered from mental health challenges relating to his persecution, and that he did not understand his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and carried mandatory immigration consequences. These included automatic detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. The superior court denied Padron‘s motion, in part, because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel at the time of his plea. The court also stated Padron signed a standard plea form acknowledging he “must expect” to be deported if he was not a United States citizen, and that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.
We conclude Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to “meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept” the immigration consequences of his plea. (
A. Underlying Plea Proceedings
On April 16, 2016, Juan Estrella stepped away from his automobile while filling the radiator, leaving the keys in the ignition and the engine running. Padron entered the empty vehicle and sat in the driver‘s seat. When Estrella confronted him, Padron pushed Estrella aside and drove away, hitting a parked car.
Three days later, Padron was charged with carjacking (count 1;
At the time of his plea, Padron was experiencing mental health challenges relating to untreated post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by persecution endured when he was in his home country. He met with his public defender twice while in a holding cell for approximately 10 minutes each time. A contemporaneous note in his counsel‘s file described Padron as “still going out nuts.” Padron and his counsel appeared at a scheduled preliminary hearing on May 9, 2016. Padron waived his right to a preliminary hearing and pleaded no contest to carjacking in exchange for a prison sentence of three years and the dismissal of all other charges and allegations.
The court accepted Padron‘s plea. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Padron was sentenced to three years in prison.
B. Padron‘s Section 1473.7 Motion
On November 4, 2022, and after serving his sentence, Padron filed a motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7, alleging he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea.
Padron submitted a declaration stating he was a citizen of Cuba and had been in the United States since 2002. Padron
Padron described that, at the time of his plea, he was “homeless and suffering from paranoia and PTSD” because he “felt like Cuban officials were after me here in the United States.” Padron supplied a copy of a 2019 psychological evaluation performed while in immigration detention, diagnosing Padron with PTSD and noting his past use of stimulant drugs. Padron attested he only spoke to his public defender “two times for about ten minutes each time.” He stated his public defender “never asked me for my [immigration] status,” “did not talk at all about the immigration consequences of my conviction” and did not consult with or refer Padron to an immigration attorney. As a result, Padron “did not have a full understanding of just how dire the [immigration] consequences were.”
Padron averred that, “If I had properly understood all the immigration consequences of my conviction, I would have been willing to agree to a plea bargain for a more serious charge if it did not have these life-long immigration consequences. I would have been willing to spend more time in jail.” He further stated, “If a plea bargain could not be reached . . . , I would have been
Padron also provided a declaration from Keli Reynolds, a California attorney specializing in immigration law and “the immigration consequences of criminal convictions.” Reynolds explained Padron‘s carjacking conviction under section 215, subdivision (a),3 was considered an “aggravated felony” and constituted “a ground of deportability, a bar to naturalization, a statutory bar to asylum, and a ground of mandatory detention.”4 As a result, Reynolds opined, “Mr. Padron, who is now in removal proceedings, is facing a very significant likelihood of having his asylum status terminated” and “any attempt by Mr. Padron to
Finally, Padron submitted letters from his wife, his daughter Karmina, and four current coworkers. In July 2022, when these letters were written, Padron‘s wife and two daughters lived in Mexico. Padron‘s family and coworkers stated Padron had been sober for over six years and had “profoundly changed.” They described his involvement in his church and in sobriety support meetings, his friendships with coworkers and customers, and his role as a dedicated father motivated by his daughters.
The People opposed Padron‘s motion to vacate his plea, arguing Padron had signed a Tahl waiver and, during the plea colloquy, Padron had acknowledged discussing immigration consequences with his attorney.
On reply, Padron submitted case notes from his public defender. The public defender‘s notes stated Padron was “still going out nuts” on April 19, 2016, and reflected the proposal of plea deal on April 25, 2016. The original plea proposal was for
Padron also submitted a declaration from his second daughter Shanthal, dated January 3, 2023. Her letter explained Padron‘s daughters and wife had reunited with Padron in San Francisco, and Shanthal was enrolled in a local high school. Shanthal declared, “My dad works two jobs so he can pay all the expenses our family has. . . . My mom only works part time. My dad is the main breadwinner for our family. My dad has made a commitment to me and my sister to support our dream of being college graduates. He doesn‘t want us to work so that our focus is 100% on school. . . . We would be devastated if my dad was deported.”
After a hearing, the superior court denied Padron‘s motion to vacate his plea. The court suggested it would have preferred to see “something from [Padron‘s public defender] indicating that he did not explain [the] immigration consequences.” The court found Padron knew of the immigration consequences because “the Tahl waiver states [Padron] would be deported” and “the prosecution had stated they w[ould] not extend an offer that has no immigration consequences.”
