People v. VivarPeople v. Vivar
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Cullar, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, Corrigan, Cantil-Sakauye
The population of the United States includes millions of immigrants who arrived as children, attended schools, and found work here. (See Dep‘t of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of California (2020) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [140 S.Ct. 1891, 1932] (conc. & dis. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.).) Whether they become citizens or not, these immigrants’ ties to our country are evident not only in their work and schooling, but in how they‘ve formed attachments and families of their own. In contrast, what ties they once had to their country of birth — from which they may lack even memories — often slip away. So when longstanding noncitizen residents of this country are accused of committing a crime, the most devastating consequence may not be a prison sentence, but their removal and exclusion from the United States. (See People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 563 (Martinez).) Because the prospect of deportation “is an integral part,” and often even “the most important part,” of a noncitizen defendant‘s calculus in responding to certain criminal charges (Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 364 (Padilla)), both the Legislature and the courts have sought to ensure these defendants receive clear and accurate advice about the impact of criminal convictions on their immigration status, along with effective remedies when such advice is deficient. (E.g.,
How these provisions apply to people like defendant Robert Landeros Vivar — who came to the United States at age six and lacked any meaningful ties to his country of birth — is the problem we address in this case. Vivar was arrested in 2002 for attempting to steal Sudafed from a grocery store. Although he‘d spent four decades living in this country as a lawful permanent
Unfortunately, as the Court of Appeal held and the Attorney General concedes, Vivar was never properly advised about the immigration consequences of his plea options. He didn‘t know, for example, that pleading guilty to violating
After Vivar made his way back into the United States by crossing the border without inspection, he sought expungement of his drug conviction. He succeeded and then tried to secure further relief by way of a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Neither had any effect on his immigration status, however. He was again deported in 2013.
In 2018, Vivar filed a motion to vacate his 2002 conviction under a recently enacted statute offering relief to those who had already served their sentences. (
I.
In 1962, when Vivar was six years old, he and his family immigrated as lawful permanent residents from Mexico to the United States. He now has two children and six grandchildren. All are American citizens and all reside here in California, along with Vivar‘s two siblings.
A.
Upon arrival, Vivar quickly adapted to life in the United States. Since early in his youth, his primary language has been English. In high school, he helped establish a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program and hoped to serve his country in Vietnam like his older brother, Martin, but the war ended a few months after he graduated. Vivar instead began working at an airline and was soon promoted to a management position that required him to work a night shift at the airport and a day shift in the office. Limited to only a few hours of sleep a night, he turned to amphetamines to stay awake.
Vivar first entered — and successfully completed — a residential drug treatment program in the late 1990s. Unfortunately, he relapsed in 2001. The conviction under review arose from his methamphetamine addiction. In February 2002, he was caught trying to steal 12 boxes of Sudafed from a grocery store in Corona. Vivar told the store‘s loss prevention officer — and later, the police — that he planned to provide the Sudafed to someone who would manufacture methamphetamine and, in turn, share some of the finished product with him. The Riverside County District Attorney charged Vivar with possessing methamphetamine precursors with the intent to manufacture the drug (
B.
The District Attorney offered Vivar several plea options. What happened next is in some dispute. Vivar recalls his attorney conveying an offer of an unspecified felony plea with a three-year sentence. He rejected that offer because of his mistaken belief — never corrected by his appointed attorney — that all felony convictions resulted in deportation and that the opposite was true for misdemeanors. (Cf. U.S. v. Graham (3d Cir. 1999) 169 F.3d 787, 792 [some misdemeanors can qualify as an aggravated felony under federal immigration law].) Based on this mistake, he asked counsel to secure a plea deal that could eventually be reduced to a misdemeanor. He also informed her he had a drug problem and wanted treatment, even if not required by the plea offer.
Following those discussions, counsel relayed an offer for Vivar to plead guilty to burglary (
Before entering his plea in March 2002, Vivar executed a form that required him to initial 17 separate paragraphs acknowledging that he understood the potential consequences of his plea. One paragraph stated, “If I am not a citizen of the United States, I understand that this conviction may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Another paragraph provided, “I have had an adequate time to discuss with my attorney (1) my constitutional rights, (2) the consequences of any guilty plea, and (3) any defenses I may have to the charges against me.”
Vivar‘s counsel declined to submit a declaration in connection with the hearing on the section 1473.7 motion. Her recollection was presented to the court instead through unsworn email correspondence and her handwritten notes. Counsel stated that while she didn‘t specifically remember Vivar‘s case, her “standard practice” at the time was to “advise non-citizen clients of the potential for immigration consequences” of their convictions and that she “routinely followed that practice.” After reviewing her notes from the plea negotiations, counsel indicated that she was “confident that Mr. Vivar was ‘fully advised’ of the consequences of the plea,” which under the circumstances of the case “would have included the standard advisement of possible deportation.” She also stated that she “believe[d]” she “specifically cautioned” Vivar “that, in spite of his experience” in a prior criminal proceeding, residential treatment “would NOT determine whether or not he would be deported on the new offense,” and that if Vivar had any questions “he should consult an immigration attorney for clarification.” What she did not advise him was whether his understanding of felonies, misdemeanors, and immigration law was correct. Nor did she advise him as to the actual immigration consequences of a plea to the drug charge or any other plea.
C.
A few days after being sentenced, Vivar was informed that he couldn‘t be admitted to the recommended drug treatment program ” ‘due to an “immigration hold.” ’ ” (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.) As he would‘ve known had he been properly advised, his conviction activated a tripwire in immigration law — it qualified as a controlled substance offense as well as an aggravated felony. (See
Determined to rejoin and support his family — and unable to find work in Mexico — Vivar reentered the United States, without inspection, in May 2003. In 2008, he successfully obtained an order to expunge his conviction under Penal Code
Vivar filed a motion in January 2018 to vacate his conviction under
The Court of Appeal affirmed, but on different grounds. Contrary to the trial court, the Court of Appeal determined that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) At a minimum, the court reasoned, Vivar had asked “a specific question about deportation” (ibid.), a question that “required an attorney to research and apprise their client of the immigration consequences of a plea” (id. at p. 227). To warn merely ” ‘that his plea might have immigration consequences,’ ” in circumstances where the consequences were “certain,” was “constitutionally deficient.” (Id. at p. 228.) What barred relief here, in the Court of Appeal‘s view, was Vivar‘s failure to demonstrate prejudice — in this context, a reasonable probability that he wouldn‘t have entered the same plea if he had been properly advised. (Id. at p. 229.) The court reasoned that Vivar‘s main priority seemed to be drug treatment, not immigration consequences, and asserted that this was corroborated by counsel‘s contemporaneous notes, by Vivar‘s rejection of the immigration-neutral burglary plea, and by the trial court‘s finding that Vivar was ” ‘was more willing to rely on his experiences than he was on his counsel‘s advice.’ ” (Id. at p. 230.) Despite the decades Vivar spent in this country, his family members’ American citizenship, and his prompt objection to the federal immigration hold, the Court of Appeal insisted there was “no contemporaneous evidence in the record” to corroborate Vivar‘s claim that he would‘ve preferred an immigration-neutral disposition. (Ibid.)
We granted Vivar‘s petition to review two rulings made by the Court of Appeal: first, its conclusion that he suffered no prejudice within the meaning of
II.
It took less than a month for Vivar to realize the dire ramifications of his mistaken embrace of a felony drug possession plea. What ensued in the 18 years that followed underscores how much Vivar consistently valued his presence on American soil, and how likely it is that — properly advised — he would have prioritized a resolution of his case allowing him to stay in the country. Mere weeks after entering his plea, when he learned that he was subject to an immigration hold and thus ineligible for a residential drug treatment program, he sent the sentencing judge a handwritten letter “to seek the court‘s mercy.” Vivar informed the court that he was “a legal resident and ha[s] been for the past 40 years“; that his mother and wife were American citizens; that his children and grandchildren, all born in Riverside County, were likewise citizens; and that his oldest child and only son was in the United States military awaiting deployment to the Middle East. He “fully accept[ed]” responsibility for his actions but “would like to change my life for good and become a productive member of society.” Two months later, after he was transferred to a federal immigration facility, he reiterated his willingness “to do whatever it takes to once again be an asset to my community and not a liability” and asked the court to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor. (See
A few months later, in October 2002, Vivar asked that his case “be Re-opened” on due process grounds. The legal advice he received at the time of his plea never conveyed, Vivar insisted, that he was accepting responsibility for “an Aggravated Felony for Immigration purposes and thus would warrant Immediate Deportation.” Had he been so advised, he “would have never plead[ed] Guilty to this Charge.” He was deported a few months later.