Padron timely appealed.
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 1473.7 provides, as relevant here: “A person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence” if “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party‘s ability to meaningfully understand, defendant against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (
Under section 1473.7, a petitioner must first show error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences. (See People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza); People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529 (Vivar).) The focus of this showing is “the ‘defendant‘s own error in . . . not knowing that his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States.‘” (People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871; accord, People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 768-769 [“a petitioner‘s own subjective error qualifies for relief“].) To establish error, a petitioner is not required to prove he received ineffective assistance from his
A section 1473.7 petitioner must also demonstrate prejudice, that is, “a reasonable probability that [he] would have rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “A reasonable probability does not mean more likely than not. [Citation.] Instead, it means merely a reasonable chance, which is more than an abstract possibility. . . . In other words, a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 (Carrillo); accord, People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 324 (Rodriguez).) The prejudice inquiry turns on “the totality of the circumstances,” including “the defendant‘s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant‘s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.” (Vivar, at pp. 529-530.)
We apply independent review to the denial of a section 1473.7 motion. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.) Under this standard, we defer to any “factual findings based on the trial court‘s personal observations of witnesses,” but otherwise “‘exercise[e] [our] independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.‘” (Id. at pp. 527-528.) Where, as here, the superior court heard no witness testimony and “the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other documents . . . there is no reason to conclude the trial court has
B. Padron Established Error Affecting His Ability To Understand the Immigration Consequences of His Plea
Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude Padron demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence he misunderstood the immigration consequences of his plea due to his mental health challenges and because his defense counsel did not advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, including the impact on his asylum status. (See Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 369 [“when the deportation consequence [of a conviction] is truly clear . . . [counsel‘s] duty to give correct advice is equally clear“].)
The mandatory immigration consequences of Padron‘s conviction were plain. At the time of Padron‘s plea in 2016, it was clear carjacking under section 215 qualified as a crime of violence (see
Padron‘s declaration and his public defender‘s case notes both support that Padron was unaware his conviction carried these mandatory immigration consequences. Padron attested his attorney did not inquire into his immigration status or discuss “all of the immigration consequences of my conviction.” According to the case notes, Padron‘s public defender advised only of unspecified, “potential” immigration consequences. Counsel‘s notes reflect Padron received this advice on the date of the plea hearing, although counsel discussed a potential plea deal more than two weeks before. The notes also do not reflect Padron‘s attorney knew of his asylum status or consulted any relevant immigration resources.5
Under these circumstances, counsel‘s “failure to give accurate and complete advice about the specific consequences of the plea agreement,” including mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and deportation to a country the immigration
Padron presented further evidence of his subjective misunderstanding of the immigration consequences due to a mental health crisis at the time of his plea. Padron attested that when he pleaded no contest, he was suffering from untreated PTSD and “in a terrible place both mentally and physically,” which impaired his ability to understand the immigration consequences. His counsel‘s notes corroborate Padron was “going out nuts” at the time of his plea, and a later psychological evaluation confirmed Padron suffered from PTSD. (See People v. DeMontoya (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1181-1182 [defendant may present evidence his “mental health prohibited [him] from meaningfully understanding, defending against, or knowingly accepting the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of [a] plea“].) These circumstances further support Padron did not subjectively understand the immigration consequences of his plea.