In 2008, Vivar successfully moved to expunge his conviction through another pro se filing. Only later did he learn that expungement hadn‘t erased or even mitigated the immigration consequences of his plea. (See Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 560.) In 2012, a lawyer advised Vivar he could obtain relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel by filing a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Vivar hired the lawyer to file such a petition. Yet this filing, too, proved fruitless: This court had already held, in 2009, that a defendant‘s ignorance of a plea‘s immigration consequences — or counsel‘s failure to negotiate a different plea — constituted a mistake of law and thus did not qualify as a ground for relief on coram nobis. (People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1102–1104 (Kim).) In a companion case, we also held that persons in federal immigration custody after completing their state sentences, as well as any probation or parole period, are no longer in state custody. (People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063.) So their state convictions are beyond the reach of habeas corpus.
But they are not beyond the reach of remedies recently enacted by the Legislature. As Vivar was running out of options, lawmakers considered the problem faced by Vivar and so many others who were unaware of the immigration consequences posed by a plea entered many years earlier. (See Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1107 [“the Legislature has been active in providing statutory remedies when the existing remedies . . . have proven ineffective“; “the Legislature remains free to enact further statutory remedies for those in defendant‘s position“].) They did so by enacting section 1473.7, which “create[d] an explicit right for a person no longer imprisoned or restrained.” (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 813 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.).) Under this new provision, a court “shall” vacate a conviction or sentence upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, of “prejudicial error damaging the moving party‘s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” (
The Court of Appeal determined that trial counsel failed to advise Vivar of “the certain immigration consequences of his plea.” (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) This rendered counsel‘s representation “constitutionally deficient.” (Ibid.) Because no party challenged this finding — and the question of counsel‘s deficient performance falls outside the issues presented for review — we accept it as true for purposes of this proceeding. We review only the Court of Appeal‘s finding that Vivar suffered no prejudice on account of counsel‘s error. In examining that finding, we consider first what is the applicable standard of review. Then we apply that standard to the record here. Reviewing the record independently, we conclude Vivar was prejudiced within the meaning of
A.
When a trial court grants or denies a motion to vacate a conviction under section 1473.7, the parties can appeal. (
The Attorney General reversed course in the proceedings before us. He no longer advocates the abuse of discretion standard — even in the context of mere statutory error. Instead, he urges us to apply the independent standard of review to all prejudice determinations under
Our case law has applied the independent review standard — which accords substantial weight to the trial court‘s credibility findings — in analogous circumstances. Whether counsel‘s advice regarding immigration was inadequate and whether such inadequacy prejudiced the defense, while mixed questions, are predominantly questions of law. (See In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 248–249 (Resendiz) (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.).)3 Accordingly, we review such rulings independently (Resendiz, at p. 248), and rightly so, given the profound and substantial consequences of a prejudicial misadvisement on a defendant‘s life. (Cf. People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1265 (Ault) [“the proper review standard is influenced in part by the importance of the legal rights or interests at stake“]; id. at p. 1266 [“another important
is the consequences of an erroneous determination in the particular case“].)
Nothing in
When the Legislature amended section 1473.7 in 2018, nowhere did it “signal an intent to supersede” the standard of review the Court of Appeal had already articulated (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57; see, e.g., Ogunmowo, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 75–76), nor did it propose that appellate courts adopt a more deferential standard of review. To the contrary: the Legislature explicitly stated its intended purpose was to make relief more broadly available to deserving defendants, given the critical interests at stake. (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2867 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 5, 2018, pp. 2, 4 [this bill helps achieve the original goal of “creating a process for individuals to erase the catastrophic consequences . . . that can attach to even very old criminal convictions” by “clearing up minor discrepancies that have arisen since implementation“].) The 2018 amendment expanded the category of defendants who could obtain relief by eliminating any requirement that the defendant establish ineffective assistance of counsel. An uncodified section of the 2018 amendment declared that the expanded language in subdivision (a)(1) provided ”clarification to the courts regarding Section 1473.7 of the Penal Code to ensure uniformity throughout the state and efficiency in the statute‘s implementation.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 825, § 1, subd. (b), italics added.) Moreover, the Legislature instructed courts to interpret section 1473.7 “consistent with the findings and declarations made in section 1016.2 of the Penal Code” (Stats. 2018, ch. 825, § 1, subd. (c)) —
The Court of Appeal posited that a different standard should apply when the moving party relies on a mistake of law under
Our embrace of the independent standard of review also fits with how section 1473.7 motions generally arise. Only
defendants who have already completed their sentences may even seek relief under section 1473.7. So these motions — as the separate opinion acknowledges — are ordinarily brought many years after the plea. (Compare
So our embrace of independent review in this context is a product of multiple factors with special relevance here: the history of section 1473.7, the interests at stake in a section 1473.7 motion, the type of evidence on which a section 1473.7 ruling is likely to be based, and the relative competence of trial courts and appellate courts to assess that evidence. (See Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1260–1261, 1265–1266.) The fact that
the motion is reviewed by way of appeal does not necessarily dictate a particular standard of review. (See id. at pp. 1266–1267.)
“[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634.) When courts engage in independent review, they should be mindful that ” ‘[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de novo review . . . .’ ” (People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1021.) An appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court‘s own observations. (See In re Ernesto H. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 298, 306; cf. George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 634 [under a de novo standard, ” ‘a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence’ “].) In reviewing the constitutional claim raised in Resendiz, we explained that factual determinations that are based on ” ‘the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed’ ” are entitled to particular deference, even though courts reviewing such claims generally may ” ‘reach a different conclusion [from the trial court] on an independent examination of the evidence . . . even where the evidence is conflicting.’ ” (Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 249 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.).)6 In section 1473.7 proceedings, appellate courts
should similarly give particular deference to factual findings
B.
The Legislature made relief available only to certain immigrants who accepted pleas without understanding the immigration-related consequences of such decisions. What someone seeking to withdraw a plea under
In People v. Superior Court (Zamudio), supra, 23 Cal.4th 183, we considered what constituted prejudice when a trial court failed to advise a defendant of the plea‘s potential immigration consequences as required by
We embraced a similar approach when deciding whether a lawyer‘s deficient advisement on immigration consequences amounts to prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant in those circumstances must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s incompetence, the defendant ” ‘would not have pled guilty.’ ” (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 901 (Patterson), quoting Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 253 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.).) The United States Supreme Court, too, undertakes a similar analysis. In Lee, supra, ___ U.S. at page ___ [137 S.Ct. at page 1967], the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry turned on whether the defendant had “adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had he known that it would lead to mandatory deportation.”
So: showing prejudicial error under
The Court of Appeal found it “not reasonably probable that [Vivar] would have rejected the plea but for his counsel‘s failure to properly advise him.” (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.) Two premises supported its conclusion: (1) that “no contemporaneous evidence” corroborated Vivar‘s claim that he wouldn‘t have entered the plea had he known the plea would lead to his deportation (id. at p. 230), and (2) that Vivar “prioritized drug treatment over potential immigration-neutral pleas.” (Id. at p. 229.) Neither premise, though, withstands scrutiny. What we find, reviewing the record independently, is that Vivar was prejudiced.
1
In a declaration submitted with his
Also revealing is the objective evidence of Vivar‘s state of mind reflected in uncounseled letters he wrote to the court at or near the time of his plea. In
The Court of Appeal neglected to explain why these facts at or near the time of Vivar‘s plea failed to provide adequate corroboration that he wouldn‘t have pleaded guilty had he known it would result in his deportation. Indeed, the court‘s analysis failed to mention these facts at all. This was error. In our view, these objective and contemporaneous facts corroborate, in a most convincing way, the statement in Vivar‘s declaration that he ”would never have pleaded guilty” if his attorney had informed him of the plea‘s consequences. (See Camacho, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1011–1012 [finding prejudice where the defendant was brought to the United States as a child, had lived here for over 30 years, and his spouse and children were citizens]; accord, Lee, supra, ___ U.S at p. ___ [137 S.Ct. at p. 1968] [finding prejudice where the defendant was brought to the United States as a child, had lived here for nearly 30 years, and his parents were citizens].)
2
What the record also shows — and neither the Court of Appeal nor the Attorney General disputes — is that Vivar could have entered a plea avoiding mandatory deportation. Trial counsel‘s contemporaneous notes indicate the prosecution offered a deal under which Vivar would plead guilty to a single count of burglary (
The Court of Appeal‘s inference fails to persuade. Vivar‘s rejection of a potentially deportation-neutral plea can hardly serve as evidence that he didn‘t care about immigration consequences when it is undisputed that Vivar was not properly advised — and thus was ignorant — of the immigration consequences attached to his various plea options. So the fact that he unknowingly rejected an immigration-neutral option cannot, in itself, demonstrate that “immigration consequences were not defendant‘s primary consideration.” (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 229–230.)
Even less supports the Court of Appeal‘s contention that Vivar “prioritized drug treatment over potential immigration-neutral pleas.” (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.) Indeed, it doesn‘t make sense to say that Vivar would‘ve chosen a plea that triggered mandatory deportation just so he could participate in drug treatment when that plea rendered him ineligible for the program.