The People argue the prosecutor verbally advised Padron during the plea hearing of deportation if he was not a United States citizen. Indeed, section 1016.5 requires a plea colloquy to advise a defendant of immigration consequences.6 But it is also
The People also argue Padron did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel admitting he did not adequately advise Padron. They concede, however, that “[a] party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required to provide the declaration of plea counsel.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 325; see Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 909 [“requiring an admission from defense counsel . . . would impose a condition on obtaining relief under section 1473.7 that is not contained in the
C. Padron Established Prejudice
Based on our independent review of the record, we also conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Padron presented evidence demonstrating a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea deal had he known of its immigration consequences to his asylum status. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) First, Padron demonstrated significant ties to the United States. “Depending on the strength of a defendant‘s community ties, ‘the prospect of deportation’ may be ‘“an integral part“’ . . . of the defendant‘s ‘calculus in responding to certain criminal charges.’ [Citation.] Community ties may be established by length of residence; immigration status; lack of connection to the country of origin; connections to family, friends, or the community; work history or financial ties; or other forms of attachment.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
At the time of his plea in 2016, Padron had lived in the United States for 14 years. He pursued legal status, successfully obtaining asylum in 2012. He had no connection to Cuba, where he experienced persecution by government officials. Indeed, the record supports Padron would have highly prioritized avoiding deportation to his home country of Cuba. (Cf. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530 [prejudice established where defendant had “virtually no ties” to country of birth and was “treat[ed] . . . like an outsider” there]; Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 912 [same, when the last time defendant visited country of birth “he was assaulted due to his sexual orientation and never returned“].) This circumstance is independently corroborated by the immigration court granting Padron asylum. (See
Further, Padron‘s goal was to achieve permanent status as a resident alien and to sponsor his family, who eventually joined him in 2023. Padron‘s history of residence, his asylum status, his lack of connection to his country of origin, his progress toward his goal of legal status for his family, and his connections with his church community, support groups, and coworkers support that “his community ties were important to him at the time of his plea.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323 [citing defendant‘s decades-long residency, presence of family, participation in church and community organizations before and after plea]; accord, Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530-531 [considering defendant‘s post-plea conduct as evidence of his priority to preserve immigration status].) These connections were substantiated by declarations from Padron‘s coworkers and family members. (See Espinoza, at p. 321 [“Objective evidence of a defendant‘s community ties includes facts provided by a
To ascertain prejudicial error, we also consider “whether alternative, immigration-safe dispositions were available at the time of the defendant‘s plea. Factors relevant to this inquiry include the defendant‘s criminal record, the strength of the prosecution‘s case, the seriousness of the charges or whether the crimes involved sophistication, the district attorney‘s charging policies with respect to immigration consequences, and the existence of comparable offenses without immigration consequences.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323.)
The parties agree that at the time of his plea, Padron faced a maximum sentencing exposure of 10 years and two months. Padron concedes the evidence against him presented “a strong case.” Relying on the declaration of his immigration law specialist, Padron argues he could have pursued a plea deal on equivalent charges without or with lesser immigration consequences. (See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 324 [defendant‘s “expect[ation] or hope” of different plea supported by declaration of an immigration attorney describing alternative charges that would not lead to mandatory deportation].) He attested he would have pleaded to “a more serious charge” and accepted “more time” in prison to avoid immigration consequences.
The People do not respond to the declaration from Padron‘s immigration specialist. Instead, they argue the prosecution expressly stated it would not offer a plea deal with no immigration consequences, especially in light of Padron‘s two prior felony convictions in 2014 and 2015. (See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 324-325 [“lack of a criminal history” supported
Considering the totality of circumstances, we conclude Padron raised “more than an abstract possibility” he would have rejected his plea deal had he correctly understood the immigration consequences, particularly given his asylum status. (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 19; accord, Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 324.) Padron left his home country after persecution and obtained asylum in the United States after a decade of residency, strongly supporting that remaining in the United States was a high priority. (See Ogunmowo, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 78 [defendant established prejudicial error where he had resided in the U.S. almost 10 years, achieved permanent resident status, and declared he “‘would have opted to go to trial if [he] knew that [his] decision to plead guilty would mean automatic deportation and no chance at ever being a U.S.
Other evidence in the record reflects that, if he had understood the immigration consequences of his plea, there is a reasonable probability Padron would have sought lesser immigration consequences or even proceeded to trial. After meeting with his public defender just twice, Padron waived a preliminary hearing and pleaded no contest. (See Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 326 [reasonable probability of rejecting plea deal in hope of immigration-neutral plea where defendant “hardly negotiated” before pleading no contest and thus “never tested the prosecution‘s resolve“].) Although the prosecution stated it would not extend a plea offer “with no immigration consequences,” Padron may have reasonably hoped to secure a plea to a charge with lesser immigration consequences short of mandatory deportation, loss of asylum, and permanent ineligibility for citizenship. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 520, fn. 2 [aggravated felony conviction “‘trigger[s] the worst of all immigration consequences: mandatory deportation with a bar to almost all forms of immigration relief, and permanent ineligibility for U.S. citizenship‘“].) Given Padron‘s strong interest in preserving his asylum status, it is “equally and reasonably probable that . . . . faced with certain deportation” to a country where he was persecuted by government agents that Padron “would have insisted on pleading no contest to a different, more immigration-neutral charge (whether it was realistic to insist on such a deal or not) or gambled on a ‘Hail Mary’ trial.” (Rodriguez, at p. 324.)
The order denying Padron‘s section 1473.7 motion is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to grant the motion, vacate the conviction, and permit Padron to withdraw his plea and to enter a different plea.