According to his declaration, Vivar told counsel that he was interested in a drug treatment program even if it was not required by the terms of his plea — and counsel‘s notes corroborate his interest in such a program. Vivar, then, did not perceive a conflict or tradeoff between the goal of drug treatment and the goal of a deportation-neutral disposition. What stands out most clearly from the record is that he was never properly advised of the role his immigration status would play either in assessing the attractiveness of his plea options or in his eligibility for a drug treatment program. In fact, the record shows he was upset to learn, just a few days after his plea, that he was ineligible for the recommended treatment program precisely because of the plea‘s impact on his immigration status. And it was scarcely a month after his plea, having heard no response from his lawyer, that he wrote a letter to the court seeking its help. Had he been properly advised, it‘s reasonably probable Vivar would‘ve sought a disposition — like the burglary plea — where he could remain in this country and undergo drug treatment. The Court of Appeal failed to explain why Vivar, if properly advised, would‘ve viewed these goals as incompatible — or why, if properly advised, he would‘ve insisted on a strategy that prevented him from achieving either of his goals.
Finally, we conclude that the advisements in Vivar‘s plea form did not mitigate the prejudice from counsel‘s deficient immigration advice. What the plea form stated was that deportation was a possibility. (Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) The problem for Vivar, though, was that deportation in these circumstances was mandatory — and when he accepted the plea deal, he remained unaware of that crucial fact. (See Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 896, 898.) In light of Vivar‘s extensive ties to the United States, the generic advisements in the plea form do not undermine our conclusion that he was prejudiced by counsel‘s failure to inform him that his plea would result in his deportation. (See In re Hernandez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 530, 547–548; People v. Espinoza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 908, 916–917; Ogunmowo, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 80–81.)
III.
Defendants who lack United States citizenship sometimes face not only penal sanctions but also harsh immigration consequences if convicted. Because of this, pleas accepted in the shadow of deficient advice about the risks of deportation can have “dire” repercussions. (People v. Superior Court (Giron), supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 798.)
The Court of Appeal failed to review the record independently. Nor did it take into account the substantial contemporaneous evidence at or near the time of Vivar‘s plea corroborating his claim that he wouldn‘t have pleaded guilty if he‘d known it would result in his deportation from his home of 40 years. We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeal with directions that it remand the case to the trial court for it to enter an order granting Vivar‘s
CUÉLLAR, J.
We Concur:
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Corrigan
I concur in the disposition and fully agree that defendant Robert Landeros Vivar should be allowed to withdraw his plea under
However, I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s holding that a form of “independent review” typically applied in habeas corpus proceedings should be applied in assessing a trial court‘s prejudice finding under
This court granted review to resolve a conflict over the standard of review governing prejudice findings under the statute and to clarify what constitutes prejudice under
The Court of Appeal created a hybrid standard turning on the asserted basis for relief. According to the appellate court, if the
In my view, the majority opinion correctly rejects the bifurcated approach adopted by the Court of Appeal. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 16–17.) Such an approach would afford undue significance to a distinction the Legislature sought to erase. It extended relief to all defendants when legal error prevented meaningful understanding of immigration consequences, regardless of whether the error constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at p. 16; see
However, I part ways with the majority conclusion that the trial court‘s prejudice finding under
The standard of review described in the majority opinion is not completely unheard of, but its extension to review of statutory claims may well be.3 The standard articulated by the majority derives primarily from the lead opinion in In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 249 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.) (Resendiz).4 (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 14,
The review of factual findings in habeas corpus matters arises from the procedural posture of those cases. Constitutionally, the courts of review are granted original jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus claims. (
When an appellate court exercises original jurisdiction in a habeas matter, it makes sense to give limited deference to the referee‘s recommended findings. In keeping with its original jurisdiction, the reviewing court is the ultimate fact finder. The same review principles apply to a successive writ situation in which a petitioner files a new habeas corpus petition in the appellate court when the superior court has denied habeas corpus relief after an evidentiary hearing. (In re Wright (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 788, 801.) In such a case, the appellate court again exercises original jurisdiction.
The situation is different, however, when the matter comes to the appellate court as an appeal. When the superior court grants habeas corpus relief and
An appeal from a ruling under
“[A]ppellate court deference to the trial court‘s resolution of fact issues is warranted by jurisdictional considerations and a recognition of the distinctive roles of trial and appellate courts: Trial courts decide questions of fact and appellate courts decide questions of law.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 8:42, p. 8-21.) Whether substantial evidence supports a judgment or ruling is a question of law reposing with the appellate court. (Ibid.) Further, as a general matter, because of the jurisdictional roles of the trial and appellate courts, deference to trial court credibility determinations is the same for both written declarations and oral testimony. (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 & fn. 3; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479; Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159.)
The argument that the reviewing court is ” ‘in the same position’ ” as the trial court in assessing documentary evidence is inaccurate. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 20, quoting People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 79.) A reviewing court exercising appellate jurisdiction is not
In its adoption of independent review like that described in Resendiz, the majority opinion cites a number of factors, including the “history of
The standard described in People v. Olvera and applied in People v. Tapia is not the standard advocated by the majority. The majority approach does not involve substantial evidence review of factual findings, even as applied to
is free to reach its own conclusions even when the evidence is conflicting and ” ‘great weight’ ” is afforded to certain findings. (Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 249 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.).) Simply put, it is incorrect to say the independent review standard adopted by the majority was the “prevailing” one.
As further support for dispensing with deferential review of factual findings, the majority cites “the interests at stake in a
The majority opinion asserts that ” ’ “[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de novo review. . . .” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 19, quoting People v. Jackson, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1021.) Yet it does little to explain how, in practice, the standards will differ as applied to
As the majority opinion notes, in this case the trial court did not even consider whether Mr. Vivar suffered prejudice, instead basing its ruling on the finding that his counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 8.)
The prejudice question turns on whether Mr. Vivar would not have entered the plea had he been properly informed and advised. This is a credibility question. The trial court found his credibility wanting because, it determined, he ” ‘was more willing to rely on his experiences than he was on his counsel‘s advice.’ ” (People v. Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 230.) The appellate court concluded, “This was a factual inference the trial court was entitled to draw. . . .” (Ibid.) Perhaps, but appellate review of that inference is not meaningless. The Court of Appeal was required to examine whether the inference found substantial support in the record. It does not. There was no evidence that counsel ever gave Mr. Vivar advice regarding immigration. Indeed, there is no evidence counsel understood the potential consequences herself or that she had made it her “business to discover what impact his negotiated sentence would have on his deportability.” (People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1480.) The public defender did not claim she gave him any substantive information at all about immigration consequences. Indeed, she made no assertion as to any advice she provided Mr. Vivar. She said that she customarily told her noncitizen clients about ” ‘possible’ ” immigration consequences. (People v. Vivar, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) But here, the unrebutted evidence was that she never asked Mr. Vivar about his immigration status. (Ibid.) Even if she had told him that he “might” get deported and, if he had further questions he should consult an immigration attorney, essentially that was no advice at all. (See id. at pp. 222–223.) This evidence, together with the record as whole, does not support an inference that Mr. Vivar would have ignored his counsel‘s advice on the immigration consequences of his plea. He received no such advice, and if he had, the proper inference to be drawn from his concern about deportation is that he would have accepted it or at least given it a fair degree of consideration. He was forced to rely on his own experiences only because counsel gave him no alternative. Because the record does not support the trial court‘s factual conclusions, a conventional substantial evidence review suffices here.
CORRIGAN, J.
I Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Vivar
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 43 Cal.App.5th 216
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S260270
Date Filed: May 3, 2021
Court: Superior
County: Riverside
Judge: Bambi J. Moyer
Counsel:
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Joseph D. Lee, William Larsen and Dane P. Shikman for Defendant and Appellant.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Kahn A. Scolnick, Daniel R. Adler and Jason S. Kim for Alyssa Bell, Reuven Cohen, Ingrid V. Eagly, Gilbert Garcetti, Meline Mkrtichian, Ronald J. Nessim, Gabriel Pardo, Jennifer Resnik and David J. Sutton as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Jennifer L. Pasquarella, Eva L. Bitran; Vasudha Talla; and David Loy for ACLU Foundation of Southern California, ACLU Foundation of Northern California and ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
O‘Melveny & Myers and Catalina J. Vergara for The Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Public Counsel, University of California Irvine Law Immigrant Rights Clinic, University of California Irvine Law Criminal Justice Clinic, East Bay Community Law Center, Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto and University of California Davis Immigrant Rights Clinic as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor General, Lance E. Winters and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Samuel P. Siegel, Deputy State Solicitor General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Dane Shikman
31 Mullen Ave.
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 512-4092
Samuel P. Siegel
Deputy State Solicitor General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 210-6